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Abstract 
 
This research project investigates whether the empowerment of Israel’s population — and 
in particular those who suffer multiple disadvantages — is achievable through housing 
policies and whether successive Israeli administrations have helped or hindered this 
process. The research focuses on communities in publicly-subsidised areas during social 
housing programmes. The housing programmes analysed in this research were: 
 The Demolish and Rebuild Programme, which represents a top-down process, 
implemented with little residents’ involvement.  
 Neighbourhood Renewal, which was a programme that formally offered partnership, 
giving residents partial share in decision-making.  
 Finally, Right to Buy represented a resident-led partnership, in which residents felt 
empowered to overcome their own disadvantaged conditions by taking a leading role in 
transforming housing policy.  
 The database complementing this research was compiled, in part, from 91 in-depth 
interviews with residents, policy makers and officials representing these three 
programmes. It is a unique aspect of this research, as it draws on perspectives about 
participation from those who have not necessarily had an opportunity to express an opinion 
before, and communicates a variety of views regarding the projects and residents’ 
participation in them. This study focuses on how it actually affects people and can even 
create behavioural change among those who are normally considered dependent. 
 Another exceptional and distinctive factor provided by this research is its analysis of 
empowerment in the social and political context of Israel. By analysing the Israeli case, 
this research will contribute both to international knowledge and academic scholarship, 
highlight the conditions of an individual state and generate an original and provocative 
narrative. The issue of participation and empowerment in a society so riven with political, 
social, religious and ethnic tensions is particularly important. Learning from the Israeli 
experience has the potential to promote understanding of empowerment under pressure. 
Empowerment related to social housing policy is distinctive in Israel because housing is 
synonymous with security. Housing is more than a cultural issue, since in Israel owning a 
property is a matter of security. Another key feature is the focal role of central government 
which determines almost every aspect in the shaping of social and housing policy. Also 
critical is the influence of national politics on local decision-making. In Israel the political 
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agenda is based upon bilateralism and the demographic dispersal of population across the 
state’s formal and informal borders.  
 Empowerment is a complex term. This research, however, explores examined and 
evidenced empowerment using just two main features: examination of residents’ 
participation; and evaluation of public policy towards resident participation. This research 
offers a unique view on empowerment within social housing policies that are subject to 
multiple pressures, and offers interpretations that could be usefully applied to issues of 
empowerment in other pressure scenarios.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Overview 
This research project investigates whether the empowerment of Israel’s population — and 
in particular those  who suffer multiple disadvantages — is achievable through housing 
policies and whether successive Israeli administrations have helped or hindered this 
process. The research attempts to answer the following questions: does the empowerment 
of disadvantaged populations matter to the delivery of social and housing policies; is 
empowerment of the disadvantaged population achievable; through what mechanisms it is 
achievable; what are the costs and benefits of that empowerment; and to what extent has it 
been achieved under different housing policies? 
 The research focuses on communities in publicly subsidised areas during social 
housing programmes. The housing programmes analysed in this research were established 
in the context of both domestic social and ethnic conflicts and land pressures brought about 
by high immigration which resulted in neglected and impoverished neighbourhoods. All 
fall under Israel’s highly politicised social and housing policy. Three were three main 
social housing programmes, each one has been analysed, each representing a different 
housing strategy and a different approach to social policy. Consequently, their impact upon 
empowerment varies.  
 The first programme is Demolish and Rebuild (aka D&R, 1960 to date), in which old 
units were demolished and replaced by new, improved units, built using the sale of 
valuable land and through the exploitation of infrastructure in central towns.  
 The second programme is Neighbourhood Renewal (NRP, 1979 to date), which set 
out to improve housing conditions and social services in pre-existing poor neighbourhoods.  
 Thirdly, this research analyses the Right to Buy (RTB) legislation (1999–2004), 
initiated by residents of publicly subsidised housing, which aims to enable them to buy 
their units at discounted rates. 
  Although all these programmes targeted disadvantaged populations, they each 
represent a different strategy. Demolish and Rebuild represents a top-down process — a 
programme implemented with little residents’ involvement. Neighbourhood Renewal was 
a programme that formally offered partnership, giving residents partial share in decision-
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making. Finally, Right to Buy represents a resident-led partnership, in which residents felt 
empowered to overcome their own disadvantaged conditions by taking a leading role in 
transforming housing-policy.  
 The database complementing this research was compiled, in part, from more than 
100 in-depth interviews with residents, policy makers and officials (out of which 91 were 
chosen to be quoted in this document) representing these three programmes. It is a unique 
aspect of this research, as it draws on perspectives about participation from those who have 
not necessarily had an opportunity to express an opinion before, and communicates a 
variety of views regarding the projects and residents’ participation in them. While many 
researchers have thoroughly investigated housing in Israel from planning, construction and 
architecture, this study focuses on a critical aspect of housing policy: how housing policy 
actually affects people and can even create behavioural change among those who are 
normally considered dependent, and whether housing policy enables individuals to become 
empowered. 
 Another exceptional and distinctive factor provided by this research is its analysis of 
empowerment in the social and political context of Israel. By analysing the Israeli case, 
this research will contribute both to international knowledge and academic scholarship, 
highlight the conditions of an individual state and generate an original and provocative 
narrative. The issue of participation and empowerment in a society so riven with political, 
social, religious and ethnic tensions is particularly important. Of course certain conflicts 
and problems are not unique to Israel, such as shortages of land and resources; 
affordability; ethnic conflicts; religious conflicts; and a lack of community initiatives; 
national and bilateral pressures and internal financial, social and sectarian pressures. 
Chapter two offers more insights on multi-conflict societies.  
 Learning from the Israeli experience, however, has the potential to promote 
understanding on empowerment under pressure elsewhere. Empowerment related to social 
housing policy is distinctive in Israel because housing is synonymous with security. It is 
more than a cultural issue, since in Israel owning a property is a matter of security. Home 
ownership is an aspiration for all residents regardless of economic status or class and thus 
the percentage of home ownership in Israel is higher compared with, for example, Europe. 
Another key feature is the focal role of central government which determines almost every 
aspect in the shaping of social and housing policy. Those not familiar with Israel would 
expect local government to have the key role in shaping housing programmes, but in Israel 
this is not the case. In discussing Israeli housing policy, any mention of an official 
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institution refers directly to central government or to one of its agencies. Also critical is the 
influence of national politics on local decision-making. Whereas in almost any Western 
European country the political agenda is split between left and right and is reflective of 
divided opinion on social and economic issues, in Israel the political agenda is based upon 
bilateralism and the demographic dispersal of population across the state’s formal and 
informal borders. The left wing in Israel, for example, supports negotiation with the 
Palestinians and softer land demands, whereas the right wing presents a firmer stand. At 
the same time anyone who is unaware of the nuances of Israeli politics might expect the 
social agenda to have a focal role in political debate; in fact it has less importance on the 
national political agenda.     
 Empowerment is a complex term. This research, however, explores examined and 
evidenced empowerment using just two main features:  
 
 Residents’ participation measured by the ‘ladder of participation’.  
 
 The official strategy that determined public policy or the extent to which central 
government allowed residents to join in the decision-making process, and provision 
of services and support in the empowerment process throughout social and housing 
programmes.  
 
 
Examination of residents’ participation will attempt to determine the extent to which 
residents took part in these programmes, the nature of their contribution, their influence on 
decision-making and outcomes. In order to measure the features or aspects that shaped 
participation, the following frameworks were used: 
 Evaluation of public policy based on residents’ experience and its assessment on a 
positive-negative scale, as well as analysis of programmes, supporting funds and 
programme maintenance provided to them by official institutions. 
 One aspect consistently referred to by interviewees was the ways in which other 
neighbourhoods and communities compared in terms of the facilitation and support of 
empowerment in housing programmes. Publically funded housing schemes were 
implemented in the New Settlements and in the Kibbutzim (with each community heavily 
supported by one of Israel’s political streams). The way in which empowerment had been 
executed in these schemes had a noticeable impact on residents’ interpretation of 
empowerment, community cohesion and influence on decision-making.  
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 To conclude, this research offers a unique view on empowerment within social 
housing policies that are subject to multiple pressures, and offers interpretations that could 
be usefully applied to issues of empowerment in other pressure scenarios. 
 
1.2 Israel as a Unique Case 
Perhaps the most interesting addition to knowledge that this research can offer relate to the 
investigation of a unique case such Israel.  There are four key areas which define Israel as 
unique in terms of the structure of government, political organisation, security and 
population: 
 
1.2.1 Dominance of Central Government  
Israel is unusual in that local government is weak. Power is centralised in national 
government and very little responsibility is delegated to local government, which is 
expected merely to provide local services. It is important, therefore, to remember that local 
government has no real influence in policy making or implementation. There is a simple 
reason for this: Israel is a very small country. London has a greater population that the 
entirety of the Israeli State, and the Israeli government believes it is able to cope with the 
needs of its citizens and to control the delivery of policy without the assistance of local 
authorities. This type of centralised control brings with it centralised power, essentially 
rendering local government almost redundant. Housing is a particular issue that the 
government is keen to control, so much so that when agreements are made to hand over the 
management of services, it prefers to work with the private sector than to delegate control 
to local authorities. 
 
1.2.2 The Political System 
The political system in Israel is also centralised. All members of parliament are elected 
centrally and there is no regional representation for a vote, no spatial constituency.. 
Consequently, there is less parliamentary power in the regions which in turn increases the 
power and influence of single-issue political groups (such as the settlers or the Kibbutzim). 
Because power is centralised, there are fewer independent professionals in the civil service 
and more who are in the direct service of the current regime. This means that single-issue 
parties are able to access parliamentarians directly. A case where a minister will favour 
their own constituency and nominate a local team to run his ministry would be almost 
unacceptable in a European situation, for example, and yet it is highly possible within 
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Israel’s current political system. Indeed, one of the dominant issues of the 2013 election 
campaign was the claim that the Housing Minister was serving only his own electorate and 
not the public at large.  
 In Israel, all policy is generated by central government. Since there are no regional 
representatives, local authorities have no say in budget planning or policy making, 
population dispersal, and support of border communities or specific ethnic or religious 
groups, beyond the national agenda. In terms of housing policy, programmes that were 
meant for the poorest neighbourhoods were also implemented in the more affluent New 
Settlements and Kibbutzim, indicating the extent to which central government ministers 
have the freedom to tailor a policy to serve a unique agenda. 
 
1.2.3 Dominance of Security Issues on the Political Agenda 
Security is a dominant, preoccupying issue for Israel. It is a country under constant threat 
of war from across any of its borders, to a point where even the two neighbours with whom 
Israel has signed peace agreements are seen as potential threats. In Israel, the Ministry of 
Defence is the second most important branch of government after the Prime Minister’s 
office and has the largest direct budget. It is crucial, therefore, to bear in mind that most 
policy decisions are made according to matters of security above all else. That 
considerable support is given to communities near Israel’s borders, no matter what their 
social status, or that population dispersal is guided by security requirements rather than the 
needs of citizens, are examples of how policy is prioritised in this way. 
 
1.2.4 Ethnicity 
Ethnicity also has a unique context in Israel. It is not of course unique to Israel as there are 
many countries that are challenged by multiculturalism and issues with immigration, its 
impact on social services and open borders. Israel is no different, but to all these 
complexities must be added the hegemony of one religion and its influence on minorities. 
Israel was founded as the home of the Jewish people, therefore anyone who is not Jewish is 
“likely to feel discriminated against, or ‘less equal’, at some point during their life”.  
 Although it is not an official policy, non-Jewish minorities are also more likely to be 
found amongst the poorest of the nation and to have less access to services. There are also 
ethnic complexities within the Jewish population itself. Israel’s aim is to be a home for 
Jews from all over the world and thus it has become a melting-pot for Jews not simply 
from a variety of nations but also of cultures. The majority of Jews who emigrated to Israel 
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before its establishment were motivated by a strong Zionist ideology to build a state for the 
Jewish people that would unite whole groups, yet some of the immigrants who arrived 
after the establishment of the State had no such motivation, as they were predominantly 
refugees fleeing social, political or religious persecution, or else were simply economic 
migrants. Compounding the harsh conditions that immigrants were met with upon arrival, 
especially in terms of housing, newcomers, particularly from Africa during the 1960s and 
the former USSR and Ethiopia in the 1990s, suffered from cultural shock and found 
themselves embroiled in conflicts with the old settlers, making it harder for them to 
successfully integrate into their neighbourhood communities. 
 
There is extensive analysis in chapter two of non-Israeli examples, yet we believe it is still 
interesting to test how the unique socio-political and cultural reality of Israel under multi-
conflicts is factored in when it comes to the analysis of the responses from interviews. We 
will also ask whether a similar exercise in a similar context can lead to the same results.     
 
1.3 Summary of Chapters 
1.3.1 Chapter two focuses on theories of empowerment and reviews the extant literature on 
empowerment. It discusses the following terms: communities, disadvantaged population, 
housing policy (government action that focuses on housing) and social policy, regeneration 
(including all kinds of social interventions and programmes), resident participation, 
housing organisations, training and education schemes and local social services. This 
chapter sets out the main elements used in this research to assess empowerment: residents’ 
participation and the official strategy towards this participation. For the purpose of this 
study of empowerment in Israel, the term empowerment has two dimensions: community 
empowerment and individual empowerment. The latter refers to how an individual is able 
to improve their situation through involvement in a process; the former refers to 
individuals’ ability to group together in order to take control of conditions and services 
within their local community, which at a developed stage can also help them to impact 
decision-making at a national level as well. The interpretation of the literature on 
empowerment in this research assumes that it encourages people to engage and set 
themselves inspirational goals, and to achieve greater success in urban regeneration while 
improving deprived areas. This research therefore aims to test whether housing policy in 
Israel has attempted to empower residents and to what degree empowerment has been 
achieved in the programmes investigated. 
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1.3.2 Chapter three provides a history of Israeli housing policy. It summarizes the 
evolution of the housing system in Israel, with special emphasis on social housing policy. 
The achievements of Israel’s housing policy are noteworthy, considering both the poor 
housing conditions when the state was established in 1948 and the fivefold increase in its 
population over the past fifty years.  
 The history of housing policies in Israel highlights two major aims that coincided 
with national interests in the early years: immigration absorption and population dispersal. 
Those goals, dominant during the State’s infancy, led to a high volume of housing 
construction. Following this, a further imperative was added to the original two: the 
provision of satisfactory housing to every household. A chronological assessment of the 
history of housing policy in Israel reveals that the market has shifted from being centrally 
planned in its early years (1948–1977) to the current market-oriented approach. This 
impacted upon official strategy and consequently influences empowerment. Over the past 
decade, housing solutions became the terrain of private investors as part of a policy of 
market liberalisation. This resulted in higher-quality housing, but only for those who could 
afford it. Hence, there was deterioration in the quality of publically funded housing 
solutions which affected the poor, despite the more general achievements noted above. 
This chapter outlines the process by which policy was modified to support demand instead 
of supply, how the publically funded housing system reshaped itself to meet the new 
challenges, and includes a discussion of the development of council housing companies, 
the structures that were created, tenure rights and the provision of services to different 
communities.  
 
1.3.3 Chapter four outlines the research methods. The two main tools of this research were 
case studies and in-depth interviews. This chapter begins with a description of the case 
studies and their relevance to this research, followed by a description of the main method 
the in-depth interviews, with over 100 participants in the investigated programmes. The 
investigated programmes are Demolish and Rebuild (D&R), the Neighbourhood Renewal 
Programme (NRP) and the Right to Buy (RTB). The projects under these programmes 
operated across the country, in main cities and in the periphery; in large and small 
neighbourhoods; old and relatively newer neighbourhoods; neighbourhoods highly 
populated with Jews and with others; religious and non-religious neighbourhoods; 
neighbourhoods populated with new immigrants and with veterans; cities, towns, villages, 
kibbutzim and the New Settlements — essentially every type of housing scheme in Israel. 
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The case studies were selected to represent all housing types and all population groups to 
provide a comprehensive perspective on empowerment in social and housing policies in 
Israel. Participants were arranged into two groups — residents and non-residents — and 
broken down further into residents who had high or low levels of involvement and non-
residents who were closely involved in decision-making, those who were outside observers 
or held other unofficial roles in the programme but were highly involved within it. 
 
1.3.4 Chapter five analyses the Demolish and Rebuild (D&R) programme, which was first 
announced on 21 August 1960 and planned for the neighbourhood of Vadi Saliv in the 
northern Israeli city of Haifa (this is also one of the case studies analysed in this research). 
Different versions of the programme have been implemented up to the present day. 
Initially, the government controlled operations, but over time, responsibility was 
increasingly handed over to the private sector. In 1998, privatisation was formalised and 
the programme renamed ‘Urban Renewal’. Since then, responsibility for individual 
developments has been in private hands; the government only identifies sites and monitors 
progress, whilst private developers are thought to be more capable of managing residents’ 
demands under free market rules.  
 The ‘Neighbourhood of Cardboard’ in Tel Aviv, for example, is a project operated 
by the private sector. Vadi Saliv in Haifa, however, represents a central-government 
approach. Evidence collected from participants in the D&R programme underpins this 
study’s evaluation of the degree of empowerment in a top-down process.  
 D&R represents a top-down process whereby residents have limited participation, 
their involvement more often denied and a very minor share in decision-making offered. 
Chapter six investigates the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme (NRP) which was 
announced by Prime Minister Menachim Begin in 1979 and in very few cases is still in 
existence today. The programme initially used central-government funding to regenerate 
increasingly dilapidated areas of social housing. NRP estates are different from the D&R 
estates discussed in chapter five, as they were built more recently, and their condition was 
less poor than the neighbourhoods that required demolition. Yet importantly, the NRP is 
the only social-housing project in the country's history to have explicitly set resident 
involvement and empowerment as a goal.  
 
1.3.5 Chapter six investigates the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme (NRP) which was 
announced by Prime Minister Menachim Begin in 1979 and is still, in very few cases, in 
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existence today. The Programme initially used central-government funding to regenerate 
increasingly dilapidated areas of social housing. NRP estates are different from the 
Demolish and Rebuild estates discussed in the previous chapter, as they were built more 
recently, and their condition was less poor than the neighbourhoods that required 
demolition. Yet importantly, the NRP is the only social-housing project in the country's 
history to have explicitly set resident involvement and empowerment as a goal. 
 This chapter provides an assessment of the programme in terms of residents’ 
participation and empowerment, as well as the official strategy towards this participation. 
Evidence collected from participants in the NRP underpins the study’s evaluation of 
empowerment of residents in projects that run in partnership between residents and 
officials. 
 
1.3.6 Chapter seven examines the passing of the 1999 ‘Right to Buy’ legislation (RTB) in 
Israel. The legislation, similar to RTB laws in other Western European countries, is 
different in one main respect: the law was initiated by residents’ groups in collaboration 
with opposition MPs against the official governmental stance. Residents living in 
publically funded housing were allowed to buy their homes at discounted rates, calculated 
according to length of tenure in the property. The very unique aspect of this programme 
was the social process in which residents of the less wealthy estates were able to lead 
social legislation against the government and the aim of developers to sell these homes to 
private investors. Residents of poor communities without a strong lobby, with almost no 
influence on decision-makers, managed to overcome the most powerful agents. The RTB 
case helps us to ascertain whether there was an exemplary level of resident participation 
and tests the hypothesis that residents’ involvement in decision-making not only ensures a 
positive impact on future management of an estate, but also dramatically improves a 
project’s chance of success. Evidence collected from participants underpins the evaluation 
of resident-led projects.   
 
1.3.7 Chapter eight discusses the investigated social and housing programmes in Israel in 
terms of empowerment. In brief; the D&R programme represents a low level of 
participation (known as the information level) and a negative public policy. The NRP 
represents moderate resident participation (at consultation level) and a supportive strategy. 
The RTB represents a high level of participation (at partnership level) but an extremely 
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hostile governmental strategy. This enables us to examine empowerment in social-housing 
policy from multiple angles. 
 
1.3.8 Chapter nine offers conclusions as to how far empowerment is achievable in social 
housing policy through resident participation, and through the enabling, support and 
facilitating of such participation.  
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Chapter Two 
A Review of the Literature on Empowerment 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Empowerment is a stated goal of social-housing policy in numerous programmes around 
the world. This chapter reviews the existing literature, some of which advocates 
empowerment as a prerequisite to urban regeneration, some of which suggests that 
empowerment is a facilitating tool that aids poor residents to move up the social ladder, 
and some of which maintains that poor residents cannot be empowered as this requires a 
state of mind that they would not be able achieve because of the multiple pressures they 
are under. At the same time there are researchers who suggest that residents of poor 
neighbourhoods know better than any outsider what is best for them, there are others who 
believe residents of poor neighbourhoods should have a guiding hand (proper training, for 
instance) to grant them influence over management, while others think it is quicker and 
simpler to allow experts to decide.  
 A system of central government control over social policy and services represents 
one approach; another is localisation of services. Nevertheless, the majority of studies 
which investigate empowerment in social and housing policy, as well as programmes 
aimed at improving deprived areas, recommend resident participation. Programmes 
encouraging people to participate seem to have had greater success in achieving their goals 
than schemes which have not.  
 At the same time, this research also challenges common beliefs related to 
empowerment in Western literature and investigates whether the Western or Northern 
assumptions on and methodologies of empowerment and its disadvantages are relevant in 
multi-conflict scenarios or countries where there are multiple pressures which go beyond 
social issues. I also consider whether Western and Northern methodologies can also apply 
to the East and South.   
 Although categorised as a Western state, Israel’s society and politics are influenced 
by a multi-conflict environment. It therefore provides a good example by which to test the 
presence of Western thinking on empowerment and whether it is a viable environment in 
which to execute it. The following literature review provides a set of conceptual tools that 
help us to understand Israel’s position: whether it has taken empowerment into 
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consideration as part of its social and housing policy, and whether residents gain more 
power and are able to transform their situation from mainly disadvantaged communities 
with little power into influential, participating agents. These conceptual tools include the 
“ladder of participation” (Arnstein, 1969; 218) that measures residents’ participation, in 
order to assess the public policy approach that has shaped official strategies towards 
participation in social and housing policies. 
 This chapter has six main parts that review different aspects of the empowerment 
process:  
 
1) Social and housing policies that have aimed to empower the disadvantaged 
 2) Individual empowerment  
3) Collective or community empowerment  
4) Empowerment delivery 
5) Multi-conflict societies  
6) Limitations 
 
 Part 2.2 reviews the literature on empowerment in social and housing policies, 
describes empowerment of the disadvantaged in its main forms, both individual and 
collective, and how these forms are executed in housing policy, in particular through 
localisation of services.  
 Part 2.3 discusses individual empowerment assessed mainly by participation, 
measured against Arnstein’s “ladder of participation” (Arnstein, 1969; 218), through 
studies on participation that refer to Arnstein, and studies that focus on additional factors 
of individual participation, such as leadership and continuity.  
 Part 2.4 considers collective community empowerment and includes an overview of 
the methods by which authorities support collective empowerment. This is manifested 
mainly in different types of publicly-provided services, and the influence collective 
empowerment has on residents, particularly in terms of increased commitment, 
responsibility and independence which not only contribute to the success of a project but 
moreover help residents move away from dependency on social welfare support.  
 This section discusses the different types of housing organisations that offer 
collective empowerment, such as co-ops (housing cooperations), tenant management 
organisations (TMOs) and resident caretakers, and how they generate trust between 
residents and the authorities. Finally, this section reviews a major tool in collective 
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empowerment — social protest and pressure groups, in which residents act collectively to 
promote issues and communicate their needs to the authorities.  
 Part 2.5 discusses empowerment in practice and focuses on the other main services 
and supporting tools authorities can offer to help residents improve their performance. This 
section discusses knowledge gaps and how training schemes can help residents to improve 
their skills and their ability to influence a programme. It offers a perspective on the 
practical experience of training schemes designed to help residents acquire new skills to 
improve their local housing conditions, and to handle problems associated with 
underachievement or unemployment.  
 Part 2.6 discusses multi-conflict societies and the ways in which social policy 
emerges when surrounded by other conflicts. Israel, as we know, accommodates more than 
one conflict and within the scope of this research we will attempt to analyse whether the 
Western literature is relevant in a scenario that involves more than just social conflicts.  
 Part 2.7 discusses the limitations of the empowerment process, which tends to 
revolve around issues of people (confidence and cost) and places (location and cost). 
 
2.2 Perspectives on Empowerment and Housing Policy 
There is a research vacuum concerning empowerment in housing programmes in Israel. 
This study must therefore look to research on empowerment located elsewhere. This 
section describes studies of empowerment of the disadvantaged in its main forms 
(individual and collective), the challenges of empowerment in social and housing policies 
aimed to support disadvantaged populations, and the public policy attempt to meet these 
challenges (localisation of services in particular). International studies show that 
participatory and supportive involvement tends to create an atmosphere of positive change, 
helps residents take responsibility for their situation and creates ways to improve it.  
 
Empowerment is a process that allows for development of confidence and 
skills in individuals or communities leading to their being able to take 
more control over their own destinies (Wates, 2000: 188).  
  
Individual empowerment is often seen as synonymous with participation — i.e., taking 
control of conditions and services within the local community. A group of empowered 
individuals leads to collective empowerment which is a commitment to act and create 
change: “organisations challenge people not only to understand, but also to commit and to 
act” (Ganz, 2002: 3). From an operational standpoint, “solutions to exclusion through the 
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process of empowerment depend on the willingness of government to support such efforts” 
(Young & Lemos, 1997: 4), and the degree of access to decision-making they allow, often 
referred to as public policy: 
 
Empowerment of the individual is about enabling low income 
households, living in marginalised areas to affect conditions, influence 
decisions and play a role in improving their surroundings. (Power, 1992; 
5-6).  
 
Measuring empowerment of disadvantaged populations is challenging. When analysing the 
participation of individuals, some studies have proposed ‘ladders’ to evaluate degrees of 
participation (Arnstein, 1969: Likert 1967). Others define ‘ladders’ with more 
organisational (Ganz 2002) or practical (Wates, 2000: World Bank, 2005) approaches. The 
‘ladder of participation’ used in this study distinguishes between different levels of 
individual participation, while others refer to redistribution of power through collective 
empowerment as the real execution of empowerment (Likert, 1967).  
 Individual empowerment is the basis upon which collective empowerment can, but 
does not always grow. If residents do not turn their participation into real influence they 
are open to manipulation by the authorities (i.e. landlords). Young and Lemos (1997) argue 
that ‘citizen participation’ does not always refer to real participation; rather, this may be 
‘politically correct terminology’ to cover a lack of real participation. If participation 
develops from the individual into a collective, it will help to improve conditions and 
strengthen communities (Brichall,1988). Studies of collective empowerment consider how 
the needs of the disadvantaged are met by governments and examine whether organisations 
are meeting those needs (Ganz, 2002). 
 In contrast, the most common approach to social housing is through direct 
government intervention within a welfare regime. It is clear that without government 
funding, housing would simply not be built (Dunleavy, 1981), but public policy relates to 
other aspects of the housing process, for example provision of decent services, improved 
housing conditions and opportunities for residents to influence and improve their 
conditions. Such provision, which is categorised as localisation of services rather than 
centrally controlled services, is directed at the poor so that, by meeting their immediate 
needs, they are able to access those things that will improve their situation, such as 
employment and education.  
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2.2.1. The disadvantaged are individuals that social and housing policies are designed to 
benefit. This group is generally characterised as the unskilled, the redundant, newcomers, 
one-parent families, and those who cannot cope. Disadvantaged people are generally less 
educated and less organised/trained to be able to act collectively or individually, politically 
or socially; their ability to attain a better position in terms of employment or wealth has a 
lower starting point than that of the general public, who have the skills and opportunities to 
overcome many obstacles and barriers. Disadvantaged populations are often alienated and 
disconnected from opportunities; they lack the resources and skills of other social classes 
and are therefore less able to participate:  
 
People who struggle to survive at the margins become unrepresented in 
the wider system. Their ability to participate becomes more and more 
limited as their societal role narrows… they face many barriers on a 
number of different levels that prevent them from having a real stake in 
development activities. (World Bank, 2005; 5,6) 
 
The problems associated with disadvantaged groups become more extreme in a nation that 
is trying to cope with massive immigration or pressures from minority ethnic groups (such 
as Israel). New immigrants are more than likely to meet the criteria associated with 
disadvantage. Newcomers in general will struggle to rise up the ladder of citizenship, and 
in many cases depend on social benefit schemes and have weaker starting positions within 
social-progress initiatives. Their empowerment is thus even harder to achieve:  
 
Even where they participate, people without work or with low-skilled 
work in a job scarce, skill driven market, have limited voice and little real 
power. If they belong to minority ethnic group, their participation may be 
even more circumscribed. (Power, 1999; 373) 
 
Ganz (2002) links disadvantage to social exclusion, and although the ‘disadvantaged’ 
clearly have skills and knowledge, in the context of their relations with authority and the 
societal mainstream they may typically be of limited use (Clapham, 1989; Bell, 1986). 
Social exclusion often results from a long period of inadequate local services:  
 
Many of the areas, which fall into our definition of under-representation 
and powerlessness, were built as solutions to the very same problem in 
the old city slums. (Power, 1992: 5) 
 
 The next generation grows up in homes in disadvantaged areas where welfare 
dependency is widespread and access to government agencies or employment is difficult. 
Governments also disempower by moving low income populations away from urban 
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centres. This is particularly relevant in Israel where the central government is exceptionally 
dominant in housing and social policy. Central to this conundrum are governments which 
generally prioritise the wishes of the wealthier majority and fail to address adequately the 
needs of its disadvantaged population (McDonald, 1986), through, for example, 
localisation of services (Wates, 2000). Nevertheless, governments have been trying for 
decades to improve conditions through social policy, regardless of whether or not they 
have been successful.  
 
2.2.2. Housing is a key indicator of the social and economic strength of a community or 
state, as it affects opportunities, opens paths to personal achievement and provides access 
to services ranging from education to employment. Lack of decent housing and the fact 
that this housing is often located in deprived areas can lead to increased aggression, anti-
social behaviour and the risk of being exposed to danger and harm.  
 Publicly built housing estates are often home to the less affluent in all societies. 
Although publicly funded housing existed, particularly in Europe at the beginning of the 
20
th
 century, such as Britain’s ‘Homes Fit for Heroes’ (1919) and the German Siedlungen 
(1925–30), since the Second World War governments across the world and across the 
political spectrum have invested in publicly subsidised housing to alleviate poverty and 
homelessness. Some community advocates would argue that such housing solutions have 
generally failed to improve conditions for the disadvantaged, as these crowded council-
housing estates are at the centre of a multitude of social problems, such as unemployment, 
excessive school drop-out rates, poor facilities, lack of decent services and high rates of 
anti-social behaviour. The combination of a desperate population housed in desolate places 
increases social problems. Since these areas are usually cheaper to live in, many poor 
people are neglected by the authorities and become stigmatised. The neglected areas 
further deteriorate, and the citizens occupying these neighbourhoods become poorer, more 
hopeless and dependent on services that are inadequate due to a lack of political will to 
meet their needs.  
 In situations of deprivation and poverty, the relationship of housing to personal 
progress is significant. Bell (1988) even suggested that decent housing in fair price should 
be first priority. Unsafe housing conditions fail, further alienating residents, with one of the 
most common outcomes being that  
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Solutions in one generation often became problems in the next, as well as unforeseen 
new problems arising (Power, 1992: 5).  
 
This is even more pronounced when the housing is rented rather than owned:  
 
Studies have shown that unsafe housing conditions are more prevalent among renters 
than owners (Cisneros et al, 2004: 3-4).  
 
This goes against the idea of generating a sense of community and deprives residents of 
both opportunities and democratic expression. It also undermines residents’ confidence in 
their ability to acquire personal skills or exercise their basic social rights. Research on 
empowerment in social housing policy suggests that policies which do not involve the 
empowerment of the disadvantaged will more often fail:  
 
The idea that housing provision of itself would solve deeper social 
problems has proved wrong. A combined social and organisational focus 
can improve conditions radically, preventing chaos and helping to build 
community. (Power, 1999; 229) 
 
Empowerment as an approach to solving social problems is now central in government 
development and planning, as its promoters claim that when the poor develop skills, they 
can lead them to independence from poverty and government support:  
 
If those who are dependent on housing subsidy have access to education, 
job training, and employment opportunities that will create a path to 
independence (Cisneros et al., 2004; 5) 
 
 Diana Mitlin & David Satterthwaite (2004) focus on low income neighbourhoods 
that face the constant threat of eviction and various forms of violence. They argue that 
none of these problems can be addressed without local changes and local involvement, and 
since urban poverty is underpinned by the failure of national governments, their role is to 
facilitate that change:  
 
The record, to date, of development professionals in reducing urban 
poverty is not very promising. Too many initiatives offered too little to 
too few people. Many have little lasting impact on the ground. (Mitlin & 
Satterhwaite, 2004; 479) 
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 To support their argument, Mitlin & Satterthwaite include case studies of innovative 
government organizations (in Thailand, Mexico, the Philippines and Nicaragua) and 
community-driven processes (in India, South Africa, Pakistan and Brazil), which illustrate 
more effective approaches to urban poverty reduction:  
 
These research case studies show that it is possible to reduce much of the 
deprivation faced by the urban poor and to make significant improvement 
in their lives. (Mitlin & Satterhwaite, 2004; 479)  
 
A solution, therefore, to poor housing conditions which have been pursued by progressive 
regimes is to invite resident involvement in the process and to increase local access to 
services:  
 
Although government funding targeted buildings, all governments 
required broad-based action to involve residents and address management 
and social problems. The Irish Government required local authorities to 
involve tenants and provide estate-based services. The Danish 
Government required social landlords to give tenants on each estate a 
controlling say in the priorities. The British Government insisted on local 
management and tenant consultation in each estate programme (Power, 
1999; 66).  
 
2.2.3 Localisation  
Accessibility is a key factor in the provision of social services. Localisation, for the 
purpose of this research, is defined as services that are delivered locally (Clapham, 1989) 
and thus made accessible to all.  
 
 Localisation, or decentralisation (‘bridges between the centre and periphery’), of 
services provides an ideal platform to test empowerment; it reduces social gaps, decreases 
feelings of alienation, offers better opportunities to residents and transforms a feeling of 
general negativity among residents into something positive upon which cooperation can 
grow:  
 
Resident-based structures needed nurturing, as without wider support they 
almost inevitably foundered. Estate rescue did not turn unpopular estates 
into stable ones, but they became more manageable and therefore more 
popular. (Power, 1999; 363) 
 
 In earlier research, Power (1994), and also McDonald (1986), Thomas (1985) and 
Turner (1972 and 1976), all declared that projects or solutions which were designed with 
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local groups worked better because the type of change was more precise and based on the 
real needs of the community.  
 
Deficiencies and imperfections in your housing are infinitely more 
tolerable if they are your responsibility than if they are somebody else’s. 
(Turner, 1976; 51) 
 
Localisation is therefore doubly important when it comes to housing programmes in poor 
neighbourhoods, since only residents know what is missing or required or not provided in 
their neighbourhoods:  
 
Estates need local effort: tenants on a particular estate cannot influence 
many of the wider issues, but they can make things work better at a local 
level if there is a small-scale, locally responsive organisation. (Power et 
al, 1991: 15) 
 
Localisation not only ensures better access to services, but also grants the power to 
influence the way in which services are delivered as well as who delivers those services:  
Giving tenants a choice of landlord without changing the underlying 
power relationship is like offering slaves a choice of masters rather than 
giving them their freedom. (Clapham, 1989; 52). 
 
Accessibility and power build confidence. Instilling a sense of self-belief should underlie 
any initiative that engages with the poor. Richardson argues that investing in community 
self help can unlock both peoples’ desire and their potential to solve community problems:  
 
Community self help solutions are positive human responses to difficult 
situations… and often triple benefits in improving mainstream services, 
in generating neighbourhood renewal and reviving democracy. 
(Richardson, 2008; 250) 
 
 Wates indicates that delegation of power to residents, especially in housing policies, 
improves local services: “Conditions therefore improve, confidence grows, efforts become 
worthwhile and self-reinforcing” (Wates, 2000; 104). Delegation of power is reflected in 
wider issues such as employment, job accessibility, environment and facilitation of 
services. Localisation, according to Turner, improves residents’ satisfaction and thus has a 
positive impact locally; he distinguishes between the traditional centrally-administrated 
heteronomous housing system controlled by the government and the bottom-up locally 
self-governing or autonomous housing solutions led by local communities. One is imposed 
and the other is self generated by the people.  
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 Locally-based projects not only offer a solution that is tailored to the real local 
community needs, but where tenants are involved in the design of their community they 
become more committed to success, and the degree of negativity felt towards authorities 
declines.  
 When people influence decisions they tend to be more satisfied and, importantly, 
take responsibility rather than blame others for their failure.  
 
When dwellers control the major decisions and are free to make their own 
contribution to the design, construction and management of their housing, 
both the process and the environment produced stimulate individual and 
social wellbeing. When people have neither control over, nor 
responsibility for key decisions in the housing process, dwelling 
environments may instead become a barrier to personal fulfilment and a 
burden to the economy. The important thing about housing is not what it 
is but what it does in people's lives. (Turner, 1976; 5-6)  
 
The impact of localisation on residents’ commitment and responsibility during housing 
programmes is featured in early studies by Turner:  
 
If someone controls the process of building his or her own house, a crack 
in the wall can be easily tolerated or fixed. If an institution controlled the 
process, the same crack in the wall becomes a constant source of 
aggravation for the client and can negatively impact the relationship 
between the dweller and the institution (Turner and Fichter, 1972; 148). 
 
and also in a subsequent study by Watts:  
 
It is widely recognised that this [more local involvement] is the only way 
that people will get the surroundings they want. And it is now seen as the 
best way of ensuring communities become safer, stronger, wealthier and 
more sustainable. (Watts, 2000; 194) 
 
The argument is that the more involved residents are, the more committed they will be and 
therefore projects have greater success rates.   
 There are two main arguments against local control which the literature discusses: 
either the poor are unable to take responsibility over their communities and their daily 
lives; or they do not want to take that responsibility (even if they are capable). Due to the 
urgent issues facing the poor — such as finding sufficient income to support their families 
— the option to participate in policy-making might seem a luxury. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that disadvantaged people are often more focused on meeting their 
basic needs (food, shelter, clothing and security) rather than on developing a civic 
sensibility. Against these criticisms of empowerment, research has revealed the opposite, 
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however: when the opportunity was given, residents were keen to participate, to gain more 
responsibilities and to improve their housing conditions:  
  
When asked, it appears that the vast majority, even in very deprived and 
depressed areas, say they want to exert more influence over events and 
services affecting their lives. (Power, 1992: 18) 
 
In a later study, Power (1999) revealed an example of the impact localisation can have on 
residents:  
 
In October 1992, an estate-wide ballot was held, with an independent 
ballot organiser agreed by the council. The question asked tenants 
whether they were in favour of tenant management of the housing service 
on this estate. Fifty-eight per cent of resident households voted. This 
turnout was double the level for local elections. Of them, 88 per cent 
voted yes in answer to the question. Resident support for independent 
management was impressive (Power, 1999; 210). 
 
 Local control as an approach to tackling social exclusion has recently been adopted 
by the UK Conservative Party’s ‘Big Society’ agenda, which aims to empower citizens and 
‘give greater authority from the state to devote local services that people really want’ 
(Cabinet Office; Cameron, D
1
; DCLG, 2010). Similar ideas were discussed by Gavena & 
Edwards in 2001 stating that Community activity allows its members to improve their 
participation and to conduct effective and comprehensive participation. That community 
organization, social movement campaigns and residents’ influence on decisions in practice 
are all part of recent democratic thinking gives renewed recognition to the role and 
importance of civil society in governance:  
 
Big organizations have moved to adapt and embrace participatory 
approaches to change. Citizens’ voice in the global debate promotes a 
genuine sense of equality and democracy. (Tunstall, 2000; 401) 
 
 To sum up, we have learned from the literature so far that empowerment is 
developed through a process whereby local control and community empowerment begins 
with individuals. Individual empowerment is derived from resident participation which is 
“a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development 
initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them” (World Bank, 2005: 1).  
 Strong, empowered individuals can carry the whole community to success. In poor, 
densely populated neighbourhoods, citizens feel discriminated against, hopeless and 
                                                 
1
 The Guardian, January 18, 2006 
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helpless, feelings that are easily channelled into crime and protest against the government 
and local authorities. Housing policy in disadvantaged communities offers a unique 
opportunity to test the source of empowerment and its potential to lift a community. The 
role of government in building a better society can therefore be significant in public 
housing if managed properly, as it can help to tackle other related social problems. Where 
residents feel a sense belonging and ownership (and housing is central to this), their sense 
of responsibility grows and as a consequence their positive contribution to their 
surroundings develops. This is more often the case in privately-rented housing, where 
landlords normally trust their tenants to keep their housing in good condition and in return 
tenants have confidence that their landlords will attend immediately and in a professional 
manner any issue they might have with their housing. This is the code of honour and 
respect that governs the private housing market which is, in general, followed by all 
concerned. A sense of responsibility and professional conduct in the public housing sector 
would contribute to an adaptation of similar values.     
 Nevertheless, to become empowered, individuals need to take an active role in 
improving the conditions in which they live: Most reasonable is to grant such control to 
those affected by (Abrams, 1971). The next section considers the nature of individual 
participation and asks how such participation can be measured. 
 
2.3 Measuring Individual Participation 
This section considers the literature on measuring participation, and discusses approaches 
which will be used later on in the research to measure resident participation. The first part 
(2.3.1) presents the most common tool in the literature to measure resident participation: 
The Ladder of Participation. In a study conducted by Sheryl Arnstein in 1969, a wide-
ranging ladder to measure levels of participation was established. The second part (2.3.2) 
presents later studies that focus on the relative significance of four categories. Many 
similarities exist across studies aimed at segmentation of the different levels of 
participation. For the purposes of this research, four levels of participation (information, 
consultation, partnership and control) will be used as an analytical framework to measure 
participation in Israel. The last part (2.3.3) discusses other aspects of individual 
empowerment (leadership and continuity) that have the power to transform individual 
empowerment into collective empowerment.  
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2.3.1. Sherry R. Arnstein’s ladder of participation (1969) is a milestone in research on 
participation. Although Arnstein conducted one of the earliest studies regarding 
participation, the framework is still more inclusive and broader in its categories than other, 
more contemporary models and therefore worth considering. Arnstein includes theoretical 
as well as practical definitions in order to expose the gap between apparent and real 
participation; for example, she concludes that ‘citizen participation’ does not necessarily 
mean beneficial or real participation; rather, this may simply reproduce ‘participation per 
se’ rather than de facto and constitute a genuine agenda of involvement (i.e., to serve the 
needs of landlords, rather than those of residents). In such cases, officials claim that 
participatory measures were delivered, but evidence of progress in terms of residents’ 
behaviour and/or the material improvement of areas is not evident:  
 
Participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating 
process for the powerless. (Arnstein, 1969; 218) 
  
 Arnstein was the first to provide comprehensive definitions for different levels of 
involvement and to categorise them by power, effects and intensity of citizen involvement 
granted to the disadvantaged population:  
 
It is the means by which they can include significant social reform, which 
enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society, (Arnstein, 
1969; 218) 
  
 The Arnstein Ladder includes three main stages from non-participatory through 
limited participation to real influence and ultimately control: the lowest level which 
Arnstein categorises as non-participatory is where participation is neither measured nor 
delivered. The next, slightly more progressive, category is tokenism, where citizens have 
the opportunity to hear and have a voice, but do not necessarily influence the process. The 
Control categories are the highest level where citizens control the decision-making process 
or have responsibility for full operational management. These three levels have sub 
categories as presented below: 
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Figure 1: Arnstein’s full ladder of participation  
 
Non-Participatory Levels: 
Manipulation 
Therapy 
Tokenism: 
Information 
Consultation 
Placation 
Control: 
Partnership 
Delegation of Power 
Citizen Control 
 
Source: Arnstein (1969) 
 
 The non-participatory levels (where there is almost no or very little power) include 
two sub categories: Manipulation and Therapy. Whereas in Manipulation, citizens are 
invited to listen to committees, but they have the status to neither influence the process nor 
permission to voice their opinions, in Therapy citizens are provided with the impression of 
involvement through attendance. At the Manipulation level, participation is used to rubber 
stamp ready-made decisions; power holders use this situation to create the appearance of 
accepting citizens who are merely bystanders with no active role. This is the level where 
participation can be considered merely a descriptive term, rather than a practical reality. 
Moreover, in many cases, power holders operate on this level in order to manipulate public 
opinion and/or the residents themselves, manufacturing a positive ‘spin’ on the process of 
participation, yet giving no real opportunity to participate (Arnstein uses the term ‘therapy’ 
to imply that power holders attempt to ease their consciences by giving residents a sense of 
involvement which is not available at the Manipulation level. The end result of therapy is 
similar in that real participation has not been exercised:  
 
Under a masquerade of involving citizens in planning, the experts subject 
the citizens to clinical group therapy. What makes this form of 
'participation' so invidious is that citizens are engaged in extensive 
activity, but the focus of it is on curing them of their 'pathology', rather 
than changing the racism and victimisation that creates their ‘pathologies’ 
(Arnstein, 1969: 219–220).  
 
Ironically, both non-participatory levels are important to this analysis, not only because 
they can reveal the true position of the authorities vis-à-vis participation but also because 
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their attitude can inspire the development of genuine participation among residents, as 
these obstructive levels — by allowing glimpses into ineffective participation — can help 
convince residents to demand other, more open processes:  
 
One hopeful note is that, having been so grossly affronted, some citizens 
have learned the Mickey Mouse game, and now they too know how to 
play. As a result of this knowledge, they are demanding genuine levels of 
participation to assure them that public programmes are relevant to their 
needs and responsive to their priorities (Arnstein, 1969: 219). 
 
 The next participatory category is Tokenism where authorities seek the opinion of 
residents (simulate token power). This category includes three sub categories: information, 
consultation and placation. Information is the lowest stage of this category, at which 
authorities inform (for real not per se) residents of their rights and responsibilities, yet 
information flows only in one direction, top-bottom, and residents’ opinions and views are 
not welcome. While in the information stage, residents do not have the opportunity to 
affect processes or negotiate power, whereas in the consultation level, residents are invited 
to share their views and opinions, to participate in surveys, board meetings and public 
hearings; their views are given a forum, but there is still no guarantee that these will be 
taken into account.  
 Finally in Placation, the highest token level, residents are invited to participate on 
boards or committees as members, and are granted only a minority share; hence, their 
influence is limited. Being appointed to boards placates residents and reduces their 
dissatisfaction; yet as minority board members, residents must convince experts of their 
needs and justify their demands in order to gain a majority in their favour.  
 The next category, Citizen Power, includes Partnership which represents joint policy 
board management that runs programmes through a mutual decision-making process with 
shared responsibilities for planning, managing and solving problems on the basis of trust. 
In Delegated Power, however, residents are in a dominant position, ruling the decision-
making process by holding a majority of seats on the board and have veto power over 
negotiated solutions, yet the authorities retain final veto. In Citizen Control, there is no 
authorities’ veto to residents’ full management; residents have final approval of power and 
full accountability. A majority of seats on a board are guaranteed to elected members of 
the community, and a representation allowance is given equally to all members of the 
community.  
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 Individual participation is associated with the other aspect of empowerment 
(willingness and localisation) which is discussed in the previous section. Arnstein shows 
resident willingness to take part and influence a process, since her ladder represents power 
taken rather than power given, and reflects the consequences of tenants striving for power, 
rather than the results of being handed power through official action:  
 
In all but one of those cities [Model Cities programs in the northeast 
region of the U.S. analysed by Arnstein] it was angry citizen demands, 
rather than city initiatives, that led to the negotiated sharing of power. 
(Arnstein 1969: 222) 
 
 Arnstein’s argument assumes that those in power hold on to their dominant positions 
unless, by not sharing power, they run the risk of losing it altogether, thus indicating that 
participation is necessarily an active rather than a passive condition:  
 
Throughout history, the powerless have extorted power or demanded 
vetoes over final decisions more frequently than they have accepted 
offers to share it. (Arnstein 1969: 222) 
 
The methodology for this research is discussed in greater detail in chapter Four. 
Nevertheless, the methodology by which to measure participation in this research has been 
structured and designed according to Arnstein’s and Power’s Ladder of Participation.  
  
2.3.2 There are many references to Arnstein’s ladder in the literature on participation. 
When measuring participation of the disadvantaged, Wilcox (1994) reconfigured the ladder 
in five stages to differentiate partnership in more detail. Elizabeth Rocha (1997), 
redesigned Arnstein’s ladder by creating her own ladder of empowerment which offered a 
tool for public planners to understand empowerment potential. Berkes (1994) discussed co-
management and used aspects of the Arnstein partnership level (training, share of 
information, cooperation and building trust) to guide authorities on what should be 
delivered to residents. Arnstein’s ladder has also been used as a tool for the research of 
participation in general. Conor (2007) used Anstein’s ladder to analyse how participation 
can solve public controversy where lower participatory levels are designed to provide 
information to the general public but where higher levels are designed to facilitate leaders.  
 Weidemann and Femers (1993) explored the concept of conflict management as an 
approach to improve the quality of public services and focused on Arnstein’s partnership 
and control stages. Dorcey, Doney and Rueggeberg (1994) used Arnstein’s ladder when 
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researching citizens’ involvement in Canadian Environmental governance, mainly to 
highlight the transformation poor residents had to go through in order to make an impact 
upon the decision-making process. Arnstein’s ladder was also used in research on the 
impact participatory methods can make on agriculture professionals (Pretty, 1995). 
 In this research, Arnstein’s ladder of participation has a key function in measuring 
participation. However, for this research we have adapted a narrower ladder that best 
describes the Israeli phenomenon: 
 
Figure 2: The reduced ladder of participation as used in this research  
 
Information 
  Consultation 
   Partnership 
     Citizen Control 
 
Information is the lowest level of participation. In this study it includes manipulation 
(noted mainly in the D&R programme). In this category, authorities simply inform 
residents about future plans with no opportunity for residents to respond or to provide their 
opinion of, or let alone influence, the process. 
Consultation offers the next level up in which authorities seek responses/opinions from 
residents when making a proposal for improvement or change (e.g., management 
structure). Some of the views might be addressed but there are no guarantees that views 
will be accepted or incorporated.  
Partnership exists when tenants are part of the decision-making process, either as 
members of the project’s management board or as part of a group that can influence the 
managing body.  
Control exists when tenants have full control (or with some limitations) on project 
management, including facilities, resources and funds. 
 
2.3.3 There are also other studies that refer to individual participation and focus mainly on 
features that affect mobility between stages, i.e. how residents can move up in that ladder. 
The majority of studies (see earlier notes on Berekers and Rocha who represent the 
minority) suggests that bottom-up pressure is the reason governments are forced to 
intervene. In other words, resident willingness and enthusiasm to participate is important in 
  
35 
persuading governments to sanction their participation. Alinski (1971), for instance, argues 
that without extreme and consistent pressure, there will be no change in policies 
 
Achieving and maintaining individual empowerment helps residents to move up the ladder, 
the willingness of the individual to become involved is fundamental, it is only the first 
stage out of three. The second stage is developed leadership (when individuals become 
leaders they impact upon the whole community), whilst the third step compels continuity 
of participation features and takes into account the duration of participation, how long 
residents remain engaged and whether or not they are still supported and backed by their 
community (which is normally determine by local election).  
 The second aspect of individual participation through community activity depends 
on the calibre of leadership. Apart from those with physical or mental disability, members 
of any community have leadership potential. Studies have found that if the disadvantaged 
community as a whole is active, participation is much more effective, yet someone needs 
to motivate the community to act. In every community, there are often ordinary people 
with leadership qualities and desire to participate; leaders play a critical role in inspiring 
the community, triggering, and later sustaining local activity, motivating individuals to act, 
representing the community and even having the power to negotiate with authorities on 
behalf of the community:  
 
Tenants and community representatives play a vital role in solving local 
problems but local leadership is volatile. (Power, 1999; 213) 
 
 Richardson (2008) recommends support and encouragement of local leadership. 
Even if there are only a few local leaders their impact upon the whole community can be 
huge as they can push the whole community forward. Moreover, their impact upon a 
project is crucial as they can determine whether the community supports a project and who 
is able to contribute to its success:  
 
Appreciate the small numbers (leaders) that come forward, to encourage 
as many to act but to understand that only few are up for the intensive 
challenge. (Richardson, 2008; 262) 
 
 The third important feature in individual empowerment that can promote a 
programme and galvanise a community is continuity of participation in general, and of 
leaders in particular. Wates agrees that individual empowerment through participation can 
help residents to develop skills to meet management levels. Such skills help residents to 
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improve their performance and build up confidence to run or influence the operation of 
management boards. Maintaining these skills over the long term allows residents to move 
from the periphery to the centre of decision making and to remain involved in the future 
management of their communities. This research aims also to test whether the main 
features that appear often in advanced Western European research are also relevant in a 
multi-conflict environment or Eastern and Southern research.     
 Individual empowerment is achieved through participation, and the key model of 
participation remains Arnstein’s ladder. This research adapts and interprets four 
participation stages — information, consultation, partnership and control, as executed in 
each of the analysed Israeli programmes. Individual empowerment is not only about a 
person being involved, it also about leadership; leaders can push the whole community to 
act. Wherever participation and leadership is consistently maintained and supported, it 
generates a positive influence on project operation. Individual participation is the first step 
in the empowerment process; residents participation, leadership and continuity together lay 
the ground for the second stage of empowerment — collective empowerment.  
 
2.4 Collective Empowerment and Public Policy  
Participation cannot be initiated only by residents’ willingness to act. Individual 
empowerment, leadership and continuity lead to a sense of community and the desire to act 
together, yet if individual participation is not simple, how does a group successfully 
function? Apart from community cohesion, there are also aspects of knowledge and 
experience that are needed if residents wish to be involved in local projects. Although 
residents of disadvantaged neighbourhoods know better than any outsider what is needed 
in their community, they have little operational knowledge of what it is to be a member of 
the management board of a housing programme, and with this lack of experience comes a 
lack of confidence. Having said that, when given the opportunity they are committed and 
enthusiastic about creating change and reviving their community. 
 In order to approach these two aspects, support for community activities and training 
for those who wish to overcome knowledge gaps in order that they can make a worthwhile 
contribution to their community are needed. This provides, essentially, the basis for 
collective empowerment — enabling the community to get together and act, facilitating its 
members who wish to gain more knowledge and supporting their learning processes. These 
services are usually provided by the authorities, and those that support empowerment will 
contribute by providing services to strengthen a community and allow collective 
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empowerment to materialise. We call this process public policy — the official strategy and 
type of government investment made available to communities that enable them to get 
involved. Positive or supportive public policy indicates to residents that attempts are 
genuine and develops trust, understanding and confidence in working together.  
 These views were first proposed in the 1970s, when public policy was linked to 
authorities’ responsibility to ensure residents were facilitated so that they could participate 
properly, even local authorities with restricted resources could create a difference (Abrams, 
1971).  
 Such views have become more prevalent recently, Moser (1990) suggested that 
governments need to provide residents with such skills that can help them to effectively 
participate, as part of a larger debate on who should be responsible for estates and their 
residents. Most (like Dunleavy, 1981) agreed that the greater responsibility in initiating 
such schemes belonged to the authorities, since they had both the power and capability to 
support a given area:  
 
The following analyses suggest that the greater the support given to a local community, the 
higher the chances for success in its operation. 
 
2.4.1. Collective empowerment begins with successful cases of individual empowerment 
which creates an environment that allows for resident participation, and supports and 
develops the performance of those with potential leadership capabilities. Allowing such 
participation to continue for a long period generates trust and confidence among residents. 
When individual empowerment is evident, additional support is required in the community 
arena. When such support is given it indicates cooperation and a commitment to success:  
 
Empowerment for a person begins with taking responsibility, and 
empowerment for organisations begins with commitment. (Ganz, 2002; 
3) 
 
 The most common elements of authorities’ encouragement of collective 
empowerment are support of community cohesion and provision of the necessary tools for 
the community to develop the means to influence processes. Services provided tend to be 
mainly housing and other social policies, such as social clubs and community centres 
which bring the community together, training schemes which enhance resident knowledge, 
courses that enable local residents to access jobs, improved services with a focus on 
involving the local community in setting the standard of services and local support, helping 
  
38 
residents’ representatives gain experience and improve their influence and performance in 
pivotal decision-making forums. Yet previous experience shows that collective 
empowerment can be most effective only when the local community is strong and the 
process is based on successful individual empowerment. Collective empowerment “[can] 
not work when communities have not been involved in rule formulation or when sharing of 
benefits with communities is minimal” (World Bank, 2005: 2). Similar outcome failures 
are evident in projects which were initiated by outsiders and did not involve the intended 
beneficiaries (World Bank, 2005: 7).  
 On the other hand, success stories in housing policy accrue where local authorities 
and residents each have the motivation and ability to take up the opportunities created by 
legislation and funding. Authorities have the most important role, as revealed by Mitlin & 
Satterthwaite (2004); even the poorest governments can support collective empowerment 
in local housing schemes:  
 
Empowering governments tend to concentrate expenditure on housing projects in poor 
areas and direct budgets in such a way that services include local involvement. In doing so, 
there is an improved fit between required local authority services and the needs of tenants, 
who in many cases are unemployed. This not only offers the resident an opportunity to 
rejoin the employment market, it also encourages them to be more informed and involved, 
to care twice as much and, therefore, show a higher level of commitment:  
 
if those who are dependent on housing subsidy have access to education, 
job training, and employment opportunities — that [inevitably will] 
create a path to independence. (Cisneros et al, 2004:2) 
 
The World Bank, in redefining its guidelines for community-oriented projects and their 
operation, argues that if earlier projects were based on expert analysis only, current 
schemes have been re-orientated toward a more collaborative approach between 
government and communities. In the new modules, in order to create an appropriate 
environment for real participation, “residents re-join society and have no limitations on 
their responsibilities and rights in management”2  
 Likert (1967), Putnam (1993) and Ganz (2002) all agree that collective 
empowerment increases commitment which consequently encourages residents to be more 
engaged with a project and more determined for it to succeed: 
                                                 
2
 http://web.worldbank.org 
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Empowerment for a person begins with taking responsibility, and 
empowerment for organisations begins with commitment; organisations 
challenge people not only to understand, but also to commit and to act. 
(Ganz, 2002; 3)  
  
Collective empowerment helps to boost resident confidence in their capabilities not only as 
individuals but, more importantly, as a community. They learn to trust that together they 
have both power and influence. Community cohesion and the ability to act collectively is a 
new concept among disadvantaged communities that helps to reduce the atmosphere of 
fear, apathy and isolation that is often typical in deprived areas. As resident confidence 
grows their self help/involvement becomes more intense, whilst greater responsibility leads 
to a more active role in creating solutions, and results are improved: “development of 
confidence and skills in individuals or communities leading to their being able to take 
more control over their own destinies” (Wates, 2000; 188). 
 Self help is noted as an achievement by any resident, yet in poor neighbourhoods it is 
twice as rewarding:  
 
Community self help in poor neighbourhoods triple benefits in improving 
mainstream services, in generating neighbourhood renewal and reviving 
democracy. (Richardson, 2008; 250) 
 
Both Newton (2010) and Gavana & Edwards (2001) argue that collective empowerment 
helps the general public as well, as it establishes a strong civil society, genuine equity and 
introduces democratic processes amongst the very poor. When such transformation occurs 
among the disadvantaged population, the whole community benefits and progresses:  
 
A nation of individuals who have meaningful access to opportunity and 
live in thriving, dynamic communities is a nation of strength. A nation 
that invests in decent housing and supports the development of strong, 
thriving communities is a secure nation. (Cisneros et al., 2004: 8) 
 
Clapham indicates that collective empowerment is best tested in housing organisations: 
 
 The provision and management of rented housing is best carried out by 
an organization collectively controlled by residents. (Clapham, 1989:24) 
 
The next section will look at resident-run housing organisations. 
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2.4.2. A well-known example of collective empowerment in housing policy is the co-
operative, where residents have a share in equity and/or management. There is no single, 
defined framework for co-ops, as there are different types, sizes and shapes, located in 
different areas with different types of properties and varieties of tenants. Nevertheless, 
they are good examples of how people can gain the advantages of small-scale housing 
management:  
 
What co-operative housing has done already is to burst the bubble of a 
few long-held myths: that owner-occupation is the only way in which 
people can gain consumer control over housing and that council housing 
is the only way in which disadvantaged people can gain access to decent 
housing. (Brichall, 1988; 190) 
 
The ICA (International Co-operative Alliance) established a set of guiding principles for 
co-ops in 1995 (see Lambert & Bliss, 2012): 
  
 Self-help and responsibility (to sustain community development and growth); 
democracy (all members have an equal vote);  
 Equality (they are open to all members);  
 Equity (members contribute to the capital of their co-operative and have a stake in 
its surplus if they decide to sell their share);  
 Solidarity (all co-ops cooperate at local, national, regional and international 
levels); honesty and openness (they are managed openly by their members who 
actively participate in their operation);  
 Social responsibility and caring (they provide education, training and information 
to all members).  
 
The opportunity to influence the employment market through housing organisation is one 
of the pivotal contributions collective empowerment can generate within the community. 
One way in which local projects can create jobs is to emphasise the caretaking of 
properties; unemployment rates among those who live in social housing are generally high, 
and those without jobs who have the skills to do repairs may appreciate the opportunity to 
join the workforce, as long as this is part of wider empowerment approach which conveys 
to residents the feeling that the jobs they take are valuable to their local community: 
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Residents’ caretaking is only likely to succeed as an integral part of 
estate-based management, not as a separate and isolated service, with its 
own hierarchy. (The PEP Guide to Local Housing Management, 1987: 
13) 
 
 Caretaking jobs could be offered to tenants not only to provide jobs for the 
unemployed, but also to improve the level of service. Since tenants are on site, they would 
respond more quickly and efficiently to requests for service. This policy also develops trust 
between residents and authorities:  
 
Residents should be able to notice that their opinion counts and that 
services are improving, small visible improvements can create a ‘change’ 
in trust. Trust can help local communities to be more visible and 
responsible and to tackle anti-social behaviour, as well as to increase a 
sense of community. (Richardson, 2008; 270) 
 
Hothi (2008) adds that empowerment can improve community and residents welfare, 
safety and happiness.  Offering caretaking jobs as an agenda is well established by Tenant 
Management Co-operatives or Organisations (TMOs), (DPMO, 2002). TMOs offer 
training for residents to improve their skills and performance with the intention of 
involving service provision on the estate:  
 
TMOs are providing an effective service in terms of their own aims and 
objectives. In most cases, they employ local residents and doing better 
than their host local authorities and compare favourably with the top 25% 
of local authorities in England in terms of repairs, rent collection, and 
tenants satisfaction. (McDonald, 1986: 16) 
 
A TMO is one successful housing programme, unique to the UK, where residents are 
involved in board operation and offered responsibility in management tasks for the 
landlords under a management agreement (The Housing Regulations Act (1994); Tenant 
Management Authority, 2008). This responsibility includes daily management, budgets, 
rent collection, maintenance, office services, staff recruitment and employment. Resident 
board members represent the local community, give updates on daily operation, provide 
services and delegate needs at board level: they are “a small group of working people who 
collectively take control of a substantial part of their lives, their housing” (McDonald, 
1986: 14).  
 Early co-ops were established in the UK in 1975; in 1985 TMO initiatives became 
legal. 1994 legislation allowed residents to initiate processes that would lead to their 
control. TMOs are often located in the most deprived areas and in 2005, it was estimated 
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that were 250 managing around 80,000 units throughout England (DPMO, 2002). Rebecca 
Tunstall, who researched TMOs in the UK, suggests (2011) that such principles encourage 
community empowerment and gives those who are less involved to become more 
involved as they are given greater responsibility locally.  
 
Good examples of residents’ successful management are noted in WATMOS in Wallsal 
and in Weller Street: “During 3 years of operation, they spent over £7M on improving 
housing conditions, which resulted in a very high level of resident satisfaction” 
(McDonald, 1986: 16). In the TMOs the review of annual reports and collaboration in 
drafting operational guidelines is encouraged. Landlords are encouraged to exceed 
standards by being innovative, promoting residents’ involvement and rewarding those 
who are voluntarily active. Tenants, on the other hand, are encouraged to be involved, 
share their feedback, aim high and expect to exceed standards, work in partnership with 
other tenants and with landlords and record their dissatisfaction if landlords do not meet 
expectations (NFTO, 2011). Another evidence to support this view comes from an 
unusual document prepared by low-income residents (with no page numbers) and 
presented to the LSE PhD and Master students in the housing programme. The document 
(Inspiring People, 2004, Case Study 3) quote residents from TRA (Tenants and Residents 
Association) at the Bentley House Estate in Manchester and in the East Rose Community 
Group in Blackburn who confirms that resident involvement has inspired their 
communities: “activity has given me sense of purpose and has made me feel useful”  
 
There are other successful case studies of housing organisations which represent the 
variety of organisations and residents’ involvement. If TMOs represent a higher level of 
resident involvement (control or partnership), The Bradford Community Housing Trust 
(Howley, 2005) represents a model in which residents are consulted:  
 
 
Other cases can be found in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets (McEleney, 2005) and 
in the Irwell Valley housing estate in Salford in which Angela Raftery, the managing 
director, confirms in a talk at the LSE Housing Programme that resident feedback is focal 
in improving the estate and increasing satisfaction: “Residents consult experts before 
making choices and plans, thereby increasing the level of commitment and association 
with decisions taken” (Raftery, 14.10.05).  
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There have been landlords who have let residents lead the way in terms of local 
improvements, a famous example being the impact made by the local community, noted in 
WECH, in which resident involvement was sustained and developed over a long period, 
turning the estate into one of the leading examples of the positive effect residents can have:  
 
The experience on Walterton and Elgin shows that ordinary working class 
people can have a positive influence on their environment. This has led to 
evaluation of a management style that is different from most social 
landlords and is more effective at supporting individuals, instilling 
citizenship and building community. (Rosenberg, 1988; 37) 
 
The contribution of empowerment in WECH is well known has also been noted by 
Ambrose & Stone (2010).  
 
Collective empowerment can also influence authorities which have not paid attention to 
the needs of a struggling community. When acting together, residents have the power to 
improve a process that is conducted jointly or, controversially, when local government is 
either unaware of or choosing to ignore local needs. In such cases a community can act to 
put pressure on the authorities to direct more efforts and finances towards an area in need. 
Pressure groups are therefore another sign of collective empowerment. 
 
2.4.3. Pressure groups are another way in which residents attempt to influence decision-
makers when participation is limited or prevented or when their views are not heard or 
denied. These are organised groups that seek to influence government policy or legislation. 
They also allow residents to raise awareness of an argument, a case, a need or any other 
issue they wish to bring to the public spectrum in order to draw attention away from 
decision-makers. Since pressure groups were focal to this research, the following section 
provides some background to the phenomenon, the way they operate, their aims and the 
different types of groups that exist. One means by which pressure groups can raise 
attention or voice their opinion is through protest. Residents’ protest indicates that they 
have reached a point of dissatisfaction where they are willing to express their frustration 
publicly. Bottom-up pressure from a group of people can act as a catalyst for community 
cohesion and for change in residents’ behaviour, as Alinski (1971) quote Franklin D. 
Roosevelt who called for pressure in order to create a political change, stating that 
politicians cannot ignore public pressure and when the pressure is high they must respond. 
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Pressure groups are generally known as interest groups, lobby groups or protest groups. 
Group sizes are varied; some are huge and operate nationally (the confederation of all 
home owners or council housing estate owners, for example), while others are smaller and 
act at a local level (the Hagoren Estate which united 10 families who campaigned for more 
frequent rubbish collections). Modes of operation also differ; there are groups which might 
consider illegal activities (some of the Israeli NS movements which acted to build 
unauthorised housing solutions, for example), some act by the rules and focus on 
generating links to political parties and decision-makers (e.g. some the residents groups).  
 The aim of pressure groups is to influence decision-makers but not to govern 
themselves. Generally, pressure groups approach all decision-makers in order to gain wider 
support. Pressure groups can have indirect political influence, one famous example from 
Israel being the influence of the RTB on residents (through local pressure groups), who in 
the 2000 election voted in favour of the supporters of legislation, turning their backs on the 
traditional vote. Residents’ groups traditionally linked to the right-wing regime shifted 
their support to the left which altered the balance of power and decided the election by 
giving the majority to the left-wing parties. The RTB pressure groups, for instance, acted 
within the law, protesting in order to voice their opinion. They also drafted the first version 
of the legislation, were involved in the campaign, lobbied in support of their version and 
participated in the parliamentary working session that prepared the final version. 
 Pressure groups can act in a national and local environment. National groups act 
across the country for issues that are relevant to all residents, for example, calling for 
investment in council housing (www.insidehousing.co.uk, 14.03.2012), or protesting 
against cuts in housing services (www.insidehouseing.co.uk, 08.09.2011). Local groups 
deal with exacting issues relevant to a particular estate, such as protesting against new 
houses built in the village of Bourton-on-the-Water (Gloucestershire Echo, 1 April 2013). 
There are also groups that act across a regional zone which is larger than a community but 
smaller than the whole nation — the group of all communities in the Glasgow area is one 
example.
3
  Some groups acts internationally; there are pressure groups in Brussels aiming 
to influence decisions at EU level, for example. Most groups follow the rules and laws, yet 
there are groups which also allow illegal activities. The Justice for Crisis group founded in 
2008 was an illegal tent city erected on disused land owned by Birmingham City Council 
to draw attention to the need for more housing (BBC News bulletin, 6 May 2009). To sum 
                                                 
3
 www.communitycouncilsglasgow.org.uk 
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up, pressure groups tend to be good sign of community activity but a less positive sign of 
cooperation between residents and authorities. 
 To conclude, there is no perfect model for collective empowerment; however, there 
appears to be some evidence of the need of governments to work with communities, if 
collective empowerment is a stated policy:  
 
The estate in 1994 was incomparably better-run, more stable, more 
popular and more viable — thanks to the combination of efforts by the 
City of Cologne and the two management companies, with the 
cooperation of residents and the advantage of greatly increased demands. 
(Power, 1999; 190)  
 
 The housing schemes mentioned above (co-ops and TMOs) are examples of housing 
organisations managed on the basis of collective empowerment and which demonstrate 
that collaboration between governments and authorities is achievable. In cases where such 
collaboration is not evident, empowered communities organise pressure groups to promote 
their ideas or needs. Collective empowerment based on participation alone cannot succeed, 
however, if residents are given the opportunity to participate yet lack the knowledge to 
perform — then both project and empowerment fail. Residents might know best what is 
good for their community, but they do not always have the capability to put that 
knowledge into practice. In order to bridge this gap, operational experience recommends 
providing communities with the proper tools to enable social development, such as training 
schemes that endorse community skills and bolster confidence. The next section analyses 
training and education schemes, their aims and how they are planned in order to overcome 
knowledge gaps among residents. It also offers insights into training in practice and 
operational guidelines.  
 
2.5 Providing Tools in Practice: Training Schemes  
Training for residents to overcome their knowledge gaps is a main theme that appears both 
from academic studies and practical experience. Knowledge gaps are one of the main 
obstacles preventing residents from taking a substantial role in housing programmes. Even 
when individual empowerment (residents are willing to act) and collective empowerment 
(authorities create the proper environment and allow such participation) meet, knowledge 
gaps can delay residents in achieving real and meaningful participation. Collective 
empowerment also includes facilitating residents with tools to be able to overcome those 
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gaps; training schemes for the local community is one of the most efficient and notable 
solutions. 
 The idea of training is not new but was first proposed in the nineteenth century by 
Octavia Hill, who was involved in the management of poor estates. She highlighted the 
importance of tenants’ involvement and commitment in achieving local improvements. She 
advocated that tenants should be given a say and responsibilities, and she considered their 
involvement essential to the revival of run-down estates. Hill believed that such 
participation and involvement could be achieved by accurate and consistent training for 
housing managers that was then delivered to tenants:  
 
It was the essence of her faith that the whole success of housing the poor 
lay not in bricks and mortar, but in skilled and trained management. (Bell, 
1986: 82) 
 
 More than a century later, these values are still valid and are demonstrated in 
academic research and in practical operation as an efficient tool to overcome knowledge 
gaps. 
 
2.5.1. Knowledge gaps 
Members of disadvantaged populations, although eager to participate when the proper 
environment exists, often have neither the skills nor the experience to develop ‘top-flight’ 
participation on their own. Residents of poor estates are often less involved and more 
dependent, while suffering lower levels of education and higher rates of unemployment. 
Without adequate support and training to cover these gaps, their participation cannot meet 
even basic standards, and the initial intention of involving them collapses. Disconnection 
and alienation from society consequently increases, forcing the disadvantaged further out 
of the public system. Training provides knowledge and can overcome gaps; as Sir Francis 
Bacon noted over four centuries ago, knowledge is power. In order to gain the knowledge 
inherent in management and negotiation skills, residents need to become familiar with how 
systems work. They need to gain experience in dealing and negotiating with government 
bodies and representatives when making demands for their communities. It takes a range 
of skills to represent the community and to appropriately manage an estate. Through 
training, potential tenant representatives can obtain the knowledge and, thus, the power to 
influence decisions. The PEP Guide to Local Housing Management, 1987 recommends:  
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a real effort to provide proper training for leaders. In every community, 
there are ordinary people with the leadership qualities and the desire to 
participate…. We also recommend offering caretaking jobs to tenants 
which provide work for the unemployed and at the same time improve the 
level of service (the PEP Guide to Local Housing Management,1987;11 - 
13) 
 
Freire (1971), who lived in deprived neighbourhoods as a youth, acknowledges that 
training helps people gain confidence and have the chance to make a real impact. Freire 
uses his experience to justify the contribution of training to encourage freedom and provide 
residents with the ability to ask critical questions and offer solutions. Gavena and Edwards 
(2001) found that local social activities have a focal role in collective empowerment, as 
they not only provide opportunities for residents to get together for leisure, socialising, 
exchanging views, but they are also a base for the networking of information about the 
community and can act as a platform for community activity. In times of disputes, tenants 
can use these connections to form pressure groups and organise campaigns. Training 
enhances knowledge and power, enabling residents to create an environment in which 
positive motivation flourishes.  
 
2.5.2 Training in Practice  
Practical experience suggests an effective formula for training schemes in the community. 
It requires long-term commitment from the authorities to provide resources for proper 
training and also to monitor its impact, in particular to encourage local leadership to be 
involved so that they can inspire the whole community. An example of such a training 
scheme is Locality UK which aims to strengthen communities by providing training for 
leaders that hopefully pushes the whole community forward. The Community Organisers 
programme enables us to involve more local people in identifying what matters to them in 
their communities and what they would like to see changed for the better. The programme 
recruits and trains up to 500 senior community organisers and 4,500 part-time and 
voluntary organisers in some of the most deprived communities in the UK:  
 
Through our network we will strengthen current and aspiring members to 
promote community enterprise, community asset ownership, and social 
action within their communities.
4
  
 
                                                 
4
 Locality UK, http://locality.org.uk/about/mission-vision/, page 1 of the mission vision page. 
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The first essential step in such training, however, is residents’ acknowledgement of their 
often-poor conditions — poor enough, in fact, to make them seek escape. As awareness of 
conditions increases, so does a sense of community, and once this sense of community has 
been formed, projects can move forward. The Citizen Organizing Foundation (UK) is 
another training programme that focuses on leaders and enables them to improve their 
skills. Training is offered to individuals from a variety of backgrounds and takes place 
locally to identify and develop new leaders. Courses as described in the group website deal 
with “how to connect faith and values to practical action; the role that power and self-
interest play in holding a group together; campaigning methodology that helps strengthen 
organisations and gains recognition and dignity for individuals, families and the 
community”.5 Outside the UK, Tenant Democracy in Denmark (Jensen, 2006) provides 
special training for leaders and board members to help them improve their performance. 
Residents’ roles include wider responsibilities in addition to representation of the local 
community, such as budgetary planning, problem-solving skills, efficient management and 
the ability to produce assessments and feedback to sponsors. 
 In addition to designated training schemes for leaders, training for the whole 
community is the main means of providing tools to overcome gaps among the general 
community. One successful example of the impact training had upon a community was 
Columbia’s Escuela Nueva Program, which involved the local community and followed an 
introduction of proper training: “The result has been to boost morale, reduce drop-out and 
repeater rates, improve achievement scores, and expand enrolment demand.”6 Another 
barrier that training schemes aim to tackle is residents lack of confidence in their own 
abilities and lack of faith in the authorities’ intention to support poor communities. 
Evidence to support this view comes from an unusual document prepared by low-income 
residents and presented to the LSE students in the housing programme. The document 
(Inspiring People, 2004, Case Study 2, no page numbers) quote Debbie Holmes, from 
Burton Park Residents Association in Rhyl, who admitted that before training she did not 
have the confidence to take even ‘slight responsibility’, yet training allowed her to gain 
“the confidence I desperately needed to become one of the best and most rewarded 
community activists in Wales” (Inspiring People, 2004, Case Study 1, no page numbers). 
                                                 
5
 http://www.cof.org.uk/. 
6
 World Bank Participation Sourcebook, Washington, D.C., 1996. ‘Participation in the Education 
and Training Sector’, Appendix II: Working Paper Summaries, p. 231. 
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Organisations that offer local residents caretaking jobs to service the community also 
includes training to ensure that residents are facilitated properly:  
 
These targets were strictly enforced by the outstanding resident estate 
superintendent, using some of the most advanced and efficient equipment. 
His one year training course in cleaning and caretaking supervision had a 
remarkable effect on confidence and performance. This caretaking, with 
nine staff, made Broadwater Farm one of the cleanest and best maintained 
estates of its kind in the country. Visitors from all over the world came to 
study its style of service, of community involvement, of youth action and 
of local control (Power, 1999; 200)  
 
WECH (Walterton & Elgin Council Homes in London), offer similar perspectives on the 
positive impact residents’ caretaking had on the estate:  
 
I was struck by the open meetings. I came away feeling invigorated and 
inspired by the sense of shared vision and determination from the 
residents, their advisors and supports. It was an enormous powerful force. 
(Rosenberg, 1987: 17) 
 
There are many other success stories related to training schemes that have empowered 
communities. One example described in an unusual document prepared by low-income 
residents and presented to the LSE housing programme. The document (Inspiring People, 
2004) provide examples of schemes in housing organisations where residents were 
dominant in management, such as TRA (Tenants Residents Association), at the Plas 
Madoc Estate in North Wales where residents confirmed how effective training schemes 
are and what influence they make locally:  
 
Before the courses, she was not able to fill in official forms, but 
afterwards she became so successful that she now teaches others. 
(Inspiring People, 2004, Case Study 4, no page numbers) 
 
There are also stories where residents were less active and more dependent. The National 
Communities Resource Centre at Trafford Hall in Chester, UK, is a charity that offers 
training and support to those living and working in low-income areas allowing them to 
develop skills, confidence and the capacity to tackle problems and reverse poor conditions:  
 
Courses aim to bring people together to share ideas and experiences, learn 
new skills and increase levels of confidence. Courses designed to meet 
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the needs families, young people and adults, are regularly evaluated to 
ensure that they are achieving the charity's aims.
7
 
  
Recently, Trafford Hall initiated the ‘Tenant Feature Training’: low cost courses for 
residents of housing associations in England, focusing on positive local action to tackle 
problems and for the development of management of social housing.
8
 There have also been 
schemes designed to overcome the inadequacies of previous courses and sustain their 
positive impact, such as at the Ballymun Job Centre (in Power, 1999) which proves the 
necessity of consistency in order to enable long-term involvement:  
 
Training schemes were often short-term. It was hard to keep them going 
permanently, when once capital programmes were completed. This 
severely limited their impact.  
 
By contrast, where training could be maintained over a long period, the chances of 
empowerment success were greater as appear in WECH (Rosenberg, 1997). 
 
There are also many success stories related to collective empowerment. Authorities allow 
participation and provide tools to overcome knowledge gaps and facilitate residents to 
perform well in their local programmes and there are housing organisations that attest to 
this, and yet collective empowerment in housing policy is not a common phenomenon. In 
this research we analyse the participatory flow in Israel: whether there is development of 
individual empowerment into collective empowerment and also the impact of multi-
conflict on communities, social policy and empowerment (in both individual and collective 
terms).  
 Creating the participatory environment for community empowerment to flourish 
requires a supportive official strategy in which local governments have a central role. Not 
all authorities or the general public are convinced of such an approach and in the Israeli 
case in particular the role of local government is extremely limited when it comes to 
housing policy. This also reflects upon the analysis of social policy under multiple external 
pressures and how multi-pressure situations influence the ability of local government to 
become involved. Community empowerment requires resources, commitment and funding 
                                                 
7
 http://www.traffordhall.com/?s=Chester%2C+UK, page 1 on community learning page under 
Chester UK search  
8
 http://www.traffordhall.com/?s=capital+programmes+, page 1 on community learning under 
capital programme section 
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and not all authorities or the public are willing to make the necessary provision for them. 
The next section discusses the critics of collective empowerment. 
 
2.6 Multi-Conflict Societies 
Israel is a special case. It is unique because it brings multi-conflicts into a single ‘melting 
pot’ society. Social policy in a multi-conflict scenario is only one conflict out of a few or 
even many. This research aims to investigate the role of social policy in a multi pressure 
environment and what is, if any, the balance of power between social policy and other 
pressures when it comes to decision making.   
 One type of pressure is ethnic conflict, such as in the case of refugees. UNHCR 
research has identified a pattern in dealing with refugee problems in many corners of the 
world, which tends to involve a collision between care and human rights on the one hand 
and an attempt to simply ‘erase’ the problem by despatching it to an area beyond the 
authority’s control (such as by repatriation), on the other. It was also shown that social 
policy was not a priority of authorities facing refugee problems:  
 
the poverty of most refugees receiving stats combined with inadequate international 
assistance meant that refugees were often viewed as been a drain on the local 
economy. Representatives of the international community occasionally came under 
pressure to encourage refugees to go back home. (Allen & Morsink, 1994;5)   
  
Cole has noted that one ethnic pressure — refugees — can collide with the cultural and 
political issues of an authority, social policy being one of them: “it is increasingly accepted 
that it is concerned with ‘such basic issues as social and economic development” (Coles, 
1989:211)     
 Stein, who focuses on refugee issues in conflict areas, has indicated that most 
refugees return home, more because of the deterioration of conditions in their country of 
residence than because of improving conditions in their home countries. Other research 
suggests that during conflicts, priorities are not necessarily driven by social policy. 
(Larkin, Cuny and Stein, 1991; Cuny, Stein and Reed, 1992). 
 In research conducted by the EU to gain support for civil society organisations, one 
of the main challenges appears to be that in time of conflict, the ability of authorities to 
provide support decreases:  
Another emergent risk appears to be in the political divergence of civil society: as 
politicians and policymakers shift attention towards dealing with populist reactions 
to specific policy failures or deficiencies, CSO that deals with issues that are not in 
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the limelight may well be relegated to lower level of attention. (Shahin, J. 2003; 
p.46) 
 
 In analysis published by UNESCO, Giordan (1992) highlighted the challenges posed 
by multi-ethnic and multicultural societies to current regimes which create difficulties for 
authorities in dealing with growing internal pressure and demands for attention to social 
needs.  
 
 There has not been a great deal of research on social and housing policies in multi-
conflict societies, and since Israel is a special case, where many conflicts come together, 
this research provides an opportunity to raise another question: whether Western thinking 
is valid when applied to multi-conflict areas. 
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2.7 Limitations 
Convincing the public and the authorities of the importance of empowerment is perhaps 
the first challenge of empowerment supporters. Although academic research and case 
studies have shown that localisation of services, enabling resident participation and the 
provision of tools to improve performance can turn projects into successes, there is no 
guarantee that the authorities or the general public will favour such programmes because 
they are targeted at low-tax-paying minorities. There is more research among Western 
economies on the advantages of empowerment in housing policy than on its limitations, 
and on why these empowerment projects in social policy are more widespread.   
 The main limitation of empowerment is therefore the shift from individual activities 
to the public arena. Participation is vital for empowerment but at the same time without a 
supportive public policy that allows participation and grants residents influence, 
empowerment is highly unlikely to develop. 
 Authorities do not always believe in the notion of empowerment, and sometimes 
argue that free market rules can solve problems better than government intervention. Some 
do not approve of greater investment in a proportion of the population that falls outside the 
ruling hegemony. Whereas the general public can also be less supportive of empowerment 
schemes, the majority of tax payers wish to see their taxes re-invested in their communities 
and in issues that are relevant to them (such as education, health, security) and not 
elsewhere.  
 Another limitation of empowerment is the dominance of central government. 
Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014), have found growing number of examples to confirm that 
democratisation processes and decentralisation have led to a rise in power of local 
government which has proved itself more attentive to low income residents.  
 
In a smaller arena, residents have a greater impact on decision-makers. Satterthwaite and 
Mitlin give an example of participatory budgeting from Porto Allegra in Brazil where 
residents of poor neighbourhoods have the power to impact upon the operation of local 
government and even replace the mayor if he/she is not delivering.  
 Another limitation is relations within the community. Since small communities can 
act together to generate power, influence decisions and create change, there is a need for 
community cohesion that as Power suggested (2007) sometimes starts at the family level. 
If these are strong empowerment can grow, when these are weak empowerment declines: 
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 There are also limits to self-help, in terms of how much the individual should invest 
in order to act, in order to improve their position, and at the same time how much support 
the authorities need to offer. There is also the issue of de-politicisation, as discussed in 
more detail in chapter Six, where authorities intervene in order to influence the shape and 
form of the local residents’ group.    
 Similar views have been presented by participants of poor neighbourhoods in Israel 
against groups who, because of community cohesion, have managed to get better housing 
terms. We will aim to analyse whether these arguments are also valid in the Israeli case or 
whether multi-conflict situations are another limitation of empowerment in the social 
housing policy case altogether. 
 In order to overcome these limitations, the main argument in support of the 
importance of empowerment is its impact upon people and in creating healthier societies 
which allow the disadvantaged to integrate with the general public and turn them into 
committed citizens that wish to pay back into society and make a contribution like 
everyone else. Another argument is associated with the potential impact upon an area. Poor 
areas are inhabited by concentrations of unemployed and unskilled disadvantaged 
populations, but it is not only these characteristics that prevent such areas from flourishing. 
Supportive public policy towards these neighbourhoods, providing improved services and 
greater care, can create positive changes which turn redundant areas into places that are 
more accommodating.  
 Finally, regeneration is ultimately the authorities’ responsibility. It is not the fault of 
residents that their neighbourhood is poor, that they are alienated from decent services and 
have limited access to them. It is these factors that create marginalisation. Authorities have 
a responsibility to all residents, and some argue that if the authorities allow the creation of 
such poor and marginalised neighbourhoods, then they should also assist in their revival 
through “political will on the part of central government and commitment by key actors” 
(World Bank, 2005, Appendix 2a: 3).  
 Even when authorities and the public are convinced as to the necessity of 
empowerment, either as a solution or as a national value or even as a moral responsibility, 
they still need to fund it. In other words, they must allocate greater budgetary support to 
those who contribute the least financially. The opponents of funding empowerment argue 
that it is in the nature of capitalism that ruling groups use their power to achieve their self-
interests at the expense of weaker, marginal groups. Others claim that social expenditure 
recycles itself, as it provides no real cure but only temporary solutions, like “A wart (a 
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virus) that spreads very easily, is very resistant to treatment and has a tendency to 
reappear” (Power, 1992; 8-9).  
 Empowerment supporters respond that social payouts without persistent care 
perpetuate the conditions of the disadvantaged. The response to financial concerns should 
therefore be to argue that in the long run, empowerment provides effective financial 
solutions in the form of reduced long-term costs, and these can be considered a real 
benefit. 
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2.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has considered the key issues in the existing literature concerning 
empowerment and provided the basis upon which this research on social and housing 
policy in Israel has been modelled. Empowerment of the disadvantaged is a challenging 
and complex task. Empowerment is about people (individual empowerment), communities 
and authorities (collective empowerment). People may be reluctant to fully participate in 
the process, since local organisation is often precarious, especially in areas of neglect, 
inhabited by the poor and alienated, and deprived both in physical and social terms. 
However, residents have a direct role to play in tackling problems and improving their 
neighbourhoods; moreover, without their input, priorities can be misdirected and 
programmes backfire. Nevertheless, individual empowerment is only the first step in the 
empowerment process. Studies show that individual empowerment (residents’ 
participation) needs to be supported with localisation (improved local services accessible 
to all residents). It should also facilitate and support leaders from the local community with 
tools to improve their involvement, gain their trust and guarantee commitment, and in 
order to sustain these achievements programmes need to be consistent. This leads to 
collective empowerment — the next phase of the empowerment process which allows for 
the delegation of power to those among the local community who prove they are capable 
of taking on responsibility.  
 Empowerment therefore involves community-based programmes and resident 
participation. The local community should be involved and have a real share in project 
management. Resident participation is essential because of tenants’ familiarity with a place 
and its problems, their ability to accurately assess what is needed and, ultimately, their 
desire to create and become committed to change. WECH prove how residents’ 
involvement can develop and empower the community (Rosenberg, 1997). 
 
Individual Empowerment and community cohesion need supportive public policy which 
allows participation, provides improved services to be delivered locally, encourages and 
maintains leadership and offers consistent support to the community. Training and 
education schemes are examples of the provision of tools to help residents develop the 
necessary skills to improve the quality and extent of their participation. Residents of poor 
estates might know best what is good for them but not necessarily how to bring that into 
practice. Knowledge is power, thus these schemes can facilitate appropriate techniques to 
confront officials and incorporate project management. 
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 The main arguments against empowerment-based programmes are related to cost 
(funds directed to small groups rather than to the general public), the idea that the private 
market will eventually solve financial problems, that central investment can only cause 
harm, that places are neglected because residents do not care and thus any investment will 
be a waste as it can create only marginal change. It is key that governments recognise that 
the potential of empowerment can be reached only through the acknowledgement of 
problems. Problems have a tendency to grow rather than disappear when ignored. A 
governments’ acknowledgement that problems will not fade away unless a joint effort is 
made involving them and local communities is the first step towards empowerment:  
 
The poor condition of the council stock is made worse by poor 
maintenance and underinvestment. These problems have built up over the 
years. (The Inquiry Commission for Council Housing Problems in 
Birmingham, 2002: 15) 
 
Once empowerment is considered as a possible solution, participation should be 
encouraged and authorities should provide localised improved services that generate trust 
and commitment. This also generates a far-reaching impact on wider issues such as 
employment, job accessibility, environment and facilitation of services. Localisation, 
therefore, improves conditions, builds up residents’ confidence in their abilities, closes 
gaps and removes obstacles; efforts become worthwhile and self-reinforcing.  
  
 Empowerment not only about helps individuals to survive in different difficult 
circumstances; it is about responding to structural problems and making major social 
changes. It is about helping the disadvantaged to become a cohesive, well-organised group 
and about enabling groups that might otherwise remain powerless to gain some control 
over their lives and living conditions. It is about providing residents with the appropriate 
tools to improve their community and offer them a route out of social dependency. 
Individual empowerment combined with collective empowerment and public support may 
offer poor neighbourhoods the opportunity to build a community that can act to improve its 
present conditions and work towards a better future. The current literature suggests that 
housing policy should embrace empowerment methods, however this research attempts to 
investigate whether these approaches are valid in a multi-conflict environment. It is this 
proposition that this study examines with relevance to Israel. 
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Chapter Three 
History: The Chronology of the Housing System in Israel 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the evolution of the housing system in Israel, with 
special emphasis on social housing policy, to provide an essential contextual understanding 
of the main focus of the research on empowerment of a disadvantaged population which is 
based on resident participation and public policy. As a starting point, studies confirm that 
Israeli social housing policy faced great challenges with reasonable success:  
 
The achievements of Israel’s housing policy are noteworthy, considering both 
the poor housing conditions when the State was established in 1948 and the 
five-fold increase in its population over the past 40 years. (Carmon and 
Czmanski, 1990) 
 
 Interestingly, in light of such achievements, the philosophy behind Israel’s housing 
policy has changed from central planning in its early years (1948–77) to the current 
market-oriented approach. The first part of this chapter discusses the main characteristics 
of Israeli housing policy chronologically.  
 The second part discusses the development of publicly-funded housing policy in 
poor neighbourhoods and in other areas. Publicly-funded housing policy in Israel is 
controlled fully by central government; although many in Europe find it hard to 
understand, there is almost no local government housing policy in Israel and almost every 
aspect of housing policy is decided by central government. This part provides the main 
characteristics of the system including the changes (reduction) in government intervention 
and the shift in social policy design to focus more on funding solutions in the private 
market. It describes the structure of publicly-funded housing, including the formation of 
housing companies, the distribution of tenure and spread of services in poor 
neighbourhoods and other communities where government invested in providing publicly-
funded housing solutions.  
 The third part presents the main housing programmes and brings all these issues 
together in order to highlight the contribution of history to the understanding of 
empowerment in social and housing programmes in the very unique case of Israel. In Israel 
the role of central government in housing is focal. It is a society that absorbed a high 
  
59 
percentage of new immigrants of mixed ethnicity over a short period of time, a society that 
is based on a preferred religious group, a society that is dominated by security concerns, a 
society with growing gaps between rich and poor, where politics is embedded in the 
decision-making process and impacts upon a policy design that diverts and allocates funds 
not only according to social criteria but according to all the factors listed above. In order to 
understand Israeli social housing policy it is important to understand its chronological 
evolution. 
 
3.2. Chronological Evolution of Housing Policy in Israel 
Research into the early years of Israeli housing policy highlights two major aims that 
coincided with national interests at the time: immigration absorption and population 
dispersal. These dominant goals led to high-volume, low-quality construction of housing. 
Following this, a more ambitious goal was added to the original two: the provision of 
satisfactory housing to every household and, over the past decade as part of a policy of 
market liberalisation, housing solutions have become more and more the responsibility of 
private investors. This has resulted in higher-quality housing for many, and mainly those 
who could afford it, but which at the same time led to deterioration in the quality of social-
housing, despite the more-general achievements noted above.  
 In brief, the chronological description begins in 1930 before Israel was established 
as a State, when private market rent was the common housing solution, and continues with 
the establishment of the State and the creation of transit camps to house the thousands of 
new immigrants. In 1952 those camps were turned into newly built and publicly-funded 
neighbourhoods (‘Shikunim’).  
 During the 1960s the first social inequalities began to appear between publicly-
funded neighbourhoods and upcoming private-built, high-standard housing. This was also 
the period when the first Demolish & Rebuild programme was introduced. This 
momentum continued throughout the 1970s with more budgets directed to fund solutions 
in the private market and less to build solutions for those in need.  
 In the 1980s, the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme was introduced to improve 
housing standards in poor neighbourhoods, with other minority groups (such as the Israeli 
Arab population) being included in social housing programmes later in the decade.  
 The new wave of immigrants that arrived during the 1990s forced the government 
to return to the housing market and renew the public housing build in order to meet 
growing demand. In 1998 the first sales of publicly-built units under the RTB began, but 
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were frozen a few years later. In 2003 the eviction of Jewish settlements from the Gaza 
Strip (the disengagement) began and the government built temporary housing for the 
evacuees. In the beginning of 2011 massive demonstrations against the lack of affordable 
housing erupted and in early 2013 election results indicated how far dissatisfaction with 
social policy and housing has taken a prime role. 
 
We have provided each of the policies, programmes, case studies, and even participants 
with an illustration. The main photos which describe an important factor in the chapter 
have been added to the main body of text, the rest have been placed in the appendix. The 
choice of illustrations is related simply to priority and selection, as this research has many 
images to present and we did not want to overload the chapters.     
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Table 1 
The following table summarises the main events in Israeli housing policy in chronological 
order 
Year / period 
 
The social housing hegemony 
1930s to 1948 (Before the Establishment of 
Israel as a State) 
Renting as a Common Housing Solution 
1948–1952 (Establishment of the State and 
the Early Years):  
The Transit Camps 
1952–1959 
 
The Transition from Special Transit Camps 
to Publicly-Built Neighbourhoods 
The Early 1960s 
 
Substantial Building Programmes and the 
Initiation of Demolish & Rebuild 
The Late 1960s 
 
The Emergence of Social Inequalities 
The 1970s Private Market Take-Over 
The 1980s:  The introduction of The ‘Neighbourhood 
Renewal Programme’   
The Early 1990s:  
 
A Massive Immigration Wave and the 
Rebirth of Government Intervention 
The Late 1990s:  
 
The introduction of the ‘Urban Renewal 
Programme’ 
From 1998 Onwards:  First Sale of Council Units and Social 
unrest 
 
Below is a detailed chronological description of the events 
 
3.2.1 From the 1930s to 1948 (Before the Establishment of Israel as a State): Renting as a 
Common Housing Solution  
The Mandate instrument passed by the League of Nations on 24 July 1922 granted Britain 
a mandate and formalised British rule over the area currently occupied by Israel, the West 
Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jordan. The British Mandate for Palestine, which ended on 14 
May 1948, was a legal commission for the administration of the territory that had formerly 
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constituted the Ottoman Empire. The mandate document formalised the creation of two 
distinct British protectorates — Palestine (AKA the State of Israel), as a national home for 
the Jewish people under direct British rule, and Transjordan, an Emirate governed semi-
autonomously by Britain under the rule of the Hashemite family, also known as the State 
of Jordan (and includes parts of what is currently known as the Palestinian Authority).  
 Housing status at the time was achieved with private capital, and renting was the 
common solution to housing needs (illustration 3.1).
9
 During this period, 90% of 
household heads were living in rented accommodation (Vertzberger And Reshef, 1991: 
30). This period was characterised by severe housing shortages that ultimately created a 
bullish rental market with shortage of units for rent, rapidly increasing rents and house 
prices. Consequently, to defend tenants against this rent inflation, the ruling government 
announced regulation to prevent landlords from charging disproportionate increases in 
rent. The new rules, together with high inflation, meant that building property for rent was 
no longer worthwhile. Loans for buying dwellings, as well as tax reductions for those who 
decided to move from renting to private owning, caused the private sector to flourish 
(illustration 1). A decade later, when the State was established, rentals accounted for only 
12% of the total housing market (Vertzberger And Reshef, 1991: 30). 
 
  
                                                 
9
 Illustrations that appear in this form – i.e. 3.1, 3.2., etc. – can be found in Appendix 7, under 
chapter headings. 
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1. Tel Aviv in 1930s. A crowded city with new immigrants from Europe who replicated their 
home cities, with shops, cafes and private rental housing.  
Source: http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?p=20640210 
 
3.2.2 1948–1952 (Establishment of the State and the Early Years): The Transit Camps  
When the State of Israel was established in 1948, housing policy faced two major 
obstacles; poor housing conditions as a result of the war between Jews and Arabs 
especially in the extreme population-density in the main cities (an average of 3 people per 
room in 1946 [Carmon, 1979]) and a massive Jewish immigration wave to the newly 
established State which further intensified the housing shortage. Absorption of hundreds of 
thousands of people forced the new State to create immediate solutions, even if they were 
only minimal shelter.  
 The first government housing innovation which aimed to provide minimal shelter 
for the newcomers and which was able to house significant numbers of people was the 
Ma’abarot — the special transit camps (illustration 2). The first camp was created in May 
1950 near Jerusalem
10
 and within two years the Ma’abarot were home to 220,000 new 
immigrants (20% of the population of Israel at the time)
11. A Ma’abara was a very basic, 
low-quality housing solution of mainly cloth tents on wooden frames, or cardboard or 
aluminium sheds with no amenities, sanitation, or even at times, running water. Almost 
none of the solutions were solid build, and some were made of asbestos. Furthermore, they 
                                                 
10
 Davar. The first Ma’abara for new immigrants was built near Jerusalem and its residents worked in 
Jerusalem forest, 23.05.1950. 
11
 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999. 
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were without electricity, gas infrastructures or moveable facilities. They were a short-lived 
solution and built as such. The first to be pulled down were in 1954 and by 1959 all the 
Ma’abarot were either demolished or were the sites of new cities. 
 
 
2. Immigrants arrive in Ma’abara, 1949. Immigrants doubled Israel’s population in 3 years: 
600,000 new immigrants arrived during the State’s first three years. Many were diverted to 
temporary tent camps called Ma’abara.  
Source: http://dancutlermedicalart.com/AlbertEinstein'sZionism/08Einstein'sZionism1950- 
1955.htm. 
 
 In the collective memory of the Israeli population, the Ma’abarot symbolise 
extremely poor housing conditions and at times engendered shame or stigma for their 
occupants, yet researchers, focusing not on housing conditions and social perspectives but 
on policy-making under pressure, describe the process as enterprising:  
 
Looking back as planners, we can appreciate the endeavour; the Ma’abarot 
were part of an ambitious development plan [to allow all the Jewish people to 
enter the state in consideration of employment opportunities]. (Carmon and 
Czamanski, 1990: 519). 
 
 The Ma’abarot were, therefore, a unique innovation, an impressive emergency 
response by a very young government to intense housing pressures, yet they were only a 
temporary solution (illustration 3). 
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3. A Ma’abara camp, 1950. Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maabara1950.jpg. 
 
3.2.3 1952–59: The Transition from Special Transit Camps to Publicly-Built 
Neighbourhoods  
Between 1948 and 1958, the number of Jewish citizens increased dramatically from 
650,000 to 1,810,000 — an expansion of 180% in ten years (Drin Hayim, 1959: 13). In 
order to ensure that the entire land was equally populated, population dispersal became a 
key priority (illustration 4). This was influenced by many factors (economics, security, 
politics) but was not a social policy. Nevertheless, one social issue that emerged was a plan 
to solve housing problems by preventing the over-concentration of the population in the 
main cities (illustration 3.2), which led to the development of the more remote areas (Drin 
Hayim, 1959: 14) (illustration 5). In 1949, the national housing corporation, Amidar, was 
founded in order to execute this housing policy, to provide housing solutions for eligible 
tenants, mainly by building housing units. In addition, the corporation was involved with 
housing management, which entailed providing housing access for new immigrants; unit 
maintenance and damage prevention; rent collection; property registration, and all other 
housing activities. Ten years later, more companies were founded to provide local housing 
solutions, yet criteria and funds were all directed by central government.  
 
 
  
66 
 
4. Transforming Ma’abara to housing. Source: http://www.ariehsharon.org/Archive/Physical-
Planning-in-Israel/Layout-and-Architecture/17156839_Qq5djj/1316061390_2xs3B3J#!i= 
1316061390&k=2xs3B3J. 
 
 
 
5. Transforming Ma’abara to housing. New housing replaced the Ma’abara tents. Residents’ 
group private collection. 
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 Appendix 1:1 provides details of the quantity of new building every year. The 
decline/increase between 1969 and 1975 and 1995 to 1998 reflects the massive 
immigration waves. 
 
3.2.4 The Early 1960s: Substantial Building Programmes and the Initiation of Demolish & 
Rebuild 
Between 1952 and 1964, the annual rate of population growth dropped to around 5% 
(much lower than the average of 20% in the first three years of the State). The government 
therefore had greater freedom during the 1960s to invest and plan more permanent 
solutions, in the shape of huge complexes called Shikunim. More than 500,000 units were 
built in twelve years, the majority being government owned and managed (illustration 3.3). 
The principle, based on previous experience, was simple: to provide proper dwellings  
instead of temporary transit camps, which had become slums. In this regard, it was 
relatively successful:  
 
towards the end of the period only 4000 households remained in 
transition camps, and one could count about 400 new small agricultural 
settlements (most of them cooperatives) and some 30 new development 
towns with modern housing, infrastructure, and services, most of them in 
the less-populated areas of Galilee and the Negev. (Carmon and 
Czamanski, 1990: 519) (Illustration 3.4)  
 
 Appendix 1:2 shows how public building dominated during the 1960s compared 
with the drop over the following years.  
 Housing policy in general has continued to be shaped by the initial objective of 
population dispersal, which continues to dominate policy making. Some argue that it 
relates to national defence and the need of the Israeli State to strengthen its periphery and 
boarders to protect against hostile neighbours (Cohen, 1969). To achieve this, settlements 
were constructed in remote areas near borders. Up until 1959, public building dominated 
the housing market; private building as a share of completed building initiatives was 
negligible, even though the young State faced high demand and a massive wave of 
immigrants (illustration 6).  
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6. Early Immigration – New immigrants arrive into Haifa port in the State early 
days. Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/jewishagencyforisrael/4035060276/ 
 
For example, if in 1949 the number of units owned by Amidar, the main housing 
corporation, was 10,000, by 1958 this number had climbed to 125,000 and reached 
200,000 in 1962 (Katz I, 1997: 192) (illustrations 7 & 8 present rapid build during the 
1960s and its consequences thirty years later). 
 
 
7. Yaski Neighbourhood in Kiryat Gat in the 1960s.  
Source: http://www.mouse.co.il/CM.articles_item,419,209,44771,.aspx. 
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8.Yaski Neighbourhood in Kiryat Gat in the 1990s. Currently a very poor estate with only 16 
families left (out of 226). Source: http://www.mouse.co.il/CM.articles_item,419,209,44771,.aspx 
 
 The first sale of public units was therefore initiated not as part of a deliberately 
planned policy, but through limited initiatives that depended on large, hard to manage 
council-housing stock in particular locations. Sales allowed tenants to purchase their 
dwellings at a subsidised discount that reduced prices by 25%. This was the first indication 
of the transformation of public solutions into private ones (illustration 9). From the 1950s 
through to the end of the 1980s, 180,000 Amidar units were transferred to private tenure. 
Analysts calculate that the initiative saved the state $75,000,000 per annum in running 
costs, equal to $420 in annual maintenance per unit (Bar Dadon Israeli, 2000: 6). Early in 
the 1960s, the government also introduced the Demolish and Rebuild Programme (D&R) 
which focused on old neighbourhoods with extremely poor and inadequate housing located 
in central cities, in order to build a new standard of housing on valuable land (illustration 
3.5). 
 
 
9. A publicly-funded peripheral housing estate in the 
1980s. These long, low-rise buildings, all similar in 
appearance and size (small-moderate) offer basic 
facilities, and were built rapidly to provide quick housing 
solutions to new immigrants.  
 
Source: http://www.themarker.com/realestate/1.1655926. 
Photo by Alon Ron. 
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3.2.5 The Late 1960s: The Emergence of Social Inequalities  
The reduction in the number of immigrants, a resulting economic recession and, above all, 
rising concerns about residents of the temporary camps who lost all patience on the day of 
their move to permanent housing, as well as conflicts between groups of residents of 
different ethnic origins packed into small sites led to a change of policy. Ethnic disputes 
led to dissatisfaction with the central authority, with many camp residents feeling 
discriminated against by a government which allegedly treated each ethnic group 
differently. New immigrants from Asia and Africa were directed to the camps in remote 
locations while those from Europe were directed to new neighbourhoods in the cities.  
 There was a huge effort under pressure of time to provide decent shelter for all new 
immigrants, yet residents’ disputes forced the government to consider moving away from 
delivering social housing solutions. When decision-makers realised that all their efforts did 
not bring them the support and rewards they had anticipated, but precisely the opposite, 
they formulated a new strategy to allow the private market to step in and offer services 
which residents could not contest. As a result, government involvement in building social 
housing solutions significantly decreased,
12
 while offers of funds to residents to find their 
own solution in the private market increased.
13
 Subsidies and supervision took over from 
actual construction, and government-led housing programmes were handed over to 
developers, who were in return tempted by rewards for rapid building. In other words, the 
housing budget, which was used by the government to build social housing, was now used 
to subsidise low-interest mortgages that were not fully indexed. The number of housing 
solutions the government had to offer decreased and therefore the criteria had to be 
revised, with less people meeting eligibility. In fact, although the government did not build 
any new public housing, it spent much more on funding the growing need through the 
private market (Appendix 1:3 shows the decrease in public building in the late 1960s). 
 An example of the growing social inequalities across Israel was that, by the end of 
the 1960s, there was almost no private housing in the south of the State (an area that was 
considered to be poor), whereas in the centre (Tel Aviv), 42% of housing was under 
private ownership (illustration 10). The fact that public housing was less available in the 
centre offered little freedom of choice for those under housing support, mainly concerning 
location, employment, social and cultural links (Lu-yon & Kalush, 1994: 6) (illustration 
3.6 presents central housing vs. the periphery). The public housing market was also 
                                                 
12
 The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. 
13
 The Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel. 
  
71 
restructured and the Housing Ministry established regional companies to manage the stock 
and deal with residents locally (Alexander, 1981), and with separate groups of residents 
(illustration 3.8).  
 
 
10. Housing in Central Israel, Tel Aviv 1960s: larger housing units with more space and 
better amenities. Source: http://www.clctin.com/yossishdemati/old-pics-tel-aviv 
 
Some suggest that the growing private market pushed the housing market forward. 
Although public housing in general was deemed to be low standard, in its early days it was 
considered pioneering in terms of modern design (Gerstel, 1980), a phenomenon quickly 
adopted by the private market:  
 
It is interesting to note that the public and not the private sector was usually the 
leading force in innovative design. In a typical scheme of an Israeli dwelling unit, 
full advantage is taken of every corner. This design started appearing in public 
projects of the sixties and was gradually developed by private builders (Carmon 
and Czamanski, 1990: 525).  
 
 The private sector also reduced density rates. Public housing was crowded. In the 
early 1960s, 24% of the population lived three or more people to a room. By the 1990s, the 
private housing market reduced that to 3.5% (Carmon and Czamanski, 1990, see also 
Appendix 2:1 for national average rates of density). Housing amenities were also 
improved. In the mid-1950s, 10% of households had no running water and twice that 
figure had no electricity, but by the late 1970s, such amenities were universally available. 
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3.2.6 The 1970s: Private Market Take-Over  
The same pattern of reduced direct government involvement in the housing market 
continued, and in the 1970s the shift from the public housing market to the private was 
almost complete. 70% of Israeli houses became privately owned and only 15% were under 
public tenancy contracts,
14
 which was an even tighter criteria since significantly less public 
housing solutions were available (Slijper, 1977). At the same time the private market 
increased housing standards and with it the demand for better quality housing than the 
publicly-funded solutions in the Shikunim. (See Appendix 5 for the growth in number of 
rooms per unit during these years). 
 Below are official figures from the Ministry of Housing
15
 showing the share of 
public housing from overall completed units, and represent the dramatic turnover in 
hegemony from public to private in less than 40 years: 
 
Figure 3: The share of publicly-funded housing units out of all housing units  
Period Share of public housing 
1950–1954 78% 
1965–1969 46% 
1987 22% 
Source: Ministry of Housing, 2005 
 
The shift from public to private is well documented in the number of housing starts,
16
 with 
the rare exception of government intervention in handling the massive immigration waves 
of the 1960s and 1990s: 
 
  
                                                 
14
 The rest were other sorts of housing like agricultural cooperatives — Kibbutzim and Moshavim — 
or religious communities. 
15
 Appendix 1 Ministry Housing, 2005. 
16
 Appendix 2 Ministry Housing, 2005. 
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Figure 4: Share of publicly-funded housing starts out of all housing starts  
Period Percentage of public housing starts 
1962 60% 
1970s 35%–45% 
1975 50% 
1977 25% 
1981 40% 
1989 15% 
1990 50% 
1991 75% 
1992 50% 
Source: Ministry of Housing, 2005 
 
Support of the table in figure 4 noted in the decline of investment in housing construction: 
from 13.7% of the national budget that spent of public housing in 1950, through an average 
of 10% in the years between 1953 and 1980; but only 5% by 1985. If public investment in 
the early years was almost equal to private, by the early 1990s it was four times higher 
(Carmon and Czamanski, 1990).  
 
3.2.7. The 1980s: ‘Neighbourhood Renewal’   
One of the main characteristics of the 1980s in terms of housing policy was the 
introduction of the ‘Neighbourhood Renewal Programme’ (NRP) (illustration 3.9). 
Although the majority of the housing stock in Israel was not old, since it was built under 
time pressure without national planning and with poor maintenance of publicly-funded 
estates which were already stigmatised and considered sub-standard and inadequate, there 
was a desperate need for renovation.  
 The Neighbourhood Renewal programme (represented by Vadi Saliv a 
governmental led project and The Neighbourhood of the Cardboards privatised form of the 
/NRP), offered social and environmental regeneration of these sites. Begun in 1979 and 
managed by the public-housing companies, the programme offered renovation of building 
exteriors and yards, interior renovation of homes and loans for housing enlargements 
(illustration 3.10). The NRP officially invited local tenants and representatives to 
participate in project management. In the programme’s early days, many projects 
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established local steering committees that were composed of officials and local residents in 
equal numbers, yet this has changed over the years, with a more dominant role taken by 
outsiders (politicians and high officials), due to a lack of a democratic tradition among 
participants and a reputation for corruption and mismanagement amongst officials. In the 
first decade, the programme included 90 neighbourhoods and, up until 1987, nearly half 
were completed or were in the process of renewal (Carmon and Gavrieli, 1987).  
 Another important focus during the 1980s was the attention to the minority Arab 
population. Much of the non-Jewish population of Israel (mainly Muslims-Arabs) tend to 
be amongst the poorest citizens; the majority live in traditional communities where only 
one working member contributes to the income of a family, facilities and conditions are 
relatively poor and planning and construction are almost non-existent. Except for mixed 
neighbourhoods of Jewish-Arab (in cities like Haifa, Jaffa, Acra, Ramle and Lod), the 
Jewish and Arab populations generally live separately, each in their own area. There are 
fewer government housing programmes for Arabs and residents claim they face 
discrimination either when trying to apply for publicly-funded housing (mainly located in 
Jewish neighbourhoods) or as a consequence of lower standards of maintenance in the very 
few housing solutions designated for them. Officials argued that during the mid-1980s, the 
government created eligibility criteria applying to all Israeli citizens (consequently 
improving the chances for non-Jewish citizens to apply for housing support). Nevertheless, 
the share of non-Jewish residents in council housing was small (illustrations 3.11 & 3.12).  
 
3.2.8 The Early 1990s: A Massive Immigration Wave and the Rebirth of Government 
Intervention 
A second large-scale immigration wave occurred in Israel between 1989 and 1994. As a 
result of the fall of the Soviet Bloc, 633,000 new immigrants arrived mainly from the 
former USSR, which required an immediate response to increase housing provision (State 
Comptroller Report no. 46, 1995: 133) (illustrations 3.13 & 3.14). In an effort to achieve 
this in a short time, the Housing Ministry regained control of the housing market and 
renewed public building. Between 1992 and 1994, 103,000 new public units were 
constructed. Interestingly, government public stock included 40,000 unoccupied units, yet 
the fact that they were located in unpopular areas, far from the centre and employment 
opportunities and with very poor transport links to the centre, forced the state to enlarge 
public building in prime locations where private market rules dominated (illustration 3.15).  
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 The following box analyses the share of housing in the national development 
budget,
17
 showing the significant rise in 1990: 
 
Figure 5: Share of budget allocated for publicly-funded housing solutions out of the 
state budget
18
 
Period % of housing out of the national development budget 
1972 27% 
1976 28% 
1989 2.5% (not a typo it was as marginal) 
1990 30% 
Source: Ministry of Housing, 2005 
 
These fluctuations are also evident in a graph of average construction time.
19
 In general, 
the private market was quicker to react and more efficient in its response, yet under 
pressure to house massive waves of immigrants, the government took control and delivered 
housing units in record time.  
 
Figure 6: Average construction time of public and private housing solutions 
Period Private Public 
1894–1987 24 months per unit 28 months per unit 
1987–1990 21 months per unit 31 months per unit 
1991 22 months per unit 11 months per unit 
Source: Ministry of Housing, 2005 
 
One explanation for this reversal is that the government felt a sense of urgency to produce 
quick housing solutions to the thousands of new immigrants (Appendix 1:3 for the rise in 
public building in the 1990s) and, to its credit, responded quickly to solve an immediate 
and urgent problem. Still, working under time pressure cannot provide perfect results, and 
some of the aspects of planning were criticised. New solutions were not suitable to support 
elderly people who needed lower-floor apartments or which were remote from other 
                                                 
17
 Appendix 3 Ministry Housing, 2005. 
18
 In 2015 the state budget was 238,000,000,000 NIS which is 40,000,000,000 GBP 
19
 Appendix 6 Ministry Housing, 2005. 
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immigrant centres, forcing new immigrants who ideally wished to live next to their 
families or residents of the same origin to struggle on elsewhere (State Comptroller Report 
no. 44, 1993: 174). 
 
3.2.9 The Late 1990s: Urban Renewal  
The delegation of authority to private developers in Demolish & Rebuild projects first 
began in the 1970s but became a phenomenon in the 1990s. The Ministry of Housing 
handed D&R projects, free of tender, to developers who agreed to take responsibility over 
a site. The new programme was similar to D&R, but offered residents guarantees before 
eviction (illustration 3.16). In the first stage, developers would build new houses into 
which residents could move; in the second stage, vacated units would be demolished and 
new ones built in their place, which allowed developers to gain profits from the sale. Since 
the negotiation was between developers and residents, in many cases they failed to reach 
agreement about eviction terms and only a few projects took off. During the massive 
immigration wave of the 1990s when land values rose dramatically and housing distress 
increased, projects became attractive to private entrepreneurs and initiatives for Urban 
Renewal become more common. However, studies (e.g., Fishbain, 2003) still suggest that 
developers’ greed and the race for immediate and excessive profits led to disagreements 
with residents, mainly over their compensation, and this limited the chances for such 
projects to thrive. 
 The Urban Renewal concept also gained support from those who believed that the 
State of Israel was no longer capable of handling comprehensive housing projects (the 
attempt to control the operation of D&R Projects in the early 1960s failed, the deterioration 
of the Neighbourhood Renewal Projects in the late 1990s is another symptom of failure), 
and that market rules granted both developers and residents a win-win situation financially 
(Maor, 2003; Tzadik, 2006; Talias, 1999; Liberman, 2007). The view was that each site 
could be expanded at least threefold from its current status and that residents could gain up 
to a 25% increase in their property’s value (Maiblum, 2002); In practice, putting decisions 
about the extent of compensation in the hands of private business, whose main interest was 
higher profits, had certain implications. For example, profit-oriented management seeking 
the extension of housing rights would almost certainly result in overcrowding and a high 
probability that the sites would become slums which was against residents wishes, as 
indeed has happened in two recent attempts (Fishbayin, 2003). Previous experience with 
regeneration programmes outside Israel suggest the benefit of cooperation between 
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residents, experts and officials, with the main interest being renewal of a deprived area 
rather than the generation of profits for developers (Maiblum, 2002). However, satisfying 
both sides (decent compensation for current residents and developers’ financial needs) can 
be extremely difficult, and in many cases this has become a zero-sum game. In early 2008, 
the Urban Renewal Programme involved 109 neighbourhoods in 32 different cities, but in 
the interview with the programme manager we have learned that so far none appear to have 
offered residents an operational role in management. This indicates limited cooperation 
between residents and developers which has delayed or postponed projects. 
 
3.2.10. From 1998 Onwards: First Sale of Council Units  
 
“Publicly built housing is a tool the state should use to intervene in order to 
guarantee appropriate housing for those in need” (Headey, 1978).  
 
Here, appropriate means quantity, quality and affordability — factors that the market itself 
cannot provide to all residents (Ho, 1995; Bal, Harole & Martens, 1998). Over the years, 
there has been a severe decline in scope and services provided by council housing 
companies. The scope of available units has also been unstable; council units in Israel have 
been sold intermittently since the 1950s (Darin, 1959; Werczberger, 1995), yet RTB was 
the first attempt to structure and anchor terms of sale in the statute book. Simultaneously, 
according to social activists, another aspect of the programme was to combat the total 
privatisation of council-housing companies. The idea was that residents would at least be 
allowed to buy these units should the government decide to end the programme (Rachman, 
2001). In order to finally get rid of unoccupied stock in public housing solutions in remote 
locations that were difficult to allocate, the Housing Ministry launched a programme for a 
general sale of units which was, however, unstructured but sporadic. Between 1990 and 
1998, 20,886 (out of the total stock of around 120,000) public units were sold to residents, 
more than 10% of these (2,455) were sold to the general public and the rest to eligible 
supported tenants. Among the units that were sold there are units that were placed in NRP 
neighbourhoods. In this waythe RTB, in some cases, could overlap with the NRP. When 
housing officials realised that many were interested in purchasing under these generous 
terms, the rules were tightened, especially in central cities, and sales fell. The formal RTB 
which aimed to legalise the sale was introduced only in late 1990s.  
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 Another D&R project was conducted in 2003 when the government announced the 
eviction of Jewish settlements (disengagement) from Gaza and re-housed evacuees in 
temporary sites. Housing problems continued to mount, however, and by 2012 inequalities 
in housing instigated huge waves of demonstrations across the country. Many middle class 
residents led protests against the lack of affordable housing, and two residents in housing 
distress even burnt themselves to death in protest. Moshe Sliman from Haifa was the first 
and his deadly activity shocked the country (illustration 3.17). A few weeks later, Akiva 
Mafei, disabled and wheelchair-bound, set fire to himself in the middle of a busy road near 
Yahud (illustration 3.18). These huge demonstrations also had an impact on the results of 
the 2013 election.  
 To sum up, the history of housing in Israel began with a new-born state that needed 
to create housing solutions for hundreds of thousands of new immigrants under pressure of 
time, and control population dispersal, ethnic conflicts and security issues, especially on 
the state’s borders. From central government control of the housing market in the first 
twenty years the shift moved towards the private housing market where housing solutions 
were subsidised in the private market to less eligible people. There were three main social 
housing programmes: Demolish and Rebuild, Neighbourhood Renewal and the publicly-
funded housing solution that was at the centre of the Right to Buy legislation. Israel’s 
involvement in multiple conflicts coalesces in housing policy. Security issues and the need 
to secure Israel’s borders (as well as the territories beyond), the country’s multi-ethnic 
society, tensions between new immigrants and veterans and between different 
communities, political relations between certain groups and the authorities, together and 
individually have had an impact on policy-making.  
 The next section discusses the main areas where housing policy and social conflict 
meet. The publicly-funded housing structure, the council housing companies and their 
relations with residents and services, the housing policy in the Kibbutzim — a unique 
community, managed and controlled by its residents (illustration 11), highly supported by 
the labour party in the country’s first three decades, and the housing benefits residents of 
the Kibbutzim have gained – the New Settlements, a unique community, strong, coherent 
and powerful, located on controversial land (according to the international law) of the 
West Bank, supported by the right wing regimes of the last three decades which have had a 
great influence on decision-makers, gaining them housing benefits. 
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11. Life in the Kibbutz comprised many social events. One of its most famous was the 
communal meal in the dining room. Source: http://kids.gov.il/kidsnews/pages/3261 
 
3.3. The Housing Programmes 
The following part provides brief information on the main programme investigated in this 
research. A detailed description of the particular case studies opens each programme 
chapter. This part provides information on the housing programmes in general, Demolish 
& Rebuild, the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme, the structure of the council-housing 
companies, tenure and spreading. It also provides information on other communities, 
where publicly-funded housing was provided, although not considered to be poor. A major 
phenomenon in Israeli history is the decline in public investment in housing compared to 
the growing private housing sector. If in the State’s early years most residents depended on 
publicly-funded housing solutions, by the late 1970s, almost 70% of Israeli citizens owned 
their homes, with almost 90% in 2006. As for those who still relied on public housing 
provision, by the late 1980s more than half lived in council housing (owned and managed 
by government-owned housing companies); others lived in subsidised rented 
accommodation in the private market. The next section focuses on this market. 
 
3.3.1 Demolish and Rebuild 
The idea behind Demolish and Rebuild (D&R) was to take advantage of valuable land that 
was currently the site of poor housing and to improve it. Many of these sites, located in the 
heart of Israeli cities, were old houses that had been affected by the war. Because their 
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poor status was never officially altered, no one ever bothered to renovate them. As a result, 
housing conditions on these sites before the establishment of the State and after (i.e. until 
D&R began in the 1960s) remained extremely poor and many buildings were deserted, 
thus making improvements impractical and extremely costly. Consequently, D&R 
emerged as a sensible way to provide housing that would benefit these communities with 
the potential to initiate social revival for residents. Another benefit seems to be use of 
valuable land to build not only better houses but also units in greater numbers.  
 Proposals for D&R emerged during the 1960s in Haifa, when plans were made to 
tackle poverty, improve social services and reduce indigence in the neighbourhood of 
‘Vadi Saliv’, located in the city centre (Weiss, 2007). More recently, D&R has also 
brought added financial value: for example, restoring historic housing in the city centre 
has produced more value than just constructing new, completely standard buildings 
(Fishbayin, 2003). The D&R Programme evolved through two main strands — the first 
proposed direct government control and, in the later phase, the government handed 
responsibility for the sites and projects to private developers: 
 The first D&R projects were all under the control of central government The 
Demolish and Rebuild Programme was confirmed in law in1965. The law set terms for the 
first projects (up to the 1970s) by which the government controlled all operational aspects, 
including identifying sites to evict and re-housing residents in the newly built units. 
Officials claim that residents were consulted, offered decent compensation and better 
housing situations than what they had had previously. Studies (Weiss, 2007; Fishbain 
2003), however, tend to disagree. Nevertheless, all concur that the operation was ungainly, 
protracted and slow, ultimately grinding to a complete halt.  
 When the centralised concept failed, the government handed the D&R to private 
developers. When private developers, as individuals, failed in few neighbourhoods, the 
model was re-thought and eventually modified to become the Urban Renewal Scheme, 
which was initiated in 1998 and is still in place. The aim of its creators was to release 
government from direct involvement in the housing market and allow free market rules, 
whereby financial issues would be resolved through direct negotiations between private 
developers and residents. Some (e.g. Levin, 2002) have stressed that the regeneration 
programme offers better use of land and infrastructure in central locations where physical 
renovation would be prohibitively expensive. It is also the only way for private 
entrepreneurs to capture available land for housing in central locations and thus it is in 
their interests to resolve compensation issues with residents. Overall, the main concept has 
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remained the same but operational responsibility has shifted from government to private 
entrepreneurs. This is in line with the socio-economic transformation of Israel from a 
socialist to a capitalist state.  
 
3.3.2 Neighbourhood Renewal 
A focal sign of the change of political power in 1977 (the first since Israel was established 
in 1948) was the announcement of the Neighbourhood Renewal programme (NRP), which 
is remembered as the new government’s greatest social achievement.20 Its intention was to 
bring housing renovation and social change to deprived areas, together with residents’ 
involvement in the process. Although Israel was a relatively new or ‘young’ country, by 
the 1970s there was already a great need for refurbishment and renovation in a number of 
neighbourhoods for the reasons discussed above, resulting in low-quality construction and 
rapid building to meet the needs of the intensive immigration wave on the one hand and 
poor and limited facilities caused by inadequate maintenance on the other (Awidat, 
25.12.06). Effected by political change and the social distress of residents in these 
neighbourhoods, the government re-prioritised its social expenditure and announced the 
new programme.  
 The criteria for identifying eligible neighbourhoods for the NRP were formulated in 
1979. Through means-testing and surveys, the population of an area was assessed for its 
levels of poverty and social exclusion. One year after it was announced, it included 29 
neighbourhoods. A few years later, 113 neighbourhoods were included in the programme 
along with 1,200,000 residents (17% of the state population). In the 1990s, when the scope 
of the programme began to decrease,
21
 only 60 neighbourhoods were supported by the 
programme, with 50 neighbourhoods assessed eligible to undergo renewal remaining on 
the waiting list (Sinai 26.12.06). All in all the NRP was operated in 190 neighbourhoods 
located in 89 different cities or communities. The highest number of projects in one city 
was in Jerusalem which had 13. 
 
  
                                                 
20
 See www.moch.gov.il. 
21
 The Housing Ministry, 2011. 
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Figure 7: The Neighbourhood Renewal Programme – characteristics  
1. Spread across the country: 
Location North Centre South Total 
Number of Neighbourhoods  40 22 27 89 
  
2. Spread across religion: 
Population Jews Arabs Mixed Total 
Number of Neighbourhoods 74 10 5 89 
 
3. Spread across types and sizes of neighbourhoods 
Type Cities Regional 
councils 
Villages and small 
communities 
Total 
Number of Neighbourhoods 52 15 22 89 
Source: Ministry of Housing, 2011 
 
 The Ministry of Housing’s 2003 NRP survey provides a good picture of the typical 
NRP neighbourhood, containing information about economic status, housing conditions, 
neighbourhood amenities, public order and other area characteristics (MOH, 2003), also 
reported in the media (Haaretz, 25.12.06). The survey results were acquired from a 
representative sample of eleven neighbourhoods and show factors that influenced the 
financial status of residents in such neighbourhoods; the aging of the population (44% 
were aged 40–59), marital status (one-fifth, 22%, were single, separated or widowed), and 
family status (17% of all heads of households were single parents), which also suggests 
financial strains.  
 The proportion of new immigrants was higher than national rates — more than 
50% in the NRP compared to 1%–5% of the general population in Israel22 — as the 
majority of new immigrants received government assistance for first housing solutions. 
Most of them ended up in one of the mass housing solutions created to ease housing 
tensions during the immigration waves. In the 1970s ethnic tension was a source of social 
unrest.
23
 Educational levels were typically lower than the national average (66% graduated 
from secondary school, while 30% were only primary-school educated). In 8% of 
                                                 
22
 The Central Bureau of statistics, 2011. 
23
 Kimhi, Demographic characteristics, 1988. 
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households, problems of disconnected youngsters were identified: these youths were 
defined as those aged 15–18 who were neither working nor attending school. A quarter of 
the male and 45% of the female population were unemployed. Among the unemployed, 
11% of men and 22% of women were ‘potential workers’ who, according to analysts, 
wanted but were unable to find a permanent job. Those employed did mainly manual and 
temporary work and were at higher risk of dismissal.  
 It was unrealistic to expect the NRP to tackle all these gaps, yet results collected 
during the years of programme operation reveal improvements in some areas. Density, for 
instance, was higher in neighbourhoods where the NRP operated than in the national 
average (see Appendix 2:1 for density in the NRP compared to the national average). 
Results show that the programme helped to ease density and reduce the number of people 
per unit (illustration 3.24). From over a fifth (22%) of households consisting of large 
families with six persons or more before the NRP operated, figures dropped closer to the 
national average, between one to two people per room, after the NRP became operational.  
 Major budgetary cuts, a politicised selection of the neighbourhoods included in the 
programme and difficulties in keeping communities engaged (some argue this was due to 
lower resident participation, some argue it was bad implementation of a potentially good 
policy), resulted in a decline in programme operation (Sinai, 26.12.06; Elgazi, 30.01.2000, 
Nir, 15.3.98).  
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 The following graph represents the decline between 2000 and 2005. 
 
Figure 8: Decline in government investment in the programmes 
 
Source: Ministry of Housing, 2006; Tzadik, 2006 
 
 A more overall perspective of these cuts is presented in the graph below, which 
shows the dramatic decline in government investment in the NRP from 1979, when it was 
funded to the tune of 750,000,000 IS (Israeli Shekels, equal to £127,651,000), to 2006 
when the programme was near termination and the budget was reduced to 48,000,000 IS 
(£8,169,000), representing just 6% of the original (Tzadik, 2006).  
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Figure 9: Government investment in the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme over 
three decades 
 
Source: Ministry of Housing, 2006 
 
 There had also been proposals from the Ministry of Finance to cancel the 
programme as early as 1995 (Haaretz,13.1.95), in 1999 (Maor, 2.9.99) and in 2006 (Sinai, 
24.12.06), but the political lobby blocked them (Maor, 22.11.99; Mualem, 14.3.07). 
Internal MOH surveys claimed that wherever a project was terminated due to budget 
constraints, community and housing conditions declined rapidly (Hovav & Weinstein, 
1997). 
 
Current Status of the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme  
Having agreed to keep the NRP alive, new voices amongst politicians called for the 
programme to be operated, managed and funded by private entrepreneurs and guided by 
private market rules (Haaretz, 29.8.99), which meant that private developers could take 
control over an area, be responsible for renovations, and gain all revenues (Kolka, 
13.4.07). Social activists (Hovav, 27.1.04) argued against privatisation and claimed that 
only a social perspective — one in which resident care is the top priority and residents’ 
opinions are taken into account — could achieve productive results (Shimshoni, 14.1.98). 
Other research has evaluated the NRP in Israel and, based on worldwide analysis of similar 
programmes, has stated that only consistent support and improvements in socially-oriented 
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policies can produce successful results in neighbourhood renewal in the long term 
(Carmon, 2003). 
 
 
3.3.3 The Structure of Public Housing Companies  
Public housing companies are state owned and run the public housing stock in Israel. All 
housing units in the RTB and the majority of units in the neighbourhoods which 
participated in the D&R and NRP are managed by these companies and thus they are 
relevant to this chapter. The key objectives of publicly funded housing are to provide 
shelter to whoever lacks housing or the money to fund housing on the private market. The 
key objective of the RTB was to allow those who lived in publicly funded housing and 
who paid their subsidised rent to purchase their home through discounted rent as if they 
had paid their mortgage against that home over a number of years.    
 Residents of publicly-funded council housing units (the stock owned and managed 
by the government-owned housing companies) include low income populations: veteran 
immigrants who arrived in the late 1950s and 1960s from Asia, Africa and East Europe; 
new immigrants who arrived from the former USSR and Ethiopia in the 1990s); elderly 
new immigrants arriving from USSR in the late 1990s housed in elderly accommodation 
mainly managed by Amigur (illustration 3.7); disabled and wheelchair-bound residents 
living in designated units; a designated neighbourhood in an Arab village, and other 
housing solutions for minorities in mixed communities in cities.  
 The type of publicly-funded solutions was also varied: most stock was located in 
central cities which was in higher demand and fully occupied, with some in the periphery, 
although these units were in less demand and thus not all were occupied. There were also 
publicly-funded estates in the New Settlements which are in less demand and are provided 
not merely according to socio-economic circumstances (Kiryat Arba, for instance, 
illustration 3.19). Other publicly-funded housing solutions built to re-house evacuees from 
Gaza settlements were initially intended to be only temporary but eventually became 
permanent. Most of the housing units in the Kibbutzim were also publicly built by the 
government (illustration 12). Another type, although small, of unique publicly-funded 
housing solutions were the ‘key money’ units, which were very old houses, mainly in 
Haifa, captured after the 1947 war and legalised for those residents only. Finally, there are 
the students’ dormitories which are a new initiative by Amigur, offering subsidised 
housing for students involved in community activities (illustration 3.20).  
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 Among the government-sponsored housing companies, Amidar is the largest, 
owning the majority of properties, with responsibility to build and manage housing 
solutions for newcomers. Their massive estates were made up of small, low standard units 
built quickly to house as many residents as possible.  
 
 
12. The first Kibbutz, Dganya A, established in 1910. Photo taken in 1936. Source: 
http://www.snunit.k12.il/vmuseum/pal/degania/degania.html. 
 
 The vast majority of tenants were new immigrants coming from multiple 
backgrounds and cultures who struggled to cope and adapt to their new conditions, thus 
these neighbourhoods were considered poor and socially dependant. Amidar was therefore 
given another responsibility, to provide social support for the residents living on its estates, 
including provision of services, maintenance, gardening and so on. In 1962 Amidar 
managed 200,000 units and when the stock became too large and hard to manage, other 
companies were formed. Amigur (the second largest) held property in joint ownership with 
the government and the Jewish Agency (JA). Amigur also manages elderly housing for 
new immigrants and sites for the disengagement evacuees. There are other government-
sponsored companies that manage regional properties: Prazot (which now belongs to the 
municipality) in Jerusalem; Halamish in Tel Aviv; Shikmona in Haifa; Afridar in Ashkelon 
and Heled in Peth-Tikva (see illustrations 3.12 & 3.22 & 3.23 & 3.24 & 3.25 &3.26 & 
3.27). 
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Figure 10: Council Housing Companies in Israel 
 
Housing Company
24
 Owned by Location 
1. Amidar The government Nationwide 
2. Amigur 
 
 
3. Halamish  
The Government and the 
Jewish Agency 
 
The Government and Tel 
Aviv Municipality 
 
 
Nationwide 
 
 
Tel Aviv – Jafa 
4. Prazot The Government and 
Jerusalem municipality 
Jerusalem 
   
5. Shikmona The Government and Haifa 
municipality 
Haifa 
6. Afridar The Government and 
Ashkelon municipality 
Ashkelon 
7. Heled The Government and Peth-
Tikva municipality 
Peth-Tikva 
   
 
Source: Ministry of Housing, 2011 
 
 The publicly-funded housing system offered housing solutions for subsidised rent. 
In most cases tenure was secure throughout a resident’s life, yet there was no guarantee for 
the next generation, who in most cases ended up in the same housing distress as their 
parents. From time to time, there were sales to encourage residents to purchase their unit at 
lower-than-market prices using low-cost loans. However, these sales were sporadic and 
mainly offered units in the periphery where demand was already low. In the late 1990s, 
tenants of publicly-funded housing were estimated to occupy 120,000 units, a lower 
number than in previous years as a result of the decline in government investment in 
housing. 
                                                 
24
 Arranged per size, full size figures in chapter 7 
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The Housing Company Amigur  
One of the greatest controversies of the RTB legislation process was the debate over the 
properties managed by Amigur, which is owned jointly by the state and the Jewish Agency 
(JA: the link between the state of Israel and Jewish communities around the world, 
responsible for collecting money from Jews internationally to be invested in Israel. It was 
instrumental in founding and building the state of Israel and is one of the main funds used 
by the Israeli government t to raise money for the state). Amigur was founded in July 1971 
to manage funds given by private individuals from the diaspora for use in social projects. 
After 1971, these funds were directed to the newly established company and thus indirectly 
managed by the state. When established, the company’s main aim was to improve housing 
conditions and services for residents in need, particularly new immigrants. The company 
owned and managed a stock of around 19,000 council units at the time the RTB was first 
discussed (Maor, 2000).  
 The RTB allowed residents of council housing to purchase units at discounted 
rates, calculated according to length of tenure. JA representatives claimed that the state 
could not commit to selling units that were not under their ownership without 
compensating their “legal” owner. Amigur claimed that selling the proposed units would 
lose the company millions of dollars. This estimate was based on sales of 17,000 units 
between 1972 and 1991, which had generated $215,600,000; the remaining stock was 
calculated as being of similar value (Eldar, 1994).  
 In his memoirs, Ran Cohen, the legislator of the RTB, reveals that the real basis for 
the JA’s intransigent position was the need to cover its growing debt to banks in the USA, 
and that the JA’s financial advisors could not have wished for a better solution (Cohen, 
2008: 122). Indeed, the JA treasurer himself admitted that the organisation does not intend 
to reinvest its share in creating new housing solutions, but will instead cover its debts 
(Cohen, 2008: 140). Given this financial imperative, JA managers took advantage of 
highly successful residents lobbying for the RTB. Amigur officials warned residents that 
they would not be included in sales if they did not convince officials to integrate them into 
the RTB.
25
 Ran Cohen, the political leader of the residents, called this manipulation:  
 
For the first time in the history of Zionism, the poorer residents of Israel are 
funding the richest Jewish congregations of the diaspora. (Cohen, 2008: 54–
55) 
 
                                                 
25
 www.Amigur.co.il (1998) 
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 Soon after RTB was legislated — and although the government intended to freeze 
the law and continue sales according to the act, which would mean Amigur units were 
excluded — residents’ pressure was so intense that it was clear that the disagreement with 
Amigur had to be resolved. Protests and demonstrations escalated, and the government 
faced demands on two fronts: from residents generally who demanded that the government 
enforce the terms of the initial RTB, and from Amigur residents who insisted on their right 
to be part of the sales.  
 On 31 January 1998 the government decided to accept JA demands and Treasury 
Minister Meir Shitrit, who was also the former Treasurer of the JA, signed the agreement. 
Compensation had two main phases: 1) a minimum compensation fee for each unit, and 2) 
comprehensive compensation for the entire stock. Compensation for each unit sold was set 
at between $22,000 and $39,000; more seriously, in financial terms, the comprehensive 
compensation package included which was actually a governmental guarantee to buy 
Amigur’s whole stock once 5,000 units were sold. These two obligations had major 
financial repercussions.  
 The compensation fee for each unit was much higher than the subsidised price 
residents had to pay, which alone meant that the state would have to fund the gap between 
residents’ discounted price and the market value. The second phase — obligation to buy 
the whole stock — had even more serious repercussions. Amigur owned around 19,000 
units, the majority of which were in remote areas and, therefore, were almost valueless in 
terms of market price. However, Amigur also had a smaller number of far more valuable 
units (approximately 5,000) in central locations. The company was easily able to sell these 
prime units to its residents under the RTB terms and claim compensation for each unit, 
according to phase one, and for the remainder of the stock, which they had struggled to 
rent in unattractive locations. Economists immediately tagged these peripheral units as 
‘dead public property’ — i.e., worthless units that might have a paper value, but no real 
market value, as the housing market in these areas is almost non-existent (Plotzker, 1997). 
The government was obligated under the terms of the agreement to buy all these units and 
at the average market price for that particular city, as these were standard private units in 
the city and not poor units in a public housing estate. 
 This arrangement has proven extremely expensive for government, and the only 
way to subsidise the compensation agreement has been to use income from the general 
RTB sales. This has literally emptied the reinvestment fund for the creation of new housing 
solutions, despite heavy criticism. For example, one of the most severe attacks was from 
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the State Comptroller (Report 53/B), who not only pointed out the mistaken decision to 
agree to the terms, but also — more importantly — highlighted the consequences for the 
social-housing market. Instead of using the large budget supplement to reinvigorate social 
policy and services for the poorest within the country, the money had been sent outside of 
Israel. Residents and MPs also criticised the JA, an organisation created to raise funds to 
support the poorest in Israel, as it had essentially appropriated the budget for its own.  
 Government investment in housing was not only directed to poor neighbourhoods, 
there were other residents’ groups that benefited from publicly-funded housing solutions 
and who were not necessarily considered the poorest. This phenomenon was frequently 
mentioned in interviews conducted for this research and is therefore relevant, especially 
when assessing empowerment. Publicly-funded solutions were noted in the Kibbutzim, in 
the New Settlements and amongst evacuees from the Gaza strip. The following section 
offers some background on these communities and the housing programmes. The analysis 
of these projects factored in the wider analysis of empowerment through housing policy in 
general and as a comparison of the empowerment of the disadvantaged communities in 
particular. 
 
3.3.4 Other Forms of Publicly-Funded Housing Solutions Outside Poor Neighbourhoods 
The Kibbutzim 
The Kibbutzim are resident-run communities, unique to Israel. They are based on the idea 
of an equal society in which members share equal rights and duties. The Kibbutzim follow 
a communist-socialist agenda and spread across Israel at the same time as similar regimes 
spread in Europe during the early days of the twentieth century. They are considered to be 
the ideological bedrock of the labour regime which governed Israel from 1948 to 1977. 
Modern economics and liberal ideas, however, have affected the Kibbutzim in the last two 
decades: the number of Kibbutzim fell; membership numbers reduced dramatically; 
residents living in the Kibbutzim were no longer fully equal in all respects; and their 
management adopted various liberal economic changes in order to compete in the private 
sector.  
 Despite these changes, the Kibbutz society is still run by its members, who have a 
substantial share in planning and administering their lives and who exercise some 
influence, even though less than previously, on decision-makers. In the past, residents of 
Kibbutzim have used their strong political lobby to obtain free housing and, more recently, 
to extend their housing rights. In 1997 they asked that the Kibbutzim be legalised and 
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proposed ‘The Tenure Rights Legislation for Rural Communities’, a bill that would allow 
them to change land-use regulations from agricultural to housing and commerce. This 
dispensation resulted in an enormous profit potential for these communities (as land usage 
became commercialised) and its residents (allowing them rights on their housing for free).  
 This triggered a huge debate — both political and legal — amongst residents of 
‘council housing estates’ who argued that they deserved similar rights. Residents of 
council housing argued that the cases were identical; both were publicly-funded housing 
programmes provided by the government with subsidised rent; both groups of residents 
were directed to their communities, a long way from the centre in most cases, by the 
government as part of its population dispersal agenda; in both communities residents lived 
in tough conditions for the first years; in both communities residents asked to have a legal 
right to the houses that they had lived in for many years, with both asking for a 
continuation of housing rights for their next of kin. This was the trigger for the ‘Right to 
Buy’ legislation. 
 These conditions changed over the years, with residents claiming mainly on the 
basis of their contribution. Also, as the value of land appreciated, both groups of residents 
claimed tenure rights. While the cases seem similar, the end result was not. In rural 
communities (the Kibbutzim), where residents operated a powerful political lobby, tenure 
rights have been given, whereas in poor neighbourhoods, tenure rights have been denied. 
The same ILA management board that denied housing-rights in the ‘Neighbourhood of 
Cardboard’ (case study analysed in this research) simultaneously authorised extensive 
building rights in the Kibbutzim (Cohen, 2007 and Los, 2007). Therefore, residents of 
council housing felt discriminated against and, like the residents of the Kibbutzim, 
believed they deserved to buy their properties and bequeath them to the next generation. 
This triggered efforts by residents to legislate a similar rule — RTB — while at the same 
time social activists petitioned the Supreme Court and demanded similar housing rights for 
council-housing residents to those given to residents of the Kibbutzim (Karif, 2007). This 
put the different groups in competition and they have been so ever since.   
 
The New Settlements  
These are Jewish communities in the territories on the West Bank and previously Gaza 
Strip which, according to international law, fall outside the formal borders of Israel. When 
it came to housing rights and government services, participants in this research referred to 
the residents of the new settlements as privileged by a greater provision of benefits and 
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amenities (see Appendix 1:5 for the higher share of public building in the NS compared to 
other parts of the country). A comprehensive report published by the Israeli research 
centre, ‘Adva’, investigating government provision to different types of settlements in 
Israel, revealed that the new settlements were given a greater degree of housing support 
than any other residential group including the fifteen wealthiest cities:  
 
Between the years of 2000–2006, 15,488 units were in the process of 
being built all across the New Settlements, representing, on average, an 
investment of 11,300,000,000 NIS (around £1,948,275,862), the 
government was responsible directly for 53% of buildings and for 43% of 
investments, whereas in all other areas, the government had direct 
responsibility to 20% of new buildings and only 10% of investments. 
(Savirski, Atias, Dahan, 2008) 
 
 Another aspect of government support for housing in the new settlements was its 
willingness to ‘look the other way’ when NS residents engaged in illegal building when the 
government was forced by international pressure not to build in this area. Media reports
26
 
and press coverage argued that the amount of illegal building in the new settlements 
amounted to a third of the total and “Activity of such scope could not be done without 
hidden cooperation with governmental officials and by hiding those figures from the 
general public” (Eldar, 2007). Only 10% of these illegal acts were ever brought to court, 
far below the figures for illegal cases in the housing market that were brought to court in 
other areas of Israel, especially poor neighbourhoods (Shargai, 2007) (illustration 3.28).  
 Ran Cohen, MP, the legislator of ‘Right to Buy’, argued that the government’s 
excessive housing support for the new settlements came at the expense of the 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods inside Israel (Cohen, 2002). It was therefore no surprise 
that participants in this research consistently referred to housing projects in the NS to 
indicate what empowerment in housing policy is. Many believed that settlers’ unity and 
empowerment gave them a sense of power which enabled them to be active in determining 
their benefits and rewards from the government and in pressuring officials to support their 
demands. The combination of high resident participation in and supportive governmental 
strategy to the New Settlements provide, according to interviewees, a great example of 
empowerment and validates the argument that it is essential for the success of a social or 
housing programme.  
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 Harel, 2006; Eldar, 2006; Eldar, 2005. 
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 One particular case of comparison made by participants in this research refers to 
the D&R programme during the eviction (disengagement) from the Gaza Strip (illustration 
3.29). The disengagement was a decision made by the Israeli government led by PM Ariel 
Sharon to demolish (withdraw and evacuate) Israeli settlers from Gaza and house them 
inside the Israeli borders. 8,000 Jews lived in Gaza surrounded by 1.3 million Palestinians. 
The government’s official statements claimed that this decision made sense from both a 
political (disentangling from a bi-national situation) and a military (completely 
indefensible settlements) perspective and that remaining in Gaza did not enhance anyone’s 
security, least of all that of the Jews who resided there, who were pounded constantly by 
Palestinian rockets (Ne’eman & Chodof, 2006). In these cases as well, residents 
highlighted many similarities between the two D&R programmes (the D&R from poor 
neighbourhoods and the disengagement; D&R from Gaza),  that triggered the comparison. 
In both cases, residents were asked to leave their homes and when they refused underwent 
relocation and were offered replacement housing; this is always problematic, as people 
tend to be bound to their homes and neighbourhoods whether they like it or not. Both sets 
of residents sought to improve their housing conditions during the process, and both felt 
that the end result failed to do so. Both groups protested against proposals made to them 
and the disorder associated with these protests featured a high level of violence, calling the 
legal rights and status of both groups into question (illustrations 3.30 & 3.31 & 3.32 & 
3.33). 
 
 Although housing programmes for the minority (Arab community), or for the 
minority residents of Kibutzim, or for the minority residents of the New Settlements, seem 
at first to be less representative when it comes to national housing policy since they refer to 
small communities, they are very relevant in terms of empowerment because of the 
influence (positive or negative) the local community has had on the housing programme.  
 
3.4 Summary 
When both Israel’s history and unique character are considered together in the light of 
empowerment theory, it is easier to appreciate why there is no strong local government in 
Israel. It is also easier to understand the fabric of Israeli society as a mix of cultures, 
opinions, religions and values which also have a significant impact upon participation.  
 Although resident participation is a prime issue in theoretical analysis, in Israel it is 
less developed, mainly due to widespread ethnic and multi-cultural conflicts and a 
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centralised political system with limited local authority, which has reduced opportunities 
for residents to participate, especially residents in poor neighbourhoods. Limited access to 
services and distance from decision-makers (as decisions tend to be taken at a national 
level) reduce residents’ motivation to act and undermine their belief in their ability to 
create change. Resident participation is a phenomenon in Israel but only amongst certain 
groups with a single agenda and does not include the general public or the poor. 
Consequently, almost all the cases assessed in the theoretical review of management 
groups in publicly-funded housing estates or programmes, and the wide range of local 
training groups, are almost non-existent in Israel. 
 A chronological analysis of the history of housing policy in Israel reveals three 
main initial aims: immigrant absorption; population dispersal; and the provision of 
adequate housing to every household. Each of these had social consequences. The 
government took a central role in all housing procedures — planning, development, 
design, construction and directing tenants — and housing policy was a main element of 
national goals, with little concern for individuals’ needs and preferences, but more for state 
security or political needs. Nevertheless, the main aims were met and the state’s efforts to 
provide shelter, even if only temporary, to all new immigrants arriving into the newly born 
state was achieved. The government also managed to build communities in the periphery 
as well in the centre, receiving much praise for its quick, efficient and, at times, innovative 
response to huge immigration waves. However, the desire to improve social conditions and 
housing was less encouraging.  
 The state failed to deal with ethnic conflicts, and despite attempts to integrate 
people from different cultures in mixed neighbourhoods, tensions were still evident and 
there was little opportunity to build community cohesion. In addition there was a shift in 
economic philosophy and from government-controlled housing policy. The hegemony 
moved to the private market, the government ceased to build housing solutions dedicated 
to the poor and instead invested in subsidising solutions in the private market. The housing 
budget has not increased in line with the cost of funding solutions in the private market, 
resulting in fewer residents eligible for housing and greater consequent distress. Less 
available housing solutions and support combined with poor standards of housing in the 
poorly managed sites led to dissatisfaction and tenant unrest, which sporadically erupted in 
the 1950s and 1960s and spread in a larger scale during the early 1990s and again in 2011. 
An insufficient housing policy for the poor, yet impressive housing support for other 
groups of residents triggered one of the most consistent debates on the Israeli agenda. 
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Housing policy, although one the most essential services for many years now, is still a 
major problem in Israel. 
This chapter’s chronological analysis highlighted the main issues the newly-born state was 
presented with in designing housing policy and focused on issues that could well be 
misinterpreted if not misperceived in the Israeli context — the dominance of central 
government, the centralised political system and the importance of security in decision-
making. Together these issues not only help us to understand the unique character of Israeli 
housing policy but also provide a context for the case studies that feature in this research. 
The next chapter provides the methodological context for this research. Following on from 
the review of empowerment theory and the history of housing in Israel, chapter 4 sets out 
the final part of the foundations for this research before we continue to the case studies. 
Part Two 
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Chapter Four 
Methods and Research Framework 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodological approach that informed the techniques used to 
conduct this research and provides the analytical framework for understanding 
empowerment in practice in social housing programmes in Israel. There are two main 
methods used to investigate empowerment: case studies representing the three main social 
housing programmes in Israel: Demolish and Rebuild; Neighbourhood Renewal 
Programme and the Right to Buy, and in-depth interviews with over 100 participants, half 
residents and half non-residents, all involved in the investigated social housing 
programmes, concerning the implementation of the policy.  
 Section 4.2 describes the case studies which represents each housing programme. 
Section 4.3 describes the interview techniques; this includes how the sample of 
interviewees was selected, how interviews were set up and conducted and how the issues 
under investigation were addressed using card-sorting exercise. The issues of 
confidentiality, language barriers and translation, pilots, sample testing and support to 
residents who had never participated in such a survey before, are explained. The ethical 
considerations and approaches are covered, renders the data valid. 
 
4.2. The Case Studies 
Although case studies were not that long ago considered to be a controversial research 
method, they are now widely recognised in social policy research. One of the main guides 
for social policy research was conducted by Judith Bell, who approved the case study as a 
method:  
 
case study can be appropriate approach for individual researches in any 
discipline because it provides an opportunity for one aspect of a problem 
to be situated in some depth. (Bell, 2010: 9) 
 
Similar outcomes referring to community-based programmes are provided by Johnson 
(2006), allowing researchers to go further in quantitative research and Tellis (1997), has 
studied behavioural analysis from the perspective of participants. The case studies in this 
research focus on different aspects of empowerment as they developed in different social 
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housing programmes. Each case study offers an insight into a particular aspect, detailed 
analysis and prime data for accurate investigation and assessment. That the investigation 
aimed to answer specific questions helped to define the limits for each case, which is an 
important factor in maintaining the rigor of the case study method:  
 
the more a study contains specific propositions, the more it will stay 
within reasonable limits. (Yin, 1994;137. See also Bell, 2010) 
  
Each case study involved interviews and surveys in order to identify key issues which 
supported the investigation and offered a comprehensive response to the research 
questions. In order to create a pattern for the investigation and to assist the comprehension 
process, all case studies were analysed systematically. All the interviews and all surveys 
followed the same structure, the same questions and the same cards to allow fair and equal 
assessment. This enabled us to learn how each programme operated, and the key 
characteristics of the housing programmes, each community, project and case. It then 
enabled us to make a qualified comparison of them. The ability to cross-check information 
was crucial in this research, as it enabled us to identify issues that did not reflect upon 
other cases. By posing specific questions on each project, programme and to each 
community, it was possible to produce a comprehensive analysis of the principal concern 
of this research — empowerment of the disadvantaged.  
 
4.2.1 Criteria for Selection of Case Studies 
The case studies chosen assisted in the investigation of the empowerment of the 
disadvantaged population in Israeli housing policy. The section below determines the 
criteria for choosing these case studies as each represent different empowerment features. 
Each section provides details of the investigated programme, its main policy aspects, the 
main issues tackled and the different case studies representing the programme. 
 The process of selecting the case studies starts with identify the social housing 
programmes in Israel. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are three main social 
housing programmes in Israel: the Demolish and Rebuild; The Neighbourhood Renewal 
Programme and the Righ to Buy. We have then identify all the projects in each of the 
progarmmes and tried to identify the main patterns of each programmme according to 
which we have choosen the projects that mostly represent the main themes of eash 
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programme to be our case studies. The next sections will provide brief introduction to each 
progsarmme and detaild information on the selection of case studies to each programme 
 
4.2.2 Demolish and Rebuild (D&R)  
This programme’s aim was to demolish old units and build improved ones using the sale of 
valuable land and infrastructure in central towns (illustration 13). Neighbourhoods in this 
programme were considered the poorest in the country; some were the scenes of infamous 
riots, as residents struggled for better housing conditions. In terms of empowerment 
analysis, this project represents a “government takeover” structure  — that is, the project 
was implemented without residents’ involvement. Demolish and Rebuild projects 
represented the lowest level of residents’ involvement (manipulation of information) since 
residents were given no power in the process. Public policy include two implementation 
modes, the first mode, dominant in the state’s early years, was government-led, meaning 
that projects were initiated, run and managed by the authorities. The second 
implementation type, more popular in the 1990s, was led by private developers.  
 
 
13. A Demolish and Rebuild in the Neighbourhood of Cardboard, showing the old 
cardboard houses just in front of the new building. Photo by Yasmin. Source: 
http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki. 
 
 This was the main element that guided us when selecting the case studies. We have 
aimed to identify the most representative case study in each of the main modes of 
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operation of the programme. The case studies, therefore, represent these different modes. 
There are two main case studies and six minor case studies (see apendix 5). The two main 
case studies described here represent the two main implementation modes of the D&R 
programme, and also are famous case studies because of the major debate they have 
generated over the years. The firt case study is of Vadi Saliv. The first ever D&R project, it 
represents centralised government control. Another case study that represents this mode is 
that of the neighbourhood of Mamila. The other case studies represent the free market 
approach where developers were handed responsibility for project operation and include 
the Neighbourhood of Cardboard and the neighbourhood of Kfar Shalem (illustration 14). 
 
 
14. Police assist the eviction of residents from Kfar Shalem. Source: 224.88. Photo: Mati Milstein, 
published in the Jerusalem Post, 01/06/2008. 
 
 We have have also examined additional case studies that will help us to gain an 
even greater understanding of projects under the different modes of operation. We have 
examined the case studies in the Neighbourhood of Mamila (representing the government 
control approach that failed and the private developers’ approach that succeeded), the 
Neighbourhood of Kfar Shalem (representing the opposite scenario — a government 
approach that succeeded and a private developers’ approach that failed), and collected 
information on the Nitzan temporary site (that subsequently became permanent), built to 
host the evacuees of the eviction from Gaza which many residnets referred to when 
comparing public policy towards residents’ participation in D&R programmes.  
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4.2.3 The Neighbourhood Renewal Programme (NRP)  
The programme’s aim was to improve existing housing conditions and social services in 
poor neighbourhoods (illustrations 15 & 16). The focus of this programme was the 
renovation of the interiors and exteriors of buildings. In terms of empowerment analysis, 
this programme represents a “government partnership” structure (illustration 17), a process 
in which residents have partial involvement. Neighbourhood Renewal represented a 
moderate level of involvement, as residents were initially invited to participate on boards 
and in decision making. The official strategy towards residents’ participation was 
supportive as it was one of the aims of the programme; in practice residents’ participatory 
share was lower than planned; they were invited to participate in project-managing boards, 
but their role was mainly to observe as officials controlled the decision-making process, 
and its financial aspects. In many cases, officials also dominated board operation, and 
equal membership did not materialise. The impact on residents’ empowerment was, 
therefore, less than anticipated. 
 
 
 
15. Neighbourhood Renewal Project before. This is how the building in 132 
Weitzman Street in Raanana looked before major renovation. The renovation 
includes strengthening of its foundations against earthquake, the creation of larger 
apartments, the addition of three storeys, with each current flat receiving an 
additional room and balcony, and for the whole building an elevator and a lobby. 
Source: Liran Sahar, 10 July 2011 http://www1.bizportal.co.il/article/277784. 
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16. Neighbourhood Renewal Project after. This is how the building in 132 Weitzman Street 
in Raanana looked after the major renovation. Source: Liran Sahar, 10 July 2011 
http://www1.bizportal.co.il/article/277784. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. NRP community meeting at a project in the city of Lod. The meeting was held in 2006, 
set up by the mayor’s office and managed and guided by officials, where residents were 
invited to participate. It is an example of a committee where residents were less influential 
in the process. Source: http://www.lod.muni.il/show_item.asp?itemId=1301& 
levelId=44600&template=20. 
 
 The following case studies were chosen to represent Neighbourhood Renewal 
because they include all kinds of neighbourhoods — large and small, in the centre and on 
the periphery; all types of residents — veteran immigramts, new immigrants from Africa 
and Europe, Jews and non-Jews; and all locations — big cities and small villages across 
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the country; and all managed by council housing companies. The list of case studies 
therefore includes: the prorogrammes in the neighbourhoods of Katamonim and Pat (both 
in Jerusalem), and the ultra-Orthodox neighbourhood of Sanhedriya in Jerusalem, the 
neighbourhoods of Kfar Shalem and Shapira (in Tel Aviv), Kfar Gvirol and Kiryat Moshe 
(in Rehovot), Jessi Cohen (in Holon), the village of Jdeda-Maker (with its high percentage 
of Arab Muslims — a minority in Israel) and Kiryat Arba ( in the NS). 
 
4.2.4 The Right to Buy (RTB) 
The programme was generated by legislation initiated by residents’ groups in collaboration 
with opposition MPs. It allowed residents of council housing to purchase units at 
discounted rates, calculated according to length of tenure. In terms of empowerment 
analysis, this programme represents a “resident-led partnership” structure (illustration 18), 
where residents feel empowered to overcome their own disadvantaged conditions by 
leading housing-policy change.  
 
 
18. The Right To Buy legislation process. Supporters of the RTB protest against the 
attempts to freeze the legislation. Photo by ‘flash’, taken in 30.8.2011. Source: 
http://savedem.org.il/?p=5720. 
 
‘Right to Buy’ represented a high level of resident involvement; they were initiators, 
promoters and the main force in promoting and advancing the legislation. The official 
stance was supportive (Parliament), shifting from an initially negative position opposed to 
legislation, to a somewhat more supportive position, as the government eventually 
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cooperated with the legislators (both MPs and residents) in designing a formula that 
brought about the sanctioning of the RTB programme (illustration 19). 
 
 
19. MP Ran Cohen with family that purchased its home under the RTB. Photo taken by 
residents during the visit of MP Cohen and used in Meretz campaign to support the RTB 
legislation, Jerusalem 1997. Source: Guy Doron. 
 
 The case studies that were chosen to represent the RTB include neighbourhoods 
managed by all the various housing companies, in many locations, and different types of 
residents (veterans, new immigrants, minorities, the elderly and disabled). The programme 
involved responses from residents, as well as non-residents, having lived in council 
housing estates in the Katamonim, Pat and Ramat Sharet in Jerusalem; Derech Lod/ 
Hatikva, Tel Kabir / Neve Ofer and Neve Saret in Tel Aviv, 4
th
 quarter in Ashdod, the 
Arab village of Kfar Maker, the mix city of Lod, the New Settlement of Kiryat Arba, the 
evacuees’ camp of Nitzan, Shaviv in Hertzeliya, Yoseftal in Kfar Saba, Kiryat Moshe in 
Rehovot, and the elderly care homes for new immigrants in Petach Tikva and for veterans 
in Lod. The case studies also include estates that are managed by all the council housing 
companies: Amidar, the national company and the biggest; Amugur Prazot in Jerusalem; 
Halamish in Tel Aviv; Shikmona in Haifa; and Heled in Petach Tikva. Since during 
interviews participents also discuss particular issues in the RTB that involve Amigur 
comany and the Kibbutzim we have also included background nformation on those two 
particular cases. The selection of case studies provides a fair cross-section of Israeli sociaty 
as it includes all types of commnumities (old and new cities, villages, Kibbutzim and new 
settlements), a representation of the main ethnic communities (Jews and Arabs, old and 
  
105 
new immigrants from Europe, Asia and Africa), the main religions (Jews, Muslims and 
Christians), sub-religious groups (orthodox, ultra othodox, reform and secular), social 
classes (poor neighbouthoods and the more affluent), and ranges across the country 
(centre, hinterland, borders west, east north and south).  
 The main measurements defining empowerment in this research were resident 
involvement and public policy towards residents’ involvement. The case studies represent 
different levels of participation and official strategies towards participation. Residents’ 
involvement is analysed mainly using the “ladder of participation”. Alignments to different 
levels of participation are based on participants’ self-assessments. Consideration of public 
policy examined to what extent residents were allowed to participate and what services 
were provided to support their participation. 
 
4.3. Method of Analysis 
This research is qualitative and the key methods used to investigate empowerment in 
housing policies were in-depth interviews within case studies. More than 100 in-depth 
interviews were conducted (91 were chosen to be included in the final document) with 
participants of case studies that represent the three main housing programmes in Israel. 
From these interviews we collected only those who responded to at least one progarmme 
fully and included them in the final database. These 91 participants include residents and 
non-residents who chose to be quoted and who appear in the tables of this reserarch.  
 This first section provides information on the methods of analysis of the case 
studies. The second section shows how we selected the interviewees. The third section 
presents the in-depth interviews. The interviews are presented as a method and as a 
contribution to qualitative research. The way they were set up, designed and conducted is 
also outlined. This includes the list of issues discussed in the interviews and their relevance 
for this research, and the way equality and accuracy was maintained during the interviews 
in order to gain the most out of the data collected. This section also presents the card-
sorting exercise, which was a unique technique relevant to those interviewees who had 
reading difficulties or language barriers, and used images as titles in order to display the 
topics during interviews. The fourth section presents the participants and concludes with a 
summary of the ethical aspects (in section 4.3.5). 
 
4.3.1 Methods of Analysis of the Case Studies 
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In order to analyse the case studies we have used mainly three main type of methods: 
reviewd official documnets (which could be done from remote) including media coverage, 
official reports and statistics, local city hall facts and figures and research, visit each case 
study site, observation and take photos which require actual visit to learn the community 
and finally interview the key actors which conducted normally in the site (see Appendix 4 
for list of participants and the location of each interview).  
 
Review of Documents 
At this stage we reviewed publications, academic reserach, information, media reports, 
government and official reports, website and social media that discussed the social housing 
programmes that are investigated here. Although academic studies are few, there is plenty 
of news coverage in the media. There was also fair amount of information that available 
from the Housing Ministry and the Central Bureau of Statistics as well as from the local 
municipalities. In order to analyse residents’ behaviour and find the key people to talk to 
we used local residents’ networks, visited community centres and NGOs active on each 
site and introductions by social activists. Only recently has social media which offers 
another means of contacting key actors. 
 
Site visits 
As part of the data collection we visited each of the case studies in this research and many 
others that were not selected. Observations allowed us to familiarise ourselves with the 
case studies, learn about the local community, identify key actors and hear public opinion. 
During the site visits we visited community centres and playgrounds, participated in 
residents’ group meetings and in site visits by officials from the housing companies or the 
municipality. We listened to residents and officials and have included their comments — 
with their permission — in this research as part of a random sample. We also took many 
photographs, some of them included here.  
 
Interviews 
All interviews with key actors were planned in advanced and most of them recorded and 
videotaped. Many of the interviews required more than one meeting and almost all the 
interviews led to another site visit to learn about a specific story, take photographs or get 
introductions to other key actors. Almost all requests for interviews were responded to 
positively. The only ones who refused to participate were decision-makers, mainly those 
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who were opposed to the RTB. M.K. Meir Shiterit set up three meetings with us but never 
really wanted to speak on record, former Housing Minister Efi Eitam agreed to meet but 
cancelled when he learnt about the essence of this research, former Minister Natan 
Shernaski, currently the head of the JA, agreed in principle but eventually asked us to 
speak with Yuli Edelstein who helped us to set up a meeting with Avraham Burg, former 
chairmain of the JA, who oversaw the agreement with Amigur. All others cooperated with 
great enthusiasm. Sometimes we felt that participants were so keen to tell their stories that 
they made a real effort to help this data collection succeed.    
 
4.3.2 Interviewee Selection 
Wherever we identified a case study that we wished to examine we conducted a site visit. 
On each site visit we learnt about the local community and tried to assess its key players 
(leaders and common participants). When we were convinced that we had enough 
information to conduct the investigation and that the case study included enough 
information for the research, we also conducted a site visit to collect random samples and 
to try and contact the relevent non-residents involved. This was to ensure unbaised data 
collection, as the author has previously been involved in housing policy, and is obviously 
familiar to the key players. We have tried to collect data from neighbourhoods which the 
author was not familer with and from residents he had never met. This was in order to 
verify that the views expressed by leaders and common residents were also shared by the 
unknown/uninvolved residents. 
 The only element that was known in advance was the interviews with the decision-
makers. The few main figures who appear in each social housing discussion in Israel are 
well known, therefore the only challange was to get them to participate. 
  
4.3.3 Interview Techniques  
In-depth interviews with residents measured their level of participation and involvement 
and helped to determine whether the attempts to empower the disadvantaged through 
housing policy were successful. The interviews with non-residents uncovered the 
fundamentals of the policies and supporting ideologies. The interviews were designed to 
include issues that enabled us to understand empowerment in social and housing 
programmes as described in the literature. They were also designed to collect data equally 
from all types of patricians in the investigated programmes, and in order to establish an 
equal platform for discussion, a unique exercise was deployed — card sorting, that 
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presented topics in both images and titles (in English and Hebrew), which ensured the 
unbiased treatment of all participants, as well as the interviewees’ clear understanding of 
what was being asked of them (Appendix 3 presents a copy of the cards as exhibits A to 
M). The cards were presented to each interviewee in order to make sure all participants 
referred to the same terminology assessed in this research and to prevent biased analysis. 
In-depth interviews were a critical tool in this research as they not only enabled us to 
collect data on all the main issues from different perspectives but also allowed participants 
to give a wider view and share their own experiences. Interviews allow focused more on 
the personal experience of empowerment, the subjective experiences and personal feelings 
which interviews are more likely to expose. 
 
Background  
In-depth interviews are commonly used in social policy to acquire information from 
unique and influential actors. Chirban (1996:3) evaluates the Interactive-Rational 
Approach (‘bonus values’): “self awareness, authenticity, attunement, personal 
characteristics and new relationship”. 
 Interviews offer unique access, encompassing a wide variety of views of those 
involved in social-housing policy. The advantage of face-to-face interviews, therefore, is 
that participants can provide insights into emotions, motives, and perceptions; they also 
help in the recognition of values, beliefs and ideas which are essential to the investigation 
of empowerment. Setting up the interviews involved several key actions: 
 
Setting  
Interviews took place in the natural environment of the interviewee to achieve the highest 
degree of cooperation. Each interviewee chose the setting and the timing of the interview. 
All interviews were conducted face-to-face; comfort and confidentiality were offered to the 
interviewees. At the outset of each interview session, subjects received a thorough 
explanation of the process to avoid any concerns or 'problematic moments' during the 
interview. In order to reduce bias or untruthful responses, all interviewees were guaranteed 
confidentiality with evidence anonymised, and the stress placed on the importance of 
giving accurate answers. This approach allowed free and honest communication, exchange 
of views, ideas, beliefs and feelings about all the issues being investigated. 
 
Trust and openness  
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The planned goal was to explore interviewees’ personal perceptions, beliefs, interest and 
values in relation to the specific case study under review. It was clear to both sides that 
openness and co-operation would achieve better results; therefore, a setting that promoted 
the most authentic response was required. Previous relationships based on respect, truth 
and trust also helped to establish these conditions. Discussing these from an academic 
perspective using an open approach helped to provide valuable insights. 
 
Equality  
During the interviews with residents, a card-sorting exercise (Shefer, 2001; Sudman & 
Bradburn, 1982: 290) was used. This form of associational task facilitates an 
understanding of attitudes and the dimensions of the research’s key issues. Each of the 
main themes—programme name, level of participation and type of housing — was not 
only discussed orally, but also presented using photos which were visually on cards. Thus, 
no bias or knowledge gaps could affect responses. (cards presented in 39). This method 
ensured equality, as interviewees represented different classes and educational 
backgrounds. The exercise ensured that all participants understood and referred to the same 
programmes, participation levels and housing forms. Cards were simple, clear, large and 
visible. Each card combined an image and title wording, in both English and Hebrew 
(cards presented in Appendix 3). 
 
Question Formulation  
The goal of the interviews was not only to collect factual or objective data, but also to 
measure subjective states — i.e., respondents’ attitudes, opinions, perceptions and personal 
evaluations of events. Interview questions were then designed to be clear and easy to 
understand, specific and aimed at relevant issues, calibrated to trigger information and 
personal experience from respondents. Participation was therefore measured by evaluation 
analyses from all participants; residents were asked to locate themselves at a point along 
the ladder of participation and explain why they would define their participation as such. 
Non-residents were asked to use the same ladder to express their views on residents’ 
participation during the projects. The policy towards the participation was assessed by both 
groups on a scale of positive-negative. During the interviews, residents raised additional 
issues related to empowerment that were analysed and compared: satisfaction rates (with 
both the projects and their participation in them), the impact of protests, training and 
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education schemes, assessment of similar housing schemes outside poor neighbourhoods, 
their implementation and their impact upon empowerment.  
 
 
Accuracy  
As the responses often relied on such subjective factors as interviewees’ memories, 
descriptions of events and personal perceptions, accuracy in collecting responses was 
highly important (Eisenhower, Mathiowetz & Morganstein, 1991; Foweler, 1995). The 
interviews dealt with events that have great personal significance for the respondents. 
Thus, the questions were consistently organised and designed in a form that emphasised 
events and processes in chronological order to help ease recall, to encourage interviewees 
to dive into their memory banks and to elicit responses as detailed as possible. All 
interviews were videotaped, documented on paper, translated into English and finally 
analysed. All the videos and transcripts of over 100 interviews and hours of discussions are 
available. 
 
Confidentiality  
In order to reduce bias and untruthful responses, all interviewees were guaranteed 
confidentiality and allowed to review anonymously should they wish to. The importance of 
giving accurate answers was explained. This environment allowed for free and honest 
communication, an exchange of views, ideas, beliefs and feelings about all the issues being 
investigated. None of the participants in this research asked to remain anonymous, and few 
limited the usage of the data to academic purposes only.  
 
Pre-interview evaluation of questions (pilot)  
This was used to ensure all the above was achieved and each potential complexity had 
been dealt with. Using two languages (Hebrew and English) made translating certain terms 
particularly important and this had to be tested. The cards, the terms and images used were 
also tested. It was important to try out the questions to ensure their intelligibility; at the 
same time, the piloting stage helped to identify any important missing questions or subjects 
and to modify the structure of the interview and the investigated issues. The pilot was 
structured in two ways: ‘think-aloud’ questions and ‘asking probing and follow-up 
questions’. These two techniques allowed respondents to share their thoughts regarding the 
interview’s structure. The ‘think-aloud’ technique allowed respondents to present thoughts, 
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question unclear or missing elements while assessing their own answers. Not only could 
they respond to the simpler questions, but they could also delve further into their memories 
to recall “hidden” events that might be important to discuss. This raised issues concerning 
definitions of terms, clarity of questions, ability to respond, accuracy of events and times, 
confidence in responding to questions, familiarity with topics and missing points that could 
be included in the research.  
  
4.3.4 The participants 
The programmes represent one of the main housing policies in Israel; Demolish and 
Rebuild, Neighbourhood Renewal, and Right to Buy. The case studies represent the 
different types of projects within each programme and cover a broad-spectrum of the 
populations. Participants were all involved in one or more of the investigated programmes 
and were arranged into two main groups: Residents and Non-Residents. These groups were 
then sub-divided: residents were rearranged according to their residential status and level 
of activity, while non-residents were segregated according to their position in or 
relationship to programmes. This segregation allowed for an in-depth analysis of 
participants’ views and helped create a more comprehensive picture of the empowerment 
features during the investigated housing projects. 
 
Residents were divided into the following three sub-groups:  
 
1.  Leaders – residents who were the most active, mainly heading up residents’ groups, and 
highly involved in the project overall. 
2.  Common, moderate participants – residents who were involved in the project up to a 
certain level. 
3.  Random sample – views collected randomly at sites where projects were implemented. 
 
Non-residents were divided into the following three sub-groups:  
 
1.  Informers / Supporters – these included academics, social activists and political 
activists who were involved in projects 
2.  Implementers – managers and administrators who carried out government policy. 
Generally they are politically neutral and adopt a professional approach. 
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3.  Decision-makers – politicians involved in shaping social policy in Israel, mainly by 
initiating the programmes investigated.  
 
A list of participants and a general categorization table can be found in Appendix 4. In 
general, all 91 interviewees selected referred to almost all the policies and programmes, 
whether in a personal mamner as they related to their particular case study, or as a 
reflection of the broad prgrammes, or at times even of the entire policy.  
 The main measurement of participation was based on The Ladder of Participation, 
which is discussed in detail in chapter 2 and includes four main stages: Information, 
Consultation, Partnership and Control.  
 Public policy towards participation was measured based on the simple 
positive/negative scale and the three investigated housing programmes which were 
implemented mainly in poor neighbourhoods, but were also compared with similar 
programmes conducted in other communities, not necessarily poor.  
 
4.3.5 Ethical Aspects  
As in any scholarly study, this research outlines the ethical issues that arose and the ways 
they were approached. 
 
Residents  
In the opening of each interview, participants were given an ethical manifesto assuring 
them that the data, information and personal experiences that they were about to share 
would be used solely for academic purposes. All participants agreed to participate in this 
research and to share their stories of their own free will. That the participants seemed 
happy to participate and cooperate came of their common desire to gain an understanding 
of empowerment amongst the disadvantaged in Israel, and the hope that their stories would 
be used for further research, ideally to promote better understanding of social policy. All 
the residents who were approached for this research accepted the invitation to participate 
and openly shared their experiences.  
 
Non-residents  
In the opening of each interview, participants were given an ethical manifesto assuring 
them that the data, information and personal experiences that they were about to share 
would be used solely for academic purposes. The participants in this research freely agreed 
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to share their stories. The majority of non-residents that had been approached for this 
research accepted the invitation to participate and share their experience. Four decision 
makers, though, refused to participate: Meir Shitrit, who served as Housing Minister at the 
time of the field work and was one of the famous opponents of the RTB, refused to 
participate. Three other former Housing Ministers who served during the period when the 
government delayed RTB — Efi Eitam, Yitzhak Levy and Natan Sheranski — all refused 
to take part in this research. Each had their own reasons, but their responses indicated their 
reluctance to discuss their views and activities, their stand and position during the 
programme and they were aware of the social critique.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
So far we have learnt from the literature that empowerment, under certain terms, is 
possible. This research aims to test global experiences in order to answer the main research 
question whether empowerment of the disadvantaged population through housing policies 
has been offered or implemented in Israel. This research has highlighted the housing 
challenges since the State of Israel was established, and in terms of policy we have 
identified the three main housing programmes. In order to investigate these programmes 
from all social aspects, this research has deployed in-depth interviews with over 100 
residents and identified case studies that represent all types of projects within the main 
programmes. 
 Taking into account all of the above, this research developed the following 
hypothesis:  
 
1.  If residents are involved in decision making, housing policies are more likely to 
succeed.  
2. If housing management services are provided locally, resident involvement 
becomes more possible and services are more likely to improve.  
 
 The following three chapters present three different policy case studies: Demolish 
and Rebuild, Neighbourhood Renewal, and Right To Buy. They set out the findings from 
the field research carried out as outlined in this chapter, giving detailed evidence about the 
case study areas and how the policies came to be implemented and also present the 
findings from the resident surveys.  
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Chapter 5 
The Demolish and Rebuild Programme 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the Demolish and Rebuild Programme (D&R), which was first 
announced on 21 August 1960 and planned for the neighbourhood of Vadi Saliv in the 
northern Israeli city of Haifa. The Programme has continued with some variations up to 
the present day. Initially, the government controlled operations but, over time, 
responsibility was increasingly handed over to the private sector. In 1998, this was 
formalised and the Programme was renamed ‘Urban Renewal.’ Since then, responsibility 
for individual developments has been in private hands; whereas the government only 
identifies sites and monitors progress (Kolka, 2007).  
 The D&R is central to this research in that it is the only social housing Programme 
in Israel in which residents have been almost completely denied participation. Initially, 
central government made decisions independent of residents’ wishes, at times even 
ignoring them completely. When this structure failed to provide successful programmes or 
sites free of dispute, responsibility for projects was handed to private developers, who 
were thought to be more capable of negotiating residents’ demands under the rules of the 
free market. A discussion of the origins and implementation of two different projects will 
address the two approaches of central-government management and free-market rules. The 
first case study, representing a central-government approach, is the first-ever D&R project, 
that of Vadi Saliv in Haifa. The second case study, representing a free-market approach, is 
the ‘Neighbourhood of Cardboard’ in Tel Aviv.  
 This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 gives a brief history of the 
programme, its design and implementation of both government control and private 
developers. Section 5.3 consists of background information on the case studies 
neighbourhoods and focus mainly on the main empowerment aspects of resident 
participation and public policy. Section 5.4 presents excerpts of original data collected 
through interviews and surveys, and integrates the findings as to the level of empowerment 
during D&R in Israel. These findings consist of participants’ views on participation, long 
term involvement, training schemes, public policy towards participation and levels of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Part 5.5 discusses another form of D&R, with slightly 
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different origins: the evacuees from Gaza. This example was used by interviewees as a 
comparative case to analyse empowerment features in a D&R when offered to another 
residential group. The chapter ends with some conclusions. 
 
5.2 Background  
The idea behind D&R (illustrations 5.1 & 5.2) was to take advantage of valuable land that 
was currently the site of poor housing and to improve it. Many of these sites, located in the 
heart of Israeli cities, The D&R emerged as a sensible way to provide housing that would 
benefit these communities with the potential to instigate social revival for residents. 
Proposals for D&R emerged during the 1960s in Haifa, when plans were made to tackle 
poverty, improve social services and reduce indigence in the neighbourhood of ‘Vadi 
Saliv’, located in the city centre (Weiss, 2007). The first D&R projects were all under the 
control of the central government. When the centralised concept failed, the government 
handed the D&R to private developers. When private developers, as individual, failed in 
few neighbourhoods, there were re thinking on that model too. It was eventually modified 
to the Urban Renewal Scheme. 
 
5.3 Case Studies 1 
5.3.1. Case study 1: The Neighbourhood of Vadi Saliv in Haifa  
The total pollution in the city of Haifa is 272,170. The number of units is 105,878. The 
box below presents the figures for the neighbourhood of the Vadi Saliv as taken in 2001: 
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Figure 11: The Neighbourhood of Vadi Saliv: Characteristics  
 
 
Characteristics Measurements 
Population in the greater neighbourhood 3,390 
Population: new immigrants after 1990 820 
Number of housing units in the greater neighbourhood 1430 
Number of housing units in Vadi Saliv 187 
Number of units (not for housing) 191 
Home owners <20% 
Average people in a household before D&R of 1995 3.1 
Average people in a household after D&R of 1995 2.4 
Size of the neighbourhoods 0.15 km
2 
Total size of all housing units 12,475 m
2 
Average size of a unit 67 m
2 
Total size of non-housing units 18,542 m
2 
  
State of housing conditions very poor 
First attempt to operate D&R projects in the neighbourhood 1963 
Recent attempt to operate D&R projects in the neighbourhood 1995 
Change in housing units since recent D&R -186 
Change in non-housing units since recent D&R 697 
Religious groups 
                    Muslims 
                    Jews 
                    Christians 
                    Others 
 
40%,  
30%,  
18%,  
12%  
Number of schools 0 (2 in the wider 
area) 
Number of nurseries 1 
 
Source – Municipality of Haifa, 2010 
 
5.3.2 Background 
Patterns of failure have been associated with the project in Vadi Saliv (illustration 20) 
since its early days, it was first announced as ‘The Destruction of Poor Neighbourhoods 
Scheme’ in August 1960, when the housing market, social conditions, financial resources 
and political structure and almost every aspect of life was guided, monitored, supervised 
and, in many cases, even operated by powerful centralised state institutions. Since it was 
the first ever D&R project in Israel, Vadi Saliv progressed in a ‘trial and error’ manner. 
Vadi Saliv was a poor neighbourhood located in the centre of Haifa, inhabited by new 
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immigrants who held no tenure documentation, as residents were ordered by officials to 
take over the abandoned houses of Arab refugees (Weiss, 2007).  
 
 
20. The Neighbourhood of Vadi Saliv before the D&R in the 1960s. Source: 
http://www.98tv.co.il/Tahana17. 
 
 
 21. The Neighbourhood of Vadi Salib in Haifa after the D&R This photo shows a 
current view of the old and new in the neighbourhood. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wadi_Salib. 
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 The result was an area of poverty, inadequate housing, high unemployment rates, 
high levels of antisocial behaviour, arrests, riots and intense social pressure (illustration 
21). However, resident protests triggered a policy change that resultant with the project. 
Protests were the result of the government’s inability to provide decent social services to 
combat poverty (Shapira, 1998). in Vadi Saliv in the late 1950s. The main social distress 
erupted after an incident in which the police shot a drunken resident, Yacov Elkarif 
(Akiva), a new immigrant from Morocco. This led to spontaneous riots mainly by new 
immigrants, against whom police used disproportionate force (illustration 22). Protests 
escalated [later remembered as the first large-scale social riots in Israel] and forced the 
government to institute a national committee of inquiry to investigate the sources of 
poverty and social distress in order to release pressure. Poor housing standards were one of 
the area left unattended by authorities, which intensified anger among residents (Weiss, 
2007), therefore an immediate plan to improve these conditions was recommended in 
order to investigate severity of housing problems (illustration 23). The idea to operate a 
D&R project came after the housing survey at the site indicated that conditions and 
infrastructure were sub-standard, repairs ineffective, and that only the complete demolition 
of units and the implementation of a rebuilding programme could produce reasonable 
housing conditions.  
 
 
 
22. Vadi Saliv Protests. The famous cover of This 
World magazine, showing the riots in Vadi Saliv 
during July 1959, entitled ‘Riots in Haifa: What 
Ignited the Moroccan Riots?’. The image has been 
reproduced many times since.  
 
Source: Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and 
Hakibbutz Haneuchdad, publishers of Wadi Salib: 
A Confiscated Memory by I. Wiess: 
http://www.vanleer.org.il/en/node/1064. 
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23. Vadi Saliv Protest. This is a photo taken by the Israeli Police on 9 July 1959 showing a 
residents’ protest outside the police station in the neighbourhood of Vadi Saliv. Source: 
http://www.archives.gov.il/ArchiveGov/pirsumyginzach/TeudaBareshet/WadiSalib/. 
 
 During this period, offering the operation of a social housing project to a private 
developer was considered ideologically unsound — not that any private company at the 
time would have been able to bear the financial consequences of such a project.  
 The state, therefore, controlled all bodies and resources to operate the programme; 
the land was owned by the state and managed by the Israel Land Administration (ILA), 
which allowed a swift process of complete eviction which was also backed by law which 
was instantly legislated (Poverty Neighbourhoods Law, State Archive). The National 
Council Housing Company, Amidar, built the new council housing estates where residents 
were to be relocated, and the government directed the programme implementation (Project 
Board Committee, 1961).  
 
5.3.3 Resident Participation 
In the early days, centralised government could make decisions and force institutions to 
act in line with them. Government bodies, for instance, made laws to force residents to 
leave their units without the need of consulting the resident. More residents preferred to 
remain in their original community rather than to relocate to the new, improved 
neighbourhood without assurances that both their housing conditions and, more 
importantly, their social and community services would improve (445 chose to stay, while 
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218 did not. Weiss, p.156, 2007). Stil, 447 of the 740 families had been evicted already, 
against the will of the majority. 
 With a powerful central regime, residents’ share in decision-making was limited, 
as cooperation with residents was never considered as needed. Consequently, operation of 
the programme moved spasmodically due to legal difficulties in handling refusals and 
unsuccessful compensation negotiations. Officials, by condemning the remaining 
buildings on the grounds that they were dangerous, used their power to force all the 
residents to leave. In terms of resident participation; residents were not asked for their 
opinions during the planning committee’s work, let alone in the overall operation of a 
project. The management committee, on which residents were not represented, made all 
the decisions. Furthermore, the committee set compensation rates with no input from 
residents, and those who were eventually included in the project were not necessarily the 
poorest (Jacobson, 1975; Weiss, p.135, 2007). 
 
5.3.4 Public Policy  
Participation of residents was never broached in ‘Vadi Saliv’ because officials did not 
consider residents capable of offering constructive assistance. One project manager 
described residents as “A (human) waste concentrated in one area” (Kolka, 1989). When 
the management board decided to open an office where residents could offer suggestions 
and be allowed to discuss their ideas, an inspector and police officer were permanently 
placed at the site to keep public order. This reflected the board’s negative expectations of 
the residents. The board also had a team of working mothers to socialise with resident 
wives in order to outwardly promote the attractiveness of the project, but also to guide 
them on hygiene and cleaning rules before integration with more-modern families already 
living in the new neighbourhoods (Weiss, 2007). With this kind of behavioural stigma, it 
is not surprising that residents were denied any involvement.  
 One of the main problems residents in ‘Vadi Saliv’ faced was dense housing 
conditions (density was a feature of the programme in general). Many new immigrant 
families were larger than those in the general population; they also suffered from higher 
unemployment rates and thus were generally more dependent on the government. This 
situation is typical of new immigrants; the head of the family is either too old or does not 
speak the language sufficiently well to get a job, thus forcing the children to become 
breadwinners. This is also why most of these families have to live together, in order to 
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survive. The new quarters planned in Vadi Saliv to re-house residents were tiny and 
densely packed which forced children to spend more time outside their homes.  
 This, in turn, had a negative impact on their educational achievements. The then 
Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, was concerned that “some children had nice homes to 
return to after school and a place where they could focus on their homework, [but] others 
were forced to stay outside and do none” (Nesher, 1959). Nevertheless, the next generation 
in these neighbourhoods were not only unable to gain proper education, but they also had 
to go to work at an early age to support their families. There were many who could not 
find jobs because they were inexperienced, and so were pushed into criminality. 
Residents’ fears about population density and its educational impacts in this case study 
were neither heard nor discussed.  
 The project in Vadi Saliv might have succeeded in re-housing residents, but it 
failed to improve their quality of life. In fact, in many respects, the project outcomes were 
less favourable than residents’ previous solutions. Residents often found it more difficult 
and complex to adapt to new neighbourhoods (Weiss, 2007). Failure to listen caused an 
ethnic disaster for the elderly among the new immigrants who become alienated in their 
neighbourhoods and families. For instance, an important social focus for the Jewish 
residents, especially for the new immigrants whom many among them were practising 
Jews, was the local synagogue. It was used not only for religious purposes (many among 
the new immigrants in this neighbourhood were religious), but also as a social club where 
residents got together with neighbours from their countries of origin, spoke their native 
languages and shared new experiences. A local synagogue was an important factor and, at 
times, a precondition before residents would agree to relocate. Synagogues were promised 
and offered at the new sites, but they were not aligned to specific ethnic groups. As a 
result, residents of this case study lost their social clubs and their religious habits; they 
found it difficult and sometimes impossible to pray in a different style and many dropped 
out of the synagogue and chose to stay at home Research has shown that the lack of an 
organised social environment causes many conflicts within households (Hazani & Ilani, 
1970), this could have been prevented through consultation with the residents. 
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5.4 Case Studies 2 
5.4.1 Case Study 2 – The Neighbourhood of Cardboard, Tel Aviv  
The total pollution in the city of Tel Aviv is 404,400. The number of units in the City of 
Tel Aviv is 184,826. The box below presents the figures for the Neighbourhood of 
Cardboard in the south east of Tel Aviv (illustration 24): 
 
 
24. The Neighbourhood of Cardboard in Tel Aviv. poor housing conditions, similar to a 
shanty town. 
Source: http://israblog.nana10.co.il/blogread.asp?blog=635228&blogcode=11423682. 
Photo taken in November 2009 by Bal. 
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Figure 12
27
: The Neighbourhood of Cardboard: Characteristics 
 
 
Characteristics Measurements 
Population  2,500 
Number of households  800 
Home owners 41.9% 
Average amount of people in a household 2.9 
Size of the neighbourhoods 0.765 km
2 
When built generally 50%  < 1948 
When built (council)  1950–1970 
Number of units 811 
Total size of all units 55,158 m
2 
Average size of a unit 68 m
2 
Average size of a building (in the old part) detached/3 storeys 
State of housing conditions (in the old part) Poor 
Average size of a building (publicly funded housing) 3–4 storeys 
State of housing conditions (publicly funded housing) Moderate 
Density  3,577people in km
2 
Density per unit 1.1 
Religious groups 
                  Jews 
                  Others 
 
88.7%  
1.3% 
Employment  58.8% 
Current value of a unit (in NIS)
28
 613,793 
Value after D&R (cal per 300% housing rights, in NIS) 1,412,000 
1
st
 attempt to operate D&R project  1993 
2
nd 
attempt to operate D&R project 1996  
3
rd
 attempt to operate D&R project 2001 
4
th
 attempt to operate D&R project 2007 
 
Source: Tel Aviv Municipality, 2010 
5.4.2 Background  
                                                 
27
 Figure 12 is as similar as possible to Figure 11 subject to the available information on the cases 
28
 1 NIS = £5.9  
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In 1992, when the then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin visited the neighbourhood of ‘Kfar 
Shalem’, he famously commented: “I can’t believe there are Israeli citizens who live in 
such poor conditions; it reminds me of views of Jebalia” (Fishbayin, 2003). ‘Jebalia’ was 
(and still is) one of the poorest refugee camps in the Gaza strip and is a symbol in the 
collective Israeli consciousness of how poverty can lead to problems, dependency and 
violence. This quote shows a lack of awareness among officials, and especially the PM, of 
the poverty and living standards that remain common in some parts of the country. Still, it 
signalled a new awareness and a change not only in rhetoric, but also in government social 
activism. Indeed, during the Rabin years, there was a notable increase in social budgets; 
moreover, ‘Kfar Salem’ in particular underwent an intensive social makeover, during 
which housing renovation and D&R projects were started (illustration 25). 
 
 
25. Shanty town dwelling and new build in the Neighbourhood of Cardboard. 
 
 The Neighbourhood of Cardboard is one part of the ‘Kfar Shalem’ area. Housing 
conditions and infrastructure in this neighbourhood are poor. There are no paved roads, no 
signs of construction or planning, and some roads are still labelled in the old system of 
numbers, rather than by name. Local municipalities usually christen new roads as one 
would a new-born baby; however, the Neighbourhood of Cardboard’s streets have never 
been authorised, and so have never been ‘born.’ Residents are second- and third-
generation immigrants who were directed to the site on arrival. In many cases, housing 
units, most of which are shacks, have not changed in 40 to 50 years. Since the 
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neighbourhood was never formally authorised, planning and mapping have never been 
properly undertaken, and residents live in high-density accommodations. If official 
improvements are not allowed, residents are left with no other option than to build their 
own extensions.  
 As a local residents’ leader explained, “Extension works are undertaken by each of 
the residents in person, from their own resources and in their spare time” (Dagan, 2006). 
Unprofessional and illegal extensions increase housing hazards and, as in many areas of 
poverty, the neighbourhood has also become associated with crime, drug abuse and 
unemployment. Very few residents consider the site as offering a proper standard of 
living; in fact, all those asked would leave if they had an alternative (Efrati, 2004). 
Significant social investment between 1992 and 1996, together with the rebirth of public 
building in order to house the huge numbers of new immigrants under Rabin , created a 
platform for change in neighbourhood conditions. The housing potential of the 
Neighbourhood of Cardboard is huge, as it exists in a prime location in the south of Tel 
Aviv near the main highway to Jerusalem and the southern part of the state. Most 
dwellings are shacks, and replacing these with high-rise blocks could almost immediately 
produce hundreds of units on valuable land.  
 
5.4.3 Resident Participation  
In the D&R conducted in the Neighbourhood of Cardboard, residents’ involvement in 
shaping project terms was almost non-existent. Residents were denied any real influence 
in decision making, and their activity had very little effect other than to delay the project. 
The chaos in the neighbourhood (i.e., no formal planning, no registration of properties and 
unauthorised building extensions), together with the pressure to create instant housing 
solutions, pushed the government to use private developers without proper planning or 
involving residents in implementing project plans. The problems soon began when the 
“true” number of residents claiming housing rights and compensation was revealed, and 
the developer refused to compensate very many. The official landlord, the ILA, was 
unable to provide a categorical picture of tenures on the site (Leibner, 2008). Residents 
refused to deal with the developer as they were offered limited compensation, if any at all, 
and the entire project came to a halt (Fishbayin, 2003). Earlier attempts to involve a 
private developer in the project had also failed since residents refused to be forced into 
accepting terms on which they had not been consulted (Sinai, 2001). 
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 The failures to make progress did not worry politicians and senior officials until 
residents began to openly protest against the project design. It was only then that 30 
Knesset members signed a petition demanding that the Housing Minister (Meir Shitrit, at 
the time) put the the project on hold until alternative housing solutions could be offered to 
residents who needed to be evicted (Chai, 2007). The government also refused a 
parliamentary initiative to put the terms for D&R programme in the statute book to 
guarantee residents’ rights (Tal, 2.6.2002). The power imbalance between residents and 
powerful developers allowed the latter enough time to manipulate and coax residents into 
agreeing with their terms; residents could respond to developers’ pressure only if they 
were organised, united and had sufficient knowledge to negotiate collectively (Petersburg, 
23.6.2002). Through collective action, residents at this site managed to delay the project’s 
operation; however, this clearly did not improve housing and social conditions, as the 
project aimed to do. Although community activity and solidarity among residents can been 
seen as positive, in this case it merely served to halt the project. Allowing residents to have 
more of a say might have prevented the demonstrations and helped achieve a more 
rewarding result; this was Fishbayin’s impression when she interviewed residents (2003). 
 
5.4.4 Public Policy  
There were two earlier state-controlled attempts to operate D&R projects on the site; in 
both instances, residents were excluded from project management, and both attempts 
failed (Efrati, 2004). This was no surprise since social services were so poor that even a 
list of tenures or residents on the site was never systematised, and no formal body could 
provide reliable records of the neighbourhood’s inhabitants (Liberman, 2008). Moreover, 
among those who were labelled as squatters and ordered to leave their property, some 
were still paying their monthly rent to the housing company (i.e. legal tenants) and that 
there were many other examples of prejudice against residents (Rapaport 2007).  
 In 2001 responsibility for the project was offered to private developers, yet without 
cooperation with residents these schemes failed to progress. All attempts to initiate the 
project over a period of 6 years without allowing residents a share in decision-making or 
without consulting their views ended in failure (Leibner, 2007; Shvita, 2007; ILA, tender 
250/98).  
Pattern of negative attitudes towards residents 
Negative attitudes of state institutions towards residents’ participation are evident. The 
Israeli Land Authority (ILA) which owns the land on which the neighbourhood is located 
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was provided with incentives including substantial discounts and tax-free schemes (ILA, 
tender250/98, 1993), yet none went to compensating residents. Only when they asked for 
legal intervention, which ultimately led to rulings that the compensation was inadequate, 
did the ILA have to increase its offers (Rulings 6715/96, 6870/96, The Supreme Court). 
The ‘insubordinate right’ rule — which states that one refusal from a tenant can prevent 
the operation of an entire project — has been the residents’ only recourse and has forced 
officials to communicate with residents (Cheshin, 1996). Some suggest the local 
municipality’s attitude was a result of ‘buy out’ by developers who were willing to share 
the revenues:  
 
developers have tools to improve facilities, but local municipalities simply want 
the residents out of the site so developers can rebuild it and make huge profits, 
of which a share will be directed to the municipality instead of residents. 
(Leibner, 2008).  
 
Yishayahu Hakshuri is the main developer involved in the Neighbourhood of Cardboard 
(illustration 5.3). He also did not invite residents to consult on plans for the site; nor did he 
ask for their input as to their needs or expectations and the compensation he offered has 
been inadequate, despite the company’s huge potential profit (Fishbayin, 2003).  
 
Summary  
Analysis of earlier studies have indicated that resident
29
 participation in D&R projects was 
very limited. Analyses of earlier studies have also indicated that in terms of public policy 
towards residents’ participation in the D&R projects was negative.  
 
5.5. Outcomes and Assessments 
My findings, as outlined in Chapter 4, are more detailed compared to those collected in 
earlier studies. All the issues investigated and raised by the participants during the surveys 
and interviews were prioritized, starting with the main themes of this research and moving 
toward the more specific issues relevant to each programme. All interviewees that were 
selected to appear in this chapter are from those who are personally involved in the 
programme. The issues are divided into the two main themes of this research: Residents’ 
Participation and Public Policy towards this Participation. The first section provides a 
general overview, a further analysis of residents’ participation during D&R, and views on 
                                                 
29
 Residents represent civil society 
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Training and Education schemes — whether they were implemented and to what extent. 
The second section discusses the various aspects of Public Policy: views on the level of 
government support for residents’ involvement in the programme; the level of satisfaction 
with residents’ influence and with programme outcomes; continuity of residents’ 
involvement and long-term impact; residents’ views on successful cases among housing 
projects where residents were empowered and the necessary changes in government 
attitudes to their cases which achieved a similar success rate.  
 As discussed in chapter 4, we have also examine additional Demolish and Rebuild 
locations / communities in order to get more comprehensive views on how the Demolish 
and Rebuilt was operated:  
 
The Neighbourhood of Kfar Shalem 
This is a neighbourhood in the south east of Tel Aviv known previously as the Arab village 
of Salame (Shalem is the Hebrew translation). In 1931 it had 3691 residents and 800 
houses. By 1948, before the war, the neighbourhood had grown to 7600 residents, majority 
were Arabs, and during the war the neighbourhood was an area of conflict between Jews 
and Arabs which was abandoned on the 22 April 1948. New immigrants, mainly from 
Yemen, moved in to the abandoned neighbourhood, taking over the evacuated houses. The 
neighbourhood was given a Hebrew name — ‘Shalem’ — and soon became densely 
populated with over 20,000 residents.  
 In 1965 the government offered the first D&R which majority of residents refused 
to cooperate. Tension reached a peak in 1982 when one resident (Shimon Yehushua) who 
refused to allow the demolishing of his house, was shot dead by a police officer. In the 
1990s, after the visit of Prime Minister Rabin and his famous comment, ‘this looks worse 
than Jebaliya’, greater investment was directed to the neighbourhoods and many residents 
accepted the chance to relocate to better housing. The new terms were much better as 
residents were allowed to build detached and semi-detached houses with a small garden. 
Nevertheless, around 400 were excluded from the project and remained in their old houses. 
30 residents received an evacuation warning as it was claimed they were occupying private 
land illegally and were thus not entitled to reimbursement. On 25 December 2007 the 
eviction went ahead without the consent of the residents (Rapaport, 2007). 
 
The Neighbourhood of Mamila 
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This is a neighbourhood in Jerusalem located between the old city and the Jaffa gate 
(illustration 5.1). It was first built in the nineteenth century and had a mixed population of 
Jews and Arabs. The neighbourhood lies just outside the old city wall and its prime 
location meant that it became a source of economic prosperity. Between 1948 and 1967 the 
neighbourhood stood on the border between Israel and Jordan and was subject to clashes 
and bombardment from both armies. Heavy artillery damaged the housing which was 
considered very poor anyway. After the 1967 war, the neighbourhood was completely 
demolished and after a long dispute involving legal, ethnic, religious and financial issues, a 
new neighbourhood was built. The renovated neighbourhood, now one of the most 
luxurious in the capital, was completed in 2006 and includes luxury housing (owned 
mainly by foreign residents), a high-end shopping mall, top-rated hotels and the best views 
of David Tower and the old city. 
 The D&R project begun in the 1970s, 700 families were relocated to other 
neighbourhoods along with all the small businesses. The eviction was completed in 1988 
and the neighbourhood was demolished in 1989, costing more than $60,000,000. The 
eviction process was slow and raised many objections from the residents resulted in high 
profile protests and the creation of a social movement known as the ‘Black Panthers’. 
Many of its activists are still involved in housing policy and were deeply involved in the 
RTB as well. 
 
Nitzan  
This was designed in 2005 as a temporary solution to house the evacuees from the Gaza 
strip (illustration 5.4). Prime Minister Sharon ordered a temporary, caravan-built 
neighbourhood only two months before the eviction The quick build that lasted four 
months (between May and August 2005) included 500 caravans. It was given special 
approval which bypassed the usual planning process and had support and investment from 
the Ministry of Defence. The site even extended further with more than 1000 temporary 
caravans hosting evacuees from the Gaza strip (Neve Dekalim, Katif, Gan Or, Morag, 
Rafiah Yam, Gadid, Bdolah, Nisanit). All together this is the largest site of evacuees, 
comprising 490 families out of the total 1667 evacuated. Residents who moved to the 
estate complain about its incomplete infrastructure, poor housing, which is too small for 
big families, and a lack of community facilities. All types of housing on the site were 
publicly sponsored and managed by the state: the council housing company responsible for 
the site is Amigur. 
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5.5.1. Participation 
The measurement of empowerment used in this investigation is framed by features from 
Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation (1969). This investigation formulated an eight-point 
ladder which is presented in the following table. An analysis of residents’ responses of the 
D&R shows that they evaluated their participation as low-level. The majority of responses 
described their involvement as being at the information level. Non-residents’ responses 
show a higher evaluation of residents’ participation in programmes; however, this rating is 
still at moderate levels with the largest response being “consultation”. 
 The table below provides a summary of interviewees’ responses with regard to 
residents’ participation in D&R. The ladder of participation consists of the following 
steps: Not Involved (1); Information (2); Consultation (3); Partnership (4). None of the 
participants claimed that residents were in control and thus this level is not presented in 
the table. Moreover, some of the participants did not respond on the subject and are 
therefore categorised as N/A – 0.   
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Table 2: Residents’ Participation in the Demolish and Rebuild Programme 
 
Total participants (in brackets)/ 
level of participation 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
0 
 
Residents (53) 
 Leaders (18) 
 Moderate participants (17) 
 Random (18) 
 
12 
5 
5 
2 
 
17 
8 
7 
2 
 
12 
5 
2 
5 
 
1 
0 
1 
0 
 
11 
0 
2 
9 
Non-residents (37) 
 Informers (21) 
 Implementers (13) 
 Decision-makers (3) 
4 
4 
0 
0 
6 
6 
0 
0 
12 
3 
8 
1 
6 
4 
1 
1 
9 
4 
4 
1 
Source: Israeli NRP survey - Guy Doron, 2005–0930  
 
Based on the ladder of participation, resident participation was low in all residential 
groups. Interestingly, the higher the leadership status residents had, the more excluded 
they felt. Most leaders chose ‘not involved’ to describe their level of participation, which 
is the lowest and most alienated level, while most ordinary residents chose ‘information’ 
as the most accurate level to describe theirs. Among the random sample, though, the most 
frequent view was of ‘consultation’.  
 The data shows that in the investigated D&R projects, where no special intention to 
involve residents was ever declared, residents did not feel welcome. Those who 
characterised themselves as local leaders have attested that they have received some share 
in decision-making in other programmes but none in the D&R. These respondents 
described D&R as offering the lowest level of participation by comparison. Residents’ 
evaluation of their low participation level in D&R is in line with the analysis of non-
residents. Members of the informers/supporters group were assessing residents’ 
participation as low (‘information’). Implementers, however, noted a moderate level of 
participation (‘consultation’).  
 These differences derived from their role in the programme: those among the 
implementers who were directly involved in project operation spoke of the fact that 
                                                 
30
 Control Level: Residents – 0; Leaders – 0; Moderate participants – 0; Random – 0; Non-residents – 0; 
Informers – 0; Implementers – 0; Decision-makers – 0. 
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residents were involved to some extent, whereas informers (who were involved in resident 
groups) noted a less participatory approach in terms of influence. Overall, non-residents 
viewed residents’ involvement as moderate, which placed residents higher on the 
‘participation ladder’ than the residents placed themselves. 
 Residents argued that although their participation was low, they were nevertheless 
sufficiently skilled, experienced and committed to run a project on their own. That said, 
the majority agreed that professional supervision and guidance would improve 
performance and final outcomes, yet such guidance was extremely limited in an 
environment in which officials did not welcome resident involvement.  
 Residents confirmed their participation level was low and that it has an impact on 
programme success. Z. Adika, leader of a residents’ group in Jerusalem, noted:  
 
If residents were offered managerial responsibilities, they could prove how 
skilled they are and prove their input on projects operation; the problem is 
that residents are not offered such opportunities. (Z. Adika) 
 
 S. Keshet (illustration 5.5), a leader of a residents’ group from Tel Aviv, asserted 
that residents operated community training to improve their understanding and in order to 
be able to influence their community.  
 
We took responsibility over our community activities after we realised that 
the government has no intention of operating in this way. We managed its 
operation ourselves, setting plans and contents, financed our activities and 
all with no assistance. I think we are doing quite well. This is to show that 
we can run projects by ourselves.  
 
Opinion supporting residents’ ability to run projects was also collected from among the 
random sample, with the view that involve residents in local projects not only improve 
conditions locally but also reduce unemployment rates:  
 
Residents here are capable of taking managerial decisions, especially when 
people are unemployed and eager to do things or make any contribution. 
(M. Hamudi) 
 
 Most residents, although sure of their ability to run projects, were willing to engage 
in any courses or joint ventures with officials to have their skills monitored and assessed:  
 
There are skilled residents who are able to run and manage projects around 
here. We might be poor, but we are not stupid. (B. Arajuani, illustration 5.6) 
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Our community is full of residents who are more than equipped to 
participate in local management, and if anybody doubts that, we invite a 
supervision body to evaluates our managerial performance. The problem is 
that authorities never had the willingness to give us a chance. (S. Meidani) 
 
Others, who were less convinced of residents’ ability to manage projects independently, 
suggested joint bodies through which residents’ performance could be improved:  
 
Residents are not experienced enough to operate complex projects on their 
own — they need guidance. This is what the government stands for. Overall 
I would think that running joint boards — of residents and officials — is the 
best way of taking this forward. This would also be a sign of cooperation 
and partnership between the two and can lead the way to completing better 
projects. (D+R Balsi)  
 
Residents admitted they were not involved in project management, they claimed that they 
are capable of running projects or at least having a pivotal role in the decision-making 
process. Having said that, acknowledging that they lack some professional skills, residents 
were very much in favour of joint bodies with officials or schemes in which they would 
hope to increase their knowledge. Such schemes however were almost always unavailable. 
 Non-residents confirm residents were not involved in the management of the D&R. 
Among non-residents, views regarding residents’ ability to run projects on their own were 
less absolute, and there were those — especially among the implementers — who still did 
not see residents as being ready for managerial tasks. However, among 
informers/supporters, many agree that residents, if allowed a share of decision making, 
have the potential to positively impact project management. 
 R. Avnimelech (illustration 5.7), a social activist who was involved in residents’ 
activities in the Neighbourhood of Cardboard, confirmed residents capabilities:  
 
Residents in this neighbourhood can influence the project, although in some 
fields they need expert advice, but this isn’t different from any other 
neighbourhood. (R. Avnimelech) 
 
 M. Margalit (illustration 5.8), another social activist who also represented residents 
in the municipality of Jerusalem, agreed on the importance of residents’ involvement, 
especially community-wise:  
 
There are some professional issues that require expertise, and in those areas, 
residents can contribute less, yet with issues that relate to social aspects, 
residents surely have the ability to manage their own projects. (M. Margalit) 
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 A supportive view of residents’ ability to run projects came from Dr Pialkov 
(illustration 5.9), the Deputy General Manager of the Housing Ministry, who confirmed 
that international experience proves that residents, if involved, can have a hugely positive 
impact on projects:  
 
I have seen an impressive example of resident management (TMOs) in the 
U.K., and I think that residents are definitely eligible to run housing 
projects. Residents’ management is a brilliant idea where residents are 
offered responsibility and then make a commitment (i.e., residents become 
the local agents and are responsible for collecting and setting the rents and 
the rules for eviction when a tenant refuses to pay). The whole project is 
obviously supervised, but the main idea behind is that poor residents are not 
necessarily unskilled. (Dr C. Pialkov) 
 
Still, most implementers did not feel residents were sufficiently reliable to be handed 
management responsibilities. S. Ben Eliahu (illustration 5.10), a former General Manager 
of the Ministry of Housing and the man in charge during the debates  around the case 
study of the Neighbourhood of Cardboard, said such initiatives are potentially dangerous 
as he’d seen residents fail to take responsibility when it was handed to them:  
 
These schemes won’t work in Israel. There is a lack of belief in the ability 
of local bodies to run projects, let alone in the residents of poor 
neighbourhoods. The D&R, for instance, is in residents’ main interests and 
should actually be run by them, but it’s not. Commitment and a structured 
ideology that shape residents involvement elsewhere are characteristics that 
are less than dominant in poor neighbourhoods in Israel. (S. Ben Eliahu) 
 
P. Alalo (illustration 5.11), a social activist who is also a senior member of the Jerusalem 
City Hall, agreed that residents require support and guidance when it comes to project 
management:  
 
In some of the disadvantaged neighbourhoods in this city, residents can’t 
even run their own housework, let alone a project. There are professional 
issues where residents agree they can contribute less, as this field is really 
an expert domain. The delegation of power to residents is obviously the 
right thing to do in term of social activity and providing sense of 
community, but it is a rather long-term process which requires intensive 
investment to renew residents’ trust and confidence again. (P. Alalo)  
 
S. Eldor (illustration 5.12), the Head of the new Urban Renewal Schemes in the Ministry 
of Housing, thinks that the new scheme offers guidance under which residents would be 
able to have a greater share in decision making:  
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If residents are lacking particular skills, they should be educated or trained. 
This is still the responsibility of officials not of the developers and 
constructors who are not equipped to do that. This is why we need joint 
efforts from other agencies which are reliable to provide such services, as 
we believe empowerment of the local population is very important. (S. 
Eldor) 
 
Summary  
Overall non-residents agree residents were not involved in the D&R management or 
decision making. the views of non-residents were diverse. The majority of non-residents 
and members of the informers/supporters group supported greater resident  involvement in 
decision-making, in that they believed residents to be capable of taking on such 
responsibility once given sufficient tools to do so. Implementers, however, were more 
sceptical about residents’ ability to cope with the challenge. 
 
5.5.2. Residents’ long-term involvement  
One of the most important factors of participation in creating successful empowerment, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, is continuity of resident participation and the extent to which 
residents maintain and develop their involvement. Participation has a long term impact and 
researchers therefore recommend the support and maintenance of residents’ participation, 
as well as the support of local leadership in the hope that it might influence the community 
to become involved and support projects. The following section presents results 
concerning the continuity of resident activity. Continuity means to what extant residents 
have maintained, reduced or increased their participation in the project over the years. 
Table 3 shows the range of activity over period of time among residents and non-residents. 
 Around half among residents (55.5%) reported that they are still highly involved in 
their communities. A significant proportion (57%) of non-residents is still highly involved 
in the programme, and the remainder have either less or no involvement. 
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Table 3: Duration of resident activity and involvement in the D&R  
 
Period of Involvement Still 
highly 
Active 
Highly active 
– moderately 
active 
Highly 
active – 
not active 
Moderately 
active – 
not active 
Never 
active 
 
Total
31
 
 
Residents 
 Leaders 
 Moderate participants 
 Random 
 
10 
7 
3 
0 
 
3 
0 
3 
0 
 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
4 
0 
0 
4 
 
18 
8 
6 
4 
 
Non-residents 
 Informers/supporters 
 Implementers 
 Decision-makers 
 
8 
4 
2 
2 
 
3 
3 
0 
0 
 
3 
2 
1 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
14 
9 
3 
2 
 
Source: Israeli NRP survey - Guy Doron, 2005-09  
 
Involvement in the analysed case studies and in other D&R projects took the form of 
individuals participating in demonstrations and community activities rather than in project 
management. Involvement tended, therefore, to be more against projects than in support of 
them, which is a sign of dissatisfaction. Although residents admitted that community 
activity and protests within the project instigated their participation, motivated their 
activity and forced them to bond together, this was not the kind of influence they had 
hoped to have on project operation. In terms of real influence on the D&R, residents have 
none, however they have managed to act collectively to protest against their exclusion 
from decision-making. In terms of continuity, residents continue to fight for their homes, 
for their very survival. Residents have shown that local leadership was not supported by 
government, at least not sufficiently to lead the community to support the programme. 
Among non-residents almost half were not involved, as the project lasted for a long time 
and took many forms. Most officials and supporters had either retired or moved to other 
jobs. 
 One of the key features to maintain residents’ participation is by providing them 
services and tools to increase their share in decision-making. This was also known as 
public policy.  
 
                                                 
31
 N/A Residents 35; Leaders 10, Moderate Participants 11, Random 14; Non-Residents 23; 
Informers/supporters 12, Implementers 10, Decision-makers 1  
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5.5.3 Public Policy towards residents’ involvement in D&R 
Training and education schemes were considered by residents as the most immediate 
support the government could provide in order to build confidence and encourage 
participation, yet at the same time, such training schemes were barely provided. 
Nevertheless, governments could support communities through localisation, by providing 
better social services, improving housing conditions, raising the standard and accessibility 
of local services. The next section analyses residents’ views on the extent and the type of 
government support within D&R.  
 The table below summarises participants’ assessment of public policy towards 
residents’ participation in the D&R. The assessment is based on a simple scale of negative 
to positive; however, participants could further categorise public policy into two more 
median stages (moderate support and high support): 
 
Table 4: Public Policy towards residents’ involvement in the D&R  
Public Policy Negative Moderate 
Support 
Supportive Very 
Supportive 
Total 
All Residents 
 Leaders 
 Moderate participants 
 Random 
23 
8 
12 
3 
 
9 
4 
0 
5 
 
9 
5 
3 
1 
 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
53 
18 
17 
18 
 
Non-residents 
 Informers/supporters 
 Implementers 
 Decision-makers 
5 
5 
0 
0 
16 
9 
6 
1 
9 
3 
4 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source: Israeli NRP survey - Guy Doron, 2005–0932  
 
An analysis of residents’ responses shows that a majority have observed a negative public 
policy towards their participation. In addition to a lack of training to support participation, 
one specific factor residents repeatedly mentioned is officials’ lack of awareness of 
                                                 
32
 N/A: Residents – 11; Leaders – 0; Moderate participants – 2; Random – 9; Non-residents – 7; Informers – 
4; Implementers – 3; Decision-makers – 0. 
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residents’ desire to take part. Another factor mentioned was the continuous disputes 
between residents and officials which becomes synonymous with D&R.  
 An analysis of non-residents’ responses shows a slightly different set of results. 
The majority describe a moderate attitude from different governments towards residents’ 
participation. Decision makers among those interviewed even declared a supportive 
attitude. Non-residents believed that the attempts to privatise projects and allow 
developers and residents direct links to negotiate under private-market rules would have 
both improved housing facilities and provided residents with better compensation. This 
belief, however, is contradicted by residents’ frustration with unproductive negotiations 
and with the deterioration of social services during the new era. In many interviews it 
seemed like the government had turned its back on the disempowering consequences of 
moving low income populations away from urban centres or opportunities. 
 According to residents, one of the main reasons for the negative public policy 
towards their participation was the low status of social housing policy within the wider 
political agenda in Israel. Given the existence of multiple conflicts, social policy is 
understandably ranked lower than issues of terror, personal security or the consequences 
of ethnic and religious strife. The issue of the low status of social policy in multi-conflict 
scenarios was repeated often in interviews and we will therefore look at that pattern more 
closely in the other projects as well to measure whether a  more general conclusion can be 
drawn.    
 Both decision makers and residents admit that social housing policy has yet to 
shape their political allegiances, therefore, it is unsurprising that it has consistently 
commanded less attention. In interviews, residents expressed frustration at this, as well as 
disappointment. Resident leaders Arajuani and Keshet admitted that they no longer 
participate in elections: “Decision makers run by personal preference, we have no more 
trust in politicians” (B. Arajuani, S. Keshet. 
 Other residents added that politician’s main interests are to satisfy the wealthiest 
(such as the developers) rather than the poor, and therefore this is a lost battle for residents 
of poor neighbourhoods:  
 
Politicians are driven by their wealthy developers’ interests. Only during 
election campaigns do they come to visit here and pretend to pay attention 
to social problems. (D. & R. Balsi, Z. Adika, D. Elimelech, M. Hamudi, D. 
& S. Azulai, S. Meidani) 
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 A common conclusion related to the internal debate about where social policy is 
placed in the Israeli political agenda  expressed by residents was that the majority of 
politicians do not focus on social issues, since they are not rewarding electorally. The 
social agenda matters only to a few policy makers who are already socially oriented. A. 
Dagan stated: 
 
 Social issues are a burden, and the majority of policy-makers avoid social 
involvement or welfare planning. Only a few really care, and their agenda is 
indeed based on social policy philosophy and judgment. 
 
 R. Aberjel noted that social policy was treated lightly without long term planning 
or follow-up agenda. Only few policy makers who have links with specific residents’ 
groups are sometimes committed to acting on their behalf:  
 
In Israel, social policy is like providing a cure to a particular pain only, 
rather than investing [in] a comprehensive or total cure. (R. Aberjel) 
 
 The fact that some policy makers clearly act on behalf of their supporters, as in the 
cases of other strong groups in Israel (e.g. the New Settlements and the Kibbutzim), has 
led many residents to believe that only by acting as a pressure group that has direct links 
with decision makers can they force social policy to rank higher on the list of priorities. In 
regional election systems, for instance, representatives are elected locally and thus more 
committed to their communities. Residents believed that implementing a regional 
representation system in national elections allowed greater influence of local communities 
on their representatives which, in turn, would result in greater commitment to local issues, 
at least for those representatives: 
 
Since politicians normally have a short term in power and since they seek 
publicity in national levels, they deal with issues that have the highest 
ratings in the national agenda rather than with social policies which in many 
case also involve local issues which are usually portrayed by the media as 
unpopular. This is to say that social policy has less weight than it should 
have. I would think that a regional election system could strengthen the 
links between representatives and the public that they are about to represent 
and, in turn, commitment towards social policy among politicians would 
increase. (G. Golan) 
 
 In practice, the current system, which is centralised with very little local 
representation, actually created the opposite scenario: many residents stated that their 
negative experiences of officialdom and government promises had led to civil apathy. A 
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central theme (as appears in the majority of interviews) was the loss of trust in the current 
system, to such an extent that more and more residents choose not to participate in general 
or local elections:  
 
Social policy should be on the public agenda truthfully this is not the case. 
Unfortunately, voters have become more and more apathetic, rather than 
more and more involved. (D. & R. Balsi) 
 
Since the Right To Buy’s famous election campaign in 1999, I have no 
longer been active in elections. I was so let down that I became apathetic; it 
was the last election campaign in which I participated. I couldn’t care less 
anymore. (Z. Adika)  
 
The majority of voters are depressed, frustrated, and in some cases even 
become apathetic towards the democratic system, as they are so fed up of 
promises that they have stopped believing in parties and politics. (D. 
Elimelech, M. Hamudi) 
 
 Despite these depressing views, some residents still expressed belief in the system 
and noted a slight increase in the importance of social policy in recent campaigns:  
 
In the last campaign, social matters became very relevant and parties that 
never used to have a social agenda developed and presented one. Although 
the traditional political discourses in Israel evolve mainly around security 
issues, voters have started to understand that there can be no national 
security before securing social security. (S. Keshet)  
 
Residents do care about social policy and that’s shaping their votes, and 
indeed the last elections are a proof of that. However, although social policy 
was among the voters’ highest priorities, it is not with decision-makers. (S. 
Meidani) 
 
 Another strong piece of evidence for the priority of social policy in the Israeli 
agenda appears in the following testimonials. Although residents were very active during 
D&R, in Israel’s environment of multiple conflicts and pressures social policy has yet to 
drive their direct or indirect involvement in political decision-making: 
 
The main issues affecting voters in Israel still relate to security issues. 
Social policies are yet to occupy importance among residents. (A. Dagan)  
 
People speak highly about social issues but vote according to other 
aspirations. Personally, I belong to the left when deciding on social issues; 
yet I have consistently voted for the right-wing parties for other traditional 
reasons. This goes to show that there is no linkage between the importance 
of social policies and voting. (G. Golan) 
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I myself admit that what shapes my vote is foreign affairs and state security 
rather than social issues. (D. & S. Azulai) 
 
 The majority of non-residents confirm that social and housing policy does not lead 
policy makers which explains the little attention to those issues within the national agenda. 
Israel’s current regime favours a liberal economic policy, rather than social values which 
were promoted by the old regime:  
 
Unfortunately, there are more representatives who are led by political, 
religious or financial doctrines, rather than those who set their priorities 
according to social agenda. As a regime that mostly imitates the American 
way of life, this is not surprising. We tend to copy their liberal attitudes and 
care less about social issues. (J. P. Alalo, M. Margalit)  
 
Israeli representatives are led by electoral and financial issues a lot more 
than by social issues. These create stronger links between politicians and the 
wealthiest citizens and in order to satisfy the latter, liberal, free-market 
policies are required. Furthermore, social issues are very uncommon on the 
media’s front pages and, therefore, politicians aim elsewhere. (R. 
Avnimelech) 
  
 Most members of the informers/supporters group agreed with residents and noted 
the marginal influence social policy has on voters and, thus, on policy makers and 
potentially even on residents themselves: even among leaders who considered to be more 
involved in social policy, there are those who admitted that they tend to vote in a way that 
is not based on social principles:  
 
Social policy is yet to really impact across the political spectrum of voters. 
As we get closer to polling day, residents are back to their traditional 
political segregations. For me as a citizen, there is a clear link between 
politics and society; therefore, social policy shapes my vote, but this has yet 
to be the case with residents. (S. Asheri) 
 
Some argue that Israel’s unique bilateral situation pushed social issues even 
further away: 
 
The influence of social policy on voters is almost negligible. Bilateral 
issues, though, are more relevant to voters as they concern many more 
people. Purely social issues are yet to be as important. Maybe one day, 
when we’ll live in a calmer and quieter society and surroundings, this might 
become a more central point of attention. (J. P. Alalo, R. Avnimelech) 
 
The consequence is that in Israel there is lower priority for social issues, M. Margalit 
argues that social orientation is not politically valued in Israel and those who believe in 
social solutions are also not valued politically:  
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As was proven during the election campaigns, parties led by a social agenda 
failed compared to those with anti-social agendas. (M. Margalit) 
 
 Some informers/supporters noted an increase in the importance of social policy in 
the recent election campaign. The fact that both the public and the media were more aware 
of social exclusion and were receptive to dealing with its repercussions encouraged policy 
makers and political candidates to come up with new programmes and plans aimed at 
creating social change. This certainly enlivened social debate:  
 
During the last election, poverty was considered a serious problem, and 
social exclusion was considered as something that the government needs to 
confront. The reality struck back to us — leaders indeed declared their 
social commitment, yet failed to show this after they were elected. (S. 
Asheri)  
 
Among implementers, social policy was generally considered unimportant in shaping 
voting behaviour. Also mentioned, however, were specific occasions in which social 
policy came to the attention of voters and inspired political debate. S. Ben Eliahu 
mentioned the election of 1977 (which led to the first ‘Likud’ government that initiate the 
Neighbourhood Renewal programme):  
 
[Social policy was a factor] only once, in 1977, when the first change of 
power took place. Begin’s regime aimed at changing and creating new 
priorities led by a social policy agenda — and officials did follow that with 
care. (S. Ben Eliahu) 
 
Dr Pialkof pointed to the “Right to Buy” debate during the election campaign of 2000 as a 
turning point at which social policy captured a central role in the political debate:  
 
I’m a long servant of the Housing Ministry and I must confess that cases 
where residents united to pressurise parties, as was the case during the RTB 
legislation, was unique. Very few will say that housing or social issues led 
their vote. (Dr C. Pialkoff) 
 
A common practice literature for services under public policy were training and education 
schemes which is the essence of the next section. 
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5.5.4 Training and Education Schemes  
Most interviewees referred to training and education as crucial tools for residents’ 
empowerment, building tenants’ confidence and promoting their current and long term 
participation. No one suggested that they were unnecessary in helping residents take part 
in project management. The next section investigates whether training was available for 
residents during the D&R.  
 Residents showed great interest in training and education schemes and confirmed 
that such courses had hardly ever been implemented in their communities during D&R. 
Where courses had been run, though, residents praised those operated by external experts 
and not by the official authorities. 
 The majority of residents stated consistently that training schemes would have 
great importance in improving the quality of their participation. However, as mentioned, 
the authorities have rarely offered them:  
 
Training and education schemes are very important. By participating in such 
courses, residents could improve their skills to get involved in projects and 
become more involved in their communities. Not only would the residents 
be learning, [but] they would also get practice and be supervised in the way 
they learn and perform. We have never been offered anything of this nature. 
All that government offices are interested in is to minimise our roles and if 
know less we would be less involved. (Z. Adika)  
 
A. Dagan, a leader of a residents’ group from the Neighbourhood of Cardboard in Tel 
Aviv, admitted that it is more than logical that a group that has no formal education or 
training would find it difficult to run a complete project on their own, but that it is possible 
with expert guidance: “Residents’ experience, together with experts’ supervision, should 
guide projects in the right direction” (A. Dagan). 
 R. Aberjel (illustration 5.13), a leader of resident group from Jerusalem who was 
also involved in the D&R in the Neighbourhood of Mamila and many others, insisted that 
due lack of trust between residents and officials, only schemes operated by external 
experts independent from officials, would do:  
 
If residents [were] getting professional consultancy and support, this should 
be an independent advisory body due to the bad reputation government 
institutions have in these neighbourhoods. (R. Aberjel) 
 
 Some resident groups insisted on training and thus decided to initiate training 
themselves where they knew such schemes were not provided by the authorities: 
  
144 
 
We arranged such courses for ourselves, which shows their benefits. 
Residents learned what their rights are and how to better achieve them. We 
weren’t offered any courses or training schemes by authorities at all. We did 
ask for it but the housing company ignored us, [and] the local municipality 
which assisted us by funding the first group session dropped the others. We 
conducted some courses helping residents to learn about their rights, the 
housing market and the way to take care of themselves. (B. Arajuani, 
illustration 5.6)  
 
Another group in Tel Aviv confirm a similar experience as the group leader describes:  
 
We haven’t been offered any courses or training schemes at all, therefore all 
activities deemed to increase resident knowledge are operated by the 
community and funded privately. We applied for support from the local 
municipality but were refused. (S. Keshet)  
 
Equally well, E. Shachar, a resident from Tel Aviv, when reflecting on his past social 
experience, felt that had he been offered such courses, he would not have failed while 
negotiating with his local bodies and could have better represented his rights:  
 
It is very important and necessary. Had I [had] the option to gain such 
capabilities, let’s say negotiation skills, I could have protected myself from 
being misled by the housing company. (E. Shachar) 
 
 Training schemes initiated by residents appear to have had a significant impact on 
their empowerment. One resident revealed how training helped him while defending his 
rights during the project in his neighbourhood:  
 
Education and training courses are definitely important. My personal 
activity helped me to gain more knowledge and gave me some opportunities 
to implement the skills I have gained. I feel that it helped me to smoothly 
get into my position as residents’ representative, whether on the local 
residents’ committees or whether it was at the national level where I 
participated in managerial and government boards. Indeed, the fact that 
officials were so shocked by residents’ resistance to the project shows how 
undervalued residents were, or how disconnected officials were from the 
neighbourhoods and from residents’ needs (S. Meidani)  
 
The great impact of training was also noted by G. Golan, a local leader from the 
neighbourhood of Kfar Gvirol in Rehovot:  
 
Training schemes give residents tools to learn how to do things, yet 
importantly the ability to merge into bigger and more complicated systems, 
as we successfully impact the project in this neighbourhood. (G. Golan) 
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 Based on such experience, residents insisted that their skills were improved mainly 
by courses that were designed and operated by external experts and not by the authorities:  
 
We consulted and were supported by independent experts external to the 
project, as officials did not assume we were capable of dealing with such 
issues and thus rebuff provision of such courses to us. (R. Aberjel) 
 
 A. Dagan held a similar view saying that the huge mistrust between authorities and 
residents made such initiatives impossible to be delivered by the government and accepted 
by residents:  
 
I’m suggesting an independent body supervising resident operations to 
prevent actual inappropriate management decisions and suspicions against 
residents’ corruption. (A. Dagan) 
 
 In general, training programmes were not offered during D&R and residents 
consequently argued that this showed that authorities did not assume residents could 
contribute or appreciate residents’ opinion:  
 
No training schemes were offered to us. I would say that authorities are very 
comfortable with a situation where residents don’t know much and stay 
poor. (D. & R. Balsi) 
 
I don’t think that educating residents is prioritised as being in officials’ 
interests at all; this is not Europe here. Had we [had] an offer, I would have 
gladly joined. I say to authorities, don’t eliminate us just because we gain 
most of our education from daily experience, ‘a street-wisdom’ sometime 
more effective than others. (D. Elimelech, D. & S. Azulai)  
 
 The issue of lack of training was also noted while interviewing random residents: 
 
I once had a course to help me to finish my studies and get a diploma that 
was operated by the job centre. I was offered nothing similar from the 
housing company. Had I been offered any courses, I would have loved to 
have gone. (M. Hamudi)  
  
The vast majority of residents supported the idea of training and education schemes, and 
those who participated in the few that were offered confirmed that the courses contributed 
greatly to their involvement and their sense of community responsibility. However, the 
majority of residents complained that these schemes were absent officially and when 
delivered after all, it was self-initiated or operated by NGO. 
 Non-residents agreed that training and education schemes were not available to 
residents under the D&R. Implementers doubted the ability of residents to develop 
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managerial skills through training courses and thus it were never planned as part of the 
programme. However, members of the informers/supporters group and even a few among 
the implementers consider training as important. 
 Members of the informers/supporters agree the importance of training schemes to 
better improve residents knowledge and participation, but they admit that such courses had 
not been offered to residents:  
 
Education, financial and specific expertise can contribute to residents and 
improve their ability to influence decisions; running a budget, for instance, 
is not a straightforward matter to an ordinary residents and needs to be 
taught in order to settled in . I don’t remember training courses (either by 
the government or the housing companies). Had such schemes been offered, 
I am confident that many of the residents would have liked to join in. (R. 
Avnimelech) 
 
Some argue that training courses are a long term vision, which not necessarily politicians 
or officials’ agenda as they plan for the short term normally in order to keep their positions 
in place:  
 
Such courses, with long-term effects, have not been offered to residents, as 
very few measured and planned for the long-term. (J.P. Alalo, M. Margalit) 
 
 S. Asheri (illustration 5.14), a social activist in one of the main NGOs active in 
Israel , described their role to cover the gap left by the government in providing training 
for residents having learnt that that was what the local community wanted:  
 
Residents need to fill gaps in many subjects, such as financial issues, 
running budgets, negotiating and conciliating, setting plans and prioritising 
between the alternatives given to them. We — as an NGO — conducted a 
few empowerment courses for residents, [and] we also support local 
management initiatives. (S. Asheri)  
 
Among implementers, views were different. Some mentioned that training is unnecessary 
as it almost impossible to improve the abilities of poor residents anyway:  
 
You can’t teach leadership. If you haven’t got it you won’t get it anywhere. 
You might be able to improve leadership skills among current leaders, but 
how many among disadvantaged residents have that potential at all? Almost 
none. (S. Ben Eliahu)  
Dr Pialkof, who is supportive of such schemes and convinced of their contribution, 
admitted that they have not yet become established in social housing policy planning in 
Israel:  
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Courses offer real empowerment potential to residents. In theory residents 
are given tools that improve their independence, in practice, though, 
housing policy in Israel is still far from that, especially when the common 
belief is that residents shouldn’t be trusted. (Dr C. Pialkoff) 
 
D&R did not offer training, and the new Urban Renewal Scheme announced in 2006 
which promised to deliver where the D&R failed, also does not include training and 
education schemes. The reason for this, according to the head of the programme in the 
Housing Ministry, is not through lack of recognition of their importance but lack of 
control, since the programme is to be operated privately. S. Eldor insists that these courses 
should be part of the local municipality’s contribution to the new scheme but cannot be 
part of the agreement between the government and the private developer:  
 
Training schemes are important. If it helps anyone to gain some education 
through that and it pushes them forward, it is definitely for the better. 
[While] it is important to remember that my department coordinates 
between the government and private developers, who definitely won’t invest 
[in] or operate such schemes, this is the duty of other government bodies. 
However, [if] these courses can be operated, I’d assume developers would 
be more than happy to benefit from them. The budget to fund such courses 
could also be found by local municipalities, but never from private 
constructors. (S. Eldor) 
 
Summary  
Non-residents agree that training and education schemes can make a contribution to 
residents, but they were missing from D&R. Moreover, many confirm that training is 
important and could potentially benefit projects. Implementers, however, feel that training 
does not necessarily have a positive impact on residents and projects and, thus, should not 
be included. Some felt that there was is a lack of interest in training amongst professionals.  
 
5.5.5. Satisfaction with D&R: Overview 
Another focal issue discussed in interviews was the level of satisfaction with the D&R 
programme. Residents were generally dissatisfied with the D&R as they were dissatisfied 
with public policy in general. Non-residents who had a role in programme operations were 
also dissatisfied with the programme impacts and with resident participation in it. Overall, 
participants have classified the D&R a social failure. One sign of the lack of 
communication and lack of cooperation between residents and authorities is the gap 
between residents’ expectations and the government programme’s plan. The failure was 
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well known in Vadi Saliv, it was evident that conditions have not improved but in fact, the 
opposite. The sense of failure was also evident in the Neighbourhood of Cardboard, even 
though its design was based on lessons learnt in Vadi Saliv. The government plan was to 
hand responsibility to private developers and they expected this would grant residents 
greater influence if they were able to negotiate with developers directly. Analysing 
residents’ feedback, however, reveals that they expected the authorities to remain 
responsible for their social and housing conditions. 
 The following table provides a summary of participants’ assessment of their 
satisfaction with D&R in general and with government support of resident participation in 
the programme. 
 
Table 5: Levels of satisfaction with Public Policy during the D&R  
Level of Satisfaction Satisfied Dissatisfied Total 
Residents 
 Leaders 
 Common participants 
 Random 
20 
11 
4 
5 
33 
7 
13 
13 
53 
18 
17 
18 
Non-residents 
 Informers 
 Implementers 
 Decision Makers 
21 
10 
9 
2 
12 
10 
2 
0 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source: Israeli NRP survey - Guy Doron, 2005– 09 33 
 
A large majority of residents (72%) declared themselves dissatisfied with public policy 
during the D&R, its outcomes, housing conditions and the social services provided to their 
communities. Dissatisfaction from the D&R is far more pronounced than in the other 
programmes investigated in this research and provides evidence for residents’ claims that 
public policy was negative which resulted in solutions that did not address their actual 
needs and expectations. 
 More than half of non-residents, however, reported various levels of satisfaction 
regarding the D&R. Again, dissatisfaction rates expressed by non-residents were higher in 
                                                 
33
 N/A residents 0; Non residents 4; informers 1, implementers 2, decision makers 1  
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D&R than in any other programme investigated in this research. Members of the 
informers/supporters group classified the programme as unsatisfactory, in line with 
residents, as many of them joined residents’ activities and were as frustrated at their 
inability to impact on decisions. Implementers, on the other hand, wish to believe that the 
new innovation of privatise the programme improve the operation as it allows residents 
direct access to developers and, therefore, greater opportunities to influence results. 
 Results were slightly different when it came to measuring residents’ with 
participation in the D&R. The table below is a summary of participants’ assessment of 
their satisfaction concerning their role in the investigated case studies of D&R (the total 
number is lower than in Table 5). 
 
Table 6: Levels of satisfaction with residents’ participation in the investigated case 
studies  
Level of satisfaction Satisfied Dissatisfied Total 
Residents 
 Leaders 
 Moderate participants 
 Random 
10 
6 
2 
2 
8 
2 
4 
2 
18 
8 
6 
4 
Non-residents 
 Informers 
 Implementers 
 Decision Making 
4 
1 
1 
2 
10 
8 
2 
0 
14 
9 
3 
2 
Source: Israeli D&R survey - Guy Doron, 2005–0934 
 
The results in Table 6 appear to be incompatible with the previous set, with a little more 
than half of residents (55.6%) who experienced the D&R satisfied with their participation. 
This outcome different from the previous question and that’s require an explanation; 
Where residents felt satisfied with their participation, it was not due to the provision of 
formal opportunities to participate. Instead, respondents explained that their mutual 
opposition to the project’s format improved community cohesion and civil awareness. This 
                                                 
34
 N/A: Residents – 0; Leaders – 0; Moderate participants – 0; Random – 0; Non-residents – 0; Informers – 
0; Implementers – 0; Decision-makers – 0. 
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can be seen in the results collected from leaders. They was the most satisfied sub-group 
amongst the residents, although had no share in the formal decision making of a project, 
and this was due mainly to their role in organising protests against the proposed projects. 
Although highly dissatisfied with the public policy in general during the D&R (as 
presented in table 5), they were pleased with the progress they had managed to achieve on 
their own and, thus, described themselves as satisfied with their participation (which was a 
‘self-made’ one).  
 Some might suggest that there is a methodological problem in cases where 
residents are satisfied with their participation although not with the outcome. We must 
emphasise that dissatisfaction with the programme’s outcome was evident across the entire 
resident spectrum. However, since this research also went one step further and interviewed 
residents of varying status and at different levels of empowerment, we can present more 
complex data, for instance satisfaction with the overall outcome of a programme and a 
unique personal assessment of empowerment, or how the programme and its frustrating 
outcome impacts personal empowerment.   
 The majority of the non-residents (71%) involved in the D&R were dissatisfied 
with resident participation. Note that non-residents measured participation as having been 
in the actual programme itself, and as such, residents’ participation was lacking. Those 
who were satisfied felt that residents’ influence had increased as a result of the 
privatisation of the programme, as this had allowed them direct negotiation with 
developers. Still, among those who personally experienced the projects in the analysed 
case studies, this belief has rarely been articulated. 
 Residents were almost all dissatisfied with the D&R outcomes. While some 
respondents attributed the failure to their own lack of unity, many believed that it was the 
result of the negative public policy toward their involvement.  
 An oft-repeated theme in the interviews was that the programme’s poor outcomes 
were the result of the officials’ negative attitude towards residents’ participation:  
 
I’m very dissatisfied. We are extremely disappointed, not only that the 
living conditions in this neighbourhood are poorer, [but also that] the lack of 
government support has caused further deterioration in our social and 
community conditions. (D. & R. Balsi) 
 
The project was a total failure and our attempts to be involved were denied; 
therefore, our involvement could be described as unsatisfactory and 
irrelevant. (A. Dagan, D. Elimelech) 
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Even among those in the random sample, a great deal of dissatisfaction was expressed:  
 
I’m very dissatisfied with the way we were treated, as a citizen that always 
followed the rules, I was plotted against! Not only was my home taken away 
from me, [but] I was also deceived during the project. (E. Shachar)  
 
I’m very dissatisfied. We have no social services, no proper education; all 
we have is our community to support each other, we don’t trust politicians. 
We are desperate. (M. Hamudi) 
 
 A number of residents wanted to emphasise that, although they failed to change 
negative public policy, their internal cooperation as a community has improved because of 
these challenges:  
 
I’m not satisfied with the project, as we have yet to achieve any progress in 
our negotiations for fair compensation. Still, I’m satisfied with our 
involvement in the protests against the implementation of the project and as 
we stood together for our rights against the developer. (S. Meidani, B. 
Arajuani, G. Golan) 
 
Personally, we are satisfied, as our unity managed to get us a fair trade deal, 
but the fact that it began without consulting the other residents in the 
neighbourhood resulted in the current situation, where the project is stuck 
and many among us have yet to agree terms. (D. & S. Azulai) 
 
 Residents, especially leaders, were encouraged by their ability to inspire their 
communities and foster community cohesion against the D&R in their neighbourhoods. At 
the same time, residents evaluated the D&R programme in general as insufficient in terms 
of both participation and public policy that the programme offers . The fact that the D&R 
programme failed to involve residents or to offer better local services  produced poor 
results in neighbourhoods where the D&R was operated, regardless of whether it was 
central government led or private. 
 Views varied between members of the informers/supporters (dissatisfaction) and 
implementers (satisfaction).  
 Most informers/supporters, as they were involved with resident groups, noted their 
dissatisfaction with the public policy towards residents’ involvement:  
 
I’m mostly dissatisfied with the D&R and with the government attitude, 
especially to residents, as it was unfair and negative. (J. P. Alalo, M. 
Margalit, R. Avnimelech) 
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 Some implementers were impressed with residents cohesiveness, and although 
agree the overall programme was a failure, they believe the protest inspired social and 
community cohesion that in the long term could have a positive impact: 
 
I’m partly satisfied. Lobbying for social policy is involving and inspiring for 
every community, let alone for a disadvantaged one. There is no doubt that 
residents benefited from and were empowered through their protests against 
the structure of the project. Yet maintaining this achievement is a long 
process that requires full and long lasting commitment and has many crises 
along the way. (S. Asheri) 
 
 Implementers, however, were generally pleased with the way the new Urban 
Renewal scheme had been conducted:  
 
Up till now, wherever we have initiated the new urban renewal scheme , we 
have received full cooperation from residents and the local municipality. 
Indeed, we can see that projects lifts the financial value of an area, renewing 
facilities and attracting new residents. I would assume that this is the reason 
for us getting the support of all parties involved. (S. Eldor) 
 
Implementers felt that their attitude towards residents’ participation was appropriate, and 
that if residents’ influence had been insufficient, this was only because of their 
incompetence:  
 
I’m very dissatisfied with residents’ low level of involvement. This low 
level is mainly because of the separation between different groups of 
residents. People are spread up and down the country, not united in 
community groups, not organised in pressure groups and this is added to by 
their financial and social weaknesses anyway. This lack of residents’ power, 
reflects the low importance housing issues get. (Dr C. Pialkoff)  
 
 The former Managing Director of the Housing Ministry admitted that officials are 
not motivated to lead policy change and residents cannot expect innovations from their 
political representatives. The fact that residents of poor neighbourhoods failed to organise 
in a pressure group, resulted in their dissatisfaction: 
 
The common resident was ignored as having no importance really. The 
government operational system is designed firstly to protect its employees 
— i.e., to allow them to retire with dignity. Any changes and 
transformations are not recommended and, indeed, most government bodies 
are unable to bring on new innovations create new policies. Reforms are 
generally perceived by officials as dangerous and threatening initiatives and 
can only be forced on government bodies or initiated by outsiders or by the 
treasury section. In this respect the new urban scheme is an example of 
innovative solution by the state to remove obstacles from developers and 
allowed them to act freely. (S. Ben Eliahu) 
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Summary  
Residents were generally dissatisfied with the D&R outcomes, in fact, many believed that 
the government’s attitude was a major factor in the programme’s failure. Some of the 
participants in the analysed case studies felt that, with a greater sense of community, they 
could minimise the negative impact of the programme since the majority of residents 
admitted that they were given confidence by the local activities and by the fact that they 
managed to postpone and prevent the operation of projects that were not in their interest. 
Non-residents’ views, however, were varied; members of the informers/supporters group 
echoed the dissatisfaction experienced by residents (and the fact that they still managed to 
act locally to protest against the project), while implementers opposed that view and 
believed the new urban scheme represent a positive change, still agree that residents failed 
to push for better public service because they were not united. 
 
5.5.6. Negative Public Policy – The Impact of Social Unrest 
One key issue that emerged from the interviews and which was used by tenants to 
illustrate their frustration toward the negative public policy during the D&R was the role 
of social unrest (which many residents consider as their main form to protest against the 
D&R and their exclusion from influence decision making). Most residents who 
experienced the D&R were also involved in demonstrations and protests. This fact in itself 
proves their dissatisfaction with their exclusion from the decision-making process and the 
prejudiced attitudes they perceived in officials. Demonstrations, although contributing to 
residents’ unity, did not change government attitudes. Social unrest in the analysed case 
studies appear in many forms from violent riots (in Vadi Saliv) to vocal protests which did 
not necessarily involve violence, even if in many cases they ended in physical 
confrontation when the police were called to the scene. The case of ‘Vadi Saliv’ is 
different; the riots were considered the most severe social unrest in Israeli history. The 
eruption of violence in Vasdi Saliv left one fatality and many injured over the few days of 
the police’s ‘siege’ of the neighbourhood, but that was an exception. Social unrest was, in 
most cases, a collective action by residents who wanted to escalate their protest and make 
a more vocal presentation of their distress.  
 To many, resident protest was perceived as empowering for the local community. 
Residents were coordinated in their protest against a project in their neighbourhood that 
they considered likely to worsen their social and housing conditions. Moreover, their 
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forcefully and consistently stated demands to be included in the decision making shows an 
empowered response, one in which residents were sure of their capabilities, aware of their 
rights, and clear on what their proper role in project management should be. In many 
cases, these demonstrations also helped garner positive public relations and attracted 
media attention (illustration 5.15).  
 Despite the protests’ empowering consequences which were noted by both 
residents and non-residents, when measuring its impact on policy, there is no evidence that 
they managed to change the government’s approach or convinced it to accept the 
residents’ demands. Yet protests did postpone and even sometimes revised plans which 
had been against their interests and, importantly, prevented developers taking on a 
particular project when they realised the seriousness of resident opposition.  
 In general, residents felt that demonstrations had raised public awareness but failed 
to make an impact on policy. While there was a sense that the demonstrations had 
consolidated individual communities, many respondents also described the violence 
protesters had suffered. The severity of the police response left many residents feeling that 
any gains made in the protests were essentially pyrrhic. 
 Most residents confirmed that demonstrations had been a response to their 
exclusion from influence decisions. As a tool to raise these issues, some still felt that the 
protests had been worthwhile:  
 
Demonstrations were highly successful as it got us some media coverage, 
which was what we aimed for. Many residents took part in these 
demonstrations; we managed to block some roads and raise public attention. 
(S. Keshet, D. Elimelech) 
 
 Although the protests attracted media attention, they were clearly considered to 
have failed to impact policy or allow residents a share in management. The protests did, 
however, have an impact on evictions and in some cases helped prevent them, as Adika 
and Balsi, protest organisers from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (respectively) explain:  
 
I organised the protests in response to the eviction orders, [and] there were 
around 300 participants. Although we managed to raise awareness about the 
issue, and we proved our resilience to decision makers, apart [from] some 
media coverage and marginal PR, nothing significant happened and we had 
no consequence on the project. (D. & R. Balsi, Z. Adika) 
 
 Another issue mentioned repeatedly by residents was the disproportionate use of 
power against them by the police during the protests. This not only illustrated the negative 
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public policy towards their involvement, but also, in this testimonial, drove home the 
ultimate ineffectiveness of protest:  
 
The price we paid for that [protesting] though was high, as we were beaten 
like hell; we were treated very violently by the police. It was almost four 
years of encampment and the demonstrations kept up all along. 
Unfortunately, I can’t say we were rewarded for that. (B Arajuani, R. 
Aberjel)  
 
D, Azulai, described a similar pattern in the demonstrations held in Tel Aviv:  
 
There were severe demonstrations in this neighbourhood, and on one 
occasion, someone even found his death as we were treated with violence. 
(D. & S. Azulai)  
 
Although most residents were proud of the resilience of their community, as demonstrated 
in protests, there were also different views among residents as to the role of these protests. 
G. Golan, on reflection, stated that the emotional damage the demonstrations had on the 
neighbourhood, which was already stigmatised as poor and badly behaved, was greater in 
the long run than any successes protesters might have enjoyed at the time, and therefore in 
his community they chose not to protest but to negotiate with the authorities:  
 
In our neighbourhood we had no demonstrations. Our experience shows that 
when a demonstration comes to its end, nobody promises that problems are 
about to be solved, while it is guaranteed, though, that the stigmatisation of 
the community is certain. Peoples’ memories from such protests are 
negative rather than positive, and that surely does not help the community to 
take pride in itself. (G. Golan) 
 
 Non-residents varied in their views about social unrest. Many agreed that 
demonstrations had not changed policy, while informers/supporters noted that 
demonstrations made a massive contribution to residents’ participation. Implementers 
denied any such claims about the significance of demonstrations in changing their 
attitudes. 
 S. Asheri supported the demonstrations and eulogized about their impact:  
 
We, as an NGO that supports resident groups, played a key role in operating 
demonstrations and protests. The demonstrations gave people a sense of 
togetherness and built up the community which was positive; it is important 
to remember that most of the residents involved in these projects are coming 
with a heavy load of trampled dignity, which they suffered from during 
most of their lives. Demonstrations helped to build up their confidence and 
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self- belief. Going all the way to arranging demonstrations, to take 
[responsibility] for all arrangements and to put everything into practice was 
a very hard thing to do but, at the same time, a very empowering process. 
(S. Asheri) 
 
R. Avnimelech was mainly impressed by the impact protests had had on building up the 
local community:  
 
Overall, the protests helped residents to get positive PR for their problems 
and needs; they also helped residents to publicly express their views, 
complaints and suggestions. Residents operated the protests; the vast 
majority of planning and organisation issues were dealt with by the 
residents, and this was also reflected in their share among the participants, 
which was high. (R. Avnimelech) 
 
P. Alalo, who was both a social activist and a member of the Jerusalem council, spoke 
about how these demonstrations were greeted by officials and admitted that they were 
intimidating:  
 
The first response from officials was of panic, as they had bad experiences 
with social riots in Jerusalem. Officials feared the repercussions of protests 
and focused on residents’ leaders, trying to eliminate them. (J. P. Alalo) 
 
 By contrast, other implementers were less positive about the effect protest had on 
policy. They claimed that demonstrations had no real influence on their behaviour and that 
protests were operated mainly by politically motivated residents and not the very poor. 
Thus, they questioned whether protest truly represented residents’ dissatisfaction:  
 
I was very unsupportive of the demonstrators. I thought that those who are 
unable to protest deserve more support than those who are protesting. It was 
immoral in my view to positively respond to those who had the time and 
ability to attend demonstrations at the expense of others who were unable 
to. I know for a fact that demonstrators were guided to [pressure] decision 
makers and threaten us in order to extort help, and I didn’t take decisions 
under pressure. (S. Ben Eliahu) 
 
Dr Pialkof also contended that the impact of the demonstrations on policy making was 
negligible:  
 
The rules are equal and identical everywhere, even if that means facing 
demonstrators from time to time or hosting tent camps outside the Ministry. 
(Dr C. Pialkoff) 
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Summary  
Protests were a collective effort by residents and thus positive in terms of participation, but 
they also had a negative impact as many residents felt frustrated by being neglected and 
abandoned and, thus, questioned the value of their community activities. Informers 
considered demonstrations to have been an influential tool for encouraging resident 
participation; implementers, however, felt that protest simply perpetuated the negative 
attitudes that residents widely attributed to officials.  
 
5.6. Another Form of D&R: A Comparison  
A second theme that emerged during interviews was a comparison made by residents of 
the analysed D&R case studies with another form of D&R project conducted during the 
eviction from Gaza. Central to this comparison was the notion that in this D&R project, 
residents received preferential treatment due to political connections and thus have better 
services and improved solutions. Participants in this research used this example to 
demonstrate that a positive public policy could have contributed to the programme 
operations and could potentially have increased its success. Residents were all aware of 
the process and could assess the terms that were presented to residents of Gaza in order to 
be able to offer their opinions on the case study. Moreover, we have also conducted 
interviews with residents of the evicted communities in Gaza to ensure equality in the data 
presented. The eviction of residents from the Gaza Strip was considered a form of D&R 
since residents were evacuated from their homes, their homes demolished and residents 
relocated, it has not been analysed in this research as a case study since it was not operated 
in a poor neighbourhood per se. Nevertheless, in both cases, residents underwent 
relocation and were offered replacement housing, therefore participants interviewed to this 
research, considered the eviction from Gaza as comparable to the D&R operated in poor 
neighbourhoods (illustrations 5.16, 5.17 & 5.18).  
 The table below summarises interviewees’ responses, comparing the eviction 
processes. The majority of residents (70%) believed that public policy towards settlers 
during the D&R in Gaza was more positive than in the analysed D&R case studies. Views 
were based on a comparison between public policy in each of the cases and presented in 
the following index order: Residents of the Gaza D&R were better treated throughout the 
eviction and demolish (1), Residents of the Gaza D&R were poorly treated throughout the 
process (2), Both groups were equally treated – fairly (3), Both groups were equally 
treated – badly (4). 
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Table 7: Participants’ comparison of public policy regarding eviction and demolish  
Comparison 1 2 3 4 Total 
Residents 
 leaders 
 moderate participants 
 random sample 
36 
14 
13 
9 
1 
1 
0 
0 
3 
1 
0 
2 
8 
2 
4 
2 
53 
18 
17 
17 
Non – residents 
 informers 
 implementers 
 decision-makers 
17 
12 
3 
2 
11 
4 
6 
1 
4 
1 
3 
0 
4 
4 
0 
0 
37 
21 
31 
3 
Source: Israeli D&R survey - Guy Doron, 2005–0935 
 
5.6.1 Participant perspectives 
The majority of residents (70%) believed that public policy towards settlers was more 
positive which resulted in better social care, compensation and better relocation solutions 
for residents evicted from Gaza:  
 
In our neighbourhoods, we got nothing, no compensation or any other 
financial assistance that would allow us to relocate. In the ex-settlements of 
Gaza, residents received millions, which could buy them a luxury home in 
any other part of the country. (R. Aberjel, Golan) 
 
When residents lived in Gaza  were relocated, they were offered full 
compensation for what they had lost. I haven’t been offered anything yet, 
nor asked or consulted, not to mention negotiated with. (S. Meidani, D. 
Benisti) 
 
During the eviction in the Neighbourhood of Cardboard we experienced the 
same problems and expressed the same needs (as in the disengagement GD), 
but received nothing. Moreover, we were penalised by officials for acting as 
a community and raising these demands. (A. Dagan) 
 
Political lobbying of residents of the Gaza settlements’ D&R resulted in a generally more 
positive public policy in response to their demands, which was seen by participants in this 
research to have resulted in better solutions:  
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 N/A: Residents – 5; Leaders – 0; Moderate participants – 0; Random – 5; Non-residents – 1; Informers – 
0; Implementers – 1; Decision-makers – 0. 
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When it comes to the compensation schemes, it’s pretty obvious that 
residents in Gaza  were better treated mainly since settlers were united, 
better linked and operated a very strong political lobby, which brought them 
more power to resist and to raise their compensation price tag… and to 
force the government to legislate a quick law authorising the additional 
benefits for residents in this D&R. (B. Arajuani) 
 
At the same time, residents who experienced the disengagement D&R, believed it was 
another failed D&R project. Many among the relocated settlers complained about negative 
public policy towards their needs (Shragai, 2007), especially the delay in preparing new 
solutions after the eviction: 
 
I was not [eligible] for any housing assistance, just compensation for 
suffering. The rest of the community members were disassembled and 
dispersed among the temporary sites built to house the evacuees, which 
looked like a bunch of caravans — disorganised, unplanned and mainly 
squalid and unattractive, like in the poor neighbourhoods. They were 
inappropriate and highly unappealing sites to live in. (Shulavich, illustration 
5.19)  
 
The experience in Gaza  D&R brought some of them to understand the impact of 
empowerment, sense of power and also to feel the difference when their influence 
collapsed: 
 
We almost controlled the creation of our communities, during which we had 
great contacts and excellent accessibility to decision makers. However, 
during the demolishing process, residents’ level of participation dropped to 
ignorance. (Shulavich) 
 
…during the eviction process, we didn’t want any negotiation whatsoever. 
State officials were anxious to talk to us, but we rejected that. We were in a 
war and you don’t negotiate with your enemy. (Zur) 
 
So confident were they in their ability to sway decisions, residents in the disengagement 
D&R rejected any attempt to negotiate their relocation or the social aspects of their new 
status, believed whichever decision if it’s not going their way they would be able still to 
manipulate it:  
 
Our local leaders ignored the reality and told us that the whole idea of the 
demolishing was like a bad dream that was about to be cancelled, and, 
therefore, we weren’t really prepared to be evicted, and no one had plans for 
the day after, not only when it came to housing, but also in job allocation or 
other social services or other fields. (Shulavich) 
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When the eviction started and the soldiers came to take us out, we were in 
the middle of an ordinary lunch; we didn’t pack anything and were not 
prepared [for] any change in our life style. It was only [a] few days later, 
when the eviction [was] completed, that we returned to pack our belongings. 
(Halfa) 
 
A consequence of the huge dissatisfaction among residents whose influence dropped 
dramatically when they realized they had failed to change the government’s decision, was 
to drop out of the Israeli political mainstream, to “disengage” from the state (Ne’eman & 
Chodof, 2006). The project had further repercussions, such as social alienation that caused 
strong communities to break down (Dayan, 2007), or the negative impact on the younger 
generation. A report made by evacuees (Shragai, 2006), shows that 30% of school children 
avoided school; dozens admitted to thoughts of suicide; and 12 attempted suicide. 
Residents who lived in the Gaza settlement confirmed:  
 
We [were] transformed from involved and very active citizens into apathetic 
[ones.] I couldn’t believe it but, after what we have been through, I actually 
tried to convince my brother to give up his voluntary army service. In our 
view now, the common and blind belief in the state as a value is over and 
there nothing to fight for; it all turned out to be a big nasty political game 
that we are not part of anymore. We have been betrayed by our country. I 
remembered my mum in the hotel moaning and crying all day long, which 
broke my heart, then I started to be apathetic. I was thinking to myself: if 
the government [doesn’t] care about us, why should we care about them? 
(Shulavich) 
 
Another similarity between the D&R projects was the sense of residents’ dissatisfaction 
which in practice seen in protests. Residents who felt that their needs had been ignored 
became frustrated, and this was channelled into social unrest and demonstrations. In all 
mentioned D&R, residents suffered from strong government resistance towards their 
protests:  
 
We both suffered the same level of violence against our demonstrations, and 
evictions were undertaken despite residents’ protest. (D. & S. Azulai, Z. 
Adika) 
 
 Although the protests were similar, resident response appears to be different. 
Whereas residents of Neighbourhood of Cardboard struggled to postpone the project and 
received no support or compensation, in the disengagement D&R, residents admitted that 
their experience of having been previously empowered helped them to cope with the new 
situation (Galili, 2007). Lior Khalfa, a local leader from the temporary evacuees’ camp, 
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Nitzn, (illustration 5.20) said that a few months after the eviction the Minister of Housing, 
in his nomination ceremony (Sikoler, 2007), announced that his first priority would be to 
provide all that was required to re-house the evacuees:  
 
During the last year [after the disengagement], we had lots of visits from 
MPs, Ministers and even the PM himself, not to mention officials. This is 
because we knew how to promote ideas and lobby for our plans. (Halfa) 
 
 Another example of the difference in public policy towards the two evicted groups 
revealed in a media report, was parliamentary activity. While residents of the 
Neighbourhood of Cardboard were left to negotiate directly with the developer and when 
they failed to agree terms had to protest against the process in the hope of postponing its 
operation. In the disengagement D&R, a law was proposed that would double the 
compensation for evacuees who were housed in temporary camps until they could move to 
permanent housing.  
 An indication of the strong lobbying power of the residents lived in the settlements 
evicted from Gaza  (illustration 5.21), came when a reporter asked the MP (Amnon Cohen 
from the National Religious Sephardic Party) who had proposed the law about the logic 
behind the proposal, compared to other D&R projects, the MP did not even remember the 
reason for the legislation or its rationale. Some argue that he probably received a proposal 
from the residents and simply ran with it:  
 
This is further proof that MPs rushed to submit proposals handed to them by 
the powerful settlers group. (Arlozorov, 2007) 
 
 As a consequence, during US President George Bush’s visit to the Middle East in 
2008, residents of the Cardboard demonstrated under the slogan, “Same ruling for illegal 
outposts and Kfar Shalem”, demanding that the authorities treat them with the same 
consideration as settlers evicted from Gaza (Weiss, 2008). The slogan, which was meant to 
capture media attention, represented many residents’ wishes to be treated in a more 
positive and tolerant way.  
 Non-residents generally agreed that residents of Gaza  D&R had better access and 
support to create improved participation, while their political links also gained them better 
compensation for the evacuated. Most implementers felt that while there had been no 
undue favouritism in terms of residents’ involvement, there was still rather more sympathy 
for the demands of those in the new settlements. 
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 Most informers/supporters stated that the authorities handled both sets of evictions 
inadequately. However, settlers, due to superior political links, were offered better 
compensation:  
 
Both groups were treated unfairly and definitely improperly. Yet, the 
residents of settlements evicted from Gaza, were better treated as they were 
part of a larger and more organised group and, therefore, their ability to get 
more from the government was high. (R. Avnimelech, J.P. Alalo) 
 
Implementers, on the other hand, rejected claims that settlers had been given better 
services. They claimed that evacuees in the disengagement D&R were correctly treated 
because they were legal residents, whereas if residents of the Neighbourhood of Cardboard 
believed they were poorly treated it was only because they did not have legal status:  
 
Settlers were not squatters, but legal residents, who were sent to these 
communities on behalf of their government and according to Israeli law. (Dr 
C. Pialkoff, Ravdal-Nadkov) 
 
 One decision-maker, however, confirmed that the settlers had better access to the 
decision-making process — and, thus, excessive rights:  
 
Residents evicted from Gaza gained more support than any individual ever 
evicted in a D&R. (R. Cohen) (illustration 5.22) 
 
 Another decision-maker (illustration 5.23) believes that the lesson from previous 
D&R failures were never learnt and lack of dialogue with local residents is also another 
reason for the failure in the Gaza  D&R:  
 
Many mistakes were made during the disengagement from Gaza; officials 
didn’t learn the lesson from previous D&R failures and, indeed, many 
evicted settlers are still in temporary housing. For future cases, I suggested 
an alternative programme for resident reintegration into the community. 
(Edelstein)   
 
To sum up, when comparing all the D&R projects, we can assume that budgets and 
financing alone does not guarantee success; residents’ involvement is equally important, 
according to participants’’ views and project outcomes.. When funds are provided but 
residents’ involvement is absent, the chances of failure are higher. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
Residents of poor neighbourhoods affected by D&R projects rated their level of 
participation in the project as low. Non-residents assessed residents’ participation as 
having reached moderate levels. Residents, although most believed that they could 
influence projects constructively, generally seemed to aspire to training and guidance. All 
agreed that these had not been provided.  
 Residents say that public policy towards their participation was negative, while 
non-residents again assessed policy as moderate. To combat the effects of negative policy, 
residents protested, and although these demonstrations may have improved their sense of 
community, they did not change policy.  
 With regard to the two main factors defining empowerment, D&R, whether 
controlled by the government or private-sector developers, is now inextricably linked with 
low levels of success. This would appear to confirm the main hypothesis of this research: 
that resident involvement in decision-making can contribute to  the successful 
management of housing projects, since when participation is low and public policy is not 
supportive the  consequence is opposite to success. Further analysis will attempt to assess 
what the consequences of higher resident participation are and what more supportive 
public policy could offer.  
 The next chapter will discuss the Neighbourhood Renewal project. 
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Chapter 6 
The Neighbourhood Renewal Programme 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme (NRP), introduced by 
Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin in 1979 and still in existence today, although in a 
far more limited form. The Programme, a centrepiece of the first Likud government, 
initially used central government funding to regenerate increasingly dilapidated social-
housing areas. It is important to note that NRP estates are different from the Demolish and 
Rebuild estates discussed in the previous chapter, as they were built more recently and 
their housing conditions were not as poor as in the neighbourhoods that required 
demolition. However, the NRP is central to this research in that it is the only social-
housing programme in the country's history to have explicitly set resident involvement and 
empowerment as a goal. The roots of this decision lay in the support the Likud party 
received from the urban poor in the 1977 election following social tension and unrest, and 
the programme reflected a more inclusive approach than subsequently followed by later 
Likud governments. The new regime prioritised the programme as the main solution to the 
deprivation and frustration that was thought to have caused the political response and the 
government’s flagship social programmes (Liron & Shapiro, 1984: 1) Prime Minister 
Begin (illustration 26). defined the aims of the programme thus:  
 
To improve infrastructures, housing facilities and levels of services. 
 
To improve the opportunities for residents in education and employment in 
particular. 
 
To increase the involvement and participation of residents in their 
neighbourhoods, strengthening their confidence and open up opportunities 
to better integrate into community and society. (International Committee for 
Evaluation of the Neighbourhood Renewal Project, 1983) 
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26. Menachim Begin 1913–92, Israeli Prime Minister between 1977 and 1983. 
Known for introducing the NRP. Source: http://funnyfames.com/menachem-
begin.html 
 
The significance of the NRP was more than the renovation of building exteriors and yards 
(see illustration 3.9), it was its innovative idea to allow local residents to participate in 
project management and in order to ensure this, officials established local steering 
committees composed of officials and local residents in equal numbers.  
 The NRP began as the flagship of the social housing policy and contributed to 
housing and social change in over 100 neighbourhoods (illustration 27). Over the last 
decade, however, government investment in the programme has declined. The following 
sections provide an assessment of the programme in terms of empowerment (residents’ 
participation and public policy towards this participation), as presented in governmental 
surveys and academic resources from the early days of the programme (6.2), and new 
evidence on the empowerment of residents collected in NRP case studies (6.3). The last 
section (6.4) offers conclusions.  
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27. Begin visiting a Neighbourhood Renewal Project in Ofakim, The PM gives his 
personal support to the programme with a site visit. Source: residents’ archive. 
 
 
6.2 Early Surveys of the NRP 
There are many who have researched the urban aspects of the NRP but only few have 
investigated residents and their needs. What follows here are two of the focal analyses 
made, one which asked residents about their views and the other which provided an 
external evaluation of management boards and the share of residents on them. A primary 
research source on resident involvement in the NRP and how the project impacted social 
policy is the Ministry of Housing’s five-year survey, published in 2003. This is the most 
recent governmental analysis of the programme and forms the most comprehensive 
database. It includes 2,300 questionnaires and its results were compared with data from 
five earlier surveys starting in 1983 in order to assess longer-term trends. A second source 
is the research study conducted by Ruth Liron and Shimon Shapiro of the Sapir Centre at 
Tel Aviv University in 1984. This study assessed residents’ involvement in NRP 
management boards. These two sources, along with more-recent research, will be weighed 
against my results from interviews conducted recently with residents and officials who 
were directly involved in the NRP.  
 In the early days of the NRP, when the programme designed and monitored by 
experts with social orientation, authorities genuinely cared about residents’ views and 
therefore assessed them constantly. One of the most comprehensive reports conducted by 
the Housing Ministry includes data collected directly from residents. In brief, this survey 
concluded that the NRP offered external improvement to unit conditions and residents 
were invited to participate in management boards, but their impact on project management 
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was limited. Long-held beliefs that renovations could improve housing conditions and 
upgrade property values remains widespread (Mirovski, 22.4.05). Still, the NRP had 
another stated goal — to push residents to join in the managing boards, to allow them a 
real opportunity to influence decisions and to localise social services making them more 
accessible to local residents. Although some have implied that heavy financial and social 
constraints prevented residents from taking a meaningful role in board operations, survey 
results showed the opposite — that residents were very keen to impact decision making 
(MOH, 2003; Kolka, 2007). The survey also analysed to what extent resident involvement 
materialised, what roles residents had and what impact they have made on board 
operations. This survey offers insights on residents’ views of the programme in its early 
days. 
 
6.2.1. Resident satisfaction 
The initial point of view of those that ran the survey was to collect information on board 
operation from those other than officials. In order to understand what the residents’ role 
was, researchers observed board operation. Residents were less satisfied with the external 
contribution the NRP delivered and were rather happier with the internal condition of their 
houses (which was under their responsibility). This has implications for a wider more 
important rule, according to which responsibility brings commitment and also higher rates 
of satisfaction; where the housing company was responsible for the service without sharing 
its decision-making with residents, resident commitment was lower and so were 
satisfaction rates.  
 Table 8 below presents satisfaction rates among residents in 11 different NRP 
operated all across the country (a list of neighbourhoods and locations is in Appendix 3:3). 
The first two rows discussing external aspects, while the third issue represent internal 
conditions. Satisfaction rates for the first two parameters (which are a result of the NRP) 
were balanced compared with more than 85% who were satisfied from the internal 
conditions of their units (which is not under the NRP). Satisfaction rates from the NRP 
were therefore low.. 
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Table 8: Level of satisfaction with external and internal impact of the NRP on 
housing conditions 
  A B C D E F G H I J K Total 
Building 
well kept 
45.7 52.1 37.4 23.5 59.2 39.9 60.0 42.3 13.4 51.2 36.2 42.8 
Yard and 
surroundin
gs well 
kept 
44.1 48.0 36.3 30.0 63.8 32.1 54.5 45.7 14.9 47.6 51.1 42.2 
Unit well 
kept 
86.9 93.7 89.5 87.7 90.5 95.5 92.3 87.6 67.6 85.1 95.0 88.1 
Source: MOH, 2003 
 
In comparative analysis of surveys conducted between 1983 and 2002 (see Appendix 2:5) 
higher dissatisfaction rates (or the aspect needs the highest attention) in almost each survey 
was with neighbourhoods’ external façade, although urban experts, who evaluated the 
programme between 1999 and 2003, revealed that housing facilities had improved and that 
budgets were directed to social services, but there is no evidence that this investment left 
its mark on residents (Carmon, 2003).  
 Overall, residents indicated a deterioration in living standards, despite the 
programme (Haaretz, 24.11.99), indicated that they had less impact on board operation 
(Bsor, 27.1.02) (illustration 28).  
 
 
28. Neighbourhood Renewal Project board meeting in the city of Lod. The meeting 
took place in the municipality with the Mayor, the Managing Director and the Finance 
Controller all present. Residents are also board members. Source: 
http://www.lod.muni.il/show_item.asp?levelId=44600%20&itemId=3632. 
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74% expected to continue living in their current neighbourhoods, mainly because financial 
constraints left them with no other choice (Awidat, 25.12.06 and Greenberg, 2.9.05) 
(illustration 6.1). its fair to say that residents, in general, opposed a decrease in the 
programme’s scope, wanting it to last longer (Haaretz, 25.12.06), mainly because it was 
the only available housing programme and residents wanted to keep the minimum they 
already had. 
 In addition, and based on similar feedback, officials admitted that improving 
housing conditions alone could not produce the expected social impact and that the NRP 
needed also to invest in people and communities (Maor, 21.11.99). Indeed, one of the 
NRP’s stated aims was to involve residents in the programme. Ministry of Housing 
surveys and an analysis of the Government Appeal Committee reveal that residents’ share 
in decision-making was lower than that targeted by the programme’s aims (Tsadik, 2006). 
Another study has argued that residents’ contributions were less effective than those of 
officials. Liron & Shapiro (1984) analysed NRP management groups in order to determine 
resident participation and influence, and their findings show that residents’ actual share in 
decision-making was marginal.  
 In theory, their analysis confirms that residents were given 50% of seats in many 
project management boards, which on paper promised a fair chance to influence decision-
making. However, in practice, residents were not fully apprised of the situation or given 
the ability to learn, prepare and impact decisions, but were pushed to adopt proposals 
already agreed by officials. Residents themselves confirmed that most decisions were 
essentially made before they were discussed on the boards and that they were simply asked 
to approve the annual programme. Plans were submitted without any opportunity to alter 
them. Powerful experts and/or political outsiders took control of the programme, taking 
advantage of the residents’ disunity or their failure to understand their potentially powerful 
role in decision-making. Residents were captive to the ambitions and aspirations of the 
political regime or the experts’ agendas (Liron & Shapiro, 1984). 
 Boards rarely convened, and most work was conducted by outside experts; 
residents acted simply as a rubber stamp. As participation was minimal and formal, 
residents tended to be apathetic and indifferent about programme aims and their ability to 
influence them (Liron & Shapiro, 1984: 5, 14, 23). A study conducted by the National 
Comptroller’s Office confirms that board operation was guided by political rather than 
social values and that officials took the principal roles whilst residents’ views were almost 
categorically denied (SCO, 2003) (illustration 6.2).  
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 Residents were frustrated about not being properly advised or consulted on 
management boards, even more so when, according to the programme’s aim, they had 
expected to be more involved. Resident frustration led to a decline in their participation in 
the programme. The survey of 2003, while offering a comparison with results of previous 
surveys (1986 and 1992), reveals a decline in community participation and awareness; 
59% of residents were not aware of community activities and 18% were not at all aware of 
the existence of a committee. These figures reveal the programme’s declining impact on 
the community, and the alienation of residents whom the programme was intended to 
benefit.  
 Other studies that have analysed the programme indicate that a lack of resident 
involvement damaged the potential success of the programme and argue that only 
residents’ responsibility could develop a strong commitment to expands on façade 
improvements and build strong communities that would eventually free neighbourhoods 
from dependency (Tzadik, 2006; Kolka, 2007). Indeed, 56% of tenants declared that if 
given a real share in decision making, they would be willing to contribute, even 
voluntarily, in community activities and board operation (MOH 2003; Appendix 13) and 
many residents were greatly disappointed by plans to discontinue the NRP (Bronovski, 
29.01.07; Haaretz, 25.12.06).  
  
6.2.2 Assessing the quality of residents’ participation 
Participation was one of the stated aims of the NRP and residents were invited to 
participate on boards, but the main issue researchers have investigated is the quality of that 
participation; how deep, developed, embedded and maintained was it and what was 
residents’ real share in management. The main factors for assessment were representation, 
role in board operation and share in voting.   
 
Representation 
The nature of real representation in democracy means that when residents elect their 
representatives, they authentically represent the whole community. If these representatives 
fail to meet the community’s expectations they are replaced. Analysis reveals that on some 
boards officials and politicians nominated their most loyal and trustworthy supporters to 
occupy the representative slots in order to control decision-making. This has also been 
noted in media reports (Dayan, 11.7.01). When representatives do not represent the whole 
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community, not only the impact on participation is negative (Pitkin, 1973), but the 
confidence and trust the community should have in the programme dissolves.  
 Researchers also analysed representatives’ performance by independent 
observation of board meetings, before, during and after (Liron & Shapiro, 1984: 17-18), 
focusing mainly on roles in operation and voting.  
 
Roles in operation  
Although they were given 50% of board seats, residents did not generally match officials’ 
attendance figures. The highest residents’ attendance observed was 33% or less. This alone 
put residents in the minority; moreover, even amongst those who did attend, participation 
was not consistent, which meant that they lost an opportunity to enhance familiarity, 
knowledge and expertise and help residents gain more control over the process and 
strengthen their status. Representatives attributed poor attendance rates to existing daytime 
work obligations (Liron & Shapiro, 1984: 29-33).  
 Officials attended boards in high levels, mainly because they had to attend as part 
of their job descriptions, and also because they were paid to do so. Therefore they 
dominated meetings and consequently set the agendas. 48% of residents on boards 
declared that most decisions were taken without consultation or dialogue with them; some 
were even run contrary to their views (Liron & Shapiro, 1984: 25–27). This led to a 
situation where residents’ role in operation was less influential. Residents were not 
properly prepared for meetings. They tended to be given only a limited outline beforehand 
(i.e. headings and general issues). Important matters, including budget bids, tenders and 
annual programmes, were routinely circulated and presented during meetings, not 
beforehand, which hindered representatives’ ability to prepare in advance. Even a highly-
qualified negotiator would have faced difficulties in examining and assessing complex 
material at such short notice, let alone non-expert members. Moreover, issues raised by 
residents were often dealt with briefly and in a limited way at the end of meetings (Liron & 
Shapiro, 1984: 38–39), which led to a situation where residents’ status on boards is low 
and their influence marginal. 
 
Voting  
Most of the teams observed avoided formal voting, and decisions reflected the official 
standpoint, either due to their voting power or as a result of manipulation. Researchers 
identified occasions on which officials cited time constraints to pressure residents to reach 
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an immediate decision, preventing them from being fairly and properly consulted. 
Residents did not initiate programmes or suggest plans; their share in evaluation, 
inspection or re-examination of progress was also generally seen to be irrelevant. Their 
role often extended only as far as choosing from options offered by officials (Liron & 
Shapiro, 1984: 39, 43–46, Carmon, 2003).  
 To sum up, although the NRP declared residents participation as a main goal, 
research reveals that resident representation on boards was lacking. Even among those who 
participated representation was inconsistent; in meetings residents did not have the time to 
prepare and properly negotiate issues and also their voting was not influential. Researchers 
thus recommended a formula to increase real participation. 
 
6.2.3 How to Improve Residents’ Participation on Boards 
Research has concluded that in practice resident participation in the NRP was more 
declarative than influential (Liron & Shapiro, 1984: 27–28). In order to turn participation 
into something more meaningful, a few factors, similar to those discussed in the literature, 
have been mentioned: training, localisation, representation and ownership. 
 
Training 
Lack of knowledge and experience among residents was mentioned as one of the reasons 
for weak and ineffective participation. Training and education schemes (illustration 29 
below), could assist residents in narrowing gaps and build confidence in the belief that 
their contribution could be effective (Edelson & Kolonder, 1968). Such schemes should be 
planned, designed and delivered effectively in order to reduce inequalities among board 
members and increase participant influence (Rosner, 1978; Chan & Camper, 1968; Liron 
and Shapiro 1984). That being said, where training and education schemes became 
available (Li, 2.3.06) — and in many cases these schemes were funded privately 
(Zimerman, 14.3.96) — residents’ participation was evaluated as more productive and 
effective (Vered, 1.5.07). The contribution of training (illustration 30 below), was noted by 
the programme designers and passed on to a dedicated department (Service for Community 
Work of the Ministry of Labour and Social affairs), with the following goals: 
 
Active participation of residents in community life helps raise social 
awareness, and promotes a positive atmosphere among participants. It 
encourages respect for the values and life style of different groups, 
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promotes social and economic services, and supports and assists 
participants in the planning and implementation process. (Pardes, 1993) 
 
The first training session for local leaders was set up in 1980. By 1993, 238 sessions had 
been held, with 4,500 residents participating (but with only 520 actually completing the 
courses). There are no figures after 1993, but according to residents, officials and 
researchers (Liron & Shapiro, 1984, Carmon, 2003) the number of courses has been 
greatly reduced due to budget cuts.  
 
 
29. Neighbourhood Renewal Programme training course. A course in housing 
maintenance delivered to residents of the neighbourhood of Shimshon in Ashkelon. 
Funded by the NRP, the course is designed to teach residents how to provide 
emergency support in their community and at the same time skills to find paid work. 
Source: http://ashqelon.net/?p=20388 
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30. Neighbourhood Renewal Training for Youth. This is a pop group, made up 
mostly of new immigrants from Ethiopia in the Neot Shaked Neighbourhood in 
Netanya, which is funded by the NRP. Source: 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/54/ART1/870/530.htm. Photo: Zeman Netanya. 
 
Localisation  
There were two types of neighbourhoods included in the NRP; a specific neighbourhood 
within a city and an entire municipality (in the case of a small town). When schemes were 
directed to specific areas and not to the whole municipality, chances of success were 
shown to be greater (Liron & Shapiro, 1984: 9). Other research suggests that results of 
projects operated locally in one neighbourhood were far better than in a city as a whole 
(Kim, 11.12.02). The reason for this is that dedicated project boards in a neighbourhood 
were formed by social workers and residents, while in townships, the local municipality 
took over the boards and directed the budget and services according to more general needs 
or a political agenda. Pateman (1970), already argues that decisions made in small 
geographical or economic areas are more relevant to residents and, thus, they are more 
motivated to participate in a project.  
 
Democracy 
As already discussed, involvement of local politicians resulted in them appointing 
representatives on behalf of residents rather than allowing residents to vote for their own 
representatives in a democratic fashion. Elections enhanced performance monitoring and 
allow residents to vote against those who did not serve them accordingly (Liron & Shapiro, 
1984, Tzadik, 2006).  
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Ownership  
This promotes commitment and responsibility. Ownership refers to either the decision 
making process or ownership of dwellings; both strengthen the links between residents and 
their area and increase commitment and a sense of responsibility. The greater the role the 
wider the responsibility and thus the residents’ commitment. The more committed 
residents are the greater the chances for success. 
 Taking into consideration previous research and recommendations, this research 
aims to reveal which of the recommended practices were implemented. The definitions of 
the terms of this research are slightly different; representation and ownership appears 
under participation and training and localisation appears under public policy. The 
following section discusses the data collected during this research. 
   
6.3 New Evidence from 2005 Onwards 
This section presents my investigation of empowerment in the NRP and includes a detailed 
description of all the main features that comprised the collection of data, from a description 
of the case studies in 6.3.1 and the issues investigated in interviews, to the participants in 
6.3.2. Interviews that discussed participation are in 6.3.3, and its continuity in 6.3.4. This 
chapter also discusses public policy in the programme in 6.3.5, training and education 
schemes in 6.3.6, satisfaction in 6.3.7, and compares them with public policy in other 
housing projects in 6.3.8. Finally, 6.4 offers conclusions.  
 This research is set apart from previous studies in that it offers a greater range of 
interviews that express the variety of opinions and experiences. My focus was not only on 
representatives (labelled as ‘leaders’) — those among residents who played an active role 
in board operation throughout the NRP — but also on other types of residents who 
participated in the programme, such as ‘common participants’ (residents who were aware 
of the programme and were somewhat active but not intensively and consistently), and a 
‘random sample’ (residents who lived in a neighbourhood in which the programme was 
operated and were selected randomly after it was confirmed that they were aware of the 
programme). My analysis also includes views from different types of non-residents who 
were involved in the programme. For assessment of the NRP, I have interviewed 
participants in the following case studies that represent the different forms of communities 
included in the programme: neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, the city with the highest number 
of projects and a diverse ethnic fabric that includes new immigrants, veteran residents and 
ultra-Orthodox communities; neighbourhoods in Tel Aviv, the largest metropolitan city in 
  
176 
Israel; neighbourhoods in Rehovot, which houses the largest community of new 
immigrants from Ethiopia; and Holon, which has the greatest number of new immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union. The case studies are described in detail below. 
 
6.3.1. The Case Studies
36
  
The Neighbourhood of Katamonim in Jerusalem  
This consists of 192,639 housing units, of 763,300 in Jerusalem as a whole, located to the 
west of the centre of Jerusalem between the neighbourhoods of Pat and Malha. Built in the 
1950s to host new immigration, most of the houses are publicly funded, built and managed 
by governmental housing companies (illustration 6.3). At times the neighbourhood was 
known for, and even symbolised, nationally, high levels of crime, anti-social behaviour 
and poverty. At the same time, it was also a site of developed community life; many 
resident leaders (both locally and nationally) began their activities in this neighbourhood 
which still is a centre for NGO operations. This was also a neighbourhood in which social 
pressure mounted and was released in protests.  
 
The Neighbourhood of Eir Ganim / Pat in Jerusalem 
This is a neighbourhood located to the west of central Jerusalem between the 
neighbourhood of the Katamonim and the Arab village of Beit Tzafafa. Jerusalem is 
mostly built on mountains, but Pat is known as one of the flattest neighbourhoods in the 
city (illustration 6.4). It was built in the 1970s to accommodate new immigrants that had 
left the temporary site of Maabarot or those who were evicted from the demolished 
neighbourhood of Mamila. The neighbourhood was considered poor, even though it was 
less crowded than the Katamonim. The neighbourhood was first included in the NRP in the 
1990s. Over the years the location around the neighbourhood developed dramatically with 
the largest shopping mall in the capital, the main football stadium and technological 
laboratories and became more attractive to residents. Currently the population enjoys 
considerably improved social and economic conditions. The neighbourhood is also a centre 
for the operation of NGOs and other social movements and for a school that promotes 
social studies. 
 
 
                                                 
36
 See Appendix 5 for a comparison between all the case study neighbourhoods. 
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Neighbourhood of Sanhedriya / Shmuel Hanavie in Jerusalem 
This is a neighbourhood in North Jerusalem, populated mainly by ultra-Orthodox Jewish 
groups (illustration 6.5). 54.2% of residents are Jewish (non ultra-Orthodox), 22.6% are 
ultra-Orthodox Jews and 23.1% are Arabs (the vast majority being Muslim). Many of the 
ultra-Orthodox spend their time in Yeshiva, either studying or else registered as students in 
order to avoid work. The number of males employed in a full time job is therefore very 
low; females also avoid paid employment and for religious reasons concentrate on 
housekeeping. Families are large and it is not unusual to find households with more than 
10 children. Low employment rates and large families almost inevitably result in poverty, 
yet the ultra-Orthodox are strong communities with a powerful influence on decision-
makers (locally and nationally), who in return reward them with excessive benefits and 
support (illustrations 6.6 & 6.7). The NRP was introduced in the neighbourhood in the late 
1980s and is still ongoing (now funded by the local municipality in which the ultra-
Orthodox representatives are powerful). 
 
The Neighbourhood of Shapira in Tel Aviv 
This neighbourhood is located on the border with Kfar Shalem on one side and with the 
site of the central bus station on the other (illustration 6.8). It currently has 8,500 residents 
and for years has been known for its poverty and population density. The neighbourhood 
hosts a mixture of ethnic groups, and recently, many asylum seekers from Africa which 
has intensified tensions between residents. Ethnic pressure was not new in the 
neighbourhood and began before the state was established. Then it was a conflict between 
Jews and Arab Muslim, now the pressure is between Jews and asylum seekers from Africa 
who find cheap housing solutions in the neighbourhood and build their social and cultural 
life and community services around it. 
 In the late 1960s a central bus station was built on the borders of the 
neighbourhood. This became an around-the-clock source of pollution, noise, poverty and 
anti-social behaviour. The fact that the site was located near a crowded, poor 
neighbourhood only invited additional tensions. The bus station is known as the ‘white 
elephant’, due to its huge, partly unoccupied structure. It is a place that offers shelter to 
many homeless people, asylum seekers and the unemployed in severe poverty — 
essentially all those who exist on the margins of society and thus a centre of violence and 
anti-social behaviour on an almost daily basis (illustrations 6.9 & 6.10). 
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Kfar Gvirol / Kiryat Moshe in Rehovot 
The two neighbourhoods are attached to each other and located in the west of Rehovot, a 
city in central Israel (south of Tel Aviv). In 2008 Kfar Gvirol (illustration 6.11), included 
more than 800 families, some of them large; Kiryat Moshe, was slightly bigger and home 
to over 1,000 families. The neighbourhood of Kfar Gvirol was occupied by new arrivals 
(from Bulgaria) in the early 1950s, who a few years later were replaced by new immigrants 
from Yemen. In the 1960s new immigrants from Morocco arrived, in the 1970s from the 
former USSR, and in the 1990s from Ethiopia. Historically, the neighbourhood was known 
for its mixture of new immigrant populations and as such was affected by ethnic conflict, 
violence and anti-social behaviour (illustration 6.12 & 6.13). 
 In Kiryat Moshe (illustrations 6.14 & 6.15) conditions were even worse, as it was 
almost entirely populated by immigrants from Ethiopia. For many years residents felt 
neglected and unwelcome. Leaders from the neighbourhood admitted that they had to 
initiate their own training schemes and courses, as residents were not invited to join in any 
of the activities in the surrounding neighbourhoods (illustration 6.16). 
 Both neighbourhoods were included in the NRP but the main breakthrough was 
when they were adopted by the Jewish Community of Toronto which invested mainly in 
the residents themselves, offering training and education schemes and professional 
guidance.  
 
Jessie Cohen – Holon  
Poor neighbourhood in Holon which is located in the south of Tel Aviv (illustration 6.17), 
with 170,900 residents, founded in 1950 to host new immigrants Mostof the units are 
publicly funded housing and managed by the housing company Amidar. For many years 
the socio-economic status of the neighbourhood was low and it was known for high 
poverty and unemployment (illustration 6.18). It’s the fourth largest neighbourhood in 
Holon with the highest rate of immigration and high social dependency (illustrations 6.19 
& 6.20).  
 
Kfar Maker (Jdeda-Maker) 
This is an Arab village near the city of Ako. The two villages Jdeida and Maker united in 
1990. In 2010 there were 18,574 residents in the village with a 2.2% growth per year 
(Israeli Bureau of Statistics). The village is very poor, ranked 9th on the Israeli socio-
economic scale (one before the poorest), income per person is 60% below the national 
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average and only 57% finish their mandatory school exams (A level). 91.3% of residents 
are Muslims and 8.7% are Christians. This is the only Arab village with a council housing 
estate that is manage by Amidar (see illustration 3.11). 
 
Kiryat Arba 
This is a New Settlement east of the Palestinian city of Hebron and the urban centre of all 
settlements in the area. The settlement was established in 1971. The community became a 
municipal authority in 1981. In 2010 there were 7248 residents with 1.4% population 
growth (Israeli Bureau of Statistics). The municipality is in the 8
th
 social-economy 
category (the second from the poorest); income per person is 60% less than the national 
average and 63.2% of pupils complete their studies. Almost all residents are practising 
Jews. There is a council housing estate in the municipality managed by Amidar 
(illustration 6.21). This site is unpopular for both ideological and practical reasons (some 
do not want to relocate to a community which is outside the Israeli State’s official borders, 
some do not wish to relocate far from the centre of the country and its employment 
opportunities). The lack of demand by people with social needs pushed local community 
offers the units to young ideological activists who wish to live in the community.  
 
6.3.2. Interviews 
The issues investigated in interviews have been divided into two main themes: residents’ 
participation and public policy, towards both the programme and resident participation. 
The first section focuses on participation, its long-term impact and influence. The second 
discusses various aspects of public policy; views on the level of government support of the 
programme, including training and education schemes, the level of satisfaction with the 
programme compared with other, similar, housing programmes.  
 
Interviewees
37
  
There are two groups of participants — residents and non-residents, each including a sub-
groups. The residents were segregated according to their level of involvement (leaders, 
common participants and random sample), representing the case studies: Jerusalem (S. 
Vazana, B. Arajuani, D. Benisti, R. Aberjel, S. Bat Chava); Tel Aviv (A. Dagan, 
Elimelech, D & R. Balsi, S. Meidani), Rehovot (G. Golan, A. Zauda); Holon (F. Drix, M. 
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 See Appendix 4 for a full list of participants. 
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Yashar), Hetzeliya (E.Harush); Ashdod (A. Aflalo, M. Edri) and The National Tenants 
Organisation (I. Twito RIP). Random samples were conducted in the case studies and also 
in neighbourhoods where the programme operated and which had unique characteristics, 
such as the Jewish ultra-Orthodox neighbourhood in Jerusalem, neighbourhoods with 
mixed populations of Jews, Muslims and Christian minorities, Arab Villages, settlements 
and neighbourhoods with high immigration rates. 
 The non-residents group was segregated according to title and position (informers-
supporters, implementers, decision makers). Among the informers we found activists 
supporting residents in: the Parliament (L. Weintrob, C. Chishin); NGOs (I. Danon, S. 
David, B. Epstein); HaKeshet Hamizrahit, the ethnic Sephardic organisation, (Dahan); a 
new immigrants home manager (Y. Zelender); Jerusalem municipality members and 
supporters of the residents group Kol Bashchunot (P. Alalo, M. Margalit, L. Warthon); the 
project in Yavne (A. Merling/ Rodrig); the Katamonim and Jerusalem projects (A. Amiel, 
B. Epstein); Herzeliya municipality (Y. Nuri); the Jewish Agency (L. Kindler); Legal 
Advocacy (T. Atias); and the project in Sanhedriya (an ultra-Orthodox neighbourhood in 
Jerusalem) (Y. Libskind, S. Kushnir). Among the implementers were: the NRP national 
programme manager (A. Ravdal Ndkov, H. Hovav); the programme’s designer (P. D. 
Shimshoni); the general manager of the Housing Ministry (S. Ben Eliahu), deputy mangers 
of the Housing Ministry (H. Pialkov, I Shwartz); NRP regional managers (Z. Weinstein); 
the former CEO of Amidar, the national housing company (T. Miara); and the project 
manager of Lod (I. Ilani). The decision-makers were MPs dedicated to the housing 
process: Ran Cohen — Deputy Housing Minister responsible for NRP; MP Tamar 
Guzanski, who was highly involved in legislation surrounding the programme; and Yuli 
Edelstein, Deputy Minister responsible for absorption of new immigrants. 
 
6.3.3 Resident Participation 
Although the NRP’s stated aim was resident participation, residents evaluated their 
participation in the NRP as low. Most of responses were spread around the median line on 
the participation scale — between ‘information and ‘consultation’. Another outcome of the 
results suggests that participation was derived from residential status. Some leaders 
indicated higher levels of participation than others as they were representatives on boards 
and, therefore, more involved. Most of the ‘common participants’ indicated a slightly 
lower level of engagement than leaders, and among the randomly sampled, participation 
was the lowest.  
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 Analysis of non-residents’ responses shows that their calculation of residents’ 
participation was slightly higher than of residents and they denoted consultation. This may 
have derived from a common assumption that residents, since they were appointed as 
members of boards, were already guaranteed some contribution. 
 The table below reflects participants’ views on their participation in the NRP. The 
results are presented in a similar scale as in the ladder of participation consisting of the 
following steps: Not Involved (1), Information (2), Consultation (3), Partnership (4), 
Control (5) 
 
Table 9: Residents’ Participation – view of participants in the NRP 
Level of Participation 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Residents 
 Leaders 
  Moderate participants 
  Random 
1 
0 
0 
1 
21 
7 
2 
12 
18 
5 
12 
1 
11 
6 
3 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
53 
18 
17 
18 
Non-residents 
 Informers 
 Implementers 
 Decision-makers 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 
6 
3 
1 
19 
12 
6 
1 
2 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source: Israeli NRP survey - Guy Doron, 2005–0938  
 
Detailed testimonials from residents reflect, in general, a lower level of participation:  
 
Real resident participation has never been tested, officials have never 
offered or authorised that, they also did not like the fact that I insisted to 
present my view and I was active. (Aflalo
 
) 
 
Preventing residents from participating in schemes taking place in their 
neighbourhood is injustice but also damaging the chances for projects to 
succeed. (Zauda) (illustration 6.22) 
 
Manyresidents argued that they were capable of carrying out managerial tasks within a 
local project:  
 
                                                 
38
 N/A: Residents – 2; Leaders – 0; Moderate participants – 0; Random – 2; Non-residents – 6; Informers – 
3; Implementers – 2; Decision-makers – 1. 
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Residents are capable of running their neighbourhoods just like they are 
capable of running their homes. It is just a bigger home to run. (Zauda; 
Aflalo  
 
Residents argued that although willing to contribute, they were not given the opportunity 
to do so and needed to force one. This is an example of the limitation of empowerment as 
discussed in the literature review: 
 
Residents’ willingness is not enough as we can learn from our experience; it 
also requires cooperation from the authorities, who are not always 
supportive of residents’ participation. Still, if the community is strong and 
demands its rights be fulfilled, cooperation is achievable and projects can 
develop in a good direction, as we did here. (Golan) 
 
Most residents considered their participation to be crucial for a project’s success, as it 
required them to show responsibility, and with that responsibility came a desire to not let 
the project fail: 
 
Our experience taught us that participation engages responsibilities, and if 
offered responsibility, residents would be bound to demonstrate 
commitment. (Golan) 
 
Residents were also promoters of local control. A. Aflalo, who began as a local leader in 
the southern town of Ashdod and became known nationwide, believed that projects should 
be run and managed locally:  
 
Each district should be allowed a self-managing body, where residents are 
the planners and supervisors and officials act as experts and advise 
residents, as long as issues are tackled locally. (Aflalo)  
 
Some resident respondents admitted that there are certain aspects of management that 
require expertise in which residents need assistance and supervision. Training course could 
have helped to cover the gap: 
  
We still need some advice to help us in taking such conflicts to a genuine 
solution. I wish we were given such help to allow us the opportunity to run 
our estate. (Sayde) 
 
To summarise, residents believed they were capable of assuming managerial tasks and 
confirmed their desire to participate. Although the NRP offered residents the opportunity 
to participate, in practice, residents confirmed that their influence was negligible.  
 Most Non-Residents who were highly involved with the NRP labelled participation 
at the level of consultation:  
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Residents have the ability to run projects in their communities; they have 
got a very clear vision and understanding of their needs; they know best 
what is required. (Ravdal) 
 
Nevertheless, non-residents argue that residents were not offered enough support to 
turn their desire for participation into a real contribution:  
 
In order to get residents to effectively participate, one of the two should be 
occur: either they are given fair opportunities to participate or they receive 
expertise assistance and supervision to participate effectively. 
Unfortunately, none have happened and participation was limited. (David) 
 
 Although participation in the NRP was limited, it was still the only programme 
where participation was allowed to any extent. This feature, according to the programme 
manger, generated the NRP’s importance and support from residents:  
 
The only programme where poor residents have the option to participate is 
Neighbourhood Renewal—not enough participation has been delivered on 
behalf of the residents; neither has proper management been delivered on 
behalf of the government, yet the NRP is the only situation where residents 
are offered a place to be involved at all. (Ravdal) 
 
 In some neighbourhoods where residents had better access to decision-makers or 
programme operators, a higher level of participation has been noted and as a consequence, 
greater success:  
 
Residents are highly involved in our project and I believe the same success 
can be applied to other projects too. (Libskind and Kushnir) 
 
Nevertheless, in many neighbourhoods residents failed to be involved:  
 
Governments do not believe that residents in poor neighbourhoods are 
capable in setting their priorities and allow them to be involved in running 
their life, why should residents believe in it? (Pade) 
 
However, donors from abroad who live in a culture of sharing power, insisted on joint 
management in each project they funded:  
 
We are certain that residents have the ability to run projects on their own, 
surely better than any outsider; this is also crucial to their ability to free 
themselves from social dependence. Residents have a basic instinct for their 
own problems, which others do not have and probably won’t ever, what I 
call a gut feeling, which is more important than any expertise. (Kindler) 
(illustration 6.23) 
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Although senior executives supported residents’ involvement, particularly those in charge 
of the NRP, participation was still limited. Z. Weinstein, a senior manager in the 
programme (illustration 6.24), advocates that welfare and social services would bring 
residents quality of life which would result in spare time to invest in community 
involvement, and was key in the decision to bypass resident involvement: 
 
There is a need to secure basics for residents, such as employment, housing 
and decent social services in order to create, first of all, an opportunity for 
them to have [the] interest or leisure time to pull together and be involved. 
(Weinstein) 
 
Another argument explaining the lack of productive participation in Israel points to a 
cultural dimension which does not particularly embrace participation:  
 
The main problem in Israel is that decision-making is based on ego and 
power rather than on cooperation. The political hegemony is based on a 
culture that gives power to local representatives who act in the name of a 
political party for the community, rather than to residents. (Rachman) 
 
Mrs H. Hovav, who was in charge of NRP design and implementation during its first 
twenty years, also cited political power and a lack of democratic instincts among 
communities which prevented, at times, full representation of residents in board activities: 
 
The first residents to join boards quickly realised the potential power that 
they could achieve from their activity, so they prevented other residents 
from joining in. Indeed, in the end, many among local political 
representatives started their activity on these boards and this led them 
forward. (Hovav) 
 
 Participation was also considered important by non-residents; it was also one of the 
founding principles of the programme and seems to have genuinely been planned to be 
delivered. In the early days there were many indications that participation was offered to 
residents too, yet somewhere along the way political power took over and caused genuine 
participation to decrease. The next section discusses continuity of participation and its 
impact on projects’ success. 
  
6.3.4. Continuity and Long-Term Participation 
As it appears in the literature review, an important factor in successful empowerment 
through participation is continuity — the extent to which residents maintain and deepen 
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their involvement. Long term participation builds residents confidence and increases their 
influence.  
 The following table explores participants’ views on the duration of their 
participation in the NRP, whether they maintain, reduce or increase their participation over 
the course of the NRP. The scale of measurements includes two main trends, those who 
maintained their activity and those whose activity declined. 
 
Table 10: Continuity and long-term participation during the NRP 
 
Period of 
involvement 
Still 
highly 
active 
Declined 
from 
highly 
active to 
moderatel
y active 
Declined 
from 
highly 
active to 
not 
active 
Declined 
from 
moderately 
active to not 
active 
Never 
active 
 
Total
39
 
Residents 
 Leaders 
 Moderate 
participants 
 Random 
17 
9 
 
6 
2 
3 
2 
 
1 
0 
7 
3 
 
4 
0 
2 
0 
 
2 
0 
12 
0 
 
0 
12 
41 
14 
 
13 
14 
Non residents 
 Informers/ 
supporters 
 Implementers 
 Decision-makers 
17 
8 
 
7 
2 
2 
2 
 
0 
0 
8 
4 
 
4 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
27 
14 
 
11 
2 
Source: Israeli NRP survey - Guy Doron, 2005–09  
 
The most common response among residents (41.5%) confirms that they have maintained 
their participation. An interesting point is that among those whose participation fell away, 
it mainly went from being highly involved to not active. This dramatic change was noted 
mainly in those neighbourhoods where the programme was cancelled. The other 
consequent outcome suggests that, as long as the NRP remained and was consistently 
                                                 
39
 N/A: Residents – 12; Leaders – 4; Common participants – 4; Random – 4; Non-residents – 10; Informers 
– 7; Implementers – 2. 
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operated, it offered residents an on-going opportunity to participate and supported both 
their individual and community progress.  
 A majority (63%) of non-residents are still highly involved in the NRP, which 
means that, at least in terms of dedicated manpower, despite the budget cut, officials kept 
their jobs. Others who were highly involved either retired or were made redundant when 
their project was terminated.  
 To conclude, the NRP offered residents a rare opportunity to participate; residents 
were offered seats on managing boards but their participation was limited. In those cases 
where projects lasted for a few years and residents were offered a real opportunity to 
impact decisions, participation was also maintained. Nevertheless, this was not the case in 
most projects where residents were allowed only a limited impact on decisions, let alone 
long term involvement. Participation is normally given not taken and authorities are the 
providers and the facilitators of an environment in which participation can grow. The most 
common way to support participation is simply to allow it, yet there are cases where 
residents, especially in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, are willing to participate and the 
authorities also wish them to participate, but they are lacking in the skills or knowledge to 
be able practically to participate to their full extent. In cases where residents require 
assistance to overcome knowledge gaps to increase their performance, authorities or public 
policy can offer a solution, in training and education schemes, services and support. The 
next section explores the extent and nature of public policy and service provision towards 
participation in the NRP. 
 
6.3.5 Public Policy towards Residents’ Involvement in the NRP 
Public policy in this research refers to authorities’ attitudes towards resident participation, 
the availability and quality of services and the facilitation of services to support the 
programme. In addition to availability of courses, we also assessed satisfaction rates of 
participants in the programme; how they felt their needs were met and whether their 
experience was different from other groups or from what they expected. 
 The measurement by which public policy was assessed was simply in terms of 
negative and positive; participants could also categorise public policy into two more 
median stages (moderate support and high support).  
 Table 11 below summarises participants’ views on public policy towards the NRP. 
. In general residents assessed public policy as supportive, non-residents, noted moderate 
support. 
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Table 11: Public policy towards participation in the NRP  
Level of Satisfaction Negative Moderate 
Support 
Supportive Very 
Supportive 
Total 
Residents 
 Leaders 
 Common residents 
 Random 
3 
2 
0 
1 
13 
5 
2 
6 
33 
11 
13 
9 
2 
0 
2 
0 
53 
18 
17 
18 
Non-residents 
 Informers/supporters 
 Implementers 
 Decision makers 
0 
0 
0 
0 
16 
7 
9 
0 
14 
10 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
0 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source: Guy Doron research, 2005–0940 
 
Analysis of residents’ responses reveals that more residents experienced a supportive 
attitude from government towards their participation in the NRP, than those who indicated 
a negative attitude. One of the NRP’s main aims was resident participation. Residents were 
invited to take part in board discussions, and thus residents considered the programme’s 
attitude encouraging. The NRP was the first social housing programme to invite residents 
to have a share on management boards and to provide a real opportunity to affect decision 
making. The NRP developed a positive reputation across poor neighbourhoods. There was 
a general air of excitement and many had great expectations. In many neighbourhoods 
there were additional services, mainly outdoor improvements sourced from government 
investment. The fact that the programme was spread across the country and appeared in 
government marketing campaigns also helped promote a positive image amongst the 
general public. Residents were consulted for the first time, invited to board meetings and 
considered government attitudes to be more supportive, especially compared to previous 
social housing programmes. Having said that, in interviews with those who had 
experienced the recent decline in programme operation, and drastic budget cuts, 
particularly in neighbourhoods where projects had recently ended, a greater number of 
negative responses were observed.  
                                                 
40
 N/A: Residents – 2; Leaders – 0; Moderate participants – 0; Random – 2; Non-residents – 5; Informers – 
3; Implementers – 2; Decision-makers – 0. 
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 Most non-residents indicate supportive public policy. Informers/supporters and 
decision-makers were impressed by the participatory approach of the NRP and presented 
positive views, as did residents, although they were not happy about the recent significant 
reductions in the NRP budget. Implementers who were responsible for the operation of the 
programme had to handle residents’ complaints and were understandably irritated by their 
inability to satisfy residents through NRP services and thus presented more negative views 
of the impact the NRP had on participation.  
 One feature of public policy as part of localisation was the importance of the 
community centres in encouraging activities and participation. Involvement in these 
centres often meant greater success in project participation:  
 
The community centre in this neighbourhood is very active as we, the 
residents, are responsible for its activities, which include legal advice, 
courses, sporting activities, evening gatherings, being a meeting point for 
the elderly during the day, holiday parties and so on. If we are good enough 
to run the community centre and plan its budget properly, we are probably 
able to run housing project as well. (Harush) 
 
We have been less involved in the community centre recently and as a 
consequence its performance is poor! (Golan) 
 
One of the key services determining public policy towards participation, as remarked on by 
experts and in many respects longed for by residents, was training and education schemes 
to grant residents better knowledge and thus better access in the future (illustration 6.25). 
Residents genuinely believed they were capable of participating effectively and assuming 
managerial roles. At the same time many realised there were some areas where higher 
expertise was required, not necessarily a professional skill in a particular housing task, but 
more general capabilities; either managerial capabilities relevant to board members, such 
as reading and understanding budget plans, prioritising and negotiating skills. Therefore, 
residents were happy to receive training to improve their existing skills, which could 
potentially help them get into or back into employment or even to be employed by their 
community, provision of sufficient training and education courses was a crucial part of the 
programme when public policy tested positively. The next section focuses on this. 
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6.3.6. Training and Education Schemes 
Training and education schemes, a topic both in the literature review and most of the 
interviews, were generally described as a fundamental tool to improve residents’ 
participation and performance, yet according to interviews they were implemented to a 
very limited extent. One might assume that if participation is a stated aim of a programme, 
training and education schemes are essential, what is more, it was common to see training 
courses that were conducted by residents themselves or funded and supported by external 
experts and NGOs. Some residents argued that training should be part of government 
responsibility if it did indeed support participation, whereas others believed that NGOs and 
residents’ self initiative provided a better structure for training and it was thus better to 
leave the government outside course provision. 
 Most residents valued training and education schemes highly, whether or not they 
were provided by the programme or by external experts. Residents’ stories exemplify 
positive experiences with and good results from training schemes:  
 
It is very important to provide such educational opportunities to residents. 
Teaching someone to do things is better in the long term than to provide him 
with the final product (Biton) 
 
 Another local leader from the Neighbourhood of Kiryat Moshe in Rehovot focuses 
particularly on the long-term value of these courses. When courses continued this not only 
improved residents’ skills and increased their responsibility, but also reduced social 
dependency and was thus also worthwhile financially to the government:  
 
In the long term, encouraging participation using training schemes are not 
just better for residents, but also valuable for governments in terms of cost, 
as the current dependency costs more. (Zauda) 
 
 An example of a successful training course which caused a local change and had an 
impact on resident commitment was noted in a statement of one leader from Ashdod:  
 
The experience we have had in our community is a very good example; a 
group of residents living in a poor area decided to take responsibility over 
their lives. I organised such courses myself, firstly to provide all 
representatives with the information they needed. Secondly, I have aimed to 
tackle claims that the neighbourhood’s residents are less skilled and capable 
of managerial or social positions. After these courses were conducted, the 
change in residents’ involvement was huge. Their influence was remarkable 
and, importantly, effective. (Aflalo) 
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When the NRP was run jointly by the government and the Jewish Agency, the donors who 
donated the amount that contributed through the JA, insisted on independent training 
schemes as preliminary condition of every project they supported. The most successful 
courses, as mentioned in interviews, appear to have been operated by external experts in 
Kiryat Moshe, a neighbourhood occupied mostly by new immigrants from Ethiopia. A. 
Zauda, (illustration 6.26) the local leader, stated: 
 
Training schemes weren’t operated by the programme, but by academic 
experts as a contribution donated by our adopting community in Toronto. 
We offered courses in youth leadership, courses dealing with building and 
operating budgets and courses to improve our involvement. These courses 
brought us to a position where we were not only more involved and had a 
thriving involvement, but we even, at times, became more expert than 
officials. These courses put us in a much stronger position. (Zauda) 
 
The initiative for professional training schemes came from donors based in Canada who 
believed that if only money was delivered, residents would stay dependent, so they insisted 
on delivering knowledge as well. They also insisted on professional training and allocated 
a decent portion of the budget for that purpose. A similar pattern was noted by the leader 
of the community in Kfar Gvirol where the donors were equally involved: 
 
The government has mainly provided the manpower for operating 
programmes which were sponsored by the Toronto community. The motto 
of these schemes was that the government would take responsibility over 
the funding of the schemes that the Canadians had started, something that 
never happened, obviously. Surprisingly enough, the donors fulfilled their 
obligations, and more, while the government failed in doing so. (Golan) 
 
Courses that were offered by officials received less impressive feedback. A resident from 
the Arab village Maker indicated that the courses (illustration 6.27), were often postponed 
and incomplete:  
 
We had some courses. I had a computer skills course on which I have taken 
only five lessons throughout; we organised the course and even paid for it, 
but the course has not been long-lasting. (Sayde) 
 
To conclude, residents considered training and education schemes to be important courses 
operated by experts and other NGOs were highly praised, while the programme itself 
offered less training than residents had hoped for.  
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Most non-residents also considered training and education schemes to be 
important. Education and training schemes are crucial, they are for the 
residents’ benefit, and for the benefit of their community. (Weinstein) 
 
H. Hovav, who was the head of the department that operated the NRP for its first 20 years, 
admitted that training schemes was not a stated goal but an addition to the whole service 
provided:  
 
Courses, as far as the NRP is concerned, should not stand by themselves, 
but should be added to the whole welfare system. The programme funded 
courses for the empowerment of local representatives, but I can’t say that 
this really changed residents’ social circumstances as it wasn’t part of a set 
agenda. (Hovav) 
 
A. Ravdal, who succeeded H. Hovav, also argued that lack of long term investment and 
consistency in the programme prevents not only its delivery but also training schemes:  
 
In Israel, the government doesn’t offer training schemes. The programme 
attempts to create interest groups where residents can develop social 
commitment which has been successful; however, in order to maintain long-
term resident involvement, residents should be given the opportunity to test 
their skills and it should be consistent. In the current scope of the NRP, 
there is no budget for it. (Ravdal) 
 
M. Rachman, who is a social activist but who has also researched the NRP, confirmed that 
his findings revealed that the number of courses provided under the auspices of the 
programme were limited: 
 
During the NRP, residents were offered some public leadership courses, but 
it was basic; running of such courses is not a frequent phenomenon in Israeli 
social policy, not to mention developing courses to push resident impact. 
(Rachman) 
 
Prof. Shimshoni, one of the creators of the programme, who also wrote a book on 
designing the NRP (illustration 6.28), admitted that when they designed the NRP, training 
was considered to be one of the main elements, not only because it promoted democracy 
but also improved residents’ skills and thus would attractive. It was assumed that residents 
would jump at the opportunity to participate: 
 
We needed to attract residents first, to create desire. We did it through 
courses that planned to encourage residents to participate in their 
community, build their confidence to have a say publicly, the skills which 
allow them an effective part in meetings where decisions are made. 
(Shimshoni) 
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 Over the years, training and education schemes acquired the relevant credibility 
and both residents and authorities noted their benefits and contribution. As a consequence 
a dedicated department under the Ministry of Labour, was set up. E. Pade, who had led this 
department, reflected on its contribution:  
 
Training provided residents with skills to tackle local problems, tools and 
knowledge to do it right. The courses that we were operating were 
conducted by experts in the field of resident empowerment. Apart from 
leadership and empowerment, we conducted specific courses in various 
fields to enhance the chances of residents to find a job. Overall, it encourage 
sense of belonging and integrates individuals into the local community 
which, in turn, improves the neighbourhood’s reputation and makes it more 
inviting for new residents; it gives hope. (Pade) 
 
In some cases, the NRP allowed local initiatives to be outsourced, instead of delivering 
training directly. A local project manager from the Ultra-Orthodox neighbourhood 
Sanhedriya in Jerusalem (image 6B) revealed:  
 
We have offered such courses to each resident who has shown an interest on 
behalf of the programme. Note that as a neighbourhood with a special 
population fabric, we could not operate certain types of training courses. 
Therefore, we either buy these services from an outside company or fund 
applicants with a scholarship to allow them to take these courses privately. 
(Libskind & Kushnir) 
 
Such local initiatives tend to a wider phenomenon, as articulated by Z. Weinstein, who was 
responsible for operating the NRP in all Central Israeli neighbourhoods. He admitted that 
in order to better attend to residents’ needs, they had hired private bodies to operate 
particular courses: 
 
The ability to run a course depended on the number of participants. When 
we had less than the minimum required, conducting a class was worthless, 
so we decided to buy in external services. We also contacted universities up 
and down the country and secured specific seats for students coming from 
neighbourhoods undergoing the NRP. Students were invited to enrol and 
were allowed a year of preparation so that they could hopefully start their 
studies the following year with a full scholarship. (Weinstein) 
 
This could be interpreted as an indication of the decline in government investment in the 
NRP or worse in residents in need, yet this is not necessarily so. Indeed, authorities have 
happily delegated the responsibility elsewhere, as it is more convenient that someone else 
take responsibility, especially as they have greater expertise in delivering such courses. 
However the scope of the investment in outsourcing responsibility was as high as when it 
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was delivered directly and in higher quality. S. David (illustration 6.29), a social activist, 
insisted that, based on their (the main NGO active in delivering courses across the country) 
experience, training schemes should be provided independently in order to be effective. 
The fact that the institutions report to government bodies rather than to residents influences 
their commitment to residents’ satisfaction:  
 
Education and training schemes must be consistent, independent and long-
term, therefore they cannot be delivered by any government body. 
Unfortunately, both the Housing Ministry and council housing companies 
failed to allow us — as an NGO — to get in and operate our schemes so we 
provided these independently. We provided residents with proper training 
allowing them fair competition with officials, the ability to present 
programmes and to stand in front of a public, the ability to make an impact 
in meetings, etc., all up to a level which in the end gains great 
achievements. None of these courses or services were ever either funded or 
supported by the programme. (David) 
 
Dr. Bustin (illustration 6.30), an expert who runs highly rated courses in Kiryat Moshe and 
Kfar Gvirol, also insists on independent courses in order to build residents’ confidence and 
cooperation:  
 
Residents don’t necessarily require control over every aspect of 
management. Familiarity in an area of interest and gaining confidence in 
how to achieve it is often more than enough. Residents are not delegated 
power, as officials don’t want residents to be too powerful to take over their 
roles, therefore, my view is that government should focus more on results, 
rather than on the way they are achieved. Currently social workers behave 
more like town sheriffs who set the rules; we on the other hand acted as 
residents’ co-operators and assist them to set their own rules. There is a lack 
of general belief among officials that residents have the capacity to affect 
decision making at all. Our programme opened the door for a change of 
mind set and attitude in this respect. (Bustin) 
 
L. Kindler, who represents the donors who funded these schemes, said that the initiative to 
offer training in general as a pre-condition of their funding came from abroad, yet after 
consulting with residents and based on their experience, they insisted on external schemes, 
as residents admitted they had no confidence in government bodies and services:  
 
We funded empowerment courses, which were operated and run by experts 
and professional institutions. It was the residents who insisted on an 
independent body as they lack confidence in governmental services. These 
were very successful schemes as gain full involvement of the local 
community. (Kindler)  
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A local social activist, who was involved in a project in Yavne, acknowledges that building 
confidence among residents about governmental courses was a complicated task: 
  
In order to gain the maximum effect, such courses required promotion, 
continuity and a lot of hard work as residents are really frustrated and let 
down by authorities. I personally initiated job training and education 
courses and worked with residents through this process, but it was not easy 
at all to convince them to join a governmental-led course. (Merling) 
 
One of the activists concluded that all agreed that training is important. However, under 
the NRP it stumbled between a lack of confidence in training that was offered by the 
government (which was rare anyway) and the limited ‘non-governmental’ or other training 
options. The consequence was that the NRP, which initially aimed high, delivered very 
little in terms of training:  
 
In order that residents can run projects properly, one of the two should be 
the case; either they are given fair opportunities to gain knowledge which 
allows them the ability for passable cooperation, or they receive expert 
assistance and supervision to overturn the knowledge gap they carry. 
Unfortunately, current bureaucracy does not support external courses and 
yet does not operate any equivalent in level directly. (David) 
 
 To sum up, all participants confirmed the importance of training and education 
schemes; however, these schemes were rarely offered through the NRP and those that were 
offered by the authorities were mostly inadequate. There is a debate as to whether one can 
be empowered and who should operate these schemes, and a consensus seems to exist that 
successful results rest on schemes being conducted professionally and independently 
where experts are dedicated to the local community and licensed to guarantee resident 
satisfaction. We also made a note on some responses which highlighted the potential 
disempowering consequences of training schemes where these are delivered by 
unprofessional organisations or an un-trusted authority. In these cases, residents chose not 
to participate, and in some cases they were even opposed to these schemes and tried to 
prevent or fail them.   
 Another way to assess public policy is to ask residents how satisfied they were 
from other services provided by authorities. This is the essence of the next section. 
 
6.3.7 Overall Satisfaction 
Participants in the NRP assessed their overall satisfaction with the programme and the 
results are summarised in Tables 12 and 13. Table12 focuses on general satisfaction with 
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the programme, its social contribution, services and facilitation in improving residents’ 
housing conditions, while table 13 focuses on satisfaction from the perspective of resident 
participation and its influence on the programme. The results emphasise the reputation the 
NRP has had in terms of resident participation, whereas residents indicate dissatisfaction 
with the overall contribution of the programme to their housing conditions probably 
because it was dramatically reduced. Nevertheless, they still indicate satisfaction with their 
role in the programme.  
 The following table presents residents’ satisfaction with the NRP as a housing 
programme. 
 
Table 12: Levels of satisfaction with the NRP as a housing programme 
Level of Satisfaction Satisfied Dissatisfied Total 
Residents 
 Leaders 
 Moderate participants 
 Random 
16 
9 
4 
3 
25 
5 
9 
11 
41 
14 
13 
14 
Non-residents 
 Informers 
 Implementers 
 Decision-makers 
16 
7 
7 
2 
8 
6 
2 
0 
27 
14 
11 
2 
Source: Guy Doron research, 2005–0941  
 
The majority (61%) of residents said that they were dissatisfied with the NRP and its 
impact on their community, their housing facilities and services. However, the higher the 
residents’ involvement, the more satisfied they were. This trend drew a link between 
involving residents, their commitment and satisfaction. Residents who were involved in the 
programme felt that they had an impact on their community and were thus more satisfied. 
The fact that the programme had dramatically reduced in recent years has, however, 
resulted in overall dissatisfaction:  
In terms of the physical regeneration, we are truly dissatisfied as 
expectations were much higher. My dissatisfaction is growing, particularly 
now when the Housing Ministry intends to end the NRP. (Meidani) 
 
                                                 
41
 N/A: Residents – 12; Leaders – 4; Moderate participants – 4; Random – 4; Non-residents – 10; Informers 
– 7; Implementers – 2; Decision-makers – 1. 
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 Results among non-residents were different. The largest group (59.3%) confirmed 
that they were satisfied with the NRP, while a smaller group tended to be rather more 
dissatisfied than satisfied. Informers/supporters and decision makers though, were slightly 
more positive whereas implementers expressed dissatisfaction. Arguably, the reason for 
this was that they had seen the deterioration of the programme first hand, felt helpless to 
meet residents’ needs and were frustrated with the decline in programme operation. The 
statement below is an example of a frustrated project manager:  
 
I’m not satisfied with the input of the government to the NRP; in my 
opinion they must keep their involvement in the poor neighbourhoods as 
this is where they are most needed. (Merling). 
 
 Table 13 presents another perspective on satisfaction, this time the aim of involving 
residents in the programme: 
 
Table 13: Level of satisfaction with resident participation in the NRP 
Level of Satisfaction Satisfied Dissatisfied N/A Total
42
 
Residents 
 Leaders 
 Moderate participants 
 Random 
25 
11 
4 
10 
16 
3 
9 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
41 
14 
13 
14 
Non-residents 
 Informers 
 Implementers 
 Decision-makers 
13 
9 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
0 
12 
4 
8 
0 
27 
14 
11 
2 
Source: Guy Doron research, 2005–09  
 
When observing only their participation in the programme, residents expressed more 
positive views, mainly because the NRP was the only social housing programme that was 
associated with residents’ participation.Therefore, in their collective memory, although the 
programme’s overall results were not a great success and had been dramatically reduced, 
residents still had positive memories regarding the NRP when it came to participation. This 
                                                 
42
 N/A: Residents – 12; Leaders – 4; Moderate participants – 4; Random – 4; Non-residents – 10; Informers 
– 7; Implementers – 2; Decision-makers – 1. 
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echoed the same conflict expressed in residents’ dissatisfaction with the D&R in general 
and some leaders’ satisfaction with their empowerment during the programme.   
 The majority (61%) of residents were satisfied with their role in the programme. 
Nevertheless, not all residents were satisfied and while leaders were more satisfied than 
others, it seems reasonable to suggest that involvement in programme operation improved 
satisfaction. Similarly, the majority of non-residents (87%), regardless of their role, were 
satisfied with resident participation in the NRP. L. Kindler, who represents the donors who 
invested in several projects, acknowledges the change that was initiated by the NRP. It is 
important, however, to remember that in these neighbourhoods the NRP offers external 
training schemes that were funded by the donors:  
 
I’m very satisfied with our contribution through the NRP. After many years 
of involvement, I have a comprehensive overview. I remember what the 
conditions were when we started and I know where we have got to today. I 
know how much money and effort has been invested and what the results 
are. We have cooperation from state institutions, and we have helped 
residents to open many institutional doors and many residents have made 
great personal progress. (Kindler) 
 
H. Hovav is proud of the pioneering approach of the NRP in terms of involving residents, 
but regrets that the programme has not developed to a scale where it is consistent, stable 
and empowering:  
 
This was the first social programme to generate a mechanism of resident 
participation, and since we started it, this has been assimilated into other 
programmes. Still, I must admit that the programme has not changed the 
poor conditions of deprived neighbourhoods, as the resources to operate the 
programme were either insufficient or were misdirected. (Hovav) 
 
 
6.3.8 Housing Projects with Positive Public Policy  
While the NRP improved satisfaction amongst the involved participants (and these were 
cases where residents were involved for real), it has still had little impact on improving 
housing conditions. Some residents argued that since they were powerless (at least in terms 
of political influence, which is a direct result of not being united as a group), they could 
not put enough pressure on public policy to prevent the decline in the programme, 
especially when compared to housing programmes in other neighbourhoods and public 
policy directed at other groups of residents. The section below discusses one example that 
was repeatedly noted in interviews. 
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  Although the new settlements were not a case study or a focus of this research, 
residents of the analysed case studies often compared their experience with that of 
empowerment in the housing projects in the new settlements (NS). When initiated the NRP 
did not include projects in the new settlements as these settlements were relatively new, 
but in 1985 the government published an addendum to the NRP which bypassed the social 
criteria and defined support per location, therefore allowing special peripheral 
communities not in the Negev (south) or north (Galilee) of Israel, to receive support 
through the programme. The only periphery in Israel which is not in the remote south or 
north is where the new settlements are located. According to residents, this is an example 
of the tools used by the authorities to flex or tailor criteria in order to assist favoured 
communities. In practice it created a special channel for communities in the new 
settlements to benefit from the NRP at the expense of those in poor neighbourhoods. 
Therefore, participants referred to the residents of the new settlements as privileged 
through the greater provision of benefits and amenities (illustration 6.31). 
 The table below provides participants’ assessments of resident participation in 
housing projects in the New Settlements, where the ladder of participation consists of the 
following steps: Information (1), Consultation (2), Partnership (3), Control (4). 
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Table 14: The New Settlements – Residents’ Participation 
 1 2 3 4 Total 
Residents 
  Leaders 
  Moderate participants 
  Random 
2 
0 
0 
2 
2 
0 
2 
0 
15 
3 
7 
5 
30 
15 
8 
7 
53 
18 
17 
18 
Non-residents 
 Informers 
 Implementers 
 Decision-makers 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
13 
7 
4 
2 
22 
13 
8 
1 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source –Guy Doron 2005–0943 
 
When participants in this research compared resident participation in housing projects 
conducted in the new settlements to those in poor neighbourhoods, the vast majority of all 
participants, both resident and non-resident, evaluated participation of residents in the new 
settlements as far higher, which particularly impacted their community cohesion: 
 
Overall, individuals as well as the community in the settlements are 
extremely powerful and much more involved in policy. While community 
members share the same values and have very much in common culturally 
and traditionally, they act like a disciplined, united group; their impact is 
very strong and, therefore, very influential. (Arajuani, Benisti, Vazana, 
illustration 6.32) 
 
A local leader and mayor of one settlement community confirmed their high level of 
participation and leverage, and explained how this worked: 
 
We controlled all management aspects of our settlement, which is the best 
way, in my opinion, to run a community. Residents were active, community 
lives are flourishing and lively. Residents choose their representatives, and 
if those representatives fail to deliver, they are replaced; this is how you 
keep high management levels and commitments. Self-management is the 
key to a healthy community. (L. Halfa, see illustration 5.20) 
 
Another mayor of a settlement community highlighted the access they had to decision-
makers, which in his words was unlimited (Zur), and was a main advantage. 
                                                 
43
 N/A: Residents – 4; Leaders – 0; Moderate participants – 0; Random – 4; Non-residents – 1; Informers – 
1; Implementers – 0; Decision-makers – 0. 
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 A senior government employee who was involved in programme operation as an 
indirect channel which the government used to serve communities in the new settlements 
(illustration 6.33), confirmed the level of residents’ participation:  
 
We established a communal board where decisions are taken mutually, until 
residents felt comfortable enough to take control, and then they were 
handed the authority to run the community by themselves. (Laufman). 
 
 Another senior government employee, the general manager of the Housing 
Ministry in the late 1990s (illustration 6.34), described settlements residents’ considerable 
influence on project operation: 
 
Residents would be involved up to the smallest detail that might be relevant 
or affect them. They invested and pushed more than any other residents in 
boards in planning and building in their area and, thus, were rewarded more. 
(Ben Eliahu) 
 
A senior MP, even though not a supporter of the settlers, argued that because residents of 
new settlements were highly empowered, they were able to manipulate the authorities into 
providing them with housing services that were supposed to be implemented only as part 
of the NRP in poor neighbourhoods: 
 
No other NRP site was supported and backed like the housing project in the 
NS, directly or indirectly. Residents lobbying were assisted by improved 
local facilities and services for their communities. The NRP was much 
needed in poor neighbourhoods and thus investment in NS was at the 
expense of poor neighbourhoods and any other weak group of people. 
(Guzanski, illustration 6.35 ) 
 
To conclude, residents of new settlements were allowed or took on greater responsibilities 
in board operation and managed to gain a greater amount of funding for housing projects 
compared to poor neighbourhoods. The reason for this is assumed to be resident unity 
which generated their political power, enabling them to be active in determining their 
benefits and rewards in forcing officials to support their requests (Cohen, 2007). 
 Many among those who were interviewed in this research insisted on highlighting 
the fact that there was supportive public policy towards housing programmes in the new 
settlements. This perspective is also supported by academics. A comprehensive report 
published by the Israeli research centre, ‘Adva’, investigating government provisions to 
different types of communities in Israel, reveals that the new settlements were given a 
greater degree of support than any other residential group and particularly if compared to 
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any other poor neighbourhood.
44
 Other supportive data underlines the gaps in public policy 
in improved services and better housing conditions, which is reflected in the number of 
residents in new settlements which has consistently grown (more than any other 
community in the country, including the 15 wealthiest cities). In poor neighbourhoods, on 
the other hand, the number of residents has declined.
45
 
 Public policy is simply reflected in housing programmes as it is easy to measure the 
scope of investment made in to a programme by the amount of work and number of 
new/renewed buildings built over a period of time. Whereas in poor neighbourhoods, 
government involvement declined and budgets were cut off in the new settlements, Adva’s 
report indicates the opposite:  
 
Between the years of 2000–2006, 15,488 units were in the process of being 
built all across the new settlements, representing, on average, an investment 
of 11,300,000,000 NIS (around £1,948,275,862). The government was 
responsible directly for 53% of buildings and for 43% of investments, 
whereas in all other housing programmes the government had direct 
responsibility for 20% of new buildings and only 10% of investments. 
(Savirski, Atias, Dahan) 
 
What is more, public policy in terms of housing included other services than building. One 
resident leader living in a new settlement described the additional housing benefits the 
community received:  
 
We also benefited from wider housing support; the government invested in 
building a council housing estate in our settlement to support the population 
growth, whereas in the end, units were sold at minimum prices to residents 
from the community, which was forced due to lack of demand. (Halfa) 
 
Ran Cohen, MP (illustration 6.36), who was the deputy Housing Minister responsible for 
the NRP, argued that the government’s excessive investment in the new settlements came 
at the expense of services and programmes such as the NRP.
46
 In 2004, government 
investments in housing in the new settlements were twice as high as in the NRP.
47
 
 Table 15 below presents the interviewees’ responses with regard to public policy 
towards housing projects in the NS. (It is similar to table 11 where residents expressed 
their views on public policy towards the NRP, only here we have a comparison between 
                                                 
44
 Savirski, Atias, Dahan, 2008, p. 5. 
45
 Savirski, Atias, Dahan, 2008, p.5, Basok, 2006 
46
 Cohen, 2002. 
47
 Ha’aretz, 2006. 
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the NRP in old neighbourhoods and the NRP in the new settlements), which was measured 
on a scale of negative to very supportive. 
 
Table 15: Public Policy towards housing renewal and support the new settlements 
Public Policy Negative Moderate 
Support 
Supportive Very 
Supportive 
Total 
Residents 
 leaders 
 moderate 
participants 
 random 
2 
0 
0 
 
2 
7 
2 
3 
 
2 
17 
4 
6 
 
7 
23 
12 
8 
 
3 
53 
18 
17 
 
18 
Non-residents 
 informers/ 
supporters 
 implementers 
 decision-
makers 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
8 
4 
 
4 
0 
10 
6 
 
2 
2 
18 
10 
 
7 
1 
37 
21 
 
13 
3 
Source – PhD research, Guy Doron, 2005–0948 
 
More residents observed a supportive public policy towards housing projects in the new 
settlements than negative. Israel Twito, one of resident leaders (illustration 6.37) 
highlighted the differences between the support given to housing programmes in the NS 
and in poor neighbourhoods: 
 
Residents of poor neighbourhoods are singled out compared to residents of 
the NS although both were sent by the government in the name of 
pioneering and inhabited deserted areas, only one group benefited from 
massive support. (Twito) 
 
Residents of the new settlements admitted that they have had disproportionate government 
support in housing and believe it is a direct result of their empowerment, community unity, 
strong lobbying and political influence. One settlers’ leader observed: 
 
Our advantage was in our unity. We were obsessed with building and 
developing our settlement, and we even set up our own development 
company. We have great accessibility and linkage to MPs and General 
Directors of government offices. As you noticed just now, I just received a 
phone call from one of the MPs asking how we are getting on. We had a 
                                                 
48
 N/A: Residents – 4; Leaders – 0; Moderate participants – 0; Random – 4; Non-residents – 1; Informers – 
1; Implementers – 0; Decision-makers – 0. 
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large number of visits by MPs and ministers to this temporary site, even a 
visit from the PM himself, let alone several officials’ delegations. I’m 
visiting the Knesset almost on a weekly basis. (Halfa) 
 
One of the most astonishing examples of the unique link and influence residents had with 
decision makers is revealed in the statement below, by a local leader who described his 
relationship with the PM (Ariel Sharon at the time) (illustration 6.38): 
 
PM Sharon was always a great friend of the settlements. When he was the 
Housing Minster, he worked like a bulldozer [a pusher in slang, GD] to 
support housing projects in the settlements. He encouraged us to build more 
and to expand as a community. Our relations were so close that I could have 
visited him if I needed anything for the community. I used to call on him 
when I was on my way from or to home, as he lives nearby. I had an entry 
permit to his farm (his private home) and would sit with him in his dining 
room, tell him of the problem and ask for his assistance. He used to sort it 
out immediately by picking up the phone and calling the relevant person. 
This was our working pattern. (Zur) 
 
Similar to residents, non-residents also indicated that public policy demonstrated greater 
commitment to the new settlements. One activist, who worked in parliament engaged with 
governments entities (illustration 6.39), revealed:  
 
Settlements offered reduced housing prices based on, extensive subsidies 
and other benefits in order to attract as many residents as possible to 
relocate to NS. (Chishin). 
 
 An affirmation of this policy was given by the general manager of the Housing 
Ministry who also confirmed it was at the behest of the State’s leadership, both in its 
support and its instigation that came from the highest political levels:  
 
Public policy was committed to support housing programmes at the new 
settlements. The Ministry was involved in planning, building, financing and 
budgeting subsidised mortgages for residents and also in all-out policy 
setting. As a General Director of the Housing Ministry, I was up to date on 
all planning programmes for the NS, approved annual working programmes 
and followed up on their progress. Ministry employees where all aware of 
and focused on the policy of giving preference to two sectors — the 
periphery of Negev and Galilee and the NS. These were our national 
priority. Investing in the NS inspired our work; when it was reported that 
there was a decrease in NS building, I was requested to explain how that 
happened not only to the Minister but also to the PM. Since every decision 
regarding the NS was declared and approved by the whole government, all 
ministers had to be not only aware, but also involved and pushing for it. 
(Ben Eliahu) 
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 Supportive public policy was provided to the NS directly and indirectly. When the 
government was forced by the international community to cease provision of benefits to 
the NS directly, it directed non-government institutions to do so instead, such as the Jewish 
Agency (JA), which provided intensive support for regeneration projects on behalf of the 
government. According to Ofer Laufman, a senior manager who worked for the JA and 
was responsible for the housing department: 
 
The JA is highly involved in many aspects of housing programmes, 
especially in the NS. Our role is to provide the necessities for all planning 
and environmental issues, but mainly we are responsible for the creation of 
sustainable communities. We shepherd and guide the newborn communities 
step by step during the establishment process and strengthening the 
community. During the last decade, the new settlements became a source of 
disagreement and conflict both within Israeli politics and in the international 
agenda, which has implications for the JA donors as well; and, indeed, in 
1992, the Boards of Deputies [the board that defines the JA’s operational 
plans —G.D.] has decided to prevent our involvement in the settlement. 
(Laufman) 
 
 To conclude, this last section provides views and data in support of the claims 
raised by residents of the NRP that public policy towards housing projects in the new 
settlements was largely influenced by political and resident lobbies, as opposed to less 
poor locations.  
 
6.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has investigated the NRP and considered to what extent it empowered 
residents. Earlier analyses have already noted that the NRP has successfully targeted 
deserving areas, populated by disadvantaged residents who were most in need of economic 
and social assistance and who were suffering poor housing standards. The programme’s 
main aim was to improve housing facilities and services to local communities and in many 
cases this has been achieved. In terms of empowerment, the NRP was the first social 
programme in Israel that offered residents a formula which allowed their involvement. 
Earlier analyses indicated a gap between residents’ involvement in practice and the level of 
their real influence on the decision-making process during the NRP. Participation and 
influence were therefore more per se rather than de facto. 
 The new evidence collected in this research examined the effectiveness of the NRP 
in terms of empowerment, primarily according to the main factors of resident participation 
and public policy. In terms of residents’ participation and their real influence on decision 
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making, this research can confirm that participation has been limited. Although boards did 
include resident representatives as members, residents had little real influence on 
programme operation and on the main decisions taken. Some residents, especially leaders, 
spoke of having real influence and assessed the NRP as successful, but they were few and, 
importantly, their participation only lasted for a short time. Overall, residents have shown a 
great desire and a capacity to have a significant role in management; however, they were 
not offered the opportunity to do so. Interviewees also noted the lack of unity among 
disadvantaged communities in poor neighbourhoods which, in contrast to other residents’ 
groups, resulted in a lack of cohesion, power and influence on decision makers and 
national agendas that might have drawn more attention to social policy in Israel. 
 Having said this, although residents were unsatisfied with the overall outcome of 
the NRP (and mainly with its dramatic decrease) when it came to their participation, they 
were more pleased with this aspect of the NRP. The fact that the programme allowed 
residents some level of participation, improved the external image of some 
neighbourhoods and helped residents to believe that they could achieve a better quality of 
life and has left a slightly positive mark in their collective memory. Indeed, since the 
decision to reduce the scope of the programme there have been residents who have 
regretted the decision and hoped it would be over-ruled. Although it is difficult to find a 
neighbourhood under the programme which improved conditions to a point where 
residents no longer required support, the programme still praised for its contribution to 
participation.  
 With regards to training and education schemes, both residents and non-residents 
argued that these schemes are essential to the success of social programmes, especially as 
they give residents the tools to improve their skills and enhance the quality of their 
participation. Nevertheless, training and education schemes were rarely provided as part of 
the programme, although they were supposed to be delivered. Budget cuts to the 
programme resulted in very little official training. Having said that, there were some 
successful examples of training schemes conducted in the NRP, but none of these courses 
were offered by the government 
 To conclude, the NRP provides a mixed picture in terms of empowerment. The 
initial formula of the programme aimed to achieve residents’ participation, but the outcome 
was more formal participation than a real share or influence. Public policy in the 
programme’s early days was more supportive  and, indeed, the programme left its mark on 
Israeli social policy in terms of residents’ participation and will be remembered as a better 
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example of a programme that  attempted to improve facilities and conditions in poor 
neighbourhoods. Although the NRP has a positive reputation because it involved residents 
to some degree, the fact that in the last decade funding for the programme was 
dramatically reduced has meant it has had a less positive impact.   
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Chapter 7 
The ‘Right to Buy’ 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses resident participation in the passing of Israel’s ‘Right to Buy’ 
legislation (RTB) of 1999. The legislation, initiated by residents’ groups in collaboration 
with opposition MPs, allowed residents of publicly built ‘council’ housing (illustration 31) 
to purchase units at discounted rates, calculated according to length of tenure. The 
government at the time opposed the idea and even considered privatising the state-owned 
housing companies and terminating government involvement in the management of social 
housing units. Residents were very active in designing, promoting and negotiating the 
terms of RTB.  
 
 
31. Council Housing Estate : The photo shows the longest public housing estate in Israel 
which is in Beer Sheva. It is called the ‘quarter of a mile’. Photo: Michaeli, 2005. Source: 
http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%91%D7%A5:YASKI01.JPG  
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This programme is therefore a rare case of high resident involvement in public policy. 
Parliamentary representatives offered their full support; although at one point it was 
completely opposed by government representatives, a subsequent government was far 
more supportive in its approach. All in all, the RTB programme allows us to investigate the 
impact of progressed resident participation on housing policies in different scenarios and 
also to test the hypothesis that residents’ involvement in decision-making can have a 
positive impact on policies whilst can also dramatically improving a programme’s chances 
of success. It is important to note that although participation in the RTB seemed to occur 
mainly in the political arena, there were many among the involved participants who 
indicated that the political context challenged them to greater community cohesion which 
indirectly influenced the community also to participate in local management. Some of the 
RTB leaders who were involved in the NRP declared that the RTB even offered a better 
opportunity to test residents’ influence as it simulates a situation where a minority of 
residents in a local management group take on the majority of professionals on a critical 
point of issue. 
 RTB provides an excellent yardstick of the consequences of resident involvement 
in social policy because residents were highly involved in campaigning for and achieving 
their demands. There has been no other social legislation in Israel where residents, 
cooperating with MPs, initiated and acted against the government successfully. Similarly, 
as this research reveals, the government’s negative reaction to the legislation — and 
particularly to residents’ involvement — was also without equal, compared to any other 
Israeli housing issue. Of all the instances of negative public policy that have been 
investigated, none was on the same scale or lasted for such an extended period. Although 
the RTB process began in 1997, it has, thus far, been the focus of little academic research. 
Only small-scale studies have been undertaken, and these have not fully examined the 
consequences of the level of residents’ participation in the RTB process (illustration 32). 
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32. Residents’ influence. Protesters outside Amidar offices. The banner reads, ‘Amidar 
Dries the Council Housing’. This is the antithesis of the image of happy families which 
Amidar advertises. Source: http://www.tarabut.info/he/articles/article/about-trachtenberg-
housing/ 
 
 The chapter is organized as follows: the first section (7.2) outlines the story of 
RTB, its origins, background and design, the role played by residents’ MPs and the 
parliament, and how public policy was formulated by government. It also describes the 
intense debate, as well as the social protests, the campaign in support and other activities 
organised by residents to set up a new agenda for RTB, concluding with its implementation 
and limitations. The next section (7.3) discusses the case studies, participants and 
neighbourhoods. Section 7.4 presents evidence collected during this research on resident 
participation and public policy during the RTB programme. Section 7.5 discusses the 
programme’s unique features, such as the controversial relationship between the 
government, the Jewish Agency (JA) and the housing company Amigur, as well as the 
controversy around the implementation of RTB in other locations which are not council 
estates. Finally the last section (7.6) offers some conclusions.  
 
7.2 Overview 
Housing in Israel has developed differently from other countries. Private ownership, for 
instance, is a more common phenomenon than elsewhere, and the numbers of home 
owners are growing, with over 90% of the population in 2004 owning their own home 
(Peterborg, 2004) Therefore, “all but the very poor are home owners” (Cohen, 2008: 95). 
As a result, political pressure for the provision of publicly built housing is limited 
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(Appendix 6:2), and no such construction has been undertaken in Israel since the 1990s. 
State-owned housing solutions are inadequate, and those among the poor who are not 
allocated a unit — but have the right to one — may receive a housing stipend to help with 
rent payments in the private market. Those who do not meet the criteria for a housing 
solution, even if only by the slightest margin, must find private rental accommodation; 
thus, there is a certain level of homelessness  
 The status of public building in Israel has declined dramatically over the years. In 
the first two decades after Israel was established, around 150,000 council housing units 
were built, and this represented almost 23% of all housing (Werczberger and Reshef, 1991; 
Klienman, 1995). By comparison, “the total number of permanent49 council housing 
dwellings held by the government at the end of 1998 was 107,927 only” (Public Appeal 
Committee, Israeli Knesset, 2004). The limited amount of publicly owned housing 
solutions, their poor maintenance and services which residents’ compare with other 
projects outside poor neighbourhoods, inspired residents to seek a change. Participation in 
Israel in general is low, and that of residents of council housing estates were no different, if 
not lower, yet the RTB has proven to have higher involvement rates, more than any other 
social housing programme, since these units were most likely residents only assets.  
 
7.2.1 Background 
Residents living in publicly funded ‘council housing estates’ have highlighted the problem 
of housing insecurity. Their main concern, based on the Israeli/Jewish tradition that a 
house equals social security, was their inability to join the housing ladder and become 
home owners. The number of home owners in Israel (72%) is dramatically higher than in 
other countries (USA 64%, UK 68%, France 54% and Japan 60%),
50
 and residents of 
public housing were no different, they too wanted to be home owners, they highlighted two 
main arguments — one relates to the past and the other to the future, while both are based 
on comparisons with housing rights given in rural communities.  
 The first relates to historical justice — taking into consideration the years people 
have lived in their homes paying subsidised rents, it could be argued that they deserve 
tenure rights over these properties. Such tenure rights, residents of council estates argue, 
                                                 
49
 Not including temporary solutions — the immigration camps — provided by the government to 
tackle the massive immigration wave in the early 1990s. 
50
 See http://www.digal.co.il. 
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were given to residents of rural communities, who also lived in publicly funded housing 
and after a long period of tenure gained ownership rights over their properties.  
The second argument is aimed at the new generation and residents who wish to leave 
something for their next of kin in order to help them out of poverty and dependency. 
Residents claim their children should be given a fair opportunity in life without having to 
start from the bottom of the housing ladder, which is the structure offered to those who live 
in publicly housing units located in rural communities. These arguments generated a 
process in which, for the first time in Israeli social policy, a housing programme was 
initiated from the bottom up. Resident activity included the design, initiation, promotion, 
shaping which ultimately led to the passing of the legislation of RTB. The following 
sections describe chronologically the evolution of the RTB legislation process. 
 
7.2.2. Origins 
The concept of RTB was first introduced in 1996. A group called Bnei Ha’Shcunot’ 
(Hebrew for ‘Sons of the Neighbourhoods’) learnt that the PM, Benjamin Netanyahu 
(illustration 7.1), was planning to authorise selling council-housing estates to private 
developers. The group identified this as dangerous to their housing security because if 
council estates were privatised, residents’ ability to pay rent under subsidised state-sector 
rules would come to an end. As a result, they have decided to initiate a petition demanding 
a new law to secure their housing rights. Driven by fear for their future but encouraged by 
a solution offered to residents living in publicly-funded houses in rural communities, 
(Appendix 6:3) Bnei Ha’Shcunot’’s members, together with Hakeshet members 
(illustration 7.2), looked to a similar government initiative which would offer residents of 
rural areas (illustration 7.3) the opportunity to not only buy their homes at discounted 
prices, but also to transfer tenure rights to their next of kin (Rachman, 2001).  
 Residents presented proposals to MPs from all parties, although mainly to the right-
wing Likud and Shas parties, to which most residents were attached politically. However, 
members of Netanyahu’s right-wing government firmly opposed the proposed legislation 
(Mualem, 2007), arguing that it was against their free market ideology which entailed 
privatising social services. The government’s stance led to frustration. The people’s elected 
representatives’ were perceived to be neglecting those in need, while residents living in 
similar housing in rural communities were being granted excessive housing rights as a 
result of their parliamentary lobby (Sidor, 1997).  
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 Residents of council estates thus shifted their focus and began to generate their own 
lobby. They received unexpected support and cooperation from Ran Cohen, MP, who 
represented the left-wing party, Meretz, was a former resident of a Kibbutz and was 
himself raised in a council housing unit (Cohen, 2008). Cohen, together with other MPs, 
cooperated with residents and submitted the RTB legislation proposal to the Knesset, in a 
written form that closely followed what the residents’ groups had proposed. After they 
secured the cooperation of Ran Cohen MP, other groups of residents from different estates 
across the country joined forces to promote the proposal. Once lobbying gained more 
momentum, the groups collaborated under an umbrella organisation called the Council 
Housing Forum. This organisation included council-housing residents, homeless residents, 
disabled residents, local neighbourhood groups, academics, social activists, students with a 
social orientation, advocates, ethnic groups, human-rights movements and political 
activists and was subsidised by several NGO’s. The organisation met on almost a weekly 
basis and was represented in the majority of Knesset meetings and hearings (illustration 
33).  
 
 
33. Residents’ meeting as part of the Right To Buy activities.  
Source: http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4287934,00.html 
 
7.2.3 The Legislation Process in Parliament and the Government’s Response.  
Cohen and representatives of the group first met at his Knesset office on 16 April 1997, 
and the first legislative draft (which was based on residents’ ideas and also the rules of 
sales of public units in rural areas) was submitted on 26 May (Cohen, 2008). By early July, 
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the government had clearly decided to oppose this measure; however, the supporting MPs 
were determined to put the proposal before the Knesset assembly and did so on 16 July 
(Cohen, 2008). The first draft passed its preliminary reading and moved to the Finance 
Committee in order to be prepared for a first reading the following March. This process 
proved to be far from easy. The government was ready to block the proposal because of the 
significance of a first reading, After this stage, the proposed bill would be kept on the 
official list and even if parliament was dissolved, could easily be enacted under a new 
administration. 
 Once the government realised that the RTB bill would gain a majority in the 
Knesset, including the support of coalition members, the coalition whip (then Meir Shitrit) 
who was known as a vocal opponent of the residents’ initiative (illustration 7.4) decided to 
shift the emphasis and began to portray the vote as a vote of confidence. They postponed 
the vote and put pressure on the government’s coalition partners to reconsider their stand, 
stressing that opposing the government line might put the whole coalition at risk. This 
political tactic is uncommon and has been used only twice in the history of parliamentary 
hearings in Israel, both times during the RTB debate. Commentators were surprised that 
the government would risk a no-confidence vote to force coalition ‘rebels’ to change their 
stance on a social issue to which Israel has tended not to give high priority (Cohen, 2008). 
As Ehud Barak, (illustration 7.5) leader of the minority in Parliament, stated during the 
debate on the legislation: “There is no justified law other than this RTB” (Cohen, 2008: 
79). Even the President of Israel, for whom intervention in political debate is highly 
irregular, wrote to residents and expressed his support for and the social significance of the 
legislation (Letter to Residents of Council Housing in Cohen, 1998).  
 The support given to the traditionally low priority of social policy in Israel by the 
highest offices in the country was out of the ordinary. To convince coalition members to 
switch support, the government also offered to instigate a special act, which was much 
more limited in its terms, to sell some council-housing units. Residents’ groups reacted 
angrily to this watered-down version and pressured MPs to stick to the initial terms, for 
which they were lobbying intensively. In the end, the sustained pressure of the lobby and 
the likelihood of defeat forced the government to withdraw its objection, at least 
temporarily, and allow the bill to pass at its first hearing on the 4 May 1998 (with 72 in 
favour; 3 against) (illustration 34). In a letter to residents after the first hearing, Cohen 
stated: “We wouldn’t have got that far without the massive support and productive 
lobbying from you — the residents” (Cohen, 2008, p. 88) (illustration 7.6).  
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34. The Knesset votes for the Right To Buy: The image was taken by residents attending the 
event, and published on their website describing the legislation process. Source: 
http://diortzibury.wordpress.com/author/shaieistein/ 
 
 The government, however, decided to sell council units according to its own 
guidelines in July 1998, ignoring the legislation process. This was a move to make the full 
RTB legislation appear unnecessary and to nullify residents’ lobbying efforts. However, 
the terms of these new guidelines were limited compared to the proposed RTB legislation, 
and residents campaigned against the scheme and organised a boycott. Groups also 
redoubled their lobbying efforts for RTB, believing this would result in even better terms. 
Three months later, on 19 October 1998, the pressure paid off and the RTB law that was 
initiated and supported by residents was passed in the second and third hearings by 49 
votes to 24.  
 Residents’ lobbying was exceedingly effective in changing MPs’ positions on the 
housing-sale issue and played a massive role in turning opponents of the legislation into 
supporters. Residents wrote to MPs and ministers offering advice drawn from their own 
experiences; made suggestions for proposals; protested in favour of the legislation; 
participated as guests in meetings, Knesset hearings and at conferences; and captured the 
media’s attention. Residents’ celebrations, though, were short-lived. Ten days after the 
vote, the government made its first attempt to delay implementation and, on 2 February 
1999, the tabled RTB law was frozen without a single unit sold under its terms. The 
Netanyahu administration continued to offer the sale of council housing under its own 
initiative, but residents, once again, preferred the terms offered under the RTB legislation 
and refused to apply to buy their units under this limited scheme. In March, residents’ 
groups appealed to the Supreme Court for aid. The court, however, refused to arbitrate and 
ruled that the issue should be determined by the government in parliament. Residents’ 
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attention then became focused on the political system and the upcoming election campaign 
(illustration 7.7).  
 
7.2.4. The election campaign of 1999 was exceptional for its focus on social and housing 
issues, and had the RTB dispute at its centre. In analyses made after the election, it was 
shown that around 40,000 traditional right-wing voters transferred their votes to the left-
wing coalition because of its commitment to revive RTB. These narrow margins indicated 
that swing voters won the election of 1999 for the left-wing coalition for the first and last 
time only during the last two decades (Cohen, 2008: p. 217). Although appreciative of the 
support from council-housing residents, the newly elected government, led by PM Ehud 
Barak, struggled to rejuvenate the full RTB. As a promise had been given to residents, the 
new government compromised by offering a right-to-buy scheme that, although limited, 
was more attractive than the Netanyahu initiative.  
 This compromise, seen as a way to alleviate pressure, was announced on the 12 
March 2000 (Rachman, 2001). There continued to be strong opposition from officials who 
sought to block the new governmental scheme and to prevent any sale of publicly built 
units, and only a potential coalition crisis, which forced the intervention of the PM himself, 
generated the second governmental act and made possible implementation. To underscore 
its political and public importance, on the first day of the programme’s operation, the PM 
and the main legislator MP Cohen (then a minister) launched the sales in the offices of the 
housing company Prazot in Jerusalem (Cohen, 2008). The sight of the PM personally 
overseeing the implementation of a social programme was, and still is, an uncommon 
phenomenon in the history of social policy in Israel. 
 The new act was based on the initial RTB legislation and was a compromise that 
the legislator, supported by resident groups, managed to agree with the Finance and 
Housing Ministries. Terms in the approved act were eventually less flexible than those 
proposed by residents in the initial legislation (Rachman, 2001). Because of the complexity 
of the RTB legislation and, some claim, also because of the firm rejection by government 
offices, the initial draft presented by residents had to be modified several times.  
 There were a number of setbacks, and proposed changes were not in the residents’ 
favour. Residents were determined to push through the full terms and, with the assistance 
of the newly elected minister (the legislator MP), managed to retain the essence of the 
initial proposal regarding eligibility and discounts. Council-housing units were to be sold 
to residents based on residential seniority, at 3% for every year of residency and a with 
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90% maximum discount gained at 30 years of seniority. On the other hand, in the final 
RTB law, residents and legislators had to withdraw the sections on continuity rights for 
next-of-kin, allowing those aged 18 and over, living with their parents and owning no other 
property, to be eligible to buy.  
 Another section in the initial legislation that was never implemented concerned re-
investment in new council housing solutions. Worried by the likely decline of council-
housing stock in the event of mass sales, the initial legislation stated that all income from 
sales would be directed to the creation of new housing solutions for those in need, with at 
least 3000 new units every year being built. In reality, no new construction of publicly 
owned units was implemented.  
 In April 2000, the sale of council housing formally began and within less than four 
years more than a fifth of all residents purchased their units (Cohen, 2008; Marciano, 
2006). The majority (two thirds) lived in central Israel and were long-term residents with 
over 30 years’ seniority (Sinai & Zrachya, 2006). The only official data about these sales, 
provided to a Knesset committee in 2004, stated:  
 
From the total of 107,927 permanent
51
 council housing dwellings held by 
the government at the end of 1998 when the act become law, 19,336 units, 
almost a fifth of the whole stock of council housing, were sold to tenants in 
less than four years. 81,341 units were still operating as council housing 
under the control of government-owned housing companies. These 
companies hold a stock of 1,672 unoccupied units under repair. 
Concurrently, 2,137 veteran residents were listed in the Housing Ministry as 
eligible for housing solutions, and around 52,000 eligible new immigrants 
were listed in the Absorption Ministry. (Public Appeal Committee, Israeli 
Knesset, 2004).  
 
Since 2004 the RTB terms have been modified again by the new right wing coalition that 
was returned to power. According to housing analysts, sales have dramatically reduced as 
the new terms are no longer attractive; The discount is relatively smaller, there are 
limitations on buyers (fewer residents are now eligible to apply), and fewer 
neighbourhoods (location restrictions) are included under the new terms (Mirovski & Bar-
Eli, 2006). After the election of the 17
th
 parliament in 2006, Ran Cohen MP again renewed 
his attempts to implement the initial RTB legislation. Cohen had tabled a new version that 
had been drafted with the cooperation of residents and offered sales in similar terms to the 
                                                 
51
 Not including temporary solutions — the immigration camps — provided by the government to 
tackle the massive immigration wave in the early 1990s. 
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initial RTB (Amsterdamski, 2008). The results at this stage were inconsequential compared 
to the earlier dispute as there were still ongoing sales of units, but at the end of July 2007, 
the Finance Committee approved the new RTB terms, with maximum discounts set at 
82.5% in central locations and 90% in peripheral areas.  
 
7.2.5 Limitations, Problems and Boundaries  
The fact that RTB raised objections from officialdom, even when a supportive government 
was in power, requires additional investigation. Civil servants had many reasons for 
objecting to RTB implementation. The most common were social and financial, but there 
were political and local urban structural reasons as well.  
 The social objection argued that selling off the current stock, without building new 
solutions to replace them, would destroy the ability of the state to support those who are in 
housing and social need. Many housing officials worried that by transferring existing 
valuable properties to private ownership without planning and building housing solutions 
for others in need (Appendix 6:4), the state would lose possible future accommodation for 
those in need (Delitzki, 1997; Cohen, 2008). They also feared that emptying the housing 
stock would put their jobs in danger, since if stock diminished, many jobs that serviced 
those units would be lost. This was the impetus for the inclusion of a section in the RTB 
legislation that obliged the government to re-invest the RTB income in building new 
solutions.  
 Initially the idea was to invest the entire RTB income, yet the legislator and 
residents were willing to accept only a fraction as long as there were new solutions in place 
(Appendix 6:5). This, fractional investment however, was never put into practice and thus 
dramatically affected the limitations on and definition of criteria to determine eligibility for 
subsidized rents. Fewer people are now eligible for housing support or subsidy and, 
consequently, more people in need find themselves without state-provided assistance and 
on waiting lists (Appendix 6:6). There is no means of providing for demand without new 
public construction and, therefore, no capacity to balance demand and supply. RTB gained 
1,500,000,000 NIS (=£266,724,000), generated by the various sales of council housing 
units, but none of this has been re-invested in creating new solutions for the approximately 
55,000 residents on housing waiting lists (Marciano, 2006). As confirmed in the budget 
proposal published in 2004: 
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part of the income from the sales was allocated to fund the sale process 
itself, part went in compensation to the Jewish Agency for its share of 
Amigur units sold and part was used to subsidize the interest on the 
mortgages awarded to buyers (Budget proposal, Ministry of Housing, 2004, 
chapter 16 [זט in Hebrew], October 2003).  
 
The financial objection was concerned with the high costs involved; first to administrate 
the sales and second, related to the ‘potential revenue or worth of asset’ that the 
government was to give away to residents as part of the process. This was a recurring 
argument against RTB (Ayges, 1998; Delitzki, 1997). The third objection, although more 
difficult to articulate, surrounded the potential political repercussions of RTB. Initially, 
representatives of the right-wing parties opposed residents’ calls to back RTB for 
ideological reasons, as they challenged liberal economic ideas. However, when the concept 
was adopted by left-wing representatives and strongly promoted in cooperation with 
residents who had traditionally identified with right-wing parties, the dispute caused a 
redefinition of the political landscape. Right-wing MPs worried about the consequences of 
allowing left-wing politicians to reward traditionally right-wing supporters by legislating a 
policy aimed at improving their conditions (Rachman, 2001). This led to an intensification 
of opposition to RTB among many in the right-wing parties. 
 Not only the government opposed RTB, but employees of housing companies 
opposed it as well, and there were those who delayed and at times even prevented sales of 
units under the new programme. They tightened the rules for assessing applications, 
increased restrictions on the eligibility of potential buyers and deliberately miscalculated 
discounts (Rachman, 2001). The most common way to decelerate sales after the approval 
of RTB became evident through the widespread and unfair evictions of residents. In trying 
to prevent purchasing rights, companies first focused on those whose tenancy legitimacy 
was in doubt (e.g., residents who delayed paying their rents or had debts; next-of-kin of 
residents who had passed away; residents who lived in a big flat, even though the actual 
number of tenants had decreased over the years — i.e. they were over-accommodated; 
elderly residents). Housing companies rushed to order evictions, thus preventing residents 
from claiming any rights of purchase. At times there were empty units in certain locations 
although the long waiting list (Appendix 6:7). In some instances, council-housing 
companies breached regulations in order to speed up evictions of residents with tenure and 
bring in new tenants with no purchasing rights. Israel has the lowest number of council 
housing units per 1000 people (Appendix 6:10). Eventually, with the situation critical, to 
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prevent violations of residents’ rights the Housing Ministry established a committee and 
gave it the final say over any eviction (Grinberg, 2005) (Appendix 6:9). 
 
Summary 
Residents’ involvement in RTB was exceptional and one of the main reasons for the 
success in the legislation process. The cooperation and support of MPs was also 
exceptional. However, opposition from government and interested authorities was also 
exceptionally strong. Not only did the government have to play unprecedented tricks to 
prevent the vote (such as the vote of confidence), it also used other means to delay, 
obstruct and postpone RTB sales. The following section presents the data collected 
regarding these empowerment features in the RTB. 
 
7.3 The Case Studies  
This section presents my findings which represent the first attempt to collect evidence from 
residents about the RTB process. Perspectives and views on RTB are almost entirely 
absent from earlier investigations. Data shown in this chapter include summaries of 
responses from residents and non-residents involved in the RTB programme (leaders, 
common participants and a random sample) and, among non-residents, the views of those 
who were engaged in it: academics, social workers, implementers, activists and decision-
makers. The collected data provides a comprehensive review of all aspects relating to 
empowerment in social policy in general and to RTB in particular.  
 The table in Appendix 5:2 presents a comparison between neighbourhoods 
characteristic of the case studies described in this chapter (there is growing criticism of the 
number of regional housing companies; see Appendix 6:1). All case study neighbourhoods 
include publicly funded housing solutions and represent the variety of neighbourhoods 
with council housing estates. They cover the entire country; from the main cities 
(Jerusalem and Tel Aviv) to the south (Ashdod), the north (Ako, Maker) and even the 
Sharon (Hertzeliya, Kfar Saba), which in general are considered wealthier than other areas 
The case studies also represent the variety of residents living in publicly funded housing; 
new immigrants (from the former USSR in Petach Tikva and from Ethiopia in Rehovot), 
the Arab populated neighbourhoods (Maker) and the New Settlements (Kiryat Arba). This 
variety helps to present a comprehensive analysis of public housing in Israel. 
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7.3.1 The National and Local Housing Companies 
Amidar 
The largest Council Housing company in Israel, (illustration 7.8) is government owned, 
established in 1949. Amidar has had a pivotal role in implementing housing policy in 
Israel, especially regarding the mass waves of immigrants during the 1960s and 1990s. In 
2006 they have managed 50,000 units (Feldman, 2011). 
 Amidar was established in 1949 and is government owned. It has a pivotal role in 
implementing housing policy in Israel, especially with regards to the mass immigrations of 
the 1960s and 1990s. During the 1950s the government opted to provide housing solutions 
for the hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants to Israel, arriving first from Europe 
and then from Africa and Asia. Amidar was set up as a company and given the 
responsibility to build and manage housing solutions for the newcomers. These were the 
first council housing units in Israel. The vast estates were made up of small units that met 
the minimum required standards, and were built quickly to host as many residents as 
possible. The majority of tenants were new immigrants coming from multiple backgrounds 
and cultures who struggled to cope and adapt to the new State, thus these neighbourhoods 
were considered poor and socially dependent. Amidar was therefore handed another role, 
to provide social services to its tenants. By 1962 Amidar was in charge of 200,000 units. 
Other housing companies were then established locally to support it. 
 The decreasing role the government took in creating new housing solutions led to a 
similar decrease in Amidar’s share in the housing market and also to a narrowed role and 
influence. The new wave of immigrants arrived from the former USSR in the 1990s and 
the need for new housing solutions, forced the government to take a greater role in the 
housing market, leading to a revival for Amidar as the largest government housing 
company. 
 The Right to Buy laws changed the balance of power between Amidar and its 
residents. Up until then Amidar controlled all aspects of housing and residents had no say 
in the process. The RTB legislation gave a greater role to residents and was a new 
challenge to Amidar: first it required a higher level of service, and secondly, selling units 
without building new ones had posed a threat to many employees who suspected they were 
about to lose their jobs. The housing stock managed by the company was reduced and no 
new solutions were built. Less housing stock and growing demand for housing support 
forced Amidar to evacuate next of kin or smaller families (those whose children had left 
home) in order to make way for others, although those evacuees were still in housing need. 
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The General Manager of Amidar, admitted in an interview that a third of the evacuees 
deserved a housing solution and the lack of units prevented the company from assisting 
them (YNET, October 2010). This provoked residents to stand against Amidar, and its 
level of service and social values were continually criticised by residents and social 
activists. Another sign of the declining influence of Amidar can be seen when assessing its 
list of chairman; in the early years they were leading politicians (including even the Prime 
Minister); today they are assistants or advisors to the housing ministers.  
 
Amigur 
This is the second largest housing company in Israel and the largest management company 
providing housing for the elderly (illustration 7.9). The company was established in 1972 
and is owned jointly by the state and the Jewish Agency. Currently Amigur manage 22,000 
housing units, 13,500 of which are council housing units which are home to 60,000 
residents. The average monthly rent is 280 NIS (around £56). In addition the company 
manages 6000 units, 1600 of which were built recently, for the elderly (the vast majority 
are new immigrants from the former USSR), with a waiting list of over 20,000. Amigur 
also managed the temporary housing estates for the evacuees from Gaza; 1000 units in 4 
locations in the south of Israel, the main one being Nitzan (illustration 7.44). On its 
website Amigur claims that their goals are not only to maintain the housing units but also 
to be responsible for the social conditions and welfare of its residents. Amigur also 
transformed two of its centres in Sderot and in Tzefat into students’ dormitories, offering 
students units for a lower rent in return for volunteer work in support of social activities in 
their communities (illustration 7.45). Amigur joined the RTB separately, after the 
government signed an agreement with the Jewish Agency to compensate them for losses in 
the market value of sold properties. Since 1999 Amigur has sold 10,000 units and the 
income channelled into the Jewish Agency. 
 
Prazot 
This is a housing company that was active in Jerusalem (illustration 7.10). It was 
established in 1961 jointly by the government and the Jerusalem municipality. After the 
selling of many units during RTB, Parzot become non-profitable and in 2008 the 
government suggested closing the company and transferring its properties to Amidar and 
Amigur (both have properties in Jerusalem as well). Objections from MPs delayed the 
proposal, yet continuing losses convinced officials in 2012 to terminate Prazot’s operation 
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and transfer its properties and responsibilities to the Jerusalem Municipality. In 2008 the 
company managed around 1,500 units (Feldman, 2011). 
 
Halamish 
The company was established in 1961 and is owned by the government and the Tel Aviv 
municipality (illustration 7.11).  
 The company was responsible for the D&R project in Kfar Shalem and managed 
properties in 5 of Tel Aviv-Jaffa neighbourhoods, the majority in the south of the city. 
Halamish submitted planning requests to build a new site with 300 units in Tel Aviv.  
 In 2011 Halmish introduced ‘Gallery’ — a project offering residents of council 
housing units a chance to express their interest in art and to present their work with the 
support of the housing company. In 2008 managed around 1,500 units (Feldman, 2011). 
 
Shikmona 
The company was established in 1961, along with the other regional companies, and was 
responsible for the city of Haifa in the north (illustration 7.12). Until 1971 it focused 
mainly on demolishing houses (a total of 4,600 units) deemed unfit for occupation (Vadi 
Saliv was one of these areas). From 1972 it also provided housing solutions, operated 
Neighbourhood Renewal in the city, provided services for housing projects for the 
municipality and other sites including student dormitories. Currently the company manages 
a total of 2,779 units
52
. 
 
Heled 
The company was established in 1961 with the other regional companies with 
responsibilities over the city of Petach Tikva in central Israel (illustration 7.13), owned 
jointly by the state and the Municipality. The company manage the publically funded units 
in the city, responsible for NRP and requests for housing support
53
. Currently managed 
around 1000 units (Feldman 2011) 
 
Afridar 
The company was established, along with the other regional companies, in 1961 with 
responsibilities over the city of Ashkelon in southern Israel (illustration 7.14). The 
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 http://www.shikmona.co.il/ 
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company manages the publicly-funded units in the city and is responsible for NRP and 
requests for housing support. It currently manages a few hundred units. 
 
7.3.2 The Case-Study Neighbourhoods: A Brief Introduction 
The section below includes a brief description of case study neighbourhoods: 
 
Katamonim / Pat – Jerusalem – neighbourhood details in chapter 6. 
 
Eir Ganim Jerusalem – neighbourhood details in chapter 6. 
 
Kiryat Moshe in Rehovot – neighbourhood details in chapter 6. 
 
Ramat Sharet Jerusalem 
The neighbourhood is located in western Jerusalem (illustration 7.15). In 2013 there were 
9,567 residents, the majority religious. From 2003 a wave of non-religious new immigrants 
from France moved in following by a wave of ultra-Orthodox residents in 2008 which 
caused tension between the groups on the cultural environment of the neighbourhood 
(http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/) 
 
Derech Lod / Hatikva – Tel Aviv  
This is the name of the main road (461) that links two main highways, a main highway and 
the cities of Tel Aviv with Lod (illustration 7.16). The area is crowded with council 
housing units managed by Halamish which was also the centre of residents’ organisation 
for RTB in Tel Aviv. 
 
Tel Kabir / Neve Ofer – Tel Aviv  
Built in the 1960s, in 1977 it changed its name from Tel Kabit to Neve Ofer. It is located in 
southern Tel Aviv on the border with the city of Holon (illustration 7.17). Most residents 
are elderly or new immigrants who supported the social care system, including housing. A 
new community centre has been built with support from the Jewish community in Mexico, 
which provides training courses for residents. 
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Neve Sharet – Tel Aviv 
This is located in the northern part of Tel Aviv and hosts around 8,000 residents, many of 
whom live in publicly-funded housing estates managed by Halamish. In the 1950s and ’60s 
it took on many new immigrants, causing social tensions to grow between groups of 
residents. This was compounded in the 1970s by a group of ultra-Orthodox residents. 
During the 1980s the neighbourhood was included in the NRP and in the 1990s hosted new 
immigrants from the former USSR. It the poorest neighbourhood in the affluent part of 
Northern Tel Aviv (illustration 7.18).  
 
Lod  
This is a city with a mixed population of Jews and Arabs (Muslim and Christian), located 
in central Israel near Ben Gurion Airport (illustration 7.19). It was originally an Arab 
village and after the establishment of the Israeli State hosted residents from nearby 
Ma’abarot. The city has around 70,000 residents, 70% Jews, 22% Arab Muslim, 2% Arab 
Christian and 7% other (mainly Bedwins). The Arab population is rapidly growing. Lod 
has one of the highest anti-social behaviour rates in the country and is known as a centre 
for drug dealers. The city has three main neighbourhoods, one for Arabs one for Jews and 
a new neighbourhood with many new immigrants, mainly from the former USSR. 
 
Shaviv / Yad Hatisha 
This is a neighbourhood in Hertzeliya, one of the wealthiest cities in Israel (illustration 
7.20). Shaviv is a publicly-funded estate in Eastern Hertzeliya, the only non-affluent 
neighbourhood in the city. Estates were built in the late 1950s and the beginning of 1960s 
to host many new immigrants arriving mainly from North Africa. The neighbourhoods 
continued to host new immigrants up until the 1990s and known for its poverty, 
unemployment and high levels of criminality, but also . home to some regeneration and 
social activist groups (such as Tikun group),
54
 The Mayor of Hertzeliya was the first to set 
up an office operated and funded by the municipality to support residents during the RTB 
programme. The manager of this unit has participated in this research as well as residents 
from Shaviv.  
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Rova Daled, Hei and Vav (Hebrew for D,E,F) in Ashdod 
This is a city on the shore of the Mediterranean sea in the south of Israel (illustration 7.21). 
Ashdod is the fourth largest city in Israel and its fastest growing city. It has a mixture of 
‘old’ immigrants who arrived from North Africa in the 1960s. There is also a growing 
ultra-Orthodox Jewish community and a large community of new immigrants arriving 
from the former USSR. This city hosts a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and diverse religious 
population with new neighbourhoods alongside old ones and with local residents’ groups. 
Residents of the case studies were active during the RTB legislation and their leader 
participated in this research. 
 
Petach Tikva 
This is another growing city in the Sharon (central-north of Israel, illustration 7.22). It 
comes mid-range on the socio-economic scale, and includes a mixture of religious 
neighbourhoods, old immigrants (mostly from Yaman) and an increasing presence of new 
immigrants from the former USSR. The city has the greatest number of housing estates for 
the elderly community from the former USSR.  
 
Yoseftal 
This is a neighbourhood in Kfar Saba, a city in the Sharon (north-east of the centre, 
illustration 7.23). It is medium sized with a population of middle class young families. It is 
ranked high on the socio-economic ladder but still has one neighbourhood with a large 
proportion of publicly funded housing estates. The neighbourhood was established in 1962 
as a house to new immigrants mainly from Africa and was known for its poverty and 
unemployment.  
 
Kfar Maker (Jdeda-Maker) 
This is an Arab village near the city of Ako (illustration 7.24) which was formed in 1990. 
In 2010 there were 18,574 residents in the village with 2.2% growth per year.
55
 The village 
is ranked 9th on the Israeli socio-economic scale (one before the poorest); income per 
person is 60% below the national average and only 57% finish their mandatory school 
exams (A level). 91.3% of residents are Muslim and 8.7% are Christian. This is the only 
Arab village with a council housing estate in Israel and it is managed by Amidar. 
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Kiryat Arba  
This is a new settlement east of the Palestinian city of Hebron and is the urban centre of all 
settlements in the area (illustration 7.25). The settlement was established in 1971 by the 
military regime and became a municipal authority in 1981. In 2010 there were 7248 
residents with 1.4% population growth.
56
 The municipality is in the 8
th
 socio-economic 
category (2 before the poorest); income per person is 60% less than the national average 
(which in 2013 was 9,159 NIS).
57
 It is also comes low down in the education rates (only 
63.2% of pupils complete their studies). The majority of residents are religious Jews. There 
is a council housing estate in the municipality managed by Amidar which is not popular 
both for ideological reasons (some do not want to relocate to a community which is outside 
the Israeli State’s official borders and surrounded by a Palestinian majority), and 
geographical-economic reasons (some do not wish to relocate far from the centre of the 
country and its employment opportunities). The local community offers units to young 
ideological activists who live in the community.  
 
7.4 Research and Data Analysis 
The data presented herewith was collected from participants involved in the RTB, both 
residents and non-residents, and includes the main issues surrounding empowerment: 
resident participation, long-term participation, public policy, training and education 
schemes, satisfaction, social unrest and even programme-specific issues such as the 
Amigur dispute and the rules for residents living in other publicly-funded housing units 
outside poor neighbourhoods.  
 
7.4.1. Residents’ Participation 
Table 16 presents a summary of interviewees’ responses with regard to residents’ 
participation in the RTB, measured by the Ladder of Participation. The ladder consists of 
the following steps: Manipulation (0), Information (1), Consultation (2), Partnership (3), 
Control (4). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56
 Israeli Bureau of Statistics. 
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Table 16: Residents’ participation in the ‘Right to Buy’ 
Level of Participation 0 1 2 3 4 9 Total
58
 
Residents 
 leaders 
 moderate 
participants 
 random 
3 
0 
2 
1 
18 
4 
3 
11 
13 
4 
7 
2 
14 
8 
3 
3 
4 
2 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
53 
18 
17 
18 
Non-residents 
 informers 
 implementers 
 decision-makers 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 
2 
6 
0 
14 
9 
3 
2 
9 
7 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
5 
2 
3 
0 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source: Israeli RTB survey – Guy Doron, 2005–09  
 
Overall, residents’ responses show that they evaluated their participation as moderate. 
Although the most common response (30%) was of a low level of information, overall, the 
majority of leaders 43% grading their involvement at the ‘partnership’ level, leaders noted 
higher levels of participation since their involvement in the design of the RTB was indeed 
higher than others. Many among the random sample were unaware of the legislation 
process.  
 Non-residents, however, evaluated resident influence slightly higher and set it at 
consultation level. In fact, non-residents deemed the influence and effective lobbying of 
residents as pivotal to the RTB legislation. This higher rating of residents’ contribution 
comes more from informers/supporters, as they cooperated with residents during the 
legislation and could closely evaluate and appraise their contribution. Others, such as 
implementers, who hardly cooperated with residents, did not deny residents’ participation 
but doubted its influence. Overall, non-residents assessed residents’ participation slightly 
higher than residents themselves, which refers explicitly to the independent platform 
residents mounted and occupied during the RTB, more than any other social programme.  
 Residents were so keen to act and persist with their attempts that even when their 
initial approach was denied, they kept pushing to influence the legislative process: 
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 N/A: Residents – 1; Leaders – 0; Moderate Participants; – 0; Random – 1; Non-residents –5; 
Informers – 2; Implementers 3; Decision-Makers – 0.   
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In some cases, residents had to pull rank and initiated their own activities to 
influence management: although officials preferred we didn’t take part, we 
insisted on being involved, regrouped, contacted exterior and independent 
experts and together with them acted. (Solomon) 
 
Residents believed they are more capable of taking managerial tasks than the previous 
generation and the RTB is a proof for that:  
 
The next generation of residents are now skilled and educated enough to 
handle management, surely better than Amidar’s officials, who show up 
only once in two years. (Yashar). 
 
Yet the bad stigma council estates gained (illustration 35) affected the chances for 
governments to allow participation and residents needed to work twice as hard to prove 
they can: 
 
Residents are capable of carrying out self-managerial positions; however, 
when a neighbourhood is stigmatised as disadvantaged, no one will allocate 
managerial positions to residents, so the stigma wins over individuals’ 
capabilities. (Awadat, Amer) 
 
 
 
35. Public housing estate under bad management. Source: http://www.magazin.org.il/ 
inner.asp?page=212890 
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In conclusion, residents considered themselves capable of being involved in deciding 
their future and in shaping legislation related to their housing conditions. Indeed, they 
played a major role in the RTB enactment process when allowed and even when not 
allowed.  
 The vast majority of non-residents agreed that residents were capable of positively 
influencing the legislation process and highlighted the substantial contribution residents 
made when they were given a chance to do so by MPs. The overall opinion, however, was 
that resident participation should be monitored and guided.  
 Academics (illustration 7.26) and other experts (illustration 7.27) who observed 
residents during the legislation of the RTB, noted their knowledge and familiarity with 
local issues and agreed that they showed sufficient competence to exercise responsibility 
over project management: “The most important value shaping participative democracy is 
arguably that people know better what is good for them and are better off when they have 
choices” (Dahan, Weintrob). 
 The RTB experience demonstrated that when residents were allowed to participate 
their responsibility increased and thus their commitment to create a change: “We have 
noticed that when responsibility is delivered to residents through management tasks, their 
attitude inevitably transforms to be more committed and satisfied” (Nuri). 
 Participation builds trust and when residents were allowed to participate 
they showed a desire to improve their conditions: 
 
Many of them expressed their willingness to participate while talking to our 
staff. While the project was managed by the government, residents were 
totally apathetic, but this has changed since we allowed them to develop 
programmes or to take part in local initiatives. (Ilani) 
 
One decision-maker (see illustration 6.35) argued that residents’ experience gave 
them an edge when discussing the fine print of the legislation and the need to plan 
budgets: “Poor people are the most suitable for planning budgets in duress 
conditions. If she couldn’t plan her expenses properly, a single mother would not 
survive” (Guzanski). 
 Senior officials (illustration 7.28) in the Housing Ministry indicated that if 
residents are actively united they can act as a pressure group to promote legislations 
that are important for them:  
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When democratic requirements are met, elected representatives work hard 
to gain residents’ support again and to earn themselves another term in 
charge and, therefore, create the best for their fellow residents. However, all 
the budgetary aspects, as well as management decisions, need to be under 
close supervision. (Schwartz, Miara) 
 
To conclude, the majority of non-resident respondents agreed that residents proved their 
ability to make a valuable contribution during the RTB legislation process, that 
participation increases responsibility, commitment and trust and, where allowed, generates 
success. Nevertheless, governments did not encourage participation during the RTB.  
 
7.4.2 Long-term Involvement  
One of the most important factors of participation in successful empowerment is continuity 
— i.e., the extent to which residents maintain and develop their participation. In relation to 
social policies participants argue that real empowerment is where projects should ideally 
continue to take effect in neighbourhoods, while control is progressively handed to local 
residents who eventually take over from officials and run projects on their own. The 
following section presents results about the continuity of residents’ activism as a corollary 
of the RTB.  
 The following table presents a summary of participants’ assessment of the 
continuity and long term impact of residents’ participation following the RTB.   
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Table 17: Continuity of activism and involvement in the RTB  
Changes in participation 
levels over time 
Still 
highly 
active 
From 
highly 
active to 
moderately 
active 
From 
highly 
active to 
not 
active 
From 
moderately 
active to 
not active 
Never 
active 
 
Total
59
 
Residents 
 leaders 
 moderate 
participants 
 random 
11 
5 
3 
3 
4 
2 
2 
0 
9 
5 
4 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
5 
0 
0 
5 
30 
12 
10 
8 
Non-residents 
 informers/supporters 
 implementers 
 decision-makers 
14 
9 
3 
2 
5 
4 
0 
1 
5 
3 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
24 
16 
5 
3 
Source: Israeli RTB survey - Guy Doron, 2005–09  
 
A third of residents (36.7%) stated that they are still highly involved in social and 
community activity; another third (30%) said that they were significantly involved during 
the legislation process, but that their activity waned when the legislation was passed. These 
results can be interpreted in relation to success rates or personal achievements. Those who 
were more enthusiastic and encouraged by their contribution, or achieved personal 
progress in spite of government resistance, continue their activism, while those who were 
more disappointed by the government’s negative attitude withdrew their participation. This 
table also indicates that the RTB is no longer a ‘live’ issue but rather a programme that 
concessive governments managed to bury. 
 For some, success in spite of the negative environment created a desire to continue, 
while for others, the aggravation and nuisance of fighting powerful bodies for respect and 
consent proved too much. Among the latter group, those who managed to buy their home 
after they had won their personal battle, felt they had had enough and withdrew their 
participation. Those who failed in their private efforts became more indifferent than 
previously. Some residents, especially leaders, emphasised that the time spent and stress 
experienced as a result of their activities created chaos in their personal lives and that the 
pressure became unbearable. Therefore, when these voluntary activities started to impact 
on their work performance and jeopardised their ability to hold on to their jobs, they had to 
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 N/A: Residents – 13; Leaders – 6; Moderate Participants – 7; Random – 10; Non-residents –
13; Informers – 5; Implementers – 8; Decision Makers – 0.   
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relinquish their community activism. Some stated that the pressure from other members of 
the community, who had made unsuccessful attempts to purchase their homes, was hard to 
take and after feeling they could no longer serve the community and get the expected 
results, they decided to withdraw from the public arena.  
 The majority (58.3%) of non-residents are still highly involved in social policy 
either as governmental employees or as social activists; the rest have either reduced or 
ended their involvement. Once the RTB legislation was passed, the need to promote the 
bill ended and, as a result, some of those who did not hold an official role ended their 
involvement. 
 Overall, results show that more of the involved participants reduced or ended their 
participation rather than continued to be involved. This is an indication that empowerment 
had not yet become completely rooted as some activists indicated (illustrations 7.29 & 
7.30): 
 
Unfortunately, the experience of the RTB is not consistent and is yet to have 
continuity. Long-term planning and community perceptions are still in short 
supply, and government’s formal attitude is less concerned about involving 
residents than it should be. (Epstein, Wharton, Danon) 
 
Participation is only one aspect in the greater empowerment context. In order for 
real empowerment to flourish public policy matters, authorities should accept, 
support and promote that participation. The next sections discuss the impact of 
public policy on empowerment during the RTB. 
  
7.4.3 Public Policy towards Resident Involvement in the RTB 
In order to assess the extent and type of public policy or government support of resident 
participation during the RTB, residents were asked to categorise its scope. In order to 
provide a comprehensive picture, non-residents also evaluated this factor. The 
measurement tool used to assess and compare public policy was a simple negative-to-
positive scale. Participants, however, further categorised government support into two 
more median stages (moderate support and high support).The following table presents a 
summary of participants’ assessment of public policy towards residents’ participation. 
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Table 18: Government attitude towards residents’ involvement  
 Negative Moderate 
Support 
Supportive Very 
Supportive 
Total 
Residents 
 leaders 
 moderate participants 
 random 
43 
16 
16 
11 
7 
2 
0 
5 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
53 
18 
17 
18 
Non-residents 
 informers/supporters 
 implementers 
 decision-making 
25 
17 
5 
3 
5 
2 
3 
0 
2 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source: Israeli RTB survey - Guy Doron, 2005–0960 
 
Residents’ responses show that, overall, the majority observed negative public policy 
towards their participation. The results were replicated across all residents. These results 
have further significance in that all participants, both residents and non-residents, 
acknowledged residents’ influence over the creation and wording of the RTB legislation. 
All agree that their participation was critical in terms of making the bill law, their 
contribution was highly appreciated by MPs, motivated and supported by external experts 
and NGOs, and yet completely denied by governmental bodies. The fact that residents 
managed to influence legislation in spite of the government’s negative attitude reinforces 
the view that they can make a significant contribution and reinforce demands that they take 
a greater share in decision making in the future. 
 One focal factor associated with public policy is provision of tools to improve 
resident participation, the most known tool is training and education schemes. The next 
section elaborates more on that. 
 
7.4.4 Training and Education Schemes  
Training and education schemes came up in most of the interviews and were generally 
described as a fundamental tool to improve residents’ participation and performance. Many 
believe it is the duty of the authorities to provide these courses in order to encourage 
residents to participate, and for their participation to be effective. One of the key factors in 
assessing government support of resident empowerment is the provision of adequate 
training schemes (illustration 36).   
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 N/A: Residents – 2; Leaders – 0; Moderate Participants – 0; Random – 2; Non-residents – 4; 
Informers/Supporters – 2; Implementers – 2; Decision-makers – 0. 
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36. NGO offers training to residents. This is a course on managing a budget, delivered to 
residents by the NGO Yadid in the city of Zfat.  
Source: http://www.zefatcenter.co.il/content.php?id=26 
 
 The vast majority of residents agreed that training and education schemes are 
extremely important. They enrich their knowledge and nurture their skills and build up 
their confidence, empowering them to contribute to their communities:  
 
Training can serve as a springboard motion for residents to shift to better 
employment and community roles. Not only would these improve 
conditions, but they would also give residents hope in their ability to make a 
change. (Awadat, Zidan) 
 
If you want to push many among the disadvantaged population to gain 
managerial skills, and get involved, these schemes are essential as they help 
residents to overcome the knowledge they lack. ( Bat Chava) 
 
There was no doubt as to residents’ skills since, even without training, residents played a 
vital role in changing the public’s mind regarding the RTB legislation. It was nevertheless 
assumed that residents sometimes needed guidance as to the right direction to take. 
Leaders (illustrations 7.31 & 7.32) were first to acknowledge that they needed more 
guidance in order to achieve better managerial results:  
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Even skilful residents need not only support, but also professional 
supervision in order to direct their potential in the right path and gain 
success in management. (Nadler, Vasana, Kashani) 
 
 Residents hoped and expected training schemes to be available as part of social 
services provided by state institutions like the housing companies, but this was not the 
case:  
 
The housing company has no awareness of the importance of such courses. 
Officials are narrow-minded and focused only on doing the minimum 
required from their role and that’s about it. (Awadat, Chalfus, Zidan, 
Vazana) 
 
We believe such training should be provided by the community centres, but 
in poor neighbourhoods, social and community services are also very poor 
and thus training were only a dream. (Drix, Yashar) (illustration 7.33) 
 
Since residents believed that training and education schemes are fundamental for progress 
towards influential roles in management, and since formal authorities did not deliver these 
schemes, residents decided, at times with the cooperation of external bodies, to conduct 
their own courses in their communities:  
 
With proper training we could gain more influence over projects, yet this 
has never been offered by any governmental body, therefore we have 
designed courses ourselves with support from NGOs. (Ezov, Zazon, 
Kashani) 
 
These courses were generally felt to have been successful: “Empowerment courses to build 
up local leadership were operated by external experts. They gave us a tremendous lift and 
helped us to empower ourselves” (Solomon, Hajaj). 
 To sum up, residents considered training and education schemes to be important. In 
most cases, the government did not provide these schemes; the few courses available were 
organised by external experts or NGOs. In these cases, residents’ responses were good, and 
the impact of the schemes was positive.  
 The majority of non-residents also assessed training and education schemes as an 
important empowerment tool:  
 
During the legislation of the ‘Right to Buy,’ residents were involved in 
operational bodies, thanks mainly to courses that helped residents, and 
especially the next generation to participate effectively and to influence the 
building up of their community. (Weintrob, Dahan) 
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Decision-makers also seemed to agree on the importance of these courses: “Training 
schemes are an excellent empowering tool. Not only are residents given something back, 
but it’s also their ticket for equal citizenship” (Cohen). 
 Social activists (illustration 7.34), who were involved in providing such courses to 
residents, still believe that it is the government’s duty to provide them:  
 
We believe that it is a state’s obligation to provide residents with 
professional assistance and knowledge to gain such capabilities and to allow 
more opportunities to take part in decision making. (Epstein, Wharton, 
Atias). 
 
In fact, wherever training and education schemes were provided, respondents who were 
involved with such courses commented on the significance of their contribution:  
 
The whole idea our organisation follows is to facilitate disadvantaged 
populations with empowerment practice. I’m fully confident in residents’ 
abilities to control processes. We are working hard in that field and the 
results of our schemes provide us with the assuredness that with the right 
approach this is more than possible. (Epstein, Nuri)  
 
Non-residents also confirmed that the majority of courses were not provided by the 
government. NGOs were very active in supporting residents with such schemes and there 
were also some local municipalities that joined forces with external experts to deliver such 
courses:  
 
It was up to the housing companies to provide budgets and resources for 
that, but they didn’t; the Housing Ministry failed to a great extent by 
missing that. (Danon, Wharton, Atias).  
 
 When the government was absent from the training support arena, other 
organisations had to step in: 
 
We have organised residents’ activities to cover the gap the authorities have 
left in that area and it has had a huge impact on the community. In residents’ 
views, we are considered a positive body and, thus, have their cooperation. 
(Ilani) 
 
Senior implementers from the Housing Ministry (see illustration 5.9) and Amidar insisted 
that a variety of courses were available, but agreed that provision was insufficient:  
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There were some courses operated by Amidar in the past, but these are not 
courses aimed at educating residents to run their projects or empower them; 
it’s definitely not up to that level. The idea of residents’ managements in 
Israel is yet to be realised. The common belief is that residents shouldn’t be 
trusted for such tasks. (Pialkoff, Swhartz, Miara) 
 
Amongst decision-makers, there was an agreement that courses were unavailable or 
insufficient:  
 
No training schemes were conducted. The departure point of governmental 
attitude is that poverty is caused by the individual and not by the system 
and, therefore, the individual should find their way out. (Guzanski) 
 
Courses were operated, but not in order to develop managerial qualifications 
among residents for them to run their own projects, but in order to 
encourage them to be more involved in community activity. (Edelstein, 
illustration 7.35) 
 
To conclude, the majority of non-residents who participated in RTB agreed that to increase 
residents’ empowerment, training and education schemes were essential, yet they were 
rarely delivered by government bodies. Whenever they were conducted by external experts 
or NGOs, the results were positive. Even given the assumption that good courses are 
difficult to run and that it is not credible that all training is indeed life-changing, most 
residents were enthusiastic about participating in what was offered, and absenteeism was 
very low.  
 In order to assess what residents really felt about public policy towards 
participation, we asked them to measure their overall levels of satisfaction with the RTB 
programme and also their satisfaction with their share in it. The results are in the next 
section. 
  
7.4.5 Satisfaction  
Another key factor in assessing public policy is residents’ satisfaction. Participants 
assessed their overall satisfaction with housing policy and the RTB in general (table 19) 
and with their role in it (table 20). In brief, residents were satisfied with their role in the 
programme but at the same time frustrated with its outcome. Non-residents’ views were 
slightly different; they were more satisfied with the social implications of the programme 
than with residents’ influence on it.  
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 The table below offers a summary of views presented by participants in regard to 
their satisfaction with the RTB and its impact on social housing policy in Israel. The 
results are presented on a satisfied / not satisfied scale. 
 
Table 19: Levels of satisfaction with the RTB programme and its impact on social 
housing policy  
Satisfaction Levels Satisfied Dissatisfied Total
61
 
Residents 
 leaders 
 moderate participants 
 random 
15 
9 
4 
2 
15 
3 
6 
6 
30 
12 
10 
8 
Non-residents 
 informers 
 implementers 
 decision-makers 
14 
8 
4 
2 
10 
8 
1 
1 
24 
16 
5 
3 
Source: Israeli RTB survey - Guy Doron, 2005–09  
 
While non-residents considered RTB outcomes satisfactory, residents were less satisfied 
with the social ramifications of RTB. One reason for this could relate to the fact that the 
law was only partially implemented, leaving many unable to purchase their units, causing 
widespread dissatisfaction. It could also be related to the long dispute that brought 
residents and authorities in conflict with each other over a long period of time, which left a 
negative legacy. However, the majority of leaders presented more satisfied views, probably 
because they were more involved in the process and had had some level of influence over 
it. 
 Non-residents were generally satisfied with RTB outcomes. Most of the dissatisfied 
responses came from members of the informers/supporters group, while implementers and 
decision-makers presented greater satisfaction with the social impact of the programme. 
Members of the informers/supporters group cooperated with residents and, thus, shared 
their dissatisfaction and disappointment with the unsupportive public policy and the long 
dispute. In contrast, implementers, who were responsible for the daily operation of the 
programme, focused more on the satisfaction of those that managed to purchase their 
homes, believed that under the circumstances, the RTB has fulfilled its mission.  
                                                 
61
 N/A: Residents – 13; Leaders – 6; Moderate Participants – 7; Random – 10; Non-residents –
13; Informers – 5, Implementers – 8, Decision Makers – 0.   
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 The table below offers a summary of views regarding the level of satisfaction with 
resident participation in the RTB. 
 
Table 20: Satisfaction from residents participation in the RTB 
Satisfaction Levels Satisfied Dissatisfied Total
62
 
Residents 
 leaders 
 moderate participants 
 random 
20 
10 
4 
6 
10 
2 
6 
2 
30 
12 
10 
8 
Non-residents 
 informers 
 implementers 
 decision makers 
16 
12 
1 
3 
8 
4 
4 
0 
24 
16 
5 
3 
Source: Israeli RTB survey - Guy Doron, 2005–09  
 
When assessing residents’ satisfaction with their participation in the RTB, results 
acknowledge higher satisfaction rates than satisfaction with the programme itself. Note 
that leaders’ results were of high satisfaction, mainly because of their active role in 
drafting and promoting the bill, while the less-involved residents were less satisfied. 
 The majority of non-resident respondents corroborated the residents’ views and felt 
that levels of resident participation had been ‘satisfactory’. Again, informers/supporters, 
who were involved in residents’ activities and closely observed their performance, were 
more satisfied than decision-makers. Implementers were generally less pleased with the 
role residents’ had. 
 The overriding response from residents was that they were satisfied with their 
participation in the RTB and the process they had initiated, but dissatisfied with the 
negative government attitude towards their involvement: 
 
I’m satisfied with our role in the RTB. We have proved what we are capable 
of achieving when united, and passing a law while the government is 
opposed to it is a great achievement, unfortunately though this participation 
did not last long. (Nadler, Yashar, Zidan, Solomon Hajaj, Zazon, Vazana, 
Kashani, Awadat) 
 
                                                 
62
 N/A Residents – 13; Leaders – 6; Moderate Participants – 7; Random – 10; Non-residents – 
13; Informers – 5; Implementers 8; Decision Makers – 0.   
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Among the non-residents, informers/supporters held similar views to residents. They were 
impressed by the residents’ influence, though not by public policy towards their 
participation:  
 
Thanks to residents activities more than 17,000 tenants have managed to 
buy their homes. Most evictions were prevented, services and maintenance 
improved, which is very satisfactory. Still, the RTB as a constitutional law 
was never implemented in full, the government’s attitude towards resident 
needs was insufficient, and officials were not very supportive. (Dahan, Nuri, 
Atias) 
 
The RTB is one of the most successful examples we have for residents’ 
participation. Residents managed to gain responsibility over decisions 
affecting them and directed policy to the way that benefited them most. 
(Epstein, Wharton, Danon, Chishin (see illustration 6.39) 
 
Decision-makers were also impressed with the residents’ contribution:  
 
25,000 families turned into owners and independent from housing support, 
which is, on its own, a great achievement. Those residents have earned 
economic stability and, importantly, are more proud citizens now. The RTB 
process lifted their confidence and will be remembered as a phenomenal 
democratic change written in their names, which proves again that 
togetherness and desire can win a fight for any group. (Cohen, Guzanski)  
 
Implementers appreciated residents’ focal role in initiating the RTB, but believed that this 
participation had not been sustained and had had little influence:  
 
The RTB gave a boost to housing issues and needs. It happened mainly 
because of residents’ output, their display during the Knesset discussion and 
the PR they made for their issue, which was a top lobbying performance. 
Still, their influence was limited and has not last long. Residents were easy 
to give up. (Pialkoff, Ilani) 
 
To conclude, residents were more satisfied with the role they had during the RTB, mainly 
because of cooperation with MPs and their influence on the legislation, and were less 
pleased with the unsupportive public policy towards their participation. Non-residents, 
however, were more pleased with the RTB’s social impact than with the residents’ input.  
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7.4.6 Protest and Social Unrest  
One of the main features synonymous with satisfaction or actual dissatisfaction is protest 
and demonstrations. Demonstrations and protests were organised by residents to promote 
the RTB, to generate enough support among MPs and to overcome the government’s 
objections to the legislation. At the same time, demonstrations were also to show 
dissatisfaction with the programme. In terms of empowerment, these demonstrations are 
important because residents managed to collaborate in order to better their social 
conditions and social status, raise awareness, which assured them of their capacity to drive 
social and civic change, and symbolised empowerment as a real possibility. They also 
helped residents to achieve positive public relations and media coverage which, in turn, 
impacted on policy making (illustration 37). 
 
 
37. Residents protest outside the offices of the public housing company, Halamish, in Tel 
Aviv, against the lack of housing solutions for poor residents. Their leader, Reuven Aberjel, 
is speaking. Source: http://www.blacklabor.org/?p=28426 
 
 The majority of those who participated in the demonstrations confirmed that they 
had an active role in organising protests and that they were joined by their supporters: 
academics, social workers, social and political activists, and NGOs. Nevertheless, opinions 
on the impact of these protests vary. Residents believe the protests put pressure on officials 
in regard to the programme (illustration 38). Among non-residents, views were diverse. 
While informers and decision-makers agreed that demonstrations had a predominant role 
in turning the RTB into a reality, implementers dismissed their impact.  
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38. Residents protesting in front of Amidar offices across the country demanding RTB 
implementation. Source: http://diortzibury.wordpress.com 
 
 Many residents observed that their active participation in protests led to major 
achievements, the most decisive of which was bringing down the objection to the RTB. To 
many, the demonstrations were the main factor that created the shift in public policy 
towards the RTB legislation:  
 
The influence of demonstrations was enormous, as we forced political 
change and supported those who had committed to enact the RTB to come 
into power. Consequently, a government Act was introduced and this was, 
in many ways, a result of our protests. (Drix, Awadat) 
 
After politicians were exposed to our protests and confirmed the support we 
had from the public, their opinions towards the legislation changed and they 
voted in favour of the law. (Kashani) 
 
Another important positive factor was that demonstrations promoted community 
consolidation, unity and cohesion as community act together to publicly voice their 
dissatisfaction. Additionally, the RTB protests were the first time after long spell (since the 
D&R protests during the 1960s) that groups of residents got together to campaign against 
lack of housing solution for those in needs:  
 
It gave us the opportunity to speak up publicly; it was also crucial in 
bringing the subject to the public. Protests, operated on a weekly basis, 
mainly in Jerusalem in front of government offices, raised a sense of 
community and commitment among residents. (Ezov, Hajaj) 
 
Some residents who were highly active during protests admitted that the way 
officials responded to demonstrations was disappointing. They hardly considered 
  
243 
the protest as an issue worth attention, although residents were determined to prove 
their arguments. They continued to protest and maintain their resistance even when 
they feared they were wasting their time and that no one would ever listen to them: 
 
The process was long and frustrating and there were times I thought, why 
we are doing this if no one listening anyway? (Ezov) … we were not a 
strong group and thus less effective compared to other groups... still our 
protest help to overturn the dismissal into a law. (Zazon, Vazana; Yashar, 
Bat Chava) 
 
Our main target was to achieve media exposure for the issue and 
demonstrations did exactly that. Not only did we raise the awareness of 
more residents to their rights, but we also raised more support among 
decision makers for the RTB. (Nadler, Solomon) 
 
Many, especially among the informers/supporters, agreed with the majority of residents 
and stressed the positive impact of the demonstrations both on community cohesion and on 
changing public policy:  
 
Residents’ pressure resulted in the implementation of the government Act. 
This was one of their greatest achievements as they understood what was in 
their power to achieve when organised together; they moved up the ladder 
from group to class. (Epstein, Wharton, Nuri, Danon Dahan, Weintrob, 
Atias) 
 
Decision-makers also agreed that the protests contributed to the social change RTB 
brought about:  
 
Residents’ lobbying and activities had a huge effect on public opinion. They 
managed to create an atmosphere of social failure within their 
neighbourhoods, which highlighted the need for the legislation. (Cohen, 
Edelstein) Protests are an establishing stage that determines protesters 
identity and directs their personal distress to a political voice. (Guzanski) 
 
By contrast, however, many of the implementers stated that residents’ protests had a 
negative impact and did not change their behaviour. The same feeling was shared by some 
residents who felt that the protests had a minor influence on implementers: 
 
Demonstrations had zero influence, nothing whatsoever. I don’t consider 
them as something that affects policy making (Shwartz, Pialkoff) ... 
normally, protesting outside of the Knesset does not guarantee an immediate 
solution or any solution at all. (Ilani) 
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To conclude, most participants confirmed that protests had a significant impact on shaping 
and furthering residents’ demands and building a strong community response to public 
policy. Many participants also believed that these demonstrations had a major impact on 
changing MPs’ state of mind regarding the legislation. Some other residents and the 
majority of the implementers, though, played down the role of the protests. Their 
observations were that these demonstrations did not make lasting changes to the legislative 
process as only some parts of RTB were enacted.  
 There were other examples of dissatisfaction and those were primarily when 
residents of poor neighbourhoods compared public policy towards the RTB with the public 
policy presented to residents of publicly funded houses elsewhere. The next section 
elaborates on this further. 
 
7.5 Public Policy towards Exceptional ‘Right to Buy’ Cases  
When it comes to investigating public policy during the RTB, interviewees raised two 
additional specific issues that illustrated more clearly their dissatisfaction with the public 
policy as stated by officials. There are those who might suggest that these issues dealt with 
collective good or political implementation, however participants insisted that these issues 
were an example of the different public policy presented to different groups of residents 
derived directly by their level of empowerment. The first was the debate involving 
residents of Amigur and the government’s attempt to prevent its inclusion in 
RTB.(illustrations 7.36 & 7.37) The second relates to the housing rights given to residents 
who live in publicly funded housing built in rural communities, such as Kibbutzim and 
Moshavim (illustration 7.38). The following section discusses these two issues.  
 
7.5.1 The Government of Israel, the Jewish Agency and Amigur 
A principal controversy that figured in residents’ memories of the RTB was the debate 
surrounding the inclusion of units owned by Amigur in the RTB sales. As a joint owner of 
Amigur (together with the state), the Jewish Agency (illustrations 7.39 & 7.40) opposed 
Amigur’s inclusion in the RTB sales unless it was compensated for each unit sold. In the 
absence of such an agreement, the RTB sales started by including units from all companies 
except Amigur. Residents of Amigur properties naturally protested against their exclusion, 
and only the coming elections rushed the government to sign an agreement allowing their 
inclusion in the RTB. The agreement, according to many, was an example of unsupportive 
and un-progressed public policy. Some even called it irresponsible. The agreement met all 
  
245 
of the Jewish Agency’s demands, including full compensation for each unit sold. The most 
disturbing aspect, according to residents, was the exploitation of RTB income to fund this 
agreement instead of creating new housing solutions for those in need as initially targeted. 
(Appendix 6:8 and Appendix 6:9).  
 The majority of residents cite the agreement between the government and Amigur 
as further proof of unsupportive public policy, which was totally against their preferences 
or interests and provided the Jewish Agency with unfair benefits:  
 
The fact that the government signed such an agreement speaks volumes 
about their sensitivity and care of residents’ needs. To waste the income 
from council housing sales which was meant to support the poor in order to 
fund the most affluent organisation probably in the Jewish world, is, in my 
opinion one of the state’s greatest shames. (Nadler, Chalfus, Yashar). 
 
The most distressing issue for residents, therefore, was the fact that the RTB income, 
which was supposed to be reinvested in building new housing solutions, ended up paying 
compensation to an organisation outside Israel that initially donated money to assist Israel 
to build housing solutions for the most in need. One of the recurrent arguments against 
council housing sales in general is that it can wipe out the majority of stock and leave very 
few options for residents in need. Residents therefore insisted that RTB should include a 
section guaranteeing that the income from sales would be directed exclusively to renewing 
the council housing stock. Giving away the income so cheaply and to one of the richest 
organisations in the Jewish world caused a great deal of frustration. Residents felt that it 
showed, once again, officials’ irrelevant decision-making based on preferential treatment 
of the wealthy and of those who had more access to decision-makers: 
 
The contract with the Jewish Agency stated that they would receive full 
compensation from the sales, so all the income from sales has been 
delivered back to the JA abroad, rather to residents’ needs in Israel’s poor 
neighbourhoods, and the JA used this for their own purposes irrelevant to 
housing policy for the disadvantaged. (Kashani, Zazon, Hajaj, Vazana) 
 
Similar views were expressed by non-residents, with the majority declaring the agreement 
unfair and unreasonable:  
 
Financially, this was imprudent, as eventually the whole income has had to 
be transferred to the Jewish community worldwide, while this money was 
intended to be reinvested in housing solutions, refurbishment or the well-
being of residents in need. (Dahan, Epstein) 
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A few informers/supporters suspected that the whole Amigur saga was another indication 
of officials’ dismissive attitude towards the RTB programme and residents of poor 
neighbourhoods:  
 
As the government opposed the RTB, they sought all sorts of systems and 
combinations in order to prevent its implementation. This was one of the 
ways to avoid the implementation of the Act. (Wharton, Chishin, Atias) 
 
Residents were very disappointed, especially when comparing the treatment they 
had received during discussions and the way in which officials treated the JA team 
from the USA:  
  
The Jewish Agency’s representatives came to the Knesset meetings escorted 
by their high-class lawyers, who came specifically from the United States, 
and most of them did not speak Hebrew at all. Looking at the scenario in the 
committee, where the most rich and powerful group, supported by high-
class lawyers and above all government officials, came to debate the poorest 
group — it was very depressing. (Danon) 
 
The harshest criticism was made by the decision-makers, perhaps because they were the 
most active in the Knesset committees and the most vocal against the JA representatives:  
 
This agreement is immoral and illegal. Amigur was always selling units and 
never asked for any compensation for that. This was the first time in the 
Zionist history where the poor residents of Israel funded the wealthy 
communities abroad, when it should be the other way round. This 
agreement is loathsome. (Cohen)  
 
This agreement is a disgrace. I cannot understand the reasons and causes for 
such an agreement to be concluded. If I had held a ministerial position, I 
would never have accepted such an agreement. (Guzanski) 
 
However, there were those among the decision-makers who had a close relationship with 
the Jewish Agency and attempted to offer an explanation, even though they still believed 
the agreement was wrong:  
 
There is some reasonable logic in the claim that the agreement is unfair, and 
I can agree with part of it. Still, the government cannot occupy units which 
are not theirs. Also we must not forget the huge contribution that the Jewish 
congregations around the world have made to the housing market in Israel 
— Amigur in particular. (Edelstein) 
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Implementers’ views are expected to be less correlated with residents, yet some insisted 
that the agreement was simply untenable, and completely against residents’ interests and 
the social interests of the regime:  
 
There is no doubt that this specific agreement with the Jewish Agency is 
outrageous, but the main problem was the initial intention to secure RTB 
revenues to the benefit of the poor by allocating them new housing 
solutions. I was highly doubtful from day one, and I wasn’t wrong. 
(Shwartz, Miara) 
 
Even among those implementers who believed that compensation to the JA was just and 
proper, the fact that it jeopardised RTB income was regarded as a clear mistake. The 
following statement is by H. Pialkoff, who is perhaps the most senior person in the 
Housing Ministry responsible for the council housing stock:  
 
I do think that the agreement with the Jewish Agency is a drain, as it wastes 
the RTB income. Yet, the money paid to the JA is fair compensation for 
their previous investment that was lost in the council-housing market. Those 
units are the JA’s property and were given to the Housing Ministry ‘on 
loan’; we never considered those units as state property. When the RTB was 
enacted, it was right that we buy these flats; otherwise, they wouldn’t go on 
sale. The only unfair issue was that we were obliged to pay the JA from the 
RTB revenue. The treasury office should not have funded the agreement 
with the JA from this trust, but from other sources. (Pialkoff) 
 
To conclude, there was almost a consensus among both residents and non-residents that the 
agreement with the JA over Amigur was signed under pressure and not for the best social 
outcomes. For many residents, this episode demonstrated a lack of government concern for 
poor residents and its bias in public policy towards wealthy and powerful organisations.  
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7.5.2 Housing Rights in Rural Communities  
When discussing the RTB, residents of council housing estates mainly considered the 
treatment of residents of publicly funded houses in rural communities, such as the 
Kibbutzim, the trigger for the RTB. Although housing solutions in both council housing 
estates in poor neighbourhoods and publicly-funded housing communities in the 
Kibbutzim were built, funded and distributed by central government, more or less at the 
same time, services and residents opportunities were at a different level by far. Public 
policy to areas or residents with powerful political influence — like residents of rural 
communities — always seemed better; participants of this research referred to residents of 
rural communities such as the Kibbutzim and Moshavim (villages) as powerful groups 
with considerable influence which were offered better services and government care of 
their housing needs.  
 Housing rights in the Kibbutzim, for example, were consistently compared to those 
in poor neighbourhoods. Distribution of tenures to Kibbutzim residents living in publicly 
funded housing were compared with similar demands by residents of council-housing in 
poor neighbourhoods. Those who initiated the RTB verified that the idea came after 
similar beneficial ruling was offered to residents of rural communities. Residents of the 
Kibbutzim used their strong political lobby to obtain extended housing rights in their 
communities and, furthermore, to put forward The Tenure Rights Legislation for Rural 
Communities, a bill that allowed them to change land-use regulations from agricultural to 
housing and commerce at no cost.  
 This disposition enabled them to extend and improve their housing conditions and 
to pass on their housing rights to their next of kin, whereas the next of kin of residents of 
the council estates were forced to leave properties immediately after their parents died. 
Residents of council housing felt that, like the residents of the Kibbutzim, they deserved to 
be able to buy their properties and bequeath them to the next generation. During the 1990s, 
social activists petitioned the Supreme Court and demanded allowances in terms of 
housing rights similar to those given to residents of the Kibbutzim, and since then the 
different groups have been in competition. Social activists representing the organisation 
that created the petition (illustration 7.41 & 7.42) argue that Kibbutzim benefited with 
better terms than those in poor neighbourhoods, even though in both communities were 
publicly-funded housing (Karif, 2007).  
 To prove claims of favouritism, they cited that the same ILA (Israeli Land 
Authority), which was hostile to housing-right allocations in publicly funded housing 
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estates, simultaneously authorised extensive building rights in the publicly funded housing 
of the Kibbutzim. (Cohen, 2007; Los, 2007). These events inspired council estate residents 
to initiate a similar rule – the RTB. The section below presents participants’ perspectives 
and comparisons regarding public policy towards each of the projects. As an overview, the 
table below represents a very clear indication of the way participants compare between the 
two and notes better treatment of Kibbutzim residents. The vast majority of participants in 
this research, both resident and non-resident, stated that housing rights offered in the 
Kibbutzim were superior to those offered in poor neighbourhoods.. 
Views are categorised under three main headings: 
 
1 – Similar government attitude 
2 – Superior government attitude towards the Kibbutzim that the RTB balance 
3 – Better public policy towards Kibbutzim 
 
Table 21: Participants’ views comparing distribution of housing rights in Kibbutzim 
and in council housing estates in poor neighbourhoods  
Assessments of services 1 2 3 Total 
Residents 
 leaders 
 moderate participants 
 random 
4 
1 
0 
3 
8 
3 
3 
2 
32 
13 
13 
6 
53 
18 
17 
18 
Non-residents 
 informers 
 implementers 
 decision-makers 
8 
5 
3 
0 
5 
3 
2 
0 
20 
10 
7 
3 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source – PhD research – Guy Doron, 2005–09
63
 
 
The majority of residents claimed that publicly funded housing and residents of the 
Kibbutzim were treated better than those in poor neighbourhoods:  
 
They [Kibbutzim] are a small group of residents with a greater share in land 
distribution and housing rights, while we (residents of council housing 
estates in poor neighbourhoods) are a larger group of people with limited 
access to housing and land. (R. Aberjel D. Elimelech , A. Dagan, D. & S. 
Azulai S. Meidani) 
                                                 
63
 N/A: Residents – 9; Leaders – 1; Moderate Participants – 1; Random – 7; Non-residents – 4; 
Informers/Supporters – 3; Implementers – 1; Decision-makers – 0. 
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Take Kibbutz ‘Gaash’ as an example. It was established at around the same 
time as our estate, its residents given free land and their houses getting 
higher in value, while we are law-abiding residents and get evicted. (D. & 
R. Balsi) 
 
Many interviewees, both residents and non-residents, explained that this disparity was 
caused by the Kibbutzim’s developed community activities and intense political lobbying, 
which was perceived as a sign of greater empowerment:  
 
The reason for this was their strong lobby which, consequently, ensured that 
not only were they allocated the land, but they also gained approval to keep 
their housing rights.( G. Golan, Miara) 
 
M. Hamudi, a random interviewee from the Arab village of Kfar Maker, which was 
surrounded by many Kibbutzim noted that “residents of Kibbutzim are always benefited 
more as they have more power and influence over governments then we do” (M. Hamudi). 
 A few resident leaders even mentioned the fact that this unbalanced treatment 
inspired the social activism that led to the creation of the RTB:  
 
When formulating our ‘Right to Buy’ proposal, we adopted the Kibbutzim's 
principles of inheritance rights in housing, which later became one of the 
principal values of our ‘Right to Buy’. (Zazon, Z. Adika) 
 
One leader, who claimed to be the first to initiate the debate, spoke from personal 
experience and testified that the comparison with housing rights distributed in the 
Kibbutzim was the founding stone of the RTB:  
 
It started when the housing company tried to force my eviction. I was 
required to check whether my tenancy was legal and what my rights were. I 
was absolutely confident that I had rights to purchase my flat after my 
parents passed away. One day, I came across an article dealing with 
continuation of housing rights for residents of the Kibbutzim. The theme 
‘continuation rights for the next generation’ caught my attention. I 
wondered how come someone else living in publicly funded house was 
offered a better solution for the same problem I had. This is where the idea 
of the ‘Right to Buy’ act came from. (Vazana) 
 
Residents in poor neighbourhoods wished to be treated the same and realised that only by 
turning into a political power would they be able to influence decisions: 
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The reason for the government to allow residents of the Kibbutzim with 
housing rights that we were denied was their unity that turned into political 
influence. They were small in size but very powerful in influence over 
decision makers. That pushed us to acknowledge that this is the focal point 
which we are missing — power as a group. If we act wisely and get 
together, we will be able to force the government to change the law, as we 
are bigger in size than the Kibbutzim. (Twito [illustration 7.43], Vazana) 
 
This was probably the turning point that pushed residents of publicly funded housing living 
in poor neighbourhoods to fight for similar housing rights that were informally distributed 
in rural communities. 
 Informers/supporters backed residents in poor neighbourhoods and argued that 
there was no justification for the different treatment and that it pushed them to support 
residents of poor neighbourhoods when they began the RTB campaign:  
 
People were very frustrated when they witnessed the partiality which was 
evident against them for no good reason. There were literally two different 
sets of housing rules — one formula for dispossessed residents of their 
homes, while the other allowed residents supplementary privileges and 
further provision in housing terms, although both groups lived in publicly 
funded houses having the same duties and rights. (Dahan; Alalo; Epstein, 
Margalit) 
 
Decision-makers also confirmed that the spirit of the RTB claims surround that debate:  
 
This claim, as it was declared by residents, definitely worked, as one of the 
senior publicists asked me once why did you give free housing rights to 
residents of the Kibbutzim? Having done so, I wondered should we now 
given the council units for free? (Edelstein) 
 
Officials as well, confirmed the biased treatment of the two groups: 
 
Residents of poor neighbourhoods were less favoured than residents of the 
Kibbutzim, who were considered pioneers and were favourite sons of the 
old dominant political and ethnic regime; therefore, they were preferred 
over many political groups and benefited from direct access to decision-
makers. (Miara; Pade) 
 
O. Laufman, who chaired the habitation division of the JA, one of the most powerful 
institutions supporting housing investments in rural communities, tried to explain the 
partiality: 
 
  
252 
Yes, there was an affirmative action for rural and peripheral communities 
and that was the right thing to do. The whole idea of running rural 
peripheral communities is about continuity — i.e., keeping excessive rights 
for the next of kin and second generation in order to tempt them to stay — 
otherwise, why should they? In order to reward those residents living in 
peripheral communities, the government was willing to secure these extra 
rights for their children. (Laufman) 
 
Another senior official justified the better provision of housing rights to residents of the 
Kibbutzim: 
 
I agree that residents of council housing estates in poor neighbourhoods 
were less favoured than those of the Kibbutzim, but at the same time we 
have land constraints and without offering rural communities additional 
benefits, people were not encouraged to relocate. (Shwartz, Dr C. Pialkoff , 
S. Ben Eliahu) 
 
Although the majority of non-residents agreed that government favouritism towards the 
Kibbutzim allowed — and still allows — extensive housing rights, some insisted that 
residents of the council housing within RTB have managed to turn this attitude on its head, 
as their lobbying and social activity have legalised the continuity rights section, while the 
Kibbutzim are still waiting for a similar dispensation: 
 
Tenure rights should be fairly and equally distributed between residents of 
publicly funded housing, rural-area residents got these rights informally, 
while others did not. The idea of the RTB came to correct this injustice and, 
at the end of the day, the RTB legislation passed faster, while the rural land 
bill still stuck in committee channels. (Wharton Nuri, Weintrob; Asheri) 
 
In conclusion, the majority of respondents agreed that public policy towards housing rights 
of residents living in publicly funded housing was much more supportive in the Kibbutzim 
than in poor neighbourhoods. The majority also indicated that such favouritism was a 
consequence of better political links and community activism among the Kibbutzim. Still, 
the exceptional lobbying and community activism of disadvantaged residents during the 
RTB benefited them, in the end, with almost similar, and in some cases, better results.  
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7.6 Conclusion 
An important point that arose from this research is that, without the committed 
participation of residents, social programme were doomed to fail. The Right to Buy 
appears to give evidence that supports the main hypothesis of this research that resident 
involvement in decision-making can contribute to successful management of housing 
programmes. Although there are those who argue that nothing in the RTB was managed 
because residents were not directly involved in housing management, residents claim that 
their involvement and its impact triggered the RTB which has been the most 
unprecedented social and housing achievement – when legislated - in Israeli history. There 
are views that support each argument. However there is no doubt that residents have 
managed the registration process which in some circumstances could be considered as 
even harder than managing the housing estate.     
 With regard to public policy, the second main factors defining empowerment, 
interviews revealed that in the RTB, the influence residents asserted was in spite of rather 
than because of public policy. That is to say, any discussion of the RTB, whether in terms 
of parliamentary law or governmental solutions, is now inextricably linked with residents’ 
fight for their rights, and their cooperation with members of parliament in posting 
opposition to a government that showed little, if any, support for their participation in 
improving social and welfare conditions.  
 While government never made a real attempt to involve residents in the 
legislation’s decision-making, MPs did offer residents full cooperation. Residents of poor 
neighbourhoods took the opportunity and managed to have a significant impact by 
convincing groups and parties to reverse their objections to the legislation. Without this 
massive involvement from residents, the RTB is unlikely to have ever come into force, or 
arguably, to have been initiated at all. Most interviewees saw the eventual success of the 
residents’ lobbying as a major victory. It is important to define success in this case, 
because even though the full legislation residents initially opted for was not passed, the 
essence of the residents’ argument was passed and despite firm objection from 
government. This is why the RTB is considered a success. The ability of residents to 
campaign against the authorities for social change and to be the main drive behind that 
change is why most participants refer to it as a success.  
 Although the final government Act was more constrained than residents’ initial 
proposals and the duration of its operation limited, the RTB created a new faith in social 
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activism amongst the citizens of Israel and pushed more NGOs to act, and positively 
promoted the potential for residents to impact upon the machinery of government.  
 It was also evident that public policy (in this regard as presented by the 
government) towards the programme and residents’ involvement was minor, which proved 
to be un-empowering. Residents’ desire to influence the RTB legislation process was 
rebuffed by officials who opposed it and acted fiercely in denying residents the opportunity 
to participate in a positive, constructive way. Residents overcame this challenge by acting 
cohesively and by cooperating with the legislating MPs, who offered them a vital role in 
wording the law.  
 Public policy persistently failed to support the RTB, and the fact that residents’ 
participation could not function fully without official structures and support for very long, 
caused the RTB’s social significance to fade over the years. RTB, despite representing a 
huge achievement for the residents in terms of empowerment, was a short lived and rare 
experiment. 
Part Three 
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Chapter 8 
Analysis of Outcomes of Different Empowerment Programmes 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The case studies analysed in this research represent the various social housing programmes 
in Israel. Each demonstrates a different approach to empowerment. This chapter 
summarises the information collected in each case study, compares them and discusses 
their impact on empowerment within the context of Israel. This allows us to answer the 
following research questions: does empowerment of the disadvantaged population matter 
to the delivery of social and housing policies?; is it achievable?; and through what 
mechanisms is it achieved? 
 The main features defining empowerment, for the purpose of this research, were 
resident participation and public policy towards this participation and towards the 
investigated programmes. Residents’ participation is one of the main catalysts necessary 
for empowerment and indicates the degree to which residents are involved in social 
housing programmes. A main hypothesis of this research assumes that if residents are 
involved in decision-making, a policy is likely to succeed. Public policy refers to the nature 
and level of government support which, through localisation of services, encourages 
resident involvement and assists residents in improving their skills. A second hypothesis of 
this research assumes that if local housing management services are provided locally, in 
combination with resident involvement, services will improve. 
 Another interesting factor that we have identified during the research relates to 
Israel as a multi conflict society and the role and priority of social policy in policy making 
where conflicts erupt at the same time.    
 The first section (8.2) of this chapter highlights both key mechanisms of 
empowerment (resident participation and public policy) as they appear in each of the 
housing programmes; section 8.3 compares and contrasts views on empowerment in 
housing programmes in Israel. Section 8.4 discusses the key results from data collected in 
the case studies which help to challenge and respond to this thesis’s hypothesis and 
question. Finally, section 8.5 offers conclusions based on the discussion in section 8.4.  
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8.2 Empowerment as Measured in Israeli Social Housing Programmes  
Demolish & Rebuild (D&R), whether controlled by the government or by the private-
sector, has shown minimal success in terms of empowerment. Residents had almost no 
share in or influence on decision-making and public policy did not welcome their 
participation. The following statement from the former general manager of the Housing 
Ministry summarises the official view of residents’ participation in the D&R: “Those who 
are not passionate about taking part are a waste of time and money, and it’s better to just 
inform them rather than ask them to take a leading role” (S. Ben Eliahu). 
 Given current housing and land constraints, as well as population density in 
city centres, such a programme could have offered an effective way to manage 
housing renewal and improve social conditions. However, with its low 
empowerment delivery, the D&R programme made a minor impact on housing 
policy in Israel. In recent years, and for the above-mentioned reasons, there has 
been a revival of the programme and new attempts, this time with more attention 
paid to residents, to operate renewal projects.       
 The Neighbourhood Renewal Programme (NRP) represents some resident 
participation under moderately supportive public policy. There is a consensus that the NRP 
appears to have successfully targeted deserving areas that show a high risk of social 
collapse and offered improvements to housing and facilities. Moreover, the initial formula 
of the programme included mechanisms that guaranteed resident participation. In practice, 
residents were invited to participate in management boards, but had limited influence on 
the decision-making process. Public policy was inconsistent. Investment during the 
programme’s early years was sufficient to create improvements and positive change. 
Nevertheless, the programme’s weakness was that it failed to focus on sustainable 
communities or make a long-term impact on the lives of local people. Leaders were not 
encouraged to increase their activities and support in the long term while budgets cuts 
prevented further investment to create new neighbourhoods. Instead of growing in 
influence, the NRP has lost its appeal and this has undermined its initial positive 
achievements. Although the NRP has undoubtedly left its mark on Israeli social policy and 
will be remembered as a real attempt to improve facilities and housing conditions in poor 
neighbourhoods, it has ultimately done little to transform them or create any lasting legacy. 
 Right to Buy (RTB) represents a high level of resident participation under wide-
ranging public policy, with unsupportive and uncooperative government attitudes on the 
one hand, and a cooperative parliamentary attitude towards residents and their initiative on 
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the other. The influence achieved by residents during RTB was due to their efforts to 
change government attitudes, rather than being a government-led initiative to help effect 
social change. The processes whereby ideas are promoted and then turned into policy, that 
encourage decision-making and drive policy change, are crucial in all democracies. Since 
the RTB programme was founded on this process, it provides perhaps the best example by 
which to measure the potential of residents’ role in the success of such a programme. 
Although the final government Act was much more limited than residents’ original 
proposals with the government eventually managing to freeze the law, the RTB created a 
new faith in social activism amongst disadvantaged groups and supporters of the welfare 
state. Its positive aspects encouraged task forces to take on other social issues, to push 
more NGOs to act, and positively promoted residents’ leverage over decision-makers. 
 If we review all the programmes together with the aim of analysing Israeli social 
policy, we learn that all forms of empowerment (including disempowerment) were tested 
at some stage, and the results show which had the most positive impact on social policy 
and what might be the recommended approach. 
  
8.3 Theoretical framework of empowerment in the context of Israeli housing  
The theoretical debates that emerged from the literature review suggest that empowerment 
is a process that depends upon the involvement of communities in producing solutions 
based on resident participation, public policy and projects tailored to deliver effective 
change. Empowerment is a tool that allows those in need to respond to structural problems 
and make social changes. It helps the disadvantaged become a cohesive, well-organised 
group and enables those that might otherwise remain powerless to gain some control over 
their lives and conditions. It also provides residents with the appropriate tools to improve 
their community and — encompassing the whole notion of social activity — to find a way 
out of dependency. This research, therefore, analysed empowerment in terms of resident 
participation and public policy towards communities in specific areas.   
 In terms of the main empowerment features of resident participation and public 
policy, the programmes analysed for this research provide an overview of the whole range 
of available scenarios, as summarised in the table, drawing and graph below. 
 Figure 13 summarises resident participation in each programme. D&R represents a 
low level of participation (information); the NRP offers a higher level of resident 
participation (consultation); and the RTB corresponds to partnership.
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Figure 13: Residents’ participation in Israeli housing programmes: a comparison 
PROJECT: Demolish & 
Rebuild 
Neighbourhood 
Renewal 
Right to Buy 
PARTICIPATION 
LEVEL: 
   
Information + + + 
Consultation - + + 
Partnership - - +/- 
Control - - - 
 
Figure 14 represents the flow of resident participation across the programmes. The three 
are boxes organised in a scheme that presents the escalation in terms of participation from 
a low level in the D&R to a moderate level during the NRP until it reaches a high level in 
the RTB (increasing from left to right): 
 
Figure 14: Residents’ participation in Israeli housing programmes: flow chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demolish and 
Rebuild 
 
Low involvement 
Neighbourhood 
Renewal  
 
Moderate 
involvement 
Right to Buy  
 
High involvement 
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Figure 15 presents the levels of resident participation across the investigated programmes: 
 
Figure 15: Residents’ participation in Israeli housing programmes: flow graph 
 
 
 
In terms of the other element that defines empowerment — public policy — this requires 
acknowledgement of problems and dedicated services which allow participation to happen. 
 
Acknowledgement of problems  
Social problems, if ignored, have a tendency to grow rather than disappear. It is crucial that 
governments acknowledge this and recognise that solutions must be devised in order to 
create social change. The data collected in this research confirms that problems were not 
ignored and, in order to tackle housing misery, programmes were initiated. Both the NRP 
and the D&R were top-bottom initiatives. The RTB (bottom-top) was slightly different in 
that it reacted to external pressure from residents. In principle, it is fair to say that Israeli 
governments have acknowledged the severity of social and housing needs and attempted to 
offer solutions.  
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Localisation 
Local services provide bridges between central administration and communities, allowing 
disadvantaged residents greater access to the centre of power and at the same time 
simplifying and accelerating operations by making them accountable to tenants. This also 
links to wider issues, such as employment, job accessibility, environment and facilitation 
of services. Good services not only improve conditions, but they also increase residents’ 
confidence in their abilities, close gaps and remove obstacles, develop trust and renew 
enthusiasm for change. Engagement thus becomes worthwhile and self-reinforcing. Based 
on residents’ testimonials, however, services and their standards are insufficient. In the 
majority of neighbourhoods where programmes had operated, services were not yet fully 
accessible and those that were offered were inadequately provided.   
 Figure 16 summarises residents’ assessments of public policy in each of the 
programmes. Public policy during D&R was less supportive, while in the NRP support was 
higher, although this support can be withdrawn after a decade. The RTB offers a 
combination of the two extremes: whereas government did not support resident initiative, 
parliament allowed residents greater influence on formulating and achieving the 
legislation.  
 
Figure 16: Public policy in Israeli housing programmes: a comparison 
PROJECT: Demolish & 
Rebuild 
Neighbourhood 
Renewal 
Right to Buy 
PUBLIC POLICY: 
   
Limited support + - -/+ 
Moderate support - + - 
Supportive - - +/- 
 
Figure 17 represents the changes in public policy across the programmes from minimal 
support in the D&R, to moderate support in the NRP (high support at the start which 
declined in later years), and mixed support (no support from government but high support 
from parliament) during the RTB (increasing from left to right): 
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Figure 17: Public policy in Israeli housing programmes: flow graph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 presents the changes in public policy across the programmes: 
 
Figure 18: Public policy in Israeli housing programmes: flow graph 
 
 
Figures 15 and 18, if combined in one drawing, appear as follows in figure 19. D&R 
presents the information level of participation and lower support from government; the 
RTB presents partnership participation levels (which were higher) and moderate support; 
0 
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and the NRP has the highest support from government, although with a consultation 
(moderate) level of participation by residents:  
 
Figure 19: Empowerment in Israeli housing policy 
 
To sum up, social housing policy in Israel offered three main programmes, each 
representing varying degrees of empowerment. Comparing the programmes allows us to 
analyse empowerment in differing forms and to conclude what might be the best way to 
achieve a higher rate of success in social policy. This is the essence of the following 
sections. 
 
8.4 Key Results 
Empowerment has been discussed in detail in this research in the context of its main 
defining features, but there are a few sub-categories that emerged from residents’ 
responses that enable us to understand how empowerment has been tested in Israeli 
housing policy. These are discussed below. The first section refers to resident participation 
and the second to public policy. The third section offers residents’ views on the impact 
empowerment can make on a policy. 
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8.4.1 Resident participation 
Residents’ management capabilities 
There is a debate in the literature in relation to participation in disadvantaged populations 
surrounding the issue of whether communities are capable of taking on managerial roles 
and whether they can cope with the challenges implicit in empowerment. Some argue that 
the challenges residents of poor neighbourhoods face apart from housing — such as 
employment, education and tackling anti-social behaviour, environmental and hygiene 
issues, social services, finances, poverty — make it difficult or almost impossible for them 
to cope with an additional challenge. If residents struggle with simple challenges, what 
guarantee is there that they would be able to handle project management duties?  
 The table below presents participant responses to this issue. The majority of both 
residents and non-residents believed that residents were capable of taking on managerial 
tasks, subject to guidance and supervision.  
 
Table 22: Participants’ views on residents managerial capabilities 
Response Yes Yes, but only 
with guidance 
and under 
supervision 
No Total 
Participant Type 
    
Residents 
 Leaders 
 Moderate participants 
 Random 
17 
7 
5 
5 
24 
9 
11 
4 
7 
2 
1 
4 
53 
18 
17 
18 
Non-residents 
 Informers/supporters 
 Implementers 
 Decision-makers 
7 
6 
0 
1 
19 
10 
7 
2 
11 
5 
6 
0 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source – PhD, Guy Doron, 2005–1164  
 
The vast majority of residents argued that they were capable of taking on managerial duties 
and were skilled in management. Of these, the majority also argued that they needed some 
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 N/A: Residents – 5; Leaders – 0; Moderate participants – 0; Random – 5; Non-residents – 0; 
Informers/supporters – 0; Implementers – 0; Decision-makers – 0. 
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degree of guidance and support to prepare themselves for managerial responsibilities. 
Similar results emerged when analysing non-residents’ views. 
 Regardless of their capabilities, some question residents’ desire or willingness to 
get involved in the face of so many other challenges. The views of those in favour of 
empowerment suggest that residents’ familiarity with their local neighbourhood and its 
problems, as well as their ability to accurately assess what is needed, promotes their desire 
not only to create a change but also to be committed in delivering it. Results of this 
research show that residents insisted that they were genuinely willing to take part, that they 
cared about their communities, that they were willing to make the effort and wanted to 
influence processes.  
 Capability and willingness effects participation and empowerment sustainability. A 
positive indication of the successful implementation of empowerment values is when 
involvement lasted in the long term, and when residents continued and even increased their 
involvement. The next session reviews continuity across Israeli social housing 
programmes. 
 
Continuity of participation  
Reviewing the data collected in the investigated programmes reveals that more than half of 
those who lead their community or have a share in community activity continued their 
influence long term. The other half, however, confirmed that they have reduced their 
activities to a certain extent. Some became less involved; others stopped participating 
completely, while the majority of residents randomly selected were never highly involved.  
 The table below presents resident self-assessments regarding continuity and long 
term activity across the investigated programmes. It also presents non-resident perceptions 
of the same criteria. 
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Table 23: Participants’ views on long term participation in Israeli housing 
programmes 
Response Still 
highly 
active 
Highly 
active 
reduced to 
moderately 
active 
Highly 
active 
reduced 
to not 
active 
Moderately 
active 
reduced to 
not active 
Never 
active 
 
 
Total 
 
 
Participant Type       
Residents 
 Leaders 
 Moderate participants 
 Random 
20 
10 
7 
3 
8 
3 
4 
1 
9 
5 
4 
0 
2 
0 
2 
0 
14 
0 
0 
14 
53 
18 
17 
18 
Non-residents 
 Informers/supporters 
 Implementers 
 Decision-makers 
23 
12 
9 
2 
5 
4 
0 
1 
9 
5 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source – PhD, Guy Doron, 2005–11 
 
Of half the residents who reduced their involvement, the majority specified that it was due 
to a lack of support and guidance in their participation. Public policy, it was revealed, had 
the greatest influence on empowerment besides participation. Services, opportunities, 
resources, availability of education and training schemes, guidance, supervision, 
accessibility and support all affected residents’ ability to continue or maximise their 
contribution.  
 
8.4.2 Public Policy 
Training and education schemes are considered by many as the type of support that can 
encourage residents who are willing to improve their managerial skills to participate and 
benefit their communities. Nevertheless, in many of the interviews conducted in this 
research, residents have highlighted the problematic role training can take if not delivered 
properly, by the right people or by a trusted organisation. This in particular, had a great 
influence on multi conflict scenarios where residents do not identify central governments 
as supportive and choose not to cooperate with their educational and training schemes. 
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 Most non-residents, and all implementers, agreed and stated that training and 
education schemes were essential if residents were to gain more knowledge. Nevertheless, 
both groups admitted that such schemes have rarely been offered across the investigated 
programmes. Training and education helps residents to fulfil their potential and improve 
their performance. Courses enable residents to gain the skills and knowledge they lack, and 
offer them the techniques to perform more professionally on management boards. The only 
programme that offered training officially was the NRP, however the majority of training 
schemes for residents in poor neighbourhoods were conducted on courses promoted or 
funded by donation from abroad, by NGOs or as part of a local initiative. The contribution 
from direct government training was deemed to be insufficient, whereas the contribution of 
third parties in self-initiated courses was considerable.  
 Participation depends mainly on the individuals concerned. Support of this 
participation, such as services, training and opportunities to influence, depends on public 
policy. In order to assess the level of satisfaction with public policy, participants were 
asked to assess their satisfaction with social housing in general, and the access to and 
influence they were allowed in the programmes. 
 The majority of residents were dissatisfied with the social housing programmes in 
general and slightly more satisfied with the role they were allowed in them. Non-residents, 
on the other hand, were partly satisfied with the programmes and with the residents’ role in 
them. The tables below demonstrate these results. 
 Table 24 present satisfaction rates with public policy in regard to the housing 
programmes in general, while table 25 present satisfaction from residents’ involvement in 
social housing programmes in Israel: 
 
  
  
267 
Table 24: Satisfaction with public policy in general 
 Satisfied Partly 
Satisfied 
Dissatisfied Total 
Residents 
 Leaders 
 Moderate participants 
 Random 
9 
3 
4 
2 
11 
8 
0 
3 
33 
7 
13 
13 
53 
18 
17 
18 
Non-residents 
 Informers 
 Implementers 
 Decision-makers 
10 
7 
2 
1 
11 
3 
7 
1 
12 
10 
2 
0 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source – PhD, Guy Doron, 2005–1165 
 
Overall, satisfaction with social housing policy showed poor results. The majority of 
residents and also non-residents were dissatisfied. Among residents, only leaders showed 
moderate satisfaction rates, while among non-residents the implementers were less 
dissatisfied than others. These slightly better responses relate to the fact that both groups 
were more engaged with the programmes, leaders were more involved and implementers 
executed them, yet overall satisfaction with the social policy was far from positive.  
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 N/A: Residents – 0; Leaders – 0; Moderate participants – 0; Random – 0; Non-residents – 4; Informers – 1; 
Implementers – 2; Decision-makers – 1. 
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Table 25: Satisfaction rates with residents’ involvement in the social housing 
programmes 
 Satisfied Partly 
Satisfied 
Dissatisfied Total 
Residents 
 Leaders 
 Moderate 
participants 
 Random 
23 
11 
4 
8 
6 
1 
2 
3 
24 
6 
11 
7 
53 
18 
17 
18 
Non-residents 
 Informers 
 Implementers 
 Decision-makers 
11 
8 
2 
1 
5 
4 
0 
1 
2 
1 
1 
0 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source – PhD, Guy Doron, 2005–0966 
 
Satisfaction rates with public policy towards resident participation were diverse, yet more 
positive than towards social policy in general. Residents were split, whereas leaders were 
obviously more satisfied with their role than others, yet the fact that others were 
dissatisfied indicated that more wanted to take part but somehow failed to do so or were in 
some way prevented. Not all non-residents were willing to respond, yet among those who 
did, satisfaction was higher.     
 Another indication of dissatisfaction with the housing programmes were the 
protests against the way in which the programmes were operated and the demonstrations 
that called for better programmes. Normally when groups of people decide that they can no 
longer change a situation through formal channels, or in cases where frustration is high 
people gather to act, often resulting in public protest. Residents dissatisfied with Israeli 
housing policy often found themselves protesting in this way. 
 Protests and demonstrations manifested in response to all social housing 
programmes and came as no surprise since residents had already voiced their 
dissatisfaction with social and housing policies. Residents had a key role in planning, 
organising and executing these demonstrations and most leaders admitted that many 
members of their community readily joined these protests. As for non-residents, informers 
and decision-makers recognised the effectiveness of demonstrations in delivering an 
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 N/A: Residents – 0; Leaders – 0; Moderate participants – 0; Random – 0; Non-residents – 19; Informers – 
8; Implementers – 10; Decision-makers – 1. 
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increased impact on processes, while most implementers claimed that these demonstrations 
had no impact on their behaviour or decisions. All agreed that the protests took place and 
that the phenomenon could not be ignored, yet the operational impact of these protests was 
minimal. 
 Few would argue against the proposition that the meagre impact of protests on 
decision-making was due to the priorities that set the national political agenda. Israel is a 
special case in that it is troubled by many domestic, social, political and religious conflicts 
which cause high levels of stress, concerns about internal and external threats and an 
intensely divided political sphere. Social policy is not considered as serious as bilateral 
conflicts, unstable boarders, ethnic and religious tensions, and thus does not come high on 
the political agenda. Equally, pressure groups in Israel do not tend to focus on social issues 
which also contribute to the lack of attention paid to social policy.  
 Another interesting aspect that emerged during this research was the role of social 
policy in Israel, where multi-conflicts dominate the political agenda. During the interviews 
we came across a pattern which we could not have been predicted or planned for before — 
the relatively lower priority social policy has in multi-conflict political spheres. Israel is a 
modern/democratic state with a structured social policy agenda; we therefore expected 
similar social policy behaviour as in other Western/Northern countries. However, we have 
learnt that the severity of other conflicts on the specific political agenda in Israel push 
social policy down decision makers’ lists of priorities. We have therefore attempted to 
answer another question: does social policy come lower down in the priorities of 
authorities in multi-conflict environments? 
 Another useful tool this research has to offer is unique access to the views of 
hundreds of participants, representing almost every type of social group in Israel, in its 
investigation of the importance of social policy for them as residents compared with and 
irrespective of other conflicts. From the literature on empowerment and participation we 
expected the same empowerment cycle to take place in a multi-conflict society; that is, 
individual participation developing into collective participation which under certain 
circumstances would possibly turn into empowerment. We therefore added another section 
to the interviews in order to investigate whether common knowledge on empowerment that 
appears in Western/Northern literature could also come into play in multi-conflict 
scenarios as well, in other words, in Southern/Eastern cultures. For that we have analysed 
the perspectives not only of the authorities but of residents as well.    
  
270 
 Tables 26 and 27 present participants’ views on the influence of social policy on 
setting public policy. Table 26 assesses the position authorities have taken towards social 
policy in a multi-conflict environment, whereas table 27 assesses residents’ behaviour in 
response to social policy issues and shows how social policy has shaped their political 
voting in a multi-conflict environment. This investigation will help us to develop wider 
perspectives on the role of social policy in multi-conflict scenarios but also to analyse the 
behaviour of residents attempting to shape a political agenda that is normally in the hands 
of decision-makers and driven solely by their priorities.    
 The majority of residents testified that public policy is not strongly influenced by 
the social agenda; non-residents also admitted that social issues do not dominate public 
policy in Israel. 
 
Table 26: The dominance of social policy in Israel 
Is social policy 
dominant on the 
Israeli Agenda? 
No Very Little Yes Total 
Residents 
 Leaders 
 Moderate 
participants 
 Random 
33 
12 
11 
10 
14 
6 
6 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
53 
18 
17 
18 
Non-residents 
 Informers 
 Implementers 
 Decision-makers 
14 
9 
4 
1 
20 
12 
7 
1 
3 
0 
2 
1 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source – PhD, Guy Doron, 2005–1167 
 
Not one resident indicated that social issues were central to public policy. Although there 
were a few amongst the non-residents (excluding informers) who did consider social issues 
to be central to public policy, the majority agreed with the residents that social policy 
contributes little in shaping public policy. One of the reasons for such a low priority is the 
lack of pressure groups promoting social change and motivating the masses to act.  
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 N/A: Residents – 0; Leaders – 0; Moderate participants – 0; Random – 0; Non-residents – 3; Informers – 
0; Implementers – 2; Decision-makers – 1. 
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 This research went on to investigate the influence of social issues in residents’ 
votes. It asked whether social policy was crucial in determining which party/agenda to vote 
for, and how powerful pressure applied by residents was in creating social change.   
 The table below presents a summary of views on whether social issues are central 
for residents and how they influence their votes. The results were surprising, as residents 
believed that social policy, although it plays a greater role in determining their vote than in 
the past, is still not central when they assess their political vote, while non-residents noted 
that social policy issues were far from central in influencing residents’ votes. The 
uniqueness of these figures and the reason why they are surprising is because most of the 
participants in this research have a direct link to social conflict, more than any others, and 
thus the social policy conflict should rank higher than other conflicts, and yet they 
prioritise it lower when they decide their vote.  
 
Table 27: How focal social policy is for you when you decide your political/electoral 
vote 
Does social policy determine 
the electoral vote? 
 No Very little   Yes Total 
Residents 
 leaders 
 moderate participants 
 random 
10 
5 
2 
3 
16 
8 
5 
3 
20 
5 
10 
5 
53 
18 
17 
18 
Non – residents 
 informers 
 implementers 
 decision makers 
18 
11 
5 
2 
14 
8 
5 
1 
5 
2 
3 
0 
37 
21 
13 
3 
Source – PhD, Guy Doron, 2005–1168 
 
Residents believed that social policy plays a greater role in determining their vote than in 
the past, but it is definitely not a central feature that determines their political vote, while 
non-residents noted that social policy issues were far from being central in influencing 
residents’ votes.  
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 N/A: Residents – 7; Leaders – 0; Moderate participants – 0; Random – 7; Non-residents – 0; Informers – 
0; Implementers – 0; Decision-makers – 0. 
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 Although residents highlighted a growing awareness of social issues in recent 
campaigns, they were still too few to turn social policy into a subject that defined voters’ 
behaviour, since for them social policy is a point of daily concern: “Politicians are well 
aware of the importance of social issues, but these play a very insufficient role in their 
decision-making process, as these are the least important issues on the national agenda” 
(Nadler, Kashani, Drix, Gutman). 
 The limited presence of social policy on the public agenda, poor social services, a 
lack of concern and care towards residents’ demands and the failure to deliver solutions 
and keep promises have left many disillusioned and led to civic apathy. Due to this, many 
residents simply do not believe that they can make a difference with their vote, at least not 
under the current system which is governed by a centralised political vote where there is no 
local representation in the national house of parliament. The result is a serious lack of 
willingness to participate; residents have lost faith in the current centralised political 
system and many even choose to avoid democratic participation altogether:  
 
There are voters who make up their minds according to welfare issues and 
social policy agendas, yet they are all manipulated to an extent in the end. 
Residents are so fed up with promises, they have stopped believing in 
parties and politics; they read promises as temporary slogans.
 
(Yashar, 
Zidan; Bat Cava, Ezov, Zazon) 
 
Non-residents who are involved in social policy state that social policy is less important to 
voters than other conflicts in a multi-conflict environment, and is a lower priority amongst 
policy makers: 
 
Social policy has no power group among voters. And, indeed, it is hard to 
find the link between the issues that irritate the common member of the 
public and the issues that the representatives deal with. When going to the 
polls, voters assess other issues such as foreign affairs, terror and personal 
security or multicultural issues as more important and define their vote 
according to parties’ stands on these issues more than on welfare issues. 
(Shwartz; Miara) 
 
 Pressure groups are a proven way to successfully influence public policy. They can 
lobby authorities to act in their favour and are powerful both financially and within their 
communities. Residents of publicly-built estates, for example, managed to exert pressure 
for a limited period of time during RTB, and as long as they could maintain that pressure, 
other groups with a strong sense of community cohesion also managed to impact housing 
policy in the same way. Some participants who were highly involved in social policy stated 
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that if residents of poor neighbourhoods acted together to generate wider influence the 
degree of success in their housing programmes would be far higher. 
 
8.4.3 Can Community Cohesion Make a Difference?  
The fact that residents of council housing estates managed, through high levels of 
participation, to operate an effective campaign and convince the public and decision-
makers to legislate RTB in a relatively short period of time and without excessive political 
force, proved that influence can be brought to bear if residents act together, even if they 
lack a clear political orientation or social/financial status.  
 Learning from other pressure groups, residents of council housing estates admitted 
that the motivation to push for their rights to be legislated in RTB came as they attempted 
to duplicate housing rights that were offered to residents of rural communities: “When 
formulating our ‘Right to Buy’ proposal we adopted the Kibbutzim’s principles of 
inheritance rights in housing which latterly came to be one of the principal values of our 
‘Right to Buy’” (Zazon, Adika). 
 Highly involved participants who attempted to analyse the reasons for their limited 
success in impacting public policy positively when it came to housing programmes in poor 
neighbourhoods admitted residents lacked a unity that could have had an influence on 
decision-makers: 
 
The government allowed residents of the Kibbutzim continuation of tenure 
rights, something which we were denied, as they were strong enough 
politically to push for that. They were small in size but very powerful in 
their influence over decision makers. That pushed me to acknowledge that 
this is the focal point which we are missing political power and influence as 
a group. If we act wisely and get together we would be able to force the 
government to legislate the law as we are bigger in size than the Kibbutzim. 
(Vazana) 
 
Another example of a powerful pressure group that managed to positively influence 
housing decisions was noted in the new settlements. The former manager of the housing 
ministry confirms the pattern: 
 
Settlers used their political power to overturn decisions and to make sure 
their representatives would be involved up to the smallest detail that might 
be relevant to residents or affect them. The reason for their success was 
their unity, the fact they are responsive to any potential change in regulation 
and alerted as a group and almost always act to utilise their influence in 
order to get additional benefits. (Ben Eliahu) 
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Another resident leader described how decisions were influenced and redirected when it 
came to publicly-funded housing estates: “We also benefited from wider housing support; 
the government invested in building a council housing estate in our settlement to support 
the population growth, whereas in the end units were sold at minimum prices” (Halfa). 
 In retrospect, the fact that a group of people could generate community cohesion 
and act together has proven not only to be key in project success but, when bad turns to 
worse, it can also be a source for community rehabilitation: 
 
The most important thing in social housing policy is to keep the community 
alive as it could save individuals. The power the community gains when 
united is greater than it what might be achieved by individuals. The 
togetherness means that in time of crisis, similar to what we have been 
through after the disengagement, the community could support individuals 
and ease things up. (Shulavich) 
 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
The important role of resident participation has been noted in the main hypothesis of this 
research. If residents are involved in decision-making, policies are more likely to succeed. 
This has been proven by the investigated case studies, where participation levels, 
cooperation in project management and the involvement of committed residents were 
measured, whilst the likelihood of success resulting from pressure group activity in the 
NRP and RTB programmes has also been noted. 
 In the investigated case studies, residents claimed influence rather than received it, 
which led to the second key feature that determines empowerment — public policy. As 
noted in this research’s related hypothesis, if local housing management services are 
provided locally together with resident involvement, services will improve. Large council-
housing estates in Israel are often areas of poverty, instability, unemployment and low 
educational achievement. As such, they have a predictably high risk of social collapse. 
When authorities offer residents better tools to improve their harsh conditions, make 
obligations to educate residents and facilitate them to take on responsibility and increase 
their community involvement, encourage social independence and civic partnership, 
residents were better equipped, more confident and willing to alter their conditions and 
move away from dependency.  
 Where both empowerment features combine together — governments offer 
residents support and cooperation, while residents are willing to influence the process and 
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acquire more knowledge to improve their skills — the local community becomes more 
committed to a project which has a huge impact on its potential success.  
 One of the main results of this research demonstrates that allowing residents to 
participate and have a share in decision-making under a supportive public policy will have 
a good chance of truly empowering them and bringing about effective social change. This 
indicates the need to follow a similar strategy of empowerment — the combination of a 
high level of participation and supportive public policy — if authorities actually want to 
improve the outcomes of social housing programmes.   
 Residents’ ability to wield their political power and lobby efficiently to achieve 
their communities’ goals is not only evident in cases of excessive government provision, 
better services and generous funding, but was first and foremost visible in the 
communities’ shared values and commitment to mutual responsibility. This has pushed 
residents to achieve more, and has also helped them to support each other in times of need. 
This crystallises another important argument of this research, that financial investment 
without social care is insufficient. If social services, participation and long term guidance 
are minimal, as was in noted in D&R, failure is almost inevitable.  
 Another interesting factor we have identified in this research is the lower role of 
social policy on the political agenda in Israel (which also represents a multi-conflict 
society). Importantly, we have learnt that the lower role of social policy appears even in 
residents’ priorities when they decide their political vote. The centralised political system 
in Israel plays a major part in this, but that helps us to draw some more general 
assumptions on the role of social policy in multi-conflict scenarios.      
 Finally, this research identified a third factor crucial for empowerment to be 
established: the ‘sense of power’. This will be discussed in the next chapter, yet in brief 
here it can be defined as the mental support that encourages residents to believe that they 
can achieve, and is a constructive force that helps combat feelings of failure. 
 The next chapter summarises the conclusions and recommendations in light of the 
research questions and the analysis of empowerment in Israeli society.   
  
276 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
 
 
9.1. Introduction 
This research has investigated whether the empowerment of Israel’s disadvantaged 
populations is achievable through housing policies, and whether successive Israeli 
administrations have helped or hindered this process. The research questions were: 
 
 Does empowerment of the disadvantaged population matter to the delivery of social 
and housing policies? (The research focuses on communities in publicly sponsored 
areas.) 
 Is empowerment of the disadvantaged population achievable?  
 Through what mechanism it is achievable?  
 What are the costs and benefits of that empowerment?  
 To what extent has it been achieved? 
 
While conducting the research an additional question arose: 
 
 What was the distinctive impact of a multi-conflict context, such as 
that of Israel, on social policy and empowerment? 
 
Based on the literature on empowerment in social housing policy, collected mainly in 
Western/Northern countries, we have predicted similar results in Israel, in line with the 
following hypotheses:  
 
 If residents are involved in decision-making, policies will be more likely to succeed.  
 If local housing management services are provided locally, resident involvement 
becomes more possible and services will be more likely to improve.  
 
These hypotheses summarise the main contribution the literature makes in helping us to 
analyse empowerment of disadvantaged communities through housing policies, at least in 
those areas where such policies have been researched. Resident participation is the first 
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essential step for empowerment to grow, which, if backed by successfully implemented 
public policy, grants residents the opportunity to impact upon and contribute to local 
housing projects.     
 The definition of social policy and public policy used in this research requires 
further clarification. Where social policy is purely the policy of a particular regime towards 
social matters (in this research social housing programmes), public policy is the attitude a 
particular regime has taken to approaching empowerment in general and resident 
participation in particular. There is an implied sense that a government-inspired policy has 
immediate and direct effects ‘on the ground’, while often the way policies are delivered, 
managed or mismanaged by local agents can completely transform the desired effects. This 
has been noted in each programme investigated in this research, and in the NRP in 
particular, where the government officially declared its intention to support the programme 
but local implementation fell short of the desired intent (see cases in Kiryat Moshe, Tel 
Kabir in Tel Aviv and Eir Ganim and Katamonim in Jerusalem).            
 This thesis explores public housing programmes, implemented by the Israeli 
government to help socially disadvantaged communities: the Demolish and Rebuild 
programme, instituted in 1960 to replace temporary and ad hoc housing hastily constructed 
to cope with emergency waves of immigrants; the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme 
developed in the 1980s to upgrade existing areas with existing residents, and the Right to 
Buy programme of the 1990s which gave public housing tenants the opportunity to become 
owners of their own property. Each programme represented a different form of public 
intervention, with very different levels of community participation and empowerment.  
 Based on 91 interviews (chosen from over 100) with residents, other local activists 
and key delivery actors in 12 representative case study areas, it was possible to assess the 
level of localisation of decision-making and delivery and the level of resident involvement 
and empowerment that took place within each programme. 
 Using responses of both residents and non-residents, it was then possible to 
measure the impact on empowerment of different approaches, using Arnstein’s widely 
recognised and used ‘Ladder of Empowerment’. This approach and the evidence collected 
and analysed in this study allows us to reach certain clear conclusions on levels and 
methods of empowerment and also to suggest areas of uncertainty. 
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9.2 Hypotheses 
Out of the three programmes, Right to Buy offered the clearest opportunity to test the 
research hypotheses. This is because residents were allowed by Parliament to participate 
directly in the (parliamentary) decision-making process and the resulting outcomes had a 
positive impact on residents’ and decision-makers’ commitment, responsibility and support 
for the process. RTB represents a rare example of cooperation between residents and the 
authorities. The outcome clearly indicates that resident involvement led to greater 
responsibility and commitment and thus to a higher level of empowerment, satisfaction and 
actual delivery of the programme’s goals. 
 The Neighbourhood Renewal Programme provides evidence to support the second 
hypothesis regarding localisation of services. When local housing management services are 
provided locally, resident involvement becomes more possible and services improved. This 
is well illustrated by the case study of the neighbourhood of Kfar Shalem. Whereas in one 
part of the neighbourhood services were provided locally in cooperation with residents and 
results showed higher satisfaction and success, in the other part of the neighbourhood 
services were not delivered locally and a private developer failed to agree terms with 
residents. As a result, residents were opposed to the project and no progress was made in 
implementing the project. 
 The Demolish and Rebuild programme was conceived as a top-down, large-scale, 
government-led initiative to replace existing poor communities and move residents to new 
housing. Its process of blanket clearance with a high level of coercion precluded 
significant empowerment, even though residents had strong views and sometimes 
expressed them.  
 
9.3 The Research Questions and Findings 
Two key questions of this research were: 
  
 Does empowerment of the disadvantaged population matter to the delivery of social 
and housing policies? The research focused on communities in publicly sponsored 
areas. 
 Is empowerment of the disadvantaged population achievable?  
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This research, in order to be able to answer these questions clearly found significant 
evidence from interviewees and policy documents.  
 Analysing the results collected from all three programmes also offers answers to a 
further three questions:  
 
 Through what mechanism it is achievable?  
 What are the costs and benefits of that empowerment?  
 To what extent has it been achieved? 
 
Each case-study reached a different level of empowerment. The sections below summarise 
their main features in terms of the mechanism, cost and benefits of empowerment.  
 This research reveals that empowerment was never delivered in full in poor 
neighbourhoods; empowerment was, however, delivered in full in housing projects outside 
poor neighbourhoods.  
 The results collected from the study of the Demolish & Rebuild programme help us 
to understand that empowerment matters in the delivery of social housing policy (and thus 
answers the relevant research question). The answer to this question was arrived at by a 
process of elimination — in other words, when empowerment was not delivered, projects 
failed. The Demolish and Rebuild programme did not empower because it was alienated 
from residents’ needs, ignored them and even tried to act against them. The new Urban 
Renewal Scheme is a new form of D&R. It also encourages empowerment features but it is 
not yet possible to establish if it has been a success. We can nevertheless assume that 
empowerment matters for the delivery of social policy, based on the findings from the 
earlier programme.  
 The Neighbourhood Renewal Programme provides a much better opportunity, at 
least in theory, for empowerment to flourish, and offers another means of testing the 
research question as to whether empowerment is achievable through housing policy. 
During the NRP, residents were invited to participate in board management, while public 
policy, at least officially, was supportive. In reality, however, during the majority of 
projects under the NRP, residents’ influence on management boards was limited, with 
governmental support declining dramatically over the last decade.  
 The NRP also highlights an additional important feature of public policy — 
continuity of service delivery. One of the main reasons preventing the NRP from growing 
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stronger or else to be less successful in some cases was the fact that the programme could 
not maintain its operation or its contribution to community life over a long period. It was 
hard to test continuity in general as most projects were ad-hoc and limited in time. The 
number of projects had been reduced, there was very little on-going investment in 
neighbourhoods where the programme was already in operation, and few supportive 
services were made available, such as training, to enable residents to improve their skills. 
The NRP, in theory, marks a clean break in social policy in that it was the first time social 
policy had been addressed by government, along with residents’ participation and their 
opportunity to influence decision-making. It also offered good quality renovation to 
existing buildings in practice, and it provided good publicity for politicians who wanted to 
show that they were delivering on social policy. Nevertheless, most neighbourhoods 
included in the programme remained poor; moreover, most residents are still locked into 
the same form of social and financial dependency. Thus, whilst the NRP seemed to make a 
significant advance, it has proved itself to be by no means the perfect model. Residents 
were keen to participate and were keen to explore and improve their capabilities through 
training courses. When training courses were conducted by a third party, they were 
generally a success in terms of involvement. Finally, participation encourages 
responsibility which results in commitment that can easily be transformed into the 
successful operation of social policy. The NRP confirms the localisation hypothesis: when 
services are delivered locally, there are greater chances for success. The NRP confirms that 
empowerment matters in social policy. The following will discuss the other aspect of the 
research question: how empowerment has been implemented.  
 Right to Buy is a unique case in terms of empowerment. From the perspective of 
participation, it was initiated, designed and promoted by residents in opposition to 
government objections. Residents registered considerable success as a result of their united 
efforts and effective lobbying which resulted in legislation, even if only temporarily, to 
implement the RTB. A distinguishing feature of this case-study is that it provides an 
opportunity to test both supportive and negative public policy towards participation, as 
both features occurred simultaneously. This enabled us to address the research questions 
and offered a broad perspective on the impact of high participation under different public 
policies on empowerment.  
 The RTB case confirms that empowerment was achieved when both factors — high 
resident participation and supportive public (parliamentary in this case) attitudes — came 
into effect. When one of the two features was limited or absent, for instance when public 
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policy was not fully established, or when residents had little autonomy because they were 
tenants or when limited participation was offered, the result was limited empowerment.  
 For example, under the RTB, residents found it impossible to influence attitudes 
when government consistently opposed their initiatives. 
 In those cases where empowerment was allowed to a limited extent, and residents 
had the opportunity to take even a small share in decision-making, such as in the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Programme, it was sufficient to create a change, build confidence 
and encourage motivation. However, when empowerment was delivered only minimally or 
was stopped it had, in the majority of cases, an immediate negative impact, breaking the 
spirit of residents and undermining their ‘sense of power’, the central element in the 
empowerment process that is responsible for its development. The main lesson from the 
RTB case-study confirms that residents, despite their energy and enthusiasm, are unable to 
maintain extended pressure on the authorities. They can register occasional victories, but in 
the long term the authorities are invariably stronger. If the authorities do not accept, allow 
and support resident involvement, then significant empowerment did not evolve. 
Empowerment is important in social policy development, but it is achievable only under 
certain conditions and with compensation investment by authorities to recompense the 
disadvantaged.  
 As mentioned in the introduction, while conducting this research an additional 
question arose and was addressed: 
 
 What was the impact of a multi conflict area on social policy and 
empowerment? 
 
Most of the known literature on empowerment, as discussed in chapter Two, has been 
collected in Western/Northern countries where social policy or housing policy took a focal 
role in the local or even national agenda. In Israel, where multi-conflicts dominate the 
political agenda constantly, we have opted to test the role of social policy in multi-conflict 
scenarios and to investigate whether the extant literature on empowerment from the 
Western/Northern hemisphere can also be applied in the South and East.  
 From our analysis of social and housing policy in Israel we have learnt that social 
policy has a lower priority under multi-conflict pressure for both authorities and residents, 
even for those residents with a personal stake in a project.  
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 Another unique characteristic that has an impact on the delivery of empowerment in 
social and housing policy in Israel is its centralised regime. Most political decisions in 
Israel are dictated and controlled by central government, with very little influence and 
control handed to local governments, let alone to local communities. We have identified 
this as another barrier to social and housing policy gaining a higher priority in multi-
conflict environments. In a centralised regime, most of the decision-makers are alienated 
from the voice of local communities, who mainly suffer from social distress and whose 
voice is inevitably weaker. We therefore assume that social and housing policy will remain 
a lower priority in multi-conflict scenarios and or where local government/representation is 
weak. 
 These new ideas on empowerment in multi-conflict scenarios or in regions under 
central government control that have emerged during this research, together with what we 
already know about empowerment, have led us to suggest a new narrative which we 
believe could contribute to knowledge on empowerment in social policy, and is certainly 
worthwhile to test in other locations with similar challenges. The notion of a ‘sense of 
power’, introduced for the first time here, could be relevant not only to multi-conflict areas 
or to centralised government, but could also be associated with empowerment in other 
forms. It offers a new perspective, thus taking the conclusions and recommendations of 
this research further than previous studies. 
 
9.4 The Sense of Power 
Participation and public policy are essential conditions for empowerment to occur, but 
empowerment is a process and not a one-off scenario, therefore the consequence of 
empowerment is the ‘sense of power’. It is a stage in which the subjects, in our case, the 
disadvantaged residents, begin to believe in their abilities. This stage requires the 
combination of two elements: personal belief and social response or feedback, where the 
subject, the resident, is willing to participate, and through participation receives positive 
feedback from society. First there needs to be willingness and capability on the part of the 
subject to participate, and secondly, public/external backing.  
 In terms of public policy, authorities should respond positively to residents’ desire 
to be active with encouragement or approval. This can be demonstrated in many ways 
outside social policy, such as the approval a parent gives their child to carry on with its 
activities, the acknowledgement and support a manager gives their employee to do a better 
job, or the support of a crowd in a theatre or at a sporting event where the players are 
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encouraged to perform at their best. Support, which is the result of official or public 
backing, creates the proper environment for a ‘sense of power’ to develop and for the 
individual to develop self-belief, confidence and trust in their capabilities. This can 
sometimes be a difficult task for an individual who has never felt capable or been enabled 
before. A sense of power takes individual empowerment and facilitates it with confidence 
and self-belief that encourages that individual to take greater leadership responsibilities in 
boosting their local community. This is how individual empowerment links with public 
empowerment, so that together people can create the first steps towards change in social 
policy. 
 Empowerment can still materialise outside of that mix; resident participation can 
grow and a group of active residents can generate unity which can eventually gain some 
success without the support of the authorities. Similarly, public policy can initiate resident 
involvement but not the other way round. Still, these empowering features, if they appear 
separately, have only a temporary effect. Like a child that can act against the will of its 
parents, an employee can act against the guidance of a manager, a player can still perform 
well, even when the crowd boos him.  
 However, in most cases, if empowerment materialises outside of that mix its action 
is limited. The authorities, in the majority of cases, hold the power to limit individual 
progress. In terms of housing this means that if they wish to evict a resident, they will find 
a way to do so, in much the same way that, if we go back to the cycle of events mentioned 
earlier, a parent is able to punish their child, a manager is able to limit the progress of an 
employee and a sports player or actor can be substituted if they underperform. Community 
empowerment has more collective power than an individual, but outside of the ‘known 
empowerment mix’ it is also limited. What does it take for empowerment to be more 
sustainable, to be able to grow even when it falls low down in the national agenda, or 
particularly when the setting is constantly affected by multi-conflicts? This thesis suggests 
a third way, which is a combination of the two main aspects of the empowerment process, 
which involves a necessary sharing of power between residents and public authorities, in 
order to create the sense of power and to create the proper environment for positive change 
to occur. In the next section we present the unique features we have identified as key for 
empowerment to grow even in a disempowering multi-conflict or centralised and dominant 
regime.   
 Participants in this research also mentioned other housing projects in Israel outside 
the scope of the investigated poor housing programmes, in which the ‘sense of power’ 
  
284 
played a major role in residents’ empowerment. In these cases, the combination of high 
resident participation and supportive public policy created empowerment that most likely 
resulted in success. As for the research questions, the cases investigated in this research 
and other cases that were analysed by participants all confirm that empowerment matters in 
the delivery of housing programmes, and that empowerment is, in principle, achievable. It 
is also evident that in multi-conflict scenarios or under dominant centralised regimes, 
empowerment develops more slowly and at times is even beyond reach. We expect there to 
be very few cases where a ‘sense of power’ develops in a non-empowering scenario or 
under a restrictive regime. However we can predict that a negative consequence of a ‘sense 
of power’ can further damage the empowerment of communities and individuals.         
 
9.5 The Negative Consequences and Loss of a Sense of Power 
The mechanism of empowerment has been discussed in detail in the case studies, yet the 
challenges of empowerment highlighted by this thesis must also offer a lesson learnt. One 
possible setback to empowerment is unexpected change to the ‘sense of power’, a process 
synonymous with multi-conflict scenarios where other conflicts could delay or postpone 
services or tools for social policy; if the sense of power is the catalyst that breaks the 
deadlock of poverty-dependency, unexpected change recreates this depressing cycle. 
During the research, participants tended to focus on elements that maintained 
empowerment (those elements that create the sense of power), amongst which are 
continuity of participation, on-going training courses, localisation, accessibility, 
availability and affordability of services and support in identifying and promoting 
community leadership. These all create the right environment for the ‘sense of power’ to 
prosper. When the proper environment exists, it is essential to maintain it until residents 
and their leaders can take over, and to ensure that none of the previous achievements are 
lost. Any change in these provisions, whether by reducing them or stopping them, damages 
the sense of power, sometimes irreparably.  
 Limited, incomplete or short-term participation which occur frequently in multi-
conflict scenarios where the social policy is not a priority, will cause a breakdown in the 
sense of power. In most cases analysed in this research resident participation was either 
limited in time or in its scope, mainly due to the fact that government was inconsistent with 
service delivery and participation permission. Training and support to encourage 
participation or build leadership was delivered, in most cases, by outsiders or residents 
themselves. Even in those cases where local leadership had grown, lack of support from 
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authorities prevented leaders from maintaining their influence or proving to their 
communities that they could represent their demands and deliver positive change. For 
leaders, the consequence of this was a loss of trust and support from their communities; as 
a result some leaders decided to withdraw their involvement while others refused to endure 
the humiliation and left their communities.  
 In terms of social change, any positive impact leadership had on unified local 
communities was replaced by disbelief and apathy when those features of empowerment 
that created the sense of power were undermined. The damage caused by broken 
leadership was even worse than the initial poor conditions of the neighbourhoods, since 
without local leadership there is almost no chance to lift a community. Such dramatic 
damage in the sense of power could be, at times, beyond repair; there were leaders among 
residents interviewed for this research who admitted that they would never return to action 
after losing their balance of power with the authorities. 
 Those residents who led their communities in the activities surrounding the housing 
programme when the sense of power unexpectedly ended became alienated from civil 
norms, lost faith in their ability to create a better society and disappeared from the public 
arena. Residents admitted that they had become sceptical about whether they could have a 
share in the current democratic system; some even revealed that they became apolitical 
which affected their civic behaviour, since they chose not to participate in general 
elections. Signs of such a phenomenon were evident amongst leaders, common 
participants, and across all residential scales. In these circumstances, projects were doomed 
to fail and the consequent frustrations could easily turn into violent riots against the 
political regime and even against the political system. When residents are given fewer 
opportunities to express their views, their frustration grows and the need to express their 
frustrations grows with it. We witnessed extreme manifestations of a sense of 
powerlessness as a spiritual break in the process of empowerment through housing policies 
investigated in this research. It corresponds to the examples used above to illustrate the 
consequences of ‘empowering rebellions’ in life more generally — a child that has lost the 
support of parents and therefore loses hope (often the backstory in juvenile delinquencies); 
someone who is struggling to find work after losing their job of many years due to the loss 
of management support; or a sports star or famous actor who has lost the support of their 
fans.  
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9.6 Israel: Lessons Learnt 
Priorities for social and housing policy are set up by governments. The process by which 
government sets priorities does not rely only on the pure need of communities; there are 
political repercussions, and in Israel the ability of a group to lobby for their needs has 
enormous influence. Although there are signs that social policies have gained more 
attention amongst politicians and social policy has risen higher on the political agenda as a 
result of pressure from the public and from the media, it is still not a top priority. Many 
socially-oriented groups are not united in the sense that their lobby can create a pressure 
group as strong as the other groups in the Israeli political structure (e.g. NS, ultra-
Orthodox, affluent families, the agricultural community that includes Kibbutzim and 
Moshavim).  
 A brake on social policy development that has emerged in recent years is centred 
around the economic debate concerning the financial costs of social policy, both in the 
short and long term. Those who argue against a supportive public policy believe that the 
economy should be directed by free market rules, which will adjust themselves without the 
need of state intervention. Government support of social policy costs money, and such 
investment at the expense of the general public is not necessary, according to free market 
activists. On the other hand, social activists believe that supporting those in need is in the 
authorities’ best interest, as more knowledge allows better performance and greater 
responsibility. Supporting poor neighbourhoods promotes their recovery and reduces the 
need for social support which, in the long term, cuts government expenditure. Investment 
in poor neighbourhoods also increases residents’ productivity and consequently the welfare 
of a state. The results collected in this research suggest that disempowering policies which 
remove the poor from civic debates may end up costing more in social services in the long 
run. 
 The fact that Israel is a unique case where multi-conflicts come together and social 
policy tends to be low on the authorities’ and residents’ agendas results not only in 
disempowering policies but also in a deterioration of the already low status social policy 
has gained. Such a reduction has damaged even further the ability for empowerment to 
develop. That the Israeli government decreased its commitment to social responsibility, 
reduced its involvement in social policies, offered less opportunities for local residents to 
be involved in projects and failed to upgrade local services has created a breeding ground 
for dissatisfaction, frustration and apathy. Such circumstances encourage riots and law-
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breaking. Properties and tenure rights can be transferred or traded under private-market 
rules, but social care cannot. It is an asset that governments should safeguard.  
 Some analysts have identified 2011 as ‘the year of the Arab spring’. 2011 will be 
remembered as the year of the mass protests that brought down the dictatorships in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria. In 2011 Time magazine even named the protester 
as ‘person of the year’. Israel is not a dictatorship, but as a nation of the Middle East is 
certainly aware of what is going on around it, and like the other surrounding countries, 
Israel both accommodates and tends to maintain a multi-conflict culture.  
 2011 will be remembered in Israeli history as the year which saw the greatest ever 
social protests and unrest. More than half a million people marched and gathered in Tel 
Aviv at the end of summer 2011 to protest against inequality and the cost of living, mainly 
in housing. This was the issue that triggered protests when young professionals struggling 
to pay their monthly rents, even though there were in full-time employment, moved into 
tents in the crowded, well-off Rothschild Avenue Park, transforming it into a tent village. 
Many similar tent villages spread across the country hosting hundreds of thousands of 
protestors. Similar “Occupy” protests took place in New York’s Wall Street, in the City of 
London close to the Bank of England and in many other European capitals. All were 
protesting about the lack of attention authorities were giving to residents’ voices and social 
needs. 
 Such unrest has acted as a red alert for Israel’s government. It tried to mitigate 
serious protest by appointing a committee to recommend change in policy. The committee 
submitted its suggested reforms within a few months, but implementation was limited, 
falling within budgetary constraints. The government may believe that with this committee 
it has appeased the protestors, but discontent is still bubbling under the surface. Social 
unrest was the main catalyst for the Prime Minister to announce a general election in 2013. 
Those elections, although they created a transformation in the public vote, did not change 
the main hegemony. This was primarily because the agenda is still not ruled by social 
issues. For example, when the coalition formed the current government, for the first time in 
history the Finance Ministry gained more attention than the Ministry of Defence. The 
Housing Ministry may still have remained slightly behind in terms of priority, yet housing 
issues were high on the agenda. There was also a public perception that partisanship 
existed in the Housing Ministry. The former minister, who represented the ultra-Orthodox 
community, had been more supportive to it than to the community at large. The new 
minister, on the other hand, represents the NS, and is also perceived to be favouring them 
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in terms of policy and support. This partisanship exemplifies the way in which the Housing 
Ministry does not enjoy the same political status as, say, the Ministry of Education or the 
Ministry of Internal Relations, since it allows for such sectarian-led representation.  
 A recent phenomenon in Israeli politics has been representatives claiming to 
champion the general population, aiming to create a balance between sectarian groups. 
Others have argued that without turning Israel’s broken centralised system into a regional 
system, which would allow for more equal representation for all residents, empowerment 
in general and empowerment of the disadvantaged in particular would fail to develop. 
Some others point out that the proposal to raise the minimum percentage of votes would 
create a two-party system that would block small parties and limit the influence of well-
organised housing interest groups. 
 One year on and conflicts involving security and borders, as well as ethnic and 
religious issues, have erupted and completely wiped social concerns off the political 
agenda, once again turning the discussion away from social policy. This is the best 
illustration we can present of the intensity and dominance of wider conflicts on social 
policy. A country or region in a state of war, with both external security issues and border 
conflicts with its neighbours, as well as internal ethnic or religious conflicts cannot 
develop and maintain empowerment of its residents in general and of the disadvantaged in 
particular. The authorities simply cannot cope with the demand, and in order to survive, 
have to sacrifice social policy deployment. We therefore assume that empowerment in its 
social policy relevance is unlikely to be developed in times of political instability. 
 
9.7 The Way Forward 
Social collapse aside, the current situation presents a greater danger to the Israeli state than 
any bilateral conflict with its neighbours. Social decline, and especially the fact that fewer 
residents are empowered to act as leaders, has caused greater individualism and apathy and 
a parallel decline in democratic values. Without community support and common values as 
a basis of leadership it is unrealistic for Israel to attempt to act as one society, and it runs 
the danger of being drawn into the kind of political and social turmoil that neighbouring 
countries are currently suffering. The way forward for Israel, and for whichever 
government that leads it, is to create a sense of empowerment amongst as many groups of 
residents as possible. This could generate an environment of creativity, care, mutual 
support and profitability, yet most importantly partnership, responsibility and mutual 
  
289 
commitment. This could be a turning point not only for disadvantaged groups, if forced to 
act alone, but for the whole of Israeli society.  
 Perhaps the first priority is the necessity for Israel to solve its bilateral and security 
conflicts with its neighbours, which have an impact on its internal ethnic and religious 
conflicts, before it can progress with its social policy and its empowerment of the 
disadvantaged. A nation suffering multiple conflicts and pressures, and thus existing in a 
state of high tension for a long period of time, risks ignoring social policy until it becomes 
so badly broken that it is ultimately beyond repair. 
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Glossary and Definitions 
 
Publicly-funded housing market – rental housing which is provided and/or managed by 
government or non government organisation. This housing is mainly targeted at large 
families, people with low incomes or unemployed, homeless and people living in 
inappropriate housing conditions. The main form of publicly funded housing is council 
housing. The common definition of council housing is property owned by the government 
and managed by state owned housing companies. In Israel,  the whole public housing 
market being controlled and guided by the government   
 
Private housing market – landlords or managing agents who own and/or manage 
privately rented property or sales of property. 
 
The council housing policy in Israel – a housing policy that aims to provide housing to 
those who cannot buy or rent in the private market. Council housing policy in Israel began 
in the 1950s with the large-scale building of units owned by the state and managed by 
state-owned housing companies, mainly to support the massive immigration wave of Jews 
to the newly established State. During the 1970s and 1980s there was a decline in 
government investment in the building of council housing. An exceptional increase in 
building came in the early 1990s to support the second massive immigration wave of Jews 
arriving from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia. Since then privatisation methods have 
dominated housing policy in Israel which led to a considerable drop in public investment 
in new housing and the majority of investment goes to support those who meet the strict 
criteria for subsidised support for rent in the private market.  Most of the units managed by 
the council housing companies are in a poor condition. In Hebrew, ‘council housing’ and 
‘public housing’ have the same meaning, ‘Diyur Tziburi’ refers to the same type of units 
that are built, owned and managed by the State via the council housing companies. 
 
Subsidised housing solutions –A sum of money is given by the government on a monthly 
basis to support residents who are not eligible for council housing unit, to rent in the 
private market, and is normally lower than the market price. This is one of the main 
indicators of the shift from public oriented solutions to private based ones. 
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Eligible resident – Those who deserve to get a council housing unit (or subsidised rent) 
are residents who meet the criteria for housing support as laid down by the Ministry of 
Housing. 
 
Before the State was established – Jews have lived in Palestine (the name of the territory 
where now Israel is located) since 1492, but the main movement of Jews to Palestine 
began in around 1881. The Zionist movement encouraged Jews from Europe to immigrate 
to Palistine, which until 1948 was under the British mandate, but the major immigration 
wave began after World War Two when many Jews believed that the newly-born Jewish 
State is the safest place for them. In order to solve the constant tension between Jews and 
Arab-Muslim living on the same land, the General Assembly of the UN adopted a 
compromise plan for partition between the groups (resolution 181, 29 November 1947). 
The Jews accepted the plan and the Arab Muslims rejected it, which led to war. On May 14 
1948, the day before the expiration of the British Mandate, the Jews announced the 
establishment of the Jewish State. After a year of fighting, a cease-fire was announced and 
the borders of the State were announced. Israel was accepted to the UN as a member on 11 
of May 1949. 
 
Immigration waves – After the establishment of the new State and the experience of the 
holocaust in Europe, many Jews from across the world decided to emigrate to the newly-
born state (in Hebrew, ‘make an Aliya’). There were two main immigration periods; the 
major immigration of over half a million Jews (687,624), into Israel which occurred 
between 1948 and 1950, with many fleeing renewed persecution in Eastern Europe and 
increasingly hostile Arab countries (the majority arrived from Europe, especially from 
Poland and Romania) and Asia (mainly from Iraq). A second large-scale immigration wave 
occurred between 1990 and 1999 (956,319), mainly from the former Soviet Union and 
Ethiopia.  
 
Ma’abara – Temporary housing sites created instantly by the government during the 
1950s, in order to offer new immigrants decent shelter, minimal housing conditions, 
mainly tents. Some have compared these temporary sites to refugee camps. These camps 
were located in periphery areas and the idea behind is population spread across the 
country. 
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Economic dispersal –The Israeli government has deliberately promoted occupation of 
periphery, in order to raise the number of people living in them, as part of this process was 
building council housing in order to encourage residents to move to the periphery.  
 
Political dispersal – The Israeli government deliberately promoted occupation of areas 
where the state wanted to gain political or bilateral control or in order to increase the 
number of Jewish residents over non-Jewish residents (mainly in periphery).  
 
The ethnic dispute over housing – The two main groups of immigrants to Israel, 
comprised the first wave of European, secular, educated Jews and the subsequent 
immigrants from Asia and Africa who were more traditional, older in age and had 
language difficulties. There were many claims that since the ruling hegemony was of 
European ethnicity, it was more likely for new immigrants from Europe to be granted 
permanent housing in more central locations. The majority of new immigrants from Asia 
and Africa were therefore directed to Ma’abarot or to the newly built shikunim in the 
periphery. 
 
Shikunim – These are large, densely populated housing estates initially built by the 
government and offer social housing to replace the Ma’abara.  
 
 
39. Shikonim (council housing estates) Haifa.  
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The periphery – This comprises cities, villages and communities far from the centre of the 
country and mainly in the south (negev) or north (Gallile) to where the government 
decided to spread the population..  
 
 
40. Israel – population density. 
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41. Map of Israel’s periphery (the north is in yellow and the south in light green), the NS are in 
pink and brown. Source: http://www.syds-blog.blogspot.co.uk/2009_05_01_archive.html 
 
Jerusalem – This is the capital of Israel and its second largest city, located in the east of 
the country with a mixed population of Jews, ultra-Orthodox Jews, Arab-Muslim and 
Christian. In 2011 it had 935,688 residents, 12% of the state population. 
  
Tel Aviv – The financial hub, the economic capital and the largest city in Israel, located in 
the centre of the State next to the sea. In 2011 there were 1,325,558 residents, 17% of the 
Israeli population
1
. The vast majority are Jewish with a small non-Jewish community, 
mainly in Jaffa. 
 
Haifa – The third largest city in Israel and the biggest in the north. It has a mix of Jews, 
Christian and Arab Muslim. In 2011 there were around 900,000 residents, 11% of the 
State’s population. 
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Galilee – An area in the north with a high proportion of non-Jews who mainly live in small 
villages. 
 
42. Map of Galilee area. 
 
Negev – The largest part of Israel in size and the smallest in population, located in the 
south of Israel, mainly populated by low income groups. 
 
The New Settlements (NS) – These are Jewish civilian communities built on the land of 
the West Bank and Gaza strip (before evictions). The New Settlements were governed by 
the Israel Army, but according to the international law, are not part of the State of Israel. In 
2009 they had 516,569 Jewish settlers.
 1
  The area is densely populated by Palestinians 
(Arab Muslim) who are not residents of Israel but of the Palestinian authority. In 2009 they 
totalled 3,935,249.
1
 The government’s investment in housing projects in the NS is 
considered excessive, despite the fact that the majority of the communities are not 
considered poor and the area is under legal dispute.   
 
The Eviction from Gaza Strip (AKA The Disengagement – The Israeli government 
decided to withdraw Israeli citizens and the army from the Gaza Strip. This entailed 
another form of D&R, but one that was guided by a political rather than social agenda. The 
decision taken by the then right wing government led by Ariel Sharon (traditionally known 
as one of the main supporter of the settlers) caused massive riots and protests among 
settlers but was backed by the general public  
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Kibbutzim – A collective community unique to Israel, traditionally based on agriculture, 
although today farming has been partly supplanted by other economic activities like 
industry and technology. In its early days the Kibbutzim were governed by the utopian idea 
of social community and Zionism, where members shared both rights and duties. In recent 
years some have been privatised. In 2010, there were 270 Kibbutzim in Israel, and the 
most recent statistics, from 2007, show that 119,700 people were living in them, less than 
2% of the State’s population. 
 
Non-Jewish residents – There are few religious groups other than Jews in Israel, the 
second largest being the Arab Muslim, who are considered generally to be poor. It is 
important to note that this community is not Palestinian. The Palestinians live in the West 
Bank and are not residents of the Israeli State. Their rights and duties are governed directly 
by the Palestinian Authority, whereas the Israeli Arab citizens are governed by the state of 
Israel as equal residents of Israel. 
 
Israeli population by religion at the end of 2008
69
 
 
Religion Population % of total 
Jewish 5,569,200 75.5 
Muslim 1,240,000 16.8 
Christian 153,100 2.1 
Druze 121,900 1.7 
Unclassified by choice 289,800 3.9 
 
The map below presents the spread of Arab population in Israel 
 
                                                 
69
 Statistical abstract of Israel, 2009 
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43. The Arab population in Israel. 
 
Arab villages – Most Arab Muslims live in their own communities in separate villages, 
although there are some mixed neighbourhoods in cities where Jews and Arabs live 
together (e.g. Haifa, Jaffa, Lod, Ramle, Accra, Jerusalem). 
 
The evolution of the Arab-Muslim community since the establishment of the Israeli 
State
70
 
 
Year Jews Muslims Muslims % 
1950 1,203.0 116.1 8.8 
1972 2,752.7 360.6 11.6 
1995 4,522.3 811.2 15.2 
2000 4.955.4 970.0 16.7 
 
                                                 
70
 Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010 
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Ultra-Orthodox Jews – A very religious groups, who live in closed communities and 
maintain their culture and traditions very strictly. They tend to have large families. They 
are very powerful politically and are thus granted additional benefits, including in housing.  
   
 
44. Ultra-Orthodox Jews. 
 
The Jewish Agency for Israel - JA – An organisation that works with Jewish people in 
Israel and beyond to “ensure a future of connected, committed global Jewish people with a 
strong Israel at its centre”.71 The Jewish Agency was involved in the immigration and 
absorption of Jews from around the world into the State of Israel. The JA own a 50% share 
of the council housing company Amigur.  
 
The Likud regime – A right wing party with a liberal and free market agenda, which 
gained power for the first time in 1977. When it was first elected it was claimed that it was 
supported by many residents from poor neighbourhoods and new immigrants from Asia 
and Africa. Recently it has become more supportive of residents in the settlements and of 
religious groups. In 1977 it was led by Menahem Begin who introduced the NRP, and is 
currently led by Benjamin Netanyahu, under whose regime the Likud led its opposition to 
RTB. 
 
The Labour regime – Social agenda party, it was in power from the establishment of the 
State until 1977, again from 1992 until 1996 and finally from 1999 until 2001. During its 
                                                 
71
 http://www.jafi.org.il/JewishAgency/English/Home/ 
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first period in government, D&R was introduced, and during its last period in power, RTB 
was initiated. 
 
D&R – The Demolish and Rebuild Programme was initiated in 1960 and operated mainly 
in central cities. The programme demolished old, poor neighbourhoods and built new 
improved housing units with greater tenure. This programme is discussed in detail in 
chapter 5. 
 
NRP – The Neighbourhood Renewal Programme offers regeneration for poor 
neighbourhoods with housing improvements and exterior extension of units. This 
programme is discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
 
RTB – Right to Buy, a law that enabled the selling of council housing units to its residents 
with discounts based on tenure and seniority. It was first approved in 1997 with a strong 
lobbying from residents and despite objections from the Likud Government, but was only 
put into practice when the Left Coalition came into power in 1999. It is discussed in more 
detail in chapter 7.  
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Appendices 
 
APPENDIX 1 – Public versus Private Building in Israel 
 
1.1 Public vs. Private Building in Israel 1955–2003 
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This table shows all units built in Israel between 1955 and 2003. The table has two main 
parts and reads from right to left. The far right column presents the years, then there is a 
comparison between the two other columns, the one on the right for start of building and 
the one on the left for completed building. Each section also has sub-categories which 
contain (from right to left) the total number of units, both publicly and privately built. The 
figures shows the changes in public build compared to private, mainly according to the 
immigration waves of 1990. Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005. 
 
1.2. Public vs. private building between 1963 and 2003 
 
 
This graph shows the percentage of public build (in blue) and private build (in grey) and 
the reduction of public build in the late 1970s and its sudden increase in 1990. Source: 
Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005  
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1.3. The Dominance of Public Building in the 1990s  
 
This graph presents the share of public (in blue) and private (in grey) building in Israel for 
the period of 1973–2008. It mainly shows the decrease in public building from the late 
1960s to the rise in public building during the 1990s in response to immigration from the 
former USSR. 
 
1.4. Public and private build in Israel 1970–2010 
 
This figure shows the decrease in public building (light green) from the late 1970s to the 
1980s. It also shows the high rise in public building in response to the massive 
immigration waves of the 1990s. Source: Central Bureau of Statistics. 
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1.5. Share of public/private building: map 
 
This table shows the share of public build (in purple) and private build (in green) on a map. 
The areas in the NS and some locations in the south and far north of Israel have a greater 
share of public build than any other. Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010. 
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APPENDIX 2 – Neighbourhood Renewal Programme Surveys 
 
2.1. Comparison between density rates in the Neighbourhood Renewal and national 
rates  
 
Number of people in 
room / source 
0–1 1 –2 2 –3 3 and more 
NRP 51.7% 35% 11.2% 2.1% 
National Density rate 74.2% 21.2% 4.2% 0.5% 
Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011 
 
This table shows the high density in NRP neighbourhoods compared to the national 
average (before the NRP was initiated). 
 
2.2. Number of people living in small units (1–2 beds) before the NRP operated  
Location/ 
people 
per unit 
(%) 
A B C D E F G H I J K Total 
1-2 35.7 35.5 21.3 28.3 18.0 24.6 12.5 21.1 37.7 33.4 14.9 26.1 
3 17.8 21.2 14.7 19.1 13.4 14.6 13.7 14.5 22.5 17.9 23.4 16.9 
4 25.2 17.2 21.7 22.0 20.9 13.7 18.8 22.8 17.2 20.7 16.3 20.3 
5 9.9 10.6 16.4 18.9 17.9 18.6 20.7 19.4 7.2 9.7 24.8 14.9 
6 + 11.4 15.5 26.0 11.7 29.8 28.5 34.3 22.2 15.4 18.3 20.6 21.8 
Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011 
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2.3 Number of people in small units after the NRP was operated  
 
Persons 
per room 
% 
A B C D E F G H I J K Total 
0 – 1 58.4 64.2 38.6 52.4 53.6 49.4 46.3 53.1 62.6 59.2 54.4 51.7 
1- 2 30.1 30.5 42.9 33.2 36.9 37.3 38.0 32.3 26.4 28.3 39.9 35 
2 +  11.5 5.3 18.5 14.4 9.5 13.3 15.7 14.6 11.0 12.5 5.7 13.3 
Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011 
 
This comparison shows how the NRP helped to ease density. 
 
2. 4. Willingness to participate in community activities (data in %) 
 
Neighbourhood 
in the 
programme 
A B C D E F G H I J K Total 
% willing to 
participate 
68.0 67.0 44.0 33.0 55.0 50.0 67.0 75.0 58.0 49.0 49.0 56.0 
Source: MOH, 2003 
 
This table presents percentages of residents who responded positively when asked about 
their willingness to participate in the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme. In 8 out of 11 
neighbourhoods more than 50% of residents were willing to participate in the programme. 
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Index: Neighbourhoods and locations in Appendix 2.2 & 2.3 
 
A – Acre, northern Israel 
B – Migdal Ha’emek, northern Israel 
C – Lod, central Israel – mixed population Jewish and Arabs 
D – Jerusalem, the capital – eastern Israel 
E – Yeruham, southern Israel 
F – Tiberius, northern Israel 
G – Beit Shemesh, eastern Israel  
H – Beit Shean, northern Israel 
I – Beer Sheva, southern Israel 
J – Ashkelon, southern Israel 
K – Or Akiva, northern Israel 
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2.5. The most important issues residents of NRP hoped to achieve through the 
programme 
 
Index: The issues 
 
1. Refurbishment and extension of dwellings 
2. Neighbourhood’s external façade 
3. Support for disconnected juveniles (youngsters who do not work or study) 
4. Education levels 
5. Crime management 
6. Support for the extremely poor 
7. Reducing unemployment rates 
8. Entertainment services 
9. Improving the neighbourhood’s image 
10. Empowering the community. 
 
Table: The list of issues as they appear in importance (on a scale of 1 being the most 
important) over the years of operation of the NRP 
 
 1983 1986 1989 1992 1996 2002 
1 59 (1) 45 (2) 35 (3-4) 29 (5) 37 (3) 24.9 (2) 
2 55 (2) 55 (1) 54 (1) 59 (1) 66 (1) 54.3 (1) 
3 38 (3) 35 (3) 29 (7) 30 (4) 20 (8) 14.4 (7) 
4 35 (4) 34 (4) 33 (5) 28  (6) 27 (5) 16.1 (6) 
5 32 (5) 24 (7) 41 (2) 45 (2) 33 (4) 24 (3) 
6 27 (6) 32 (5) 35 (3-4) 26 (7) 41 (2) 19.1 (4) 
7 18 (7) 28 (6) 30 (6) 38 (3) 24 (6) 18.6 (5) 
8 16 (8) 22 (8) 18 (8) 25 (8) 22 (7) 11.4 (9) 
9 9 (9) 9 (9) 9 (9) 10 (9) 10 (10) 12.1 (8) 
10 7 (10) 8 (10) 5 (10) 6 (10) 12 (9) 4.2 (10) 
Source: MOH, 2003 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Exhibits A–M: Card-sorting exercise 
 
1. The Social Housing Programmes 
 
 
A 
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B 
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C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
311 
2. Level of Participation  
 
 
D 
 
 
E 
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F 
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G 
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3. Type of Housing Communities 
 
 
H 
 
I 
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M 
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APPENDIX 4 – Table of Interviewees for this research  
NAME SEX AGE ETHNICITY OCCUPATION MARITAL 
STATUS 
TENURE ADDRESS DATE 
Leaders         
E. Zazon Male 66 Sephardic 
(Morocco) 
 Retired (Postman) Married + Former 
council 
housing 
bought 
RTB 
Jerusalem 11.4.06 
A. Hajaj Male 63 Sephardic Driver, disabled Married + Former 
council 
housing 
bought 
RTB 
Tel Aviv 09.05.06 
@  
17:00 
G. Golan Male 53 Sephardic – 
Yamane 
IT manager, Amidar – 
Housing Company 
Married +4 Private 
tenure 
 Kfar Gvirol, 
Rehovot 
16.01.07 
@ 20:30 
Z. Adika  Female 60 Sephardic – 
Kurdistan 
Training Social Worker Widowed +5 +13 Council 
housing 
Jerusalem 20.12.06 
@ 19:00 
L. Halfa  Male 37 Sephardic – 
Algeria and 
Tunis   
Head of evacuees’ 
committee 
Married +6 Temporary 
caravan 
The temporary 
site of Nitzan  
29.07.07 
@ 09:00 
I. Twito Male 41 (died 
since) 
Mixed (mother 
Ashkenazi, 
Father 
Sephardic).  
unemployed – disabled, 
living on benefits 
divorced, single 
parent father for 
three girls. 
Temporary 
caravan 
Givat Shmuel 29.06.06 
@ 14:30 
B. Arajuani  Female 44 Sephardic head of the Residents’ 
Rights Organisation and 
Single Parents Committee 
Divorced +1 Council 
housing 
Jerusalem 8.05.06 
@ 13:45 
F. Drix Male 60 Sephardic – 
Tunis  
Unemployed Divorced +4 Homeless – 
waiting for 
council 
housing 
Holon.  09.05.06 
@ 10:00 
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NAME SEX AGE ETHNICITY OCCUPATION MARITAL 
STATUS 
TENURE ADDRESS DATE 
A. Zur  Male 57 Ashkenazi  Former mayor of the 
regional Council of Gaza 
Seashore, evicted, now 
unemployed and at times 
financial advisor 
Married +6+7 Temporary 
caravan 
Yad Binyamin 05.04.07
; 19:30 
D. Benisti Male 44 Sephardic – 
Morocco 
Lawyer, social activist Single Former 
council 
housing 
bought 
RTB 
Jerusalem 08.05.06 
@  
17:00 
E. Harush Male 58 Sephardic 
(Morocco) 
State Employee – Ministry 
of Defence 
Married +4 Former 
council 
housing 
bought 
before RTB 
Hrtzeliya 03.04.07 
@ 14:30 
R. Aberjel Male 68 Sephardic 
(Morocco) 
Social Worker Divorced +, 
Living with 
Partner. 
Council 
housing 
Jerusalem 14.4.06  
@ 11:00 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
09.05.06  
@ 15:00 
A. Aflalo Male 53 Sephardic – 
Morocco 
Social Worker/ Property 
Assessor 
Divorced Former 
council 
housing 
bought 
RTB 
Ashdod   10.10.06 
@ 10:00 
A. Sabag Female 46 Sephardic 
Sabra – born in 
Israel, Parents 
– Morocco. 
Operator, Local 
Community Co–operative 
Supermarket – food and 
home ingredients in basic 
costs 
 
 
Divorced +2 Council 
housing 
Jerusalem 08.11.06 
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NAME SEX AGE ETHNICITY OCCUPATION MARITAL 
STATUS 
TENURE ADDRESS DATE 
S. Vazana Male 42 Sephardic 
(Morocco) 
Film Director and Lecturer Married +2 Former 
council 
housing 
bought 
RTB 
Jerusalem  8.5.06 
A. Zauda Male 32 Shephrdic – 
Ethiopia (New 
Immigrant) 
Member of the City 
Council (elected), 
Chairperson of the local 
residents’ organisation, 
New Immigrants co–
operator – the Trade Union 
Federation 
Married + 1 Private 
ownership  
Kiryat Moshe 
– Rehovot  
12.10.06 
D. Kashani Male 64 Sephardic – 
Iran 
Pensioner, voluntarily 
running residents’ 
information bureau 
Married +2 Former 
council 
housing 
bought 
RTB 
Tel Aviv  12.4.06 
@  
09:30 
Common P.         
R. Chalfus  Female 62 Ashkenazi Retired Divorced +2 Council 
housing 
Tel Aviv  27.6.06 
S. Sayda  Male 38 Arab – Muslim Unemployed living on 
benefits 
Married +4 Council 
housing 
Kfar Maker 7.11.06 
@ 17:30 
L.& E. Nadler Male & 
Female 
56 & 58 Sephardic – 
Argentina. 
Electrician; Secretary in the 
local municipality. 
Married Council 
housing 
Kfar Saba. 09.10.06 
@ 18:30 
D.& R. Balsi Male & 
Female 
58 & 54 Sephardic – 
Yamane 
Local Municipality 
Employee; Post Office 
Employee 
Married +3 Council 
housing  
Tel Aviv – 
Jaffa 
27.05.07 
@  
20:30 
M. Yashar  Male 45 Sabra (parents 
Sephardic – 
Iran) 
Janitor in an elementary 
school 
Single Council 
housing 
Holon  09.11.06 
@  
16:30 
        01.07.06 
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NAME SEX AGE ETHNICITY OCCUPATION MARITAL 
STATUS 
TENURE ADDRESS DATE 
S. Bat Chava Female 54 Ashkenazi – 
Anglo–Saxon – 
USA. 
Secretary, volunteer – 
Local Community Co–
operative Supermarket – 
food and home ingredients 
in basic costs.  
Single, living with 
a partner +2 
Council 
housing 
Jerusalem  08.11.06 
@ 13:30 
S. Meidani Female 45 Mixed – 
Eastern 
European and 
Iran 
Assistant nursery teacher Married + 4 Private 
ownership  
Tel Aviv  10.10.06  
@ 20:00 
Z &. T Awadat Male & 
Female 
50 & 52 Sephardic – 
Morocco and 
Aden – 
Yamane 
Carpenter; Secretary Married +4+ 2 Former 
council 
housing 
bought 
RTB 
Nes Tziona 18.12.06 
M. Ezov  Male 42 Ashkenazi Unemployed, living on 
benefits and disabled 
support. Volunteer in 
residents committee 
Married +2 Council 
housing 
Jerusalem / 
Kiryat Arba  
28.06.06  
@  
17:30 
D. Elimelech  Male 46 Sephardic – 
Morocco 
trained Sheaf, disabled, 
unemployed 
Single Council 
housing 
Tel Aviv – 
Jaffa 
8.10.06 
A. Biton Male 57 Sephardic – 
Morocco 
Local City Council 
Employee 
Married +3 Former 
council 
housing 
bought 
before RTB 
Tel Aviv  2.7.06 
M. Edri Female 49 Sephardic Unemployed Divorced + 2 
Living with 
Partner. 
Council 
housing  
 
Ashdod 14.4.06  
@ 13:00 
A. Dagan Male 54 Sephardic – 
Iraq 
Car mechanic in a local 
Garage 
Married +3 Private 
ownership 
 
Tel Aviv  2.7.06 
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NAME SEX AGE ETHNICITY OCCUPATION MARITAL 
STATUS 
TENURE ADDRESS DATE 
Random  Random Random Random       
A. & H. Zidan Male & 
Female 
61 & 48 Arab – Muslim Carpenter and Housewife Married +2 Council 
housing 
Kfar Maker 7.11.06 
M&.N Solomon Male & 
Female 
38 & 67 Sephardic – 
Ethiopia 
– Local city employee, 
pensioner 
Married +1, 
Widowed + 2 
Council 
housing 
Rehovot 15.01.07 
@ 17:00 
R. Mimi Female 71 Sephardic Pensioner Widow ++ Council 
housing 
Lod  26.06.06  
@ 13:30 
E. Shachar Male 56 Sephardic – 
Tunis. 
Taxi Driver Married Former 
council 
housing 
bought 
before RTB 
Rishon LeZion  09.05.06  
@ 15:30 
M. Hamudi Male 30 Arab – Muslim Driver Engaged Council 
housing 
Kfar Maker 7.11.06  
@ 1900 
E. Trayzman Female 67 Sephardic – 
Morocco 
Pensioner Married + 10 Council 
Housing 
Lod  26.06.06  
@ 13:30 
        7.11.06 
S. Shulavich Female 22 Sephardic – 
Morocco 
Student Married +1 Private 
ownership  
Petach Tikva.  31.05.07 
@  
11:00 
Y. Harush Male 48 Ashkenazi Taxi Driver Married Former 
council 
housing 
bought 
before RTB 
Tel Aviv North  09.05.06  
@ 14:30 
D. & S. Azulai Male and 
Female 
56 & 50 Sephardic – 
Syria & Turkey 
Construction Worker; 
Seamstress 
Married +2 Former 
council 
housing 
bought 
before RTB 
Tel Aviv – 
Jaffa  
08.10.06 
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NAME SEX AGE ETHNICITY OCCUPATION MARITAL 
STATUS 
TENURE ADDRESS DATE 
Z. Barda Female 78 Sephardic Pensioner Divorced, Mother 
and Grandmother 
Council 
Housing  
Lod  26.06.06  
@ 12:30 
A. Amer  Male 41 Arab – Muslim Unemployed Married +4 Council 
housing 
Kfar Maker 7.11.06 
@ 20:30 
C. Gutman Male 26 Ashkenazi – 
Poland and 
Germany 
District Manager in the 
religious youth movement – 
‘Benei Akiva’. 
Married +1 Council 
housing 
Kiryat Arba  11.10.06
; 10:00 
H. Cohen Female 69 Sephardic – 
Morocco 
Pensioner Widowed + 7 Council 
Housing 
Lod  26.06.06  
@ 14:00 
A. Yatosha Male 45 Sephardic – 
Ethiopia 
Unemployed  Divorced/ 
Widowed +2 
Council 
Housing 
Kiryat Moshe 
– Rehovot  
17.12.06 
Informers         
L. Weintrob Male 32 Ashkenazi – 
Anglo–
American. 
Governmental Employee – 
Foreign Affairs’ Counsel 
Married +2 Private rent Tel Aviv  25.6.06 
S. Asheri  Female 39 Ashkenazi – 
Italy  
Lobbying and Group 
Consultant Social in social 
NGO – ‘Shatil’ 
Living with a 
partner +2 
Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem  20.12.06 
@  
16:30 
Dr. Y. Dahan Male 52 Sephardic – 
Morocco 
Academic, N.G.O. active 
member 
Married Private 
ownership 
Oxford 
University. 
15.07.06 
@ 14:00 
A. Zelender  Male 50 Ashkenazi 
(former USSR) 
Manager of an Estate 
Housing for Elderly New 
Immigrants. 
Married +2 Private 
ownership 
Petach Tikva. 31.05.07  
@  
14:15 
J.P. Alalo Male 61 Sephardic – 
Peru. 
Councillor in the city hall 
of Jerusalem. 
Married + 3  Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem. 08.11.06 
@  
19:00 
A. Merling Male 56 Sabra (parents 
– Ashkenazi – 
Romania) 
Psychologist, Retired Pilot. Married +2 Private 
ownership 
Yavne. 06.11.06 
@ 13:30 
09.10.06 
@ 10:00 
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NAME SEX AGE ETHNICITY OCCUPATION MARITAL 
STATUS 
TENURE ADDRESS DATE 
A. Amiel Male 78 Sephardic – 
Morocco 
Retired, former head of the 
welfare department in the 
municipality of the city of 
Jerusalem 
Married Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem 01.09.06 
B. Epstein  Female 56 Ashkenazi – 
Anglo–
American 
U.S.A. 
Manger – the Social Rights 
Advocacy Centre in 
Jerusalem. 
Married Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem 28.06.06 
@ 15:30 
L. Warton  Female 43 Ashkenazi – 
USA  
PhD student in the Political 
Science department, the 
Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, former 
coordinator of the residents 
group – ‘Kol Ba’Schunot’. 
Divorced +2 Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem 10.10.06 
@ 16:30 
Y. Nuri Male 56 Mixed – Latvia 
and Kazakhstan 
Senior Assistant for welfare 
issues to the Mayor of 
Hertzeliya 
Married +2 Private 
ownership 
Hertzeliya 09.10.06  
@ 13:15 
L. Kindler  Female 51 Ashkenazi – 
USA 
Coordinator of the Toronto 
congregation in NRP 
project in Israel and fund 
raiser. 
Married  +1 Private 
ownership 
Ra’anana  06.11.06 
@ 17:30 
S. David Male 42 Mix – Greece 
and Russia  
Lobbying and Group 
Consultant Social in social 
NGO – ‘Shatil’ 
Married +2 Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem  17.01.07 
@  
15:00 
C. Batz Female 30 Ashkenazi – 
France 
Business Development 
Officer in lobbying firm. 
Married +1 
(pregnant) 
Private 
ownership 
Hertzeliya 09.11.06 
@ 21:30 
M. Margalit Male 54 Sephardic – 
Argentina. 
Human Rights NGO – 
Former councillor in the 
city hall of Jerusalem 
Separated + 3  Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem 10.10.06 
@  
14:00 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
08.11.06 
@ 16:00 
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NAME SEX AGE ETHNICITY OCCUPATION MARITAL 
STATUS 
TENURE ADDRESS DATE 
T. Atias  Male 36 Sephardic – 
Morocco 
Advocate Married +2 Private 
ownership 
Rishon Le–
Zion 
10.10.06  
@  
12:30 
Dr. E. Bustin  Female 61 Sabra – 
parents’ origin: 
Ashkenazi 
Russia. 
Independent consultant for 
building societies in multi–
cultural environments. 
Married +3 Private 
ownership 
Gedera.  09.11.06  
@ 10:30 
: Mr. Y. 
Linskind & Mrs. 
S. Kushnir 
Male & 
Female 
56 & 41 Ashkenazi (Mr 
Linskind 
Poland and 
Mrs. Kushnir 
Russia. 
Both are local coordinators 
of the social section in the 
Neighbourhood Renewal 
Project – Mr. Libskind 
represents the municipality; 
Mrs. Kushnir represents the 
Ministry of Housing.  
Mr. Linskind 
married +5, Mrs. 
Kushnir married + 
2 
Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem  17.01.07  
@  
14:00 
I. Danon Female 37 Sephardic – 
Turkey and 
Yemen 
Social Worker currently 
with the welfare department 
in the Jerusalem 
Municipality, former 
coordinator of the housing 
forum in ‘Shatil’. 
Married +2 Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem 18.12.06 
Implementors         
A. Ravdal – 
Nadkov  
Female 56 Ashkenazi – 
born in Israel 
(Sabra) 
Head of the social section 
in the Neighbourhood 
Renewal Project – Ministry 
of Housing  
Married  Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem. 20.12.06 
Prof. D. 
Shimshoni 
Male 87 Ashkenazi – 
USA. 
The NRP manager in the 
PMO office when the 
project announced, Prof. in 
Political Science and 
socials Policy.  
 
 
Married Private 
ownership 
Herzeliya 18.01.07 
@ 14:00 
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NAME SEX AGE ETHNICITY OCCUPATION MARITAL 
STATUS 
TENURE ADDRESS DATE 
 
S. Ben Eliyahu 
 
Male 
 
52 
 
Sephardic – 
Iraq. 
 
Former Director General, 
Ministry of Housing, 
Director General ILA, 
Director General Settlement 
Division WZO. 
 
Married +4 
 
Private 
ownership 
 
Jerusalem 
17.01.07
@ 10:00 
O. Laufman Male 41 Ashkenazi – 
East Europe 
General Director, the 
settlement division of the 
World Zionist 
Organisation. 
Married Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem  16.01.07  
@   
11:00 
T. Miyara Female 58 Sephardic – 
Morocco. 
Former General Manager – 
Amidar 
Married  + 3 Private 
ownership 
Ramat Gan  09.10.06 
@ 15:30 
M. Merchaviya Male 48 Ashkenazi 
(former USSR 
immigrated to 
Israel in 1987). 
Head of the District of 
Jerusalem – Ministry of 
Housing  
Married +10 Private 
ownership 
The settlement 
of Eli 
19.12.06 
@  
10:00 
I. Shwartz Male 60 Ashkenazi – 
Poland. 
Senior Deputy Director 
General and Head of the 
habituation department – 
Ministry of Housing  
Married Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem 20.12.06 
@ 10:00 
Dr. Z. 
Weinstein 
Male 58 Ashkenazi – 
Sabra. 
Senior Governmental 
Employee – manager of the 
NRP project for the central 
district, in the Ministry of 
Housing.   
 Private 
ownership 
Tel Aviv 18.01.07 
@ 09:30 
S. Eldor Female 62 Ashkenazi – 
Poland 
Head of the Urban Renewal 
Department– Ministry of 
Housing  
Widowed  Private 
ownership 
Tel Aviv 20.12.06  
@  
12:30 
Dr. C. Fialkoff Male 53 Ashkenazi – 
U.S.A 
Senior Deputy Director 
General, Ministry of 
Housing. 
Married +3 Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem 9.10.06 
@ 15:30 
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NAME SEX AGE ETHNICITY OCCUPATION MARITAL 
STATUS 
TENURE ADDRESS DATE 
G. Ilani Male 43 Sephardic 
Sabra –born in 
Israel, parents 
born in Iraq 
and Italy 
Project manager of two 
council housing estates, 
employed by a private 
company  
Married +1 Private 
ownership 
Lod 16.1.07 
@ 17:00 
E. Pade Male 65 Sephardic – 
Morocco. 
Senior Governmental 
Employee – deputy 
manager of the department 
for community work 
services in the Ministry of 
Welfare. 
Married + 2 Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem. 27.05.07 
@  
15:30 
C.Hovav Female 71 Sabra 
(Ashkenazi) – 
Israel 
(originally 
Germany) 
Head of the NRP 
department in the Ministry 
of Housing, retired. 
Married Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem 8.10.06 
Decision–
makers 
        
R. Cohen Male 67 Sephardic 
(Iraq). 
Member of the parliament, 
the initiator of the RTB and 
former Minister of Industry 
and Trade  
 
Married +4+2 Private 
ownership 
Jerusalem.  05.04.07  
@  
14:00 
T. Guzanski  Female 67 Sabra – 
Ashkenazi. 
Former Member of 
Parliament. 
Married  +2 +2 Private 
ownership 
Bat Yam.  04.04.07 
@ 18:00 
Y.Edelstein  Male 48 Ashkenazi 
(former USSR) 
immigrant to 
Israel in 1987. 
Former minister of 
Absorption and a member 
of parliament – rejoin the 
parliament again a month 
after the interview 
conducted 
Married +2 Private 
ownership 
Alon Shvut, 
Gush Etzion.  
18.12.06  
@  
16:00 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
5.1. A comparative description of Neighbourhood Renewal Programme case studies 
analysed in this research 
 
Case Study/ 
Criteria 
Katamonim Eir Ganim Sanhedriya Shapira Kfar Gvirol Jessi Cohen 
Population  5,900 3,500 8,682 9,000 2,500 10,026 
Number of 
households  
2300 1,100 784 4100 900 3,703 
Home owners 52% 64% 64% 27% 51* 32* 
Average 
household 
2.7 3.1 4.6 2.3 2.9  3 
Size of the 
neighbourhood 
0.45km2 0.2km2 0.73km2 0.82 km2 0.98 km2 0.8 km2* 
Number of units 2,283 1,257 2349 4,712 1054 4700* 
Total size of 
units in m2 
119,481 67,010 118,000* 270,962 103,633 
 
270,000* 
Average size of a 
unit in m2 
52.3 53.3  52* 57.5 51* 58* 
Density (people 
in km2) 
12,207  16,480 21,000* 11,041 11,041 
 
14,000* 
 
Density per unit 0.9 1.1* 5.6* 2.9 1.4* 2.9 
 
Religious groups 
(new 
immigrants) 
Jews 100% Jews 90% 
Arab 
Muslim 
10% 
 
Jews 100% 
(majority 
ultra-
Orthodox)   
Jews 
80.8%  
Others 
19.2% 
 
Jews 100% 
 
Jews 89% 
(35% are new 
immigrants), 
Muslims  
0.5% 
Employment  63% 59.3% 
 
45% 69.9% 71% 56% 
Socially 
dependent 
2.69% 3.49% 
 
4.4%* 2.09 1.6* 2.5%* 
Current Value 
of a unit 
441,700 
NIS72 
441,700 NIS  972,700 NIS 613,793 
NIS  
664,672 
NIS  
490,055 NIS  
Value after 
D&R (calculated 
per 300% 
housing rights) 
1,063,000 
NIS 
1,063,000 
NIS  
2,012,000 
NIS 
1,412,000 
NIS  
1,112,000 
NIS 
1,011,000 
NIS 
  
                                                 
72
 1 NIS =  £0.6 
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5.2. A Comparison of Right to Buy case studies analysed in this research 
   
Neighbourhoods National 
Housing 
Company 
Local 
Housing 
Company 
Location Ethnicity RTB 
Leaders* 
Protests 
Katamonim + Pat Amidar Prazot Jerusalem Jews, New 
Immigrants 
(1960s) 
Yes Yes 
Eir Ganim Amidar Prazot Jerusalem  Jews, New 
Immigrants 
(1950s) 
Yes Yes 
Kiryat Moshe Amidar  Rehovot 
Central Israel 
Jews, New 
Immigrants 
(1990s) 
Yes Yes 
Lod - Merkaz Amidar  Lod Central 
Israel 
Jews, Arabs No No 
Ramat Sharet Amigur Prazot Jerusalem Jews Religious 
+ New 
Immigrants 
(1950s) 
Yes Yes 
Derech Lod + 
Hatikva 
Amidar Halamish Tel Aviv 
Central Israel 
Jews, New 
Immigrants 
(1960s) 
Yes Yes 
Tel Kabir / Kfir Amidar Halamish Tel- Aviv 
Central Israel 
Jews, Arabs, 
New 
Immigrants 
(1970s) 
Yes Yes 
Neve Sharet Amidar Halamish Tel Aviv – 
Centrel Israel 
Jews, New 
Immigrants 
(1950s) 
No Yes 
Rova Daled (4), 
Hei (5) and Vav 
(6) 
Amigur  Ashdod – 
Southern 
Israel 
Jews, New 
Immigrants 
(1990s) 
Yes Yes 
Shaviv, Yad 
Hatisha 
Amidar  Herzeliya – 
Sharon 
Jews, New 
Immigrants 
(1970s) 
Yes No 
Amishav and 
Immigrants Centre 
Amigur Heled Petach-Tikva 
Crentral 
Israel 
Jews, New 
Immigrants 
(1990s) 
No No 
Kfar Maker Amidar  Northern 
Israel 
Arabs No No 
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Kiryat Arba Amidar  New 
Settlements 
Jews Religious Yes No 
Jessi Cohen Amidar  Holon – 
Central Israel 
Jews, New 
Immigrants 
(1960s +1990s) 
Yes Yes 
Yoseftal Amidar  Kfar Saba – 
Sharon 
Jews, New 
Immigrants 
(1960s) 
Yes Yes 
 
  
  
331 
APPENDIX 6 – Charts and graphs on the Right To Buy 
 
6.1. Number of units and employees in the housing companies  
A total of 503 employees and 9 directors are employed by Amidat to manage 41,000 units, 
while in the regional companies (from right to left, Halamish 2
nd
 in blue, Shikmona first in 
red and then Prazot and Heled) the number of units to manage were smaller than in 
Amidar, company employee numbers were higher. The Finance Ministry used this 
comparison as an example of public money wasted. Source: 
http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/1,7340,L-3607480,00.html  
 
 
 
6.2. Comparison of the share of public housing out of general housing in the EU 
Diagram showing the proportion of publicly funded housing out of total housing in Israel 
compared to other European countries. Left to right: The Netherlands, UK, Austria, 
Sweden, Denmark, France, Finland, Ireland, Israel (orange), Italy, Belgium, Portugal, 
Spain, Luxembourg. Source: http://hamishmar.org.il/  
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6.3. Public support to different groups 
Residents presented figures to argue supportive public policy and a more efficient political 
lobby helped other groups of residents to get better housing conditions. The following 
table presents the tax residents needed to pay for renovating their land to meet the legal 
living requirements (row from right to left), in Moshev, Kibbutz, City, New Buyers, in four 
stages, (column from top down; new buyers, next of kin, 3
rd
 house onwards, commercial 
business. Source: http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=697220 
 
 
 
6.4. The reduction of units managed by Amidar, 1960–2011 (title in Hebrew reads 
‘Amidar Reduced’)  
This diagram shows the decrease public funded solution from 1960. The figures represent 
numbers in thousands. Source: http://www.themarker.com/realestate/1.658528 
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6.5. The decrease in public housing (number of units) per 1000 people since the Right 
to Buy began (between 1999 and 2007).  
The legislators’ initial idea was that the income from sales of units would be used to build 
new ones. In practice the income used to compensate the JA and no new buildings were 
added since.. Source: http://www.tarabut.info/he/articles/article/diyur-stat/ 
 
 
 
6.6. The number of residents on waiting lists and the number of vacant housing 
solutions. Data (column from top down): presents in Tel Aviv Jaffa, Netenya, Holon, 
Ramle, Benei-brak, Bat-Yam. The middle column presents the number of approved cases 
waiting for housing units. The far left column presents the number of empty units.  This 
table shows the lack of housing solutions. This figure is taken from the State Comptroller 
Report 2008. Source: http://www.blacklabor.org/?p=20994 
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6.7. Numbers and location of empty units managed by Amidar. The grey boxes show 
numbers of vacant units, and in red the number of empty units which companies are very 
slow to allocate although the waiting list is long.  Source: 
http://www.themarker.com/realestate/1.1688261 
 
 
 
6.8. ‘Right To Buy’ income and expenditure 
This table summarises revenue from the RTB and how it was spent (rows on the right 
column from top down)  – 1. income from direct sales of council housing units; 2. payment 
to the JA; 3. general expenses; 4. Housing Ministry income from sale of council housing 
units; 5. Housing Ministry housing expenses; 6. purchase of a) standard and b) disabled 
units; 7. Housing Ministry balance; 8. balance of monies paid to council housing 
companies; 9. Finance Ministry balance. The majority went to compensate the JA and very 
little (almost none) was passed to the public housing companies with none directed to build 
new solutions as initially aimed by the RTB. Source: 
http://maavakbs.wordpress.com/category 
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6.9. Quantity of Vacant Houses Held by Amidar and Amigur 
The table shows the decrease in the number of empty public housing units over a decade. 
This shows that demand is higher than supply and explain why residents insisted to 
reinvest RTB income in creating new housing solutions. Source: 
http://goliath3.wordpress.com/2011/10/31/. Housing Ministry Monthly Report, figure C, 6 
July 2004. 
 
 
 
6.10. A comparison of the number of public housing units per 1000 residents in EU – 
(from top down on the right column) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, 
England, Average in Europe, Israel. Israel is far behind. Source: 
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000791504 
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APPENDIX 7 – Illustrations 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
3.1. Tel Aviv, before the establishment of the State 1930. Bauhaus/International style buildings 
constructed in the 1930s in Tel Aviv, Source: http://the-tallyho.blogspot.co.uk/2010/11/white.html. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Poor housing. The neighbourhood of Mamila in Jerusalem in the state’s early days, an example of 
poor housing conditions. Source: Residents’ group archive. 
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3.3. The new ‘Shikun’. Dimona, early 
publicly-funded housing for new 
immigrants to replace the Ma’abara. 
 
Source: 
http://murmolka.com/post/4254/A-
rasskajite-mne-pojaluysta-pro-
zarubejnyie-dlya-jiteley-
postsovetskogo 
 
 
3.4. Publicly-funded housing managed by Amigur in Ofakim in southern Israel. Periphery 
housing.  
Source: http://www.xnet.co.il/articles/0,14538,L-3089378,00.html. Photo by Michael Jakobson. 
 
3.5. Demolish & Rebuild Project add value in central cities. This is D&R in the neighbourhood of 
Kfar Shalem in Tel Aviv, a central location which has huge value, still under commercial dispute 
between residents and the managing company Halamish. Source: 
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000722306. Photo by Tamar Matzfi. 
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3.6. Council housing estate in the periphery. 
New public housing building in the southern 
city of Dimona in 1955. Source: 
http://www.2all.co.il/web/Sites/106FM/PAG
E7.asp 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7. Elderly housing in Ashdod managed by 
Amigur.  
Source: http://www.amigour.co.il/ 
 
 
 
3.8. Students’ dormitories in Techniyon University of Haifa. These housing solutions are 
subsidized and offered for students. Source: 
http://www1.technion.ac.il/_local/includes/blocks/news-items/110720-meonot/news-item.htm 
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3.9. Neighbourhood Renewal Programme in the city of Migdal Ha’Emek. The pictures were taken 
(left) before work and (right) after the renovation completed. Images are from the NRP department 
of the Ministry of Housing. 
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3.10. Neighbourhood Renewal. External works as part of NRP in Or Akiva Source: 
http://www.oraqiva.muni.il/News/Pages/development.aspx 
 
 
 
 
 
3.11. A view of housing in Kfar Maker. The image shows the unplanned infrastructure and 
building regulation widely associated with Arab villages in Israel. Source: 
http://www.peopleil.org/ImageInfo.aspx?pageID=piGalleries&imageid=24262&galleryid=4044&r
n=2&n=0&cId=11 
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3.12. Publicly-funded housing for minorities in Israel. This unit in a Muslim neighbourhood  
highlights the housing problems of the Arab population of the Israeli cities. Many live in poverty 
but there are very few solutions dedicated to this group. Source: 
http://www.tarabut.info/he/articles/article/about-trachtenberg-housing/. 
 
 
 
3.13. New Immigrants arrive in Israel. Young Jewish new immigrants celebrate with the Israeli flag 
as they arrive at Ben Gurion airport in Tel Aviv, Israel. Photograph by Menahem 
Kahana/AFP/Getty Images Source: http://www.tumblr.com/tagged/ben-gurion-airport 
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3.14. New immigrants from Ethiopia arrive by cargo plane. Photo by Miss Rosen. Source: 
http://missrosen.wordpress.com/tag/israel/. 
 
 
 
 
3.15. Urban Renewal Scheme as 
advertised by Halamish for a project 
in Jaffa. Source: 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/
107/229.html 
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3.16. Demolish and Rebuild. Old and 
new houses in a D&R project. 
Source: 
http://www.kono.org.il/?CategoryID
=251&ArticleID=690 
 
  
 
3.17. Moshe Sliman, resident who 
denied housing support, burned 
himself to death in the social unrest 
of 2012.  Source: 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/
471/534.html 
 
  
 
3.18. Akiva Mefei disabled and in 
housing needs burned himself to 
death in the main road of the city of 
Yahud (few weeks after Moshe 
Sliman) during the social unrest of 
2012.  
Source: 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/
388/510.html 
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3.19. Building of publicly-funded 
housing in the city of Hebron 
which is outside the formal borders 
of the Israel State (i.e. a New 
Settlement). This publicly-funded 
housing is not in demand and is 
therefore provided without social 
criteria.  
 
Source: the website of the community, http://www.hebron.co.il/text/history.html 
 
 
3.20. Kibbutz Overview – Kibbutz Mashabei Sade in the 1960s.  
Source: http://blog.saftastory.co.il/?p=297. 
 
 
 
 
3.21. Amidar logo. Amidar is the largest 
Public housing company in Israel. Source: 
http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%A7%D7%
95%D7%91%D7%A5:Amidar_logo.svg 
 3.22. Amigur logo. Amigur is the second largest 
public housing company in Israel, owned jointly 
by the state  and the JA. . Source: 
http://www.amigour.co.il/ 
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3.23. A local housing company. The offices of Halamish, the public housing company that 
deals with stock in Tel Aviv. Source: 
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000734515 
  
 
 
 
3.24. Announcing Afridar’s first units. High 
officials visit Afrider new site in Askelon,when 
public building was controlled by the state. 
Source: Residents archive l.  
 
Source: Residents’ group archive. 
 
 
 
 
3.24. Crowded housing conditions. This family 
(2 adults + 6 and the 7
th
 on the way) lives in a 
single unit house in Jerusalem. The father is 
working and the mother is disabled and they are 
on the waiting list with very little chance of 
getting a unit in Jerusalem.  
 
 
Source: http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/1.1569376 
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3.25. A building managed by Heled, 
a housing company active in the city 
of Petach Tikva.  
The company own by the state and 
Petach Tikva Municipality. Source: 
http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articl
es/0,7340,L-3570136,00.html. Photo 
by Amit Shaal. 
  
 
3.26. Prazot: public housing 
company in Jerusalem. Now own 
by the municipality Source: 
http://www.jerusalemnet.co.il/articl
e/44139 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3.27. Shikmona Housing in the old 
city of Haifa. Source: 
http://j14.org.il/articles/43641 
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3.28. Illegal housing in the new 
settlements. The neighbourhood of the 
Ulpana in Bet El. Was a source of 
legal arguments about the land on 
which the houses built. Suprime Court 
ordered to demolish the houses built 
illegally Source: 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/36
0/127.html 
  
 
 
3.29. Post eviction. Images of the 
deserted houses in Gush Katif after 
residents were evicted and protests 
ended. Source: 
http://www.pbase.com/bardugo/gush_
katif. 
 
  
 
 
  
3.30. Protests  against the eviction from Gaza.  
Source: 
http://www.galim.org.il/peoples/katif/hitnatkut2.ht
ml. 
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 3.31. Residents’ protests against the D&R in kfar 
shalem. Source: 
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-
4160726,00.html 
 
 
   
 
 3.32. Police confront residents during the 
protests in the D&R in poor neighbourhoods 
(Kfar shlem). Source: 
http://www.tarabut.info/he/who-are-
we/activities/. 
 
 
   
 
 3.33. Police confront residents protest against the 
eviction from Gaza. Source: 
http://news.nana10.co.il/Article/?ArticleID=734392
. Photo by Reuters. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
5.1. The neighbourhood of Mamila, Jerusalem 6-7/5/1949 (before the D&R), Source: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PikiWiki_Israel_6329_Jerusalem_1949.jpg 
 
 
5.2. The neighbourhood of Mamila in Jerusalem after the D&R, currently considered as the most 
expensive neighbourhood in Jerusalem. Source: http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki 
 
 
5.3. Yishayahu Hakshuri, the developer who 
took on the D&R project in the 
Neighbourhood of Cardboard. Source: 
http://www.calcalist.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-
3389377,00.html. 
Photo taken by Yariv Katz, published 
24.01.10. 
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5.4.The temporary caravan neighbourhoods at Nitzan. The temporary site at Nitzan was 
created to host evacuees from the D&R  in the Gaza Strip. Photo: Haim Hornstien. Source:  
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3905692,00.html. 
 
 
 
5.5. Shula Keshet, leader of residents group in 
Tel Aviv Source: 
http://www.achoti.org.il/?p=1519. 
 
 
  
 
5.6. Brach Arajuani, a leader of residents 
group in Jerusalem, in a meeting with 
the Deputy Minister of Housing in 1993. 
Source: residents’ archive. 
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5.7. Rami Avnimelech. A social activist who 
worked as an advisor to Ran Cohen MP, the 
legislator of the RTB. Rami was active in various 
residents’ groups in Tel Aviv and lived in a 
neighbourhood where the majority of units were 
publicly funded. Source: residents’ archive. 
   
 
  
5.8. Meir Margalit. Former member of  the 
Jerusalem City Council, he is a social activist who 
joined residents’ groups in Jerusalem.. In this 
photo Meir speaks to a residents’ group. Source: 
residents’ group archive. 
 
 
 
 
5.9. Dr Hayim Pialkov, Deputy Manager of the 
Housing Ministry. He was involved in all 
programmes and housing policies in Israel. 
Source – Ministry of Housing 
 
 
 
5.10. Shlomo Ben Eliahu. Former Executive Manager of the 
Housing Ministry under the Minister Efi Fain. Ben Eliahu was also 
the Managing Director of the ILA. Source: 
http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3402939,00.html. 
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5.11. Joseph (Pepe) Alalo, social activist and 
member of the Jerusalem Municipality, was a 
member of many residents’ groups. In the photo 
Pepe speaks at a protest. Photo taken by residents. 
Source: residents’ group archive. 
 
 
 
5.12. Eng. Sofia Eldor is senior manager in 
the Housing Ministry and responsible for the 
New Urban Renewal Scheme. 
Source: 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/16/ART2/313/64
5.html. 
 
 
 
 
5.13. Reuven Aberjel was a resident leader 
from Jerusalem, who  was active nationwide..  
Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reuven_Abergel 
 
 
  
5.14. Shlomit Asheri, social activist, works for Shatil, 
one of the main NGOs which is active in social 
projects. Source: residents’ group archive. 
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5.15. Banner expressing residents’ frustration at lack of 
housing.  
Photo: Yaron Cohen – Tzemach.  
Source : http://www.themarker.com/career/1.1594085 
(published 18/12/11). 
 
  
 
5.16. Residents protest against the Disengagement 
D&R.  
Source: 
http://www.galim.org.il/peoples/katif/hitnatkut2.html 
(Government Press Office) 
 
  
 
 
5.17. Protest against evacuees from publicly-funded 
housing. Brochure published on the residents’ group 
website inviting residents to a demonstrations.  
Source: http://j14.org.il/articles/17209. 
  
 
 
5.18. Protest against D&R Programme, taken by 
residents.  
Source: residents’ archive. 
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5.19. Shulamit Shulavich was a 
resident of a settlement in Gaza 
who was evicted in the D&R. 
Private archive. 
 
 
 
 
5.20. Lior Khalfa, residents’ leader, was a resident of a 
settlement evicted in the disengagement and re-housed 
in the temporary site of Nitzan and elected as a 
residents’ representative. Photo taken from his 
campaign to be elected as the residents’ representative. 
 
 
 
 
5.21. Lior Khalfa leads a meeting of a 
residents’ committee in Nitzan. Source: 
residents’ archive. 
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5.22. Ran Cohen, MP, former Deputy of Housing and one 
of the leading parliamentary voices in housing issues.  
Source: Guy Doron. Image taken for the Meretz party’s 
housing campaign in 1999. 
 
 
 
5.23. Yuli Edelstein MP. Chairman of Parliament, former Deputy Minister of Housing and 
Minister of Absorption. Born in the former USSR, he lives in the NS and is one of the leading 
voices in housing issues. Source: residents’ archive. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
6.1. Poor conditions on a site where Neighbourhood Renewal operated in Ramat Eshkol in 
Ashkelon. The project was stopped before completion because of a budget cuts. Source: 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/54/ART2/365/319.html. Photo by Zman Ha’Darom. 
 
 
6.2. ‘Neighbourhood Renewal Programme, Organisation chart’ as it appears on the Housing 
Ministry website. Source: 
http://www.moch.gov.il/shikum_vehitchadshut/shikum_shechunot/Pages/shikum_shechunot.as
px 
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6.3. Council Housing Estate in The neighbourhood of Katamonim in Jerusalem, taken in 2005 
Source: http://d-spot.co.il/forum/index.php?showtopic=46424 
 
 
 
6.4. Council Housing Estate in The neighbourhood of Pat in Jerusalem taken in 2005. Source : 
http://d-spot.co.il/forum/index.php ?showtopic=46424  
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6.5. The Ultra-Orthodox Neighbourhood of Sanhedriya in Jerusalem. As the ultra-Orthodox 
normally have large families and housing units are small, many residents have extended their 
houses, some  even illegally as the community has a very strong lobby in Parliament and 
Government which allows such activities to occur. Source: http://freezion.wordpress.com    
 
 
 
 
 
6.6. Ultra-Orthodox Jews. They live generally in closed communities and make up almost half the 
population of Jerusalem. They have a very strong political lobby which helps with greater housing 
benefits and allowences. Source: http://10in.in/11. 
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6.7. The ultra-Orthodox Jews are a strong, organised community with huge influence on the Israeli 
political system. Their representatives repeatedly ask for control over the Housing Ministry. This is 
an example of community commitment when it comes to protesting.  
Source: http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politi/1.174673. Photo: Shiran Granot 
 
 
 6.8. Homeless in the neighbourhood of 
Shapira in Tel Aviv, which is a centre for 
illegal imigrants and asylum seekers in Israel. 
It is also a place of poverty and anti-social 
behaviour. Source: http://972mag.com/three-
eritreans-stabbed-in-south-tel-aviv-internet-
cafe/52142/ 
 
 
 
 
6.9. Housing in the neighbourhood of 
Shapira. Source: http://www.south-
tlv.co.il/article2126. 
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6.10. Illegal immigrants in Shapira 
neighbourhood in Tel Aviv, where ethnic 
tensions between veteran and newcomers is 
high. Source: 
http://www.hakolhayehudi.co.il/?p=31033 
 
 
 
 6.11. Community centre for new immigrants in 
Kfar Gvirol, providing training, education, 
community activities and services for residents. 
Source: 
http://www.2all.co.il/Web/Sites/kfargvirol/PAG
E5.asp 
 
 
 
 6.12. The neighbourhood of Kfar Gvirol in Rehovot – 
an overview. A mixture of high- and low-rise buildings, 
new and old.  
Source: http://www.mynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-
4122618,00.html. Photo by Avi Mualem. 
 
 
 
 
 6.13. The Neighbourhood of Kfar Gvirol: A dead-end 
street that prevents any access from the poor 
neighbourhood to the new more affluent neighbourhood 
nearby. Source: 
http://michaelarch.wordpress.com/2010/11/24. 
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6.14. Housing in the neighbourhood of 
Kiryat Moshe in Rehovot, highly populated 
with new immigrants from Ethiopia. It is 
considered to be one of the most socially 
dependent and poor housing facilities, yet 
has a strong local community. Source: 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/1.16809
35. Photo by Isreal BarOn. 
 
 
 
 6.15. Youth unemployment and high rates of 
anti-social behaviour in the neighbourhood 
of Kiryeat Moshe in Rehovot. This is 
thought to be due to a lack of activities and 
support for young people, who are forced 
out onto the streets by inadequate housing 
and poverty. 
Source: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3408280,00.html. Photo: Michael Kremer 
   
 
 6.16. High rates of unemployment in the 
neighbourhood of Kiryeat Moshe in 
Rehovot. Source: 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/54/ART2/242/55
1.html. Photo: Reuven Kastro 
 
 
 6.17. Small housing and unplanned 
extensions in the neighbourhood of Jessi 
Cohen in Holon. Source: 
http://boazcohen.wordpress.com 
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 6.18. Homeless residents in temporary tents 
sited in the neighbourhood of Jessi Cohen in 
Holon.  
Source: 
http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/90/1857767. 
Photo: Dror Einav 
 
   
 
 6.19. Poor housing conditions in the 
neighbourhood of Jessi Cohen in Holon. 
Source: 
http://www.mynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-
3736939,00.html. Photo: Kobi Koanks 
 
   
 
 6.20. Residents’ meeting at a tent site in the 
neighbourhood of Jessi Cohen in Holon. 
Source: 
http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/90/1857767. 
Photo: Dror Einav 
 
 
 
6.21. Houses in the new settlement of 
Kiryat Arba. Recent building in Kiryat 
Arba, a new settlement in the West 
Bank. Source: PHOTO: 
ALESSANDRA GOLA, 
http://mondoweiss.net/2009/12/there-
are-settlers-in-hebron-because-israel-
wants-them-there.html. 
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 6.22. Abai Zauda Leader of a residents’ 
community in Kiryat Moshe together with the 
mayor of Rehovot, opens a new police station 
in the neighbourhood to help tackle  anti-
social behaviour.  
Source: 
http://www.hnn.co.il/old_gallery2256.html. 
 
 
6.23. Laura Kindler represents 
the Jewish Federation of 
Toronto in Israel and is active 
as the main link between 
donors and communities they  
support (Kfar Gvirol and in 
Kiryat Moshe, for example).  
Source: http://www.israelisincanada.com/Default.asp?page=details&newsID=800 
 
 
 
6.24. Dr Zvi Weinstein is a senior manager of the NRP in the 
Housing Ministry responsible for the main metropolitan of Tel 
Aviv. He is also an academic who wrote about the programme.  
 
Source: http://wufisrael.wordpress.com/about/ 
 
 
 
  
6.25. Leadership for Youth funded by the 
Federation of Canadian Jews and provided as 
part of the NRP in Akko.  
Source: 
http://www.akkonet.co.il/forums/viewtopic.p
hp?f=11&t=22514 
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 6.26. Abai Zauda is a resident leader from  
the neighbourhood of Kiryat Moshe in 
Rehovot, representing the community of new 
immigrants from Ethiopia. He was active in 
all housing projects in his neighbourhood 
Source: 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/54/ART2/242/55
1.html 
 
 
 
6.27. Neighbourhood Renewal Training 
Course for Arab population. This is an 
English course, funded by the NRP for 
residents in Julis, as the programme was 
implemented in non-Jewish neighbourhoods 
as well. Source: 
http://www.myjulis.co.il/node/1119 
 
 
 
 
6.28. Prof Shimshoni’s NRP: Politics of Change. The cover of a 
book by the programme’s designers. Source:Guy Doron  
 
 
6.29. Shmulik David, resident activist, who 
worked in the NGO Shatil and supported 
residents’ groups. Source: 
https://www.facebook.com/photo 
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6.30. Dr Edna Bustin is an expert in empowerment who was employed by the Federation of 
Canadian Jews and together with residents designed and operated training schemes for Kfar 
Gvirol and Kiryat Moshe. Residents were full of praise for her contribution. Source: 
https://www.facebook.com/edna.bustin 
 
 
6.31. Public investment in building in the New Settlements. According to participants in this 
research the NS receives considerably higher government support for housing projects.  
Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/03/israeli-settlements-growing-peace-talks-
pass_n_748387.html. 
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6.32. Residents’ artwork in the 
neighbourhood of Katamonim,, led 
by S. Vazana and D. Benisti, two of 
the initiators of the RTB, created 
this work of art on a deserted stone 
site near their neighbourhood to 
show that they care and are willing 
to create change. Although the site 
was created in the 1980s it still 
remains today. Source: Residents’ 
archive. 
 
 
 
   
 
 6.33. Ofer Laufman was the manager of the Settlements 
division in the JA. One of his main aims was to support 
housing programmes in the NS when the government was 
prevented from investing in the NS.. 
 
Source: 
http://www.goarad.co.il/?pid=15&t=mFinal&L1=41&L2=1
44&item=524. 
  
 
6.34. Shlomo Ben- Eliahu - Former General 
Manager of the Housing Ministry. Source: 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/smartphone-
article/1.2015069. 
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6.35. Tamar Guzanski, MP, one of the most active 
legislators in housing issues and the legislator of the 
rights of council housing residents law. Source: 
http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/9/832809 
 
 
  
 
 
 
6.36. Ran Cohen MP, former deputy Minister of Housing, 
was responsible for the NRP whilst in office. Source: 
http://public-policy.huji.ac.il 
 
 
 
 
6.37. Israel Twito RIP (second from 
left), leader of a residents’ group 
protesting in front of the Government 
Square in Jerusalem. Source: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/activestill
s/237961416/lightbox/ 
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6.38. PM Ariel Sharon is considered to be one of the most 
politically supportive of the NS.  
 
Source: 
http://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Lexicon/Pages/sharon.aspx   
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.39. Caroline Chisin, social activist and assistant to Ran Cohen MP. Source: 
https://www.facebook.com/photo 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
 
7.1. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose 
initiative to privatise the public housing market 
triggered the residents of council housing to 
initiate the Right To Buy.  
Source: https://twitter.com/netanyahu 
 
 
 
 
7.2. Residents’ group Ha’Keshet Hademokratit (logo): The Democratic Rainbow, an organisation 
led by academics and others of Sepharadic origin who fight for housing rights law for residents of 
public housing similar to those given to residents of the Kibbutzim. Their arguments were socially 
based but with an ethnic orientation. They supported the RTB and joined residents activities, a few 
of the initiators of the residents’ version of the RTB being members of the Keshet as well. Source: 
http://matityaho.com 
 
 
 
7.3. Housing in rural areas. The housing 
rights for rural communities apply also in 
Kfar Shmaryahu (in picture), one of the 
wealthiest locations in the country.  
Source: 
http://www.themarker.com/realestate/1.186
2554. Photo: Dudu Bachar. 
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7.4. Meir Shitrit, MP, Finance Minister and the coalition whip at the time of the RTB legislation. 
Known as the vocal opponent of the RTB and the main force behind the agreement with Amigur, 
he suffered the greatest criticism from residents because he had originally come from a poor family 
and so residents expected him to be supportive of their claims. Source: 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/54/ART2/304/403.html?hp=54&cat=873. 
 
 
 
 
7.5. Ehud Barak, Prime Minister under whose leadership the RTB was approved and implemented. 
He promised before the election that he would push for approval of the RTB and it is claimed that 
this is what brought him the small margin that won him the election. Source: 
http://www.globalpost.com/photo-galleries/5728290/israel-elections-parties-and-leaders-photos#9. 
Photo: Paul Richards/AFP/Getty Images. 
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7.6. Ran Cohen MP, the legislator of  Right To Buy presents his book about the legislation, The 
Fight for the Home. Source: http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3616094,00.html. Photo by 
Dana Kopel. 
 
 
7.7. Political implications of the Right 
To Buy legislation. The left-wing 
party, Meretz, of which Ran Cohen 
MP was a member, was very active 
politically before the election to attract 
support from council housing residents 
who were not traditional supporters. 
Source: http://meretz.org.il  
 
  
 
 
7.8. Amidar Housing.  
Source: 
http://www.realestatetoday.co.il  
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7.9. A housing estate for elderly new 
immigrants in Jerusalem managed by 
Amigur. A unique architecture which bad 
management turned it into what residents 
call a slum. Source: 
http://www.shitufit.co.il/projects.aspx?ca
tId=09&itemId=158 
 
 
 
7.10. Publicly-funded Housing in the Neighbourhood of Pat in Jerusalem. Source: http://d-
spot.co.il/forum/index.php?showtopic=46424 
 
 
7.11. Poor housing 
conditions in a mixed 
neighbourhood; Jaffa, Tel 
Aviv. Prices are pushed 
down despite the central 
location. Source: 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1
6/ART2/097/609.html. 
Photo: Naor Rahav. 
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7.12. An advert by the housing 
company of Shikmona. 
Source: 
http://www.shikmona.co.il/index.php?
m_id=3&if_link=0 
 
 
 
 
 
7.13. Housing by Heled in the city of 
Petah Tikva. Residents opposed the 
company’s plan to offer detached 
houses on this land, because they 
believed such a project would be 
expensive and insufficient for their 
housing needs. Source: 
http://www.themarker.com/realestate/1
.1616525 
 
 
 
 
7.14. The entry gate to the Afridar Neighbourhood in Ashkelon, 1960s. Source: residents 
archive. 
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7.15. Housing in the Neighbourhood of Ramat Sharet in Jerusalem houses a mix of ultra-Orthodox 
communities and non-religious groups who struggle to agree on the cultural mode of the 
neighbourhood. Source: http://www.nrg.co.il/online/54/ART2/433/662.html  
 
 
 
 
7.16. Hatikva Neighbourhood in Tel Aviv. Source: GD – site visit. 
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7.17. New Community 
Centre in the Neighbourhood 
of Neve Ofer in Tel Aviv. 
Source: 
http://commons.wikimedia.or
g/wiki/File:Neve_Ofer_com
munity_center_in_Tel_Aviv.
JPG 
 
  
 
7.18. Housing in the 
neighbourhood of Neve 
Sharet, one of the poorest 
neighbourhoods in Northern 
Tel Aviv. Source: 
http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/
%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%91
%D7%A5:Telavivu009.jpg  
 
 
 
7.19. Poor housing in the city of Lod. Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/akiva/2297159214/ 
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7.20. Public housing in the neighbourhood of Shaviv in Herteliya, a poor public housing 
neighbourhood in one of the most expensive cities in Israel. Initiatives to provide D&R are 
attractive because prices for the land are very high. Source: 
http://www.themarker.com/realestate/1.1593223  
 
 
7.21. A publicly-funded estate in the city of Ashdod. On this site, a D&R project plan to build high 
rises to replace the current four-storey building was strongly opposed by residents. Source: 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/54/ART2/181/149.html. Photo: :Lavan Agviashvili 
 
 
7.22. Residents protesting on a publicly-funded 
estate in Petch Tikva against the eviction of a 
resident.  
Source: 
http://diortzibury.wordpress.com/2012/04/23/pinu
y_rivka/ 
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7.23. A publicly-funded housing estate in the neighbourhood of Yoseftal in Kfar Saba. Source: 
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000836732  
 
 
 
 
7.24. Housing in the Arab village of Kfar Maker showing poor, unplanned facilities. Source: 
http://www.peopleil.org/ImageInfo.aspx?pageID=piGalleries&imageid=24262&galleryid=4044&r
n=2&n=0&cId=11 
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7.25. Recently built housing in the new settlement of Kiryat Arba, with the public housing 
neighbourhood at the bottom. Source: http://www.hebron.org.il/hebrew/gallery.php?id=208 
 
 
 
 
7.26. Dr Yosi Dahan, an academic and one of the 
founders of the Keshet group, who was active during 
the RTB. Yosi was interviewed for this research. 
Source: 
http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-
3402811,00.html 
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7.27. Lior Weintrob, social activist and parliamentary 
advisor to Ran Cohen MP.  
Source: http://twtrland.com/profile/liorweintraub 
 
 
 
 
7.28. Tamar Miara, a long-serving manager of the 
public housing company Amidar. She was known for 
being attentive and supporting residents.  
Source: https://www.facebook.com/tamarmiara?fref=ts 
 
 
 
7.29. Barbara Epstein is a social activist, 
founder and manger of ‘Singur Kehilati’ 
(Neighbourhood Advocacy) assisting 
residents with housing-related issues. The 
NGO was very active in supporting 
residents during the RTB. 
Source: 
http://pixelit.bac.org.il/ContentPage.aspx?id
=355 
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7.30. Laura Wharton is a social activist, academic and 
member of Jerusalem City Hall. She was the secretary 
of the Kol BaSchunot residents’ group before being 
elected to represent residents in the municipality of 
Jerusalem.  
Source: http://meretz.org.il. Photo taken from her 
campaign page. 
 
 
 
7.31. Resident leader Shlomo Vazana one of the initiators of 
the Right To Buy. A resident of a council housing unit which 
fought against his eviction following the death of his parents, 
and led the activities to legislate the RTB and allow 
continuation rights similar to residents of Kibbutzim. He was a 
member of Kol Baschunot and Hakeshet. 
 
Source: http://www.film-e-good.org.il/siteFiles/1/36/9750.asp   
 
 
 
7.32. David Kashani, resident 
leader from Tel Aviv at a 
protest.Source: David Kashani 
private album. 
 
 
7.33. Fredi Drix, leader of a residents’ group in the neighbourhood 
of Jessi Cohen in Holon. Photo taken from a docomentry about 
him (Jessi Kongo). Source: 
http://www.rashut2.org.il/prod_program.asp?catId=165 
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7.34. Tal Atias. A lawyer with expertise in housing, 
who assisted residents by debating their rights and 
representing them in court (mainly voluntarily) against 
public housing companies. He was a member of the 
team that worked with Ran Cohen, legislating the RTB. 
 Source: https://www.facebook.com/tal.atias.73?fref=ts 
 
 
 
 
7.35. Yuli Edelstein, MP. Edelstein currently chairs the 
Knesset and was Deputy Minister for Housing and Minister 
for Absorption. He is highly involved in housing issues and 
represents the right-wing agenda, lives in the NS. Source: 
http://www.edelstein.org.il/hebrew/press/news/page/15/  
 
 
7.36. Poor housing conditions in an 
Amigur unit. Source: 
http://www.ashdodnet.com/article/41522 
  
 
7.37. The CEO (former) of Amigur visits 
residents in the city of Nahariya together 
with the Mayor , promoting the company’s 
recent investment Source: 
http://www.nahariya.muni.il/Lists/List5/Di
spForm.aspx?ID=51  
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7.38. Housing rights for residents in rural 
communities. Kibbutz lands were the source 
of arguments on housing rights. Residents of 
public housing asked for similar rights on 
their land. This image is taken from an article 
published in the Keshet forum arguing these 
issues.  
Source: http://www.haokets.org/tag/89/ 
 
 
  
 
7.39. The Jewish Agency advertising the 
long-lasting link between Jews in the 
Diaspora and Israel. Source: 
http://sochnut.org.il/JewishAgency/English
/About/History 
 
  
 
7.40. Chairman of the JA, Natan Sheransky, 
lights a candle with new immigrants in 
Amigur housing for new immigrants near 
Jerusalem. Source: 
http://www.jafi.org.il/JewishAgency/Englis
h/About/Press+Room/Press+Releases/2009/
dec15.htm 
 
 
 
7.41. The cover of Moshe Karif’s book, Hamzrahit (Jews of 
Sephardic Origin), which describes the group and its 
activities.  
Source: 
http://simania.co.il/authorDetails.php?itemId=44491 
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7.42. Moshe Karif the author of the ‘Mizrahit’. 
Source: 
http://simania.co.il/authorDetails.php?itemId=
44491 
 
 
 
 
7.43. Israel Twito RIP, one of the national 
leaders of residents in poor neighbourhoods. 
Source: Residents’ archive. 
 
 
7.44. Government investment in housing 
to replace a temporary site (top) in a 
new settlements with new houses. 
Source: 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/374
/990.html. Photo: Flash 90  
 
 
 
7.45. Student dormitories at Tel Aviv 
University offer students subsidised 
rent. Source: 
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-
3557006,00.html 
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